Royals Sign Bobby Witt Jr. To Franchise-Record Extension

The Kansas City Royals committed to the largest contract in franchise history on Monday, signing shortstop Bobby Witt Jr. to an 11-year extension worth $288.8 million. In addition to the guarantee, which runs through the 2034 season, there’s a three-year club option worth $89 million that would bring the total value of the deal to $377 million if exercised. Witt gets some options of his own, with four opt-out opportunities from 2030 to 2033 (the seventh, eighth, ninth, and 10th seasons of the deal). The 23-year-old Witt had a breakout 2023 season, hitting .276/.319/.495 with 30 homers and 49 stolen bases, good for 5.7 WAR, a mark that ranked third among shortstops behind only Corey Seager and Francisco Lindor.
Suffice it to say, I was floored when news of this deal hit Monday afternoon. Money may not go as far as it used to, but a nearly $300 million commitment is still a pretty large one, with fewer than 20 contracts in league history exceeding $250 million in guaranteed cash. A contract this big would still be a massive story in New York or Los Angeles; in the context of Kansas City baseball, the discovery of extraterrestrial life would probably get booted from the front page in favor of this deal. To say the Royals don’t typically enter into pacts like this would be an epic understatement. We’re talking about a franchise that had never given out even a $100 million contract, with the largest previous deal being Salvador Perez’s 2021 extension that guaranteed him $82 million over four years. Triple the size of Perez’s bag of cash and you still have enough left over to make a stack of hundred dollar bills about 140 feet high.
The Royals picked the right player to play Rich Uncle Pennybags with. Witt is the team’s best young player since Carlos Beltrán about 20 years ago. Back then, the Royals valued him so highly that after agreeing in principle to a three-year, $25 million contract, ownership decided to blow up the deal by trying to pull back a million dollars. A year later, Beltrán was traded in a three-way swap that netted the organization Mark Teahen, Mike Wood, and John Buck, who combined for about seven total WAR as Royals. Two decades later, Beltrán has a good shot at making the Hall of Fame — the biggest obstacle is his involvement in Houston’s trashcananigans — and if he gets a plaque, it may be with NY on the cap, not KC.
Witt isn’t some stathead favorite who snuck in a great season on the back of a spike in walks and crazy one-year defensive numbers (though we’ll get to his defense in a minute) — he was one of the top amateurs in the country, and as a pro prospect, he was one of those rare players who the scouts, the numbers crowd, and the computers all relished. He so electrified the atmosphere in spring training in 2021 that the Royals might have given serious thought to having him basically skip the whole upper minors.
While the Royals were probably right to develop Witt traditionally, assigning him to Double-A in 2021, they cleared the decks to get him a full-time spot in the lineup for 2022. Adalberto Mondesi’s presence resulted in Witt starting off at third base, but Mondesi’s ACL tear opened up the shortstop job, which Witt has mostly held since. A .254/.294/.428 line in his rookie campaign wasn’t phenom material, but as a 22-year-old shortstop, it was still enough to place him around average at the position, with a whole lot of unexplored ceiling remaining. Let’s crank up the time machine and jump back to his long-term ZiPS projections before last season:
| Year | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | SO | SB | OPS+ | DR | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | .265 | .313 | .462 | 565 | 88 | 150 | 35 | 5 | 22 | 86 | 35 | 134 | 25 | 110 | -6 | 2.6 |
| 2024 | .269 | .320 | .470 | 583 | 94 | 157 | 37 | 4 | 24 | 91 | 39 | 131 | 24 | 114 | -5 | 3.1 |
| 2025 | .273 | .325 | .475 | 598 | 99 | 163 | 38 | 4 | 25 | 95 | 42 | 129 | 24 | 116 | -5 | 3.4 |
| 2026 | .276 | .329 | .482 | 608 | 103 | 168 | 39 | 4 | 26 | 97 | 44 | 127 | 22 | 120 | -5 | 3.7 |
| 2027 | .278 | .332 | .484 | 608 | 104 | 169 | 39 | 4 | 26 | 97 | 45 | 125 | 20 | 121 | -5 | 3.9 |
| 2028 | .277 | .334 | .480 | 602 | 104 | 167 | 38 | 3 | 26 | 95 | 47 | 122 | 18 | 121 | -5 | 3.8 |
| 2029 | .277 | .333 | .478 | 592 | 101 | 164 | 38 | 3 | 25 | 94 | 46 | 121 | 17 | 120 | -5 | 3.6 |
| 2030 | .277 | .334 | .477 | 577 | 98 | 160 | 37 | 3 | 24 | 91 | 45 | 118 | 15 | 120 | -6 | 3.5 |
| 2031 | .277 | .333 | .476 | 578 | 97 | 160 | 37 | 3 | 24 | 91 | 44 | 119 | 14 | 119 | -7 | 3.3 |
| 2032 | .276 | .332 | .473 | 558 | 93 | 154 | 35 | 3 | 23 | 86 | 43 | 116 | 13 | 118 | -7 | 3.0 |
| 2033 | .276 | .331 | .467 | 537 | 87 | 148 | 34 | 3 | 21 | 82 | 41 | 112 | 11 | 117 | -8 | 2.7 |
| 2034 | .274 | .329 | .460 | 511 | 81 | 140 | 32 | 3 | 19 | 76 | 38 | 108 | 9 | 114 | -9 | 2.3 |
Assuming the reduced salary figures for his pre-free agency years, ZiPS would have offered 11 years and $282 million to cover Witt through the 2034 season, though without the opt-out years, which do add significant value for most players. And remember, that projection isn’t what the computer suggests knowing how last season went — this is before 2023.
While this projection did a decent job of pegging Witt’s 2023 offense (with a projected OPS+ of 114 vs. an actual OPS+ of 120 and a wRC+ of 115), the computer didn’t see his defensive improvements coming. Originally, it was up for debate whether Witt’s future in the majors would be at shortstop or third base; the Royals originally starting Mondesi at short over Witt wasn’t necessarily some bit of undue veteran deference. Per Statcast’s RAA, Witt improved by 17 runs at shortstop from 2022 to 2023, ranking as the top defensive shortstop in the American League last season. Even Sports Info Solutions’ Defensive Runs Saved, a relative skeptic on Witt, saw a 12-run improvement.
Defense is notoriously hard to measure, but Witt’s numbers improved both in terms of range and avoiding errors. The latter is a relatively small part of defense, but it’s also one that’s much easier to measure, and Witt netted six runs of his improvement just from avoiding errors, going from six non-throwing errors to only two in 2023 despite 50% more innings. Last August, Jake Mintz went into detail on Witt’s defensive instruction at shortstop:
For a crash course in rewiring his defensive approach, Witt’s personal hitting coach Jeremy Isenhower invited well-known private infield coach Nate Trosky out to his hitting facility in Tomball, Texas, for two days of intensive training with the young shortstop. In the nippy mid-December chill, Trosky, an eccentric, fast talking, sun-hat wearing, country-song singing, infield mental skills expert, ran Witt through nearly six straight hours of instruction.
[…]
A close review of Witt’s 2022 errors confirms this hypothesis. Most of his fielding mistakes appeared to stem from a hesitant first step that led to issues with Witt’s timing and rhythm toward the ball. But if Trosky made things incredibly complicated on purpose, Royals first-year infield coach José Alguacil has taken an opposite yet complementary approach.
Let’s spin up the computer one more time and get Witt’s current projection, through the team option years:
| Year | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | SO | SB | OPS+ | DR | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | .275 | .323 | .481 | 615 | 97 | 169 | 35 | 7 | 26 | 97 | 41 | 127 | 35 | 119 | 1 | 4.1 |
| 2025 | .279 | .329 | .488 | 613 | 100 | 171 | 35 | 6 | 27 | 98 | 43 | 122 | 32 | 122 | 1 | 4.3 |
| 2026 | .279 | .330 | .485 | 612 | 101 | 171 | 35 | 5 | 27 | 98 | 44 | 119 | 30 | 122 | 1 | 4.3 |
| 2027 | .280 | .333 | .487 | 610 | 102 | 171 | 35 | 5 | 27 | 98 | 46 | 116 | 28 | 123 | 1 | 4.4 |
| 2028 | .281 | .335 | .484 | 609 | 103 | 171 | 35 | 4 | 27 | 97 | 47 | 115 | 25 | 123 | 1 | 4.5 |
| 2029 | .280 | .335 | .478 | 607 | 102 | 170 | 34 | 4 | 26 | 95 | 48 | 113 | 23 | 122 | 1 | 4.2 |
| 2030 | .279 | .334 | .475 | 591 | 98 | 165 | 33 | 4 | 25 | 92 | 46 | 110 | 21 | 121 | 0 | 4.0 |
| 2031 | .279 | .333 | .476 | 569 | 93 | 159 | 32 | 4 | 24 | 88 | 44 | 107 | 18 | 121 | -1 | 3.7 |
| 2032 | .279 | .333 | .471 | 569 | 92 | 159 | 32 | 4 | 23 | 87 | 44 | 107 | 17 | 119 | -2 | 3.5 |
| 2033 | .277 | .332 | .464 | 541 | 86 | 150 | 30 | 4 | 21 | 81 | 42 | 103 | 15 | 117 | -3 | 3.1 |
| 2034 | .276 | .330 | .458 | 515 | 81 | 142 | 28 | 3 | 20 | 76 | 39 | 99 | 13 | 115 | -3 | 2.7 |
| 2035 | .273 | .325 | .450 | 484 | 73 | 132 | 26 | 3 | 18 | 69 | 36 | 94 | 10 | 112 | -4 | 2.2 |
| 2036 | .271 | .323 | .438 | 447 | 66 | 121 | 24 | 3 | 15 | 62 | 33 | 87 | 8 | 108 | -5 | 1.6 |
| 2037 | .268 | .322 | .431 | 406 | 58 | 109 | 21 | 3 | 13 | 55 | 30 | 80 | 7 | 106 | -5 | 1.3 |
How good is this projection? ZiPS would happily throw another $100 million Witt’s way, meaning the Royals still have a lot of room for this deal to be absolutely fabulous from their point of view. Note that ZiPS isn’t even assuming Witt is a +10 defensive shortstop; 2023 was only enough for it to believe that he’s league average. If I tell ZiPS to assume he’s a -10 shortstop with the glove right now, it still thinks $240 million would be a fair deal. In other words, liking this contract from Kansas City’s perspective does not require you to abandon all skepticism about his defense.
Outside of the bottom line figure, it’s encouraging to see the Royals invest in a young star to this degree. It’s hard to remember now, but at one point, the Royals were one of baseball’s model franchises. Founded with the late Ewing Kauffman as the owner, the Royals managed to pass the .500 mark in just their third year of existence, and following their breakout 1975, they were one of the top teams in baseball for 15 years, a whole generation of baseball:
| Team | W | L | WPct |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yankees | 1323 | 1043 | .559 |
| Red Sox | 1286 | 1083 | .543 |
| Royals | 1286 | 1084 | .543 |
| Dodgers | 1277 | 1099 | .537 |
| Orioles | 1267 | 1096 | .536 |
| Reds | 1261 | 1111 | .532 |
| Phillies | 1245 | 1128 | .525 |
| Cardinals | 1217 | 1152 | .514 |
| Tigers | 1214 | 1156 | .512 |
| Astros | 1207 | 1171 | .508 |
| Pirates | 1198 | 1167 | .507 |
| Brewers | 1193 | 1179 | .503 |
| Expos | 1187 | 1184 | .501 |
| Angels | 1180 | 1195 | .497 |
| Mets | 1177 | 1192 | .497 |
| Athletics | 1174 | 1201 | .494 |
| Giants | 1162 | 1215 | .489 |
| Rangers | 1139 | 1230 | .481 |
| Blue Jays | 983 | 1064 | .480 |
| White Sox | 1131 | 1233 | .478 |
| Twins | 1133 | 1239 | .478 |
| Cubs | 1125 | 1241 | .475 |
| Padres | 1127 | 1249 | .474 |
| Indians | 1091 | 1267 | .463 |
| Braves | 1045 | 1319 | .442 |
| Mariners | 860 | 1190 | .420 |
Kauffman mostly kept Kansas City’s stars together and put the team’s cash back into the roster. From 1985 to 1994, the Royals were only out of the top 10 in payroll once, in 1992, and even led the league in 1990. But Kauffman passed away in 1993 and so did the team’s Golden Era. Outside of the Royals’ brief period of relevance in the mid-2010s, they spent so much time in the basement that someone should have checked them for a Vitamin D deficiency. The team’s success in 2014-2015 energized the locals for the first time in decades, but the organization showed little inclination to actually try and keep those fans, and as the team’s core aged and/or moved on, so did the KC faithful. Paid attendance in the championship 2015 season was over 33,000 per game. The Royals haven’t even done half that since 2019.
Does signing Bobby Witt Jr. bring back the Royals as a dynasty? Of course not — the team has still more holes than Clyde Barrow’s 1934 Ford DeLuxe Fordor. But Witt’s signing is a callback to a happier time, when Royal blue held more than just temporary apparel for superstars. Whether or not the Royals solve their other problems, for the next decade, shortstop probably won’t be one of them.
Dan Szymborski is a senior writer for FanGraphs and the developer of the ZiPS projection system. He was a writer for ESPN.com from 2010-2018, a regular guest on a number of radio shows and podcasts, and a voting BBWAA member. He also maintains a terrible Twitter account at @DSzymborski.
‘The Royals have the largest payroll in the AL Central in 2024’ was not a sentence I ever expected to see or hear.
Thing I learned recently that blew me away: only 4 Hall of Famers have ever played a single game for the Royals, and only 1 of them (George Brett) played more than one season for the Royals. The others:
Orlando Cepeda (33 games)
Harmon Killebrew (106 games)
Gaylord Perry (14 games)
Team’s been around for 55 years! If ever there were a team in need of a new face of the franchise, it’s this one.
Hey, I mentioned that a few weeks ago (I think on one of the Sunday columns). Stop stealing from me!!! JK
Yeah, I was floored when I learned that as well. I found it a few months ago via Immaculate Grid. One of the boxes was a Royals HOFer. I obviously entered Brett. Then, when I finished the grid, I was surprised to see there were only 4 correct answers. And even more shocked to see who the other 3 were.
Anyway, they might get Beltran soon. If not, Grienke isn’t far behind…
David Cone and Bret Saberhagen would be in my HOF over all these relievers and Jim Rice
That is crazy, although to be fair, Zack Greinke and Carlos Beltran will eventually join that list and it’s possible David Cone could someday too.
Thing I learned just now because you made me curious: 10 Hall of Famers played for the Monarchs.
BTW, here are the numbers for the other ’69 expansion teams:
Montreal Expos/Washington Nats (10): Larry Walker, Lee Smith, Vlad Guerrero, Tim Raines, Ivan Rodriguez, Randy Johnson, Pedro Martinez, Andre Dawson, Gary Carter, Tony Perez
San Diego Padres (13): Fred McGriff, Trevor Hoffman, Mike Piazza, Greg Maddux, Roberto Alomar, Rickey Henderson, Goose Gossage, Tony Gwynn, Ozzie Smith, Dave Winfield, Rollie Fingers, Gaylord Perry, Willie McCovey
Seattle Pilots/Milwaukee Brewers (7): Ted Simmons, Trevor Hoffman, Paul Molitor, Robin Yount, Don Sutton, Rollie Fingers, Hank Aaron
So yeah, the Royals are lagging behind just a bit in terms of overall numbers as well as length/quality of career with the team.
Here’s another fun little fact–the number of championships for each one:
Royals: 2
Expos / Nats: 1
Padres: 0
Brewers: 0
I find this wild. The Brewers had half those guys at the same time. The Expos had Gary Carter, Tim Raines, and Andre Dawson all around the same time. The Padres never had a critical mass of many of them being being elite and on the team at the same time. Meanwhile, the Royals only had something like two-better-than-average hitters in 1985 and rode them, a good rotation, and a dominant closer all the way to the championship.
Closest for the Padres was the ’92 team with McGriff and Gwynn + almost HOFer Gary Sheffield. They brought all three back the next year but traded Sheffield partway through the year, getting Hoffman back as part of the deal.
Traded McGriff away too (for Ryan Klesko, if memory serves). The Sheffield deal worked out slightly better.
You’re right, not sure how I missed McGriff getting traded in ’93. But the main player they got back was Melvin Nieves, a top 100 prospect who flopped.
That 1994 expos team is an exercise in what could have been. 74-40 when the strike happened. Larry Walker and Pedro as future HOF playing the part. Jeff Fassero, Ken Hill, Moises Alou, and Marquis Grissom all excellent.
How can the small market White Sox expect to compete with a free spending team like that?
Good for Witt, good for the Royals, good for baseball. That team option that comes after 4(!) player options seems a little bit unnecessary, but what the hell.
The Royals bought out three free agent seasons and guaranteed $288M in order to do it. Granted, those are his age 27-29 seasons but they’re taking on quite a bit of downside risk to secure those three seasons.
That three year team option at the end is weird. What are the odds he chooses not to opt out for four straight years, then the team exercises 3/89?
The only thing I can think of is if he’s hurt/bad for his three option years, exercises the fourth and has a renaissance. 1 in 20? 1 in 50? Pretty unlikely. But I guess it has some value if it can serve as a framework for negotiation when he’s looking at that first opt out.
Yeah, when I saw it I assumed it was a deal where if Witt opts out, the team then has the option to not only guarantee the remaining opt out years, but has to pony up $89 million more.
Seeing that is not the case, I don’t understand the purpose. It seems virtually irrelevant.
Yeah, that option will never be relevant. It maybe serves some messaging purpose to both Witt and fans that KC wants him to be a lifer. It does mean a little more as part of the contract than it would coming from the team PR guys.
Agree. Feels to me like being able to say $377M in connection with this contract has PR value.
Let’s go, Royaks!
In light of the Wander Franco situation, are teams including language in contracts now regarding what happens to players unable to play due to criminal charges?
Typically, the player can be placed on the restricted list and not paid. Can’t perform your end of the contract, ya don’t get paid, ya know? There’s also the regular disciplinary process. I don’t think there’s any need for new contract language.
Franco was/is currently being paid for some reason (probably because he’s only currently charged and not convicted). MLBPA, rightly, would not tolerate players being tossed on a restricted list without pay solely due to a criminal allegation. Different story if you’re convicted or, say, held without bail so you can’t show up and play.
It seems like Franco would be unable to get a visa to come to spring training; maybe he’ll stop getting paid then?
From my understanding THAT is the crux of the matter. Franco cannot get a visa, so in turn he is not fulfilling his end of the contract so will he will be put on the restrictive list and not get paid. That simple.
It almost doesn’t matter what the numbers say. The Royals had to buy out at least two (and preferably more) free agent years. Otherwise he’s trade bait. Aside from Vinnie Pasquantino, there is not a single other core player in the entire Royals organization. Maybe Ragans, if you think he’s not going to blow out his arm (but he’s going to blow out his arm).
Maybe they get lucky with a pitcher popping up like Kudrna or Wolters, or maybe Blake Mitchell becomes their catcher of the future. But they had the second worst record last year and probably have the second- or third-worst farm system in MLB right now. The core of the next good team is probably not in the Royals organization right now. They need more time to stockpile talent. This gives them the possibility that by the time they have that talent, Witt will still be around.
“Thankfully, brevity is not the soul of Witt’s contract.” -Ouch. ‘Hope no one got hurt dragging this one in here.
Witt improved in every meaningful category from his rookie to second year. And his wOBA trailed his xwOBA by 30 points. This is an MVP-type player who still seems undervalued. I hope KC can get some talent around him soon.
Insert Gavin Cross, the hero of my dynasty stash roster. (also bring back 2019 AL Home Run Champ Jorge Soler)
I assume ZiPS is looking at the batted ball data that generated that xWOBA to formulate his projections, but I do agree that the offensive upside still seems very real.
The ZiPS 80th percentile from the Royals team projection is a 139 OPS+ for 2024. If he hits that I imagine his long term projections would go up another full WAR per year.
Witt put up a nearly 6 win season despite being pretty awful/unlucky the first 2 months (think he had a sub 90 wRC+ and like a 100 point split between wOBA/xwOBA).
So yeah, As crazy as it sounds there is definitely a higher ceiling for him.
A guy drafted and developed by Dayton Moore who doesn’t walk and has defensive issues. Nothing sus here! What could possibly go wrong?
well so far it’s gone extremely right
He was literally one of the best defensive SS in baseball last year lol.
Maybe actually do like 30 seconds of reading before you form an opinion?
Using one source he might be. Per DRS, he has been the worst defensive SS in MLB since 2022, merely 4th worst last season by runs. Maybe you should dig under the hood a bit before condemning comments you don’t like?
Also this article talks about him improving his errors, not his awful range, which should only get worse as he ages and slows down.
The “upgraded” DRS is literally a dime store version of Statcast, created in an attempt to keep BIS relevant after the MLB started making their proprietary data public.
The fact you are citing DRS over something like statcast tells me pretty much everything i need to know. Good day.
I forgot that statcast is perfect and infallible. all hail statcast.
Trying to find comps for Witt of recent players I was a little shocked to see Nomar as his zips #1 and not Trea Turner. Elite baserunner/SB guy with good but not great def and a good bat(trea got better in his mid/late 20’s, Witt improved in year 2), and with similar walk% and K% rates.
The guy I always comped him to was the pre-injury version of Trevor Story. The one from 2016-2020. But he already seems to have reached that approximate level, so it’s entirely possible he’s going to end up better than that. Not likely, just possible.
Good for Witt, and good for Royals fans. It’s always fun to watch a stud play baseball through his prime. But exactly why Witt would have the faith to hitch himself to the Royals wagon when the franchise has shown so little acumen for acquiring/developing talent for such a long time escapes me. He’s running a real risk of a career of 72-90 seasons.
lots of risks are worth $288 million
I wonder about the contract structure. The salaries escalate over the first four years, there are opt-outs, and then they get significantly higher-much higher. Possible that the Royals hope for high performance the first few years, He opts out after 2030, and they are off the hook for the presumed decline years. Or, he stays in, still a valuable player, and the trade him with some cash to save a lot more.
The whole point of these types of contracts is that you get incredible value early on so it doesnt matter what happens later. So yes, thats exactly what the Royals are thinking.
By the time they start paying Witt real money they will have gotten so much surplus value it wont even matter what his decline is like.
The thing about long term contracts is no matter how much extra value they might get in the early years, fans get very grumpy when the star hangs on and collects more in the out years than he “earns” on the field.
Sure? Letting fans sentiment run the team is an awful idea though.
…Except when all the fans want ownership to spend more money. Right?
This feels almost unnecessarily generous from the Royals.
Those four opt outs are ridiculously valuable for Witt Jr. while the club option is essentially worthless.
Has there been a single hitter in the history of MLB whose career has been such that he would not opt out from this deal after his age 30, 31, 32, 33 season yet the team would want to pay $89M for his age 35-37 seasons?
It was pointed out above that neither side expects the contract to last that long.
It’s all about PR value.
It would have to be a player that was great but had major injury concerns that threatened his career but then came back and was great and healthy for a couple years (33,34) to prove it was safe to keep him into his late 30’s.
We’ll see how much Sherman wants to spend after he gets his shiny new taxpayer funded stadium
I think that makes 628.7M in extension money for sons of 1998 Cardinals. How about that, thanks.
Did Delino deShields Jr get an extension? Good for him!
“…the opt-out years, which do add significant value for most players.”
—I’d be interested in the cost added to teams of opt-outs such as these. It has to be significant given how much it limits the ceiling of the return on the deal. Granted if Witt couldn’t opt-out he might well be priced out of KC’s range and they’d have little choice but to do the “Small to Mid-Market Shuffle” in perpetuity with their best players.
Still, I wonder what the cost is here, as difficult as that is to nail down.
So he’s getting traded in what, year two?
It always strucks me how such numbers-based minds like Dan praise such contracts. These contracts are just one stupid motorcycle accident in the off-season, just one PED suspension or just one under age girl-friend away from becoming disastrous.
What? I mean, sure, they’re possibly disastrous, but you’ve amusingly cited three scenarios which would result in the player _not_ getting paid:
Riding a motorcycle is guaranteed prohibited by the contract, so if an accident happened, contract would be voidA PED suspension is a suspension without payAn arrest + inability to play voids the contract (which we’re about to see happen with Wander, when he isn’t able to attend spring training)
Wander Franco is currently geing paid, because he is not convicted. A verdict in a trial could take years and he would be getting paid while at court.
And even if he would not get paid – how could a team sign a player that the team wanted to sign at the time they handed out the fat contract, but could only afford one player?
So by extension you wouldn’t sign any player to a long-term contract ever? I mean, all the players – even the very very best ones, the generational talents – are one motorcycle accident away, one PED suspension away, one propane tank explosion away, one buried in a grain silo away, one abducted by pirates on the high seas away…
If I owned a team I would only sign long term contracts like Ozzie Albies’. Seven full seasons minus one day is quite a lot to squeeze out of arbitration and these seasons usually cover the prime of even the most talented players. Why pay 300 millions for 13 seasons if you can get 7 out of maximum 10 good seasons by arbitration? The Cubs did moneywise much better with Kris Bryant than the Rockies.
Would you rather pay 300 millions over 13 seasons in order to get 10 good seasons or would you take 7 seasons minus 1 day of the player’s prime for less than 100 milliin and miss eventually 3 prime seasons?
This is quite a bad contract structure for the royals. You get a few FA years, but at significant downside risk of the 4 years of player options. And it’s not like those FA years are coming cheap (35m), that’s technically some excess value but not a ton compared to the potential loss of value by giving him the ability to opt out in the next 4.
All for a guy who is a league average bat, with one year of putting up elite defensive numbers but a track record of scouting that suggests he’s merely an average to above average defender.
Average to above average defender at shortstop. And he was 15% better than league average as a hitter in his age 23 season. xWOBA thinks he deserved even more.
You can argue that they’re paying 48m for the remainder of his team control and 100m for the first three free agent years, and that the four player option years that guarantee another 140m are too steep a price, without underselling how good he is. I wouldn’t, but you could.
If he’s as good as projected, it leaves a pretty open path when that first option year rolls around for a deal where he gives up his player options in return for the team guaranteeing its 3 year option.