Ruben Amaro Wasn’t Nuts for Turning Down the Padres
So, look. I don’t want to write any more about Cole Hamels. You don’t want to read any more about Cole Hamels. We’ve all basically covered every possible angle of the Cole Hamels thing. It’s tired, and all anyone wants is to be able to move on. But, on the other hand, yesterday I published articles about Chris Young, Huston Street, and fan opinions of pitching coaches. So now I’m writing about Cole Hamels again.
At least this time there’s new information. Ken Rosenthal wrote this earlier:
The Padres wanted Hamels. The Padres made an aggressive offer for Hamels. The Padres are one of nine teams that can acquire Hamels without his permission.
[…]
It is not known precisely how they view the Padres’ top three prospects — righty Matt Wisler, catcher Austin Hedges and outfielder Hunter Renfroe. But a source last month said that in the Phillies’ view, the Padres might “not have enough.”
That’s pretty concrete. That’s reporting that the Padres made a bid. They’re one of apparently four teams to have made an actual bid, but now from Bob Nightengale, we get names:
The Phillies keep shopping Hamels, and have had plenty of talks with the likes of the Los Angeles Dodgers, San Diego Padres and Boston Red Sox, but continue to await an acceptable proposal. […] The Padres’ offer of prospects Hunter Renfroe and Austin Hedges isn’t enough.
Rosenthal reported that the Padres made an offer. Nightengale, here, reports that the Padres offered Renfroe and Hedges. So, two of the Padres’ alleged “big three” prospects who remain. One thing we don’t know is if this is actually true. Another thing we don’t know is, if we grant that the proposal is real, was there money involved? We can’t be absolutely certain that Hedges and Renfroe were offered for Hamels, straight up, with no other bits included.
But let’s just make the assumptions and move on. Let’s say everything that’s been said is valid. Let’s say the Padres made the proposal, and the Phillies turned it down. What is there to be made of this? One has to figure the offer is no longer on the table, with the Padres having grabbed James Shields. So Hamels remains, knowing he’ll have a new home, but not knowing where, or when anything will happen.
My first thought: the offer seems in the vicinity of fair. Perhaps it favors one team, but if such a trade were to happen, I don’t think it would be a disaster for anybody. It would’ve been an opportunity for Ruben Amaro to just get this over with before spring training. Hamels has a little more value to a team like the Padres than, say, the Red Sox, because San Diego wouldn’t have to guarantee Hamels’ fifth-year option. Also, while I haven’t run the math myself, my feeling is that wins this past offseason were priced higher than I expected at the start of the offseason, when I first dove into the Hamels trade-rumor quicksand.
I do think Amaro could’ve accepted the deal, and it would’ve been all right. Renfroe’s a talented kid. Hedges too. These guys are regarded as quality prospects for a reason. But as I’ve thought about it more, I’ve been better able to justify the Phillies’ decision. I don’t know of Amaro’s own thought processes, but following thought processes with which I’m familiar, I don’t think it’s nuts for Amaro to have held out.
I don’t think he’s going to find a Blake Swihart on the other end of this. Nor do I think he’ll end up with a Mookie Betts or an Addison Russell. The best Dodgers prospects will presumably remain the best Dodgers prospects. For Philadelphia, I’m sure it’s all been frustrating, yet while there’s a gap between what they want and what they’d have to settle for, it seems like they could settle for more than Renfroe and Hedges.
Obviously, this whole thing almost entirely depends on how you feel about Hunter Renfroe and Austin Hedges. Hedges in particular is polarizing, and opinions are scattered on both. But I don’t think the trade would’ve come with enough safety. There’s no such thing as a safe prospect, but there is a spectrum, and Renfroe and Hedges come with their own risks.
Renfroe was a first-round pick, and he’s a favorite for his tools. He’s still plenty young, and he possesses massive raw power, with athleticism to spare. He’s the subject of more than a few tall tales, and he’s an easy guy to dream on. He also has a fairly raw approach, and in his only exposure to Double-A, spanning 251 plate appearances, he posted a .659 OPS. That by no means dooms him, but he hasn’t yet performed against advanced competition, and it’s these sorts of guys who are more boom-or-bust. Renfroe’s likely to end up in a corner, and if his discipline gets in the way of his raw strength, that’s not much of a player. I like a prospect with a high floor. Renfroe has a low floor.
And then there’s the Hedges thing. You know what this is about. Hedges is considered an elite-level defensive catcher. Easily big-league caliber, now. Baseball Prospectus recently wrote the following sentence:
Super-prospect Austin Hedges has the best minor league framing season on record to date. Tony Wolters, who moved from infield to catcher, trails Hedges from a distance.
There’s pretty much no question that Hedges is great behind the plate, and that would come with him as he climbs the ladder. The issue is the hitting. Hedges doesn’t do it. He might someday do it, but he hasn’t hit a lot yet, and last year in Double-A he posted a sub-.600 OPS. More than 450 plate appearances. When Yadier Molina was Hedges’ age, he hit a lot better in Triple-A, and he hit a lot better in the majors. Hedges doesn’t yet have the results, and Hedges doesn’t seem to have the necessary tools.
He might eventually hit enough, and it’s his main focus for 2015, but nothing’s guaranteed, here. The bat is a concern. The counter-argument is this: if Hedges is so good behind the plate, he doesn’t need to hit. Look at all those framing runs! Value is value. Jose Molina didn’t hit. I believe in the pitch-framing stuff, and it’s the framing that I think will make Hedges an actually helpful big-leaguer.
Yet, often, when I talk about framing, Dave issues a reminder that framing still doesn’t have much of a market. Teams are aware of it, but teams don’t pay for it like they pay for other things. Russell Martin got a huge contract, but Russell Martin has a lot of strengths. Hank Conger was dealt for cheap. Francisco Cervelli was dealt for cheap. Rene Rivera was just a part of a much bigger trade. I don’t even know where Chris Stewart is. Carlos Corporan was put on the scrap heap. Let’s say Hedges doesn’t hit much. Let’s say he’s a defensive specialist. Evidence suggests those guys aren’t hard to find. Maybe this is an inefficiency, but it’s become a long-lasting inefficiency, and so while Hedges has a virtually certain elite skill, today, that same skill isn’t thought of like other skills in the majors. Hedges needs to hit to be considered a special player. Good luck finding a group of people who all agree that Hedges will hit down the road.
If the Phillies traded Hamels for Renfroe and Hedges, it could absolutely work out for them. Renfroe could be ready by August, and Hedges could be the regular backstop somewhere in 2016. But that’s a trade with a fairly high probability of not returning much of anything. Renfroe is high-risk, and while Hedges should have a career, at the moment he’s poised to average 40 games a year instead of 120. As the comps go, the Phillies don’t want to come out of this with Jeff Francoeur and Drew Butera.
So the Phillies wait. Probably, they shouldn’t still have Cole Hamels, but considering just the Padres’ offer, it’s understandable. There’s a lot of risk in there, and while the Padres ultimately signed Shields instead, that offer might reappear in some form if injury strikes. Even aside from Josh Johnson and Brandon Morrow, you can’t automatically count on big innings from Tyson Ross or Andrew Cashner. Situations change, somewhat unpredictably, and at this point it makes some sense for the Phillies to wait through the season’s first few months. One can’t predict the midseason market, but Hamels stands a good chance of being the best player available. The one thing you can predict is the Phillies will be bad.
So far, I think A.J. Preller has come the closest. You can understand why Hamels could be a Padre today. And you can understand why he isn’t one.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.
Jeff, I’m in Bradenton, Florida, in case you are still wondering where I am!
Your still a standup guy among Giants fans.
Today is your birthday Chris Stewart!
Seems like a nice starting point for discussions, and a package that the Dodgers and Sox could comfortably bid against if they’re ready to step up to the plate. According to Kiley’s list:
Padres:
41. Wisler
49. Renfroe
130. Hedges
Honorable mention: Liriano
Dodgers:
4. Urias
6. Seager
11. Pederson
89. Holmes
HM. Anderson
HM. Verdugo
Red Sox:
9. Swihart
23. Rodriguez
33. Owens
35. Margot
48. Devers
104. Johnson
HM. Cecchini
HM. Barnes
HM. Marrero
HM. Chavis
I keep wondering about something like the Red Sox sending Henry Owens, Rodriguez, and Jackie Bradley Jr. Seems pretty fair to me. Helps both teams.
I think that’s a pretty serious overpay.
I agree. Note that Hamels is set to get paid $23.5 million per year through his age 35 season. There’s not likely to be much surplus value there, unless your WAR or $ per WAR prediction is very different from the mean. A bag of balls might be an overpay.
Agreed — if the Philies want that sort of package, they need to pay down some of Hamels’ contract. Especially since the Sox would most likely have to guarantee his option year for Cole to waive his no-trade clause.
Roberto: “23.5 mil per year . . .”
The value is in the length of the contract as more so than the AAV. Only being on the hook for 4 or 5 years, when a FA of his caliber would probably warrant 7 years is a benefit. A team gets to shed the last two/three seasons (usually the worst of a long-term contract). Also, he’d probably get more than 23.5 AAV considering that Lester got over 24.
Receiving a front line starter to a fairly reasonable contract, and ending at 35 has more value than getting three second tier prospects, one of which has enough of a major track record to severely discount. What is the failure rate of prospects outside of the top 20? Hamels would be worth a true top prospect for a team that didn’t have payroll constraints.
no chance the phils do that
when will people learn that other teams dont want the red sox poo poo platters of overrated prospects
weak effort. you can do better.
that being said, when shark gets russell and shields gets myers, you’re probably right that sox fans are dreaming if they think they csn get hamels for 2 or 3 b prospects.
“poo poo platter” Huh? 23rd and 33rd ranked prospects in all of baseball? Both of which are higher than any prospect Philly currently has. JBJ is just a throw in, but a decent 4th outfielder for sure.
everdiso @ 1:29 is fake everdiso
he’s being sarcastic but in general he’s right
margot, devers, and rodriguez all are b grade prospects and there’s no chance in hell the phils accept that deal
your trolling is getting far worse
sox fans are delusional if they think theyre getting hamels. offering one B prospect like swihart doesn’t move the needle, and sox fans dont even think they should give up him
everdiso 2:06 is the best troll of the bunch.
the rest of you could learn from him. he’s painfully good at it.
@ TB,
JP Crawford is actually rated higher than both Rodriguez and Owens.
You guys are ridiculous. Really.
You are saying that the Sox wouldn’t be in a little better position to win right now if they had Hamels. The goal is to win a World Series right? Owens has huge question marks and Rodriguez may be a 2 but most likely a 3 or 4. JBJ is probably a 4th outfielder.
Look, if the Sox don’t want to put up then that is fine but they aren’t winning anything with that rotation.
First of all this list is not like listing new cars and their MSRP and resale value.
I find it laughable that Urias is rated higher than Corey Seager. I would be more
than willing to let the Dodgers keep Urias and Pederson and take a couple of their
other arms along with Seager.
The Padres have nothing. I would give them Cliff Lee and his contract for those
lottery tickets. That’s it.
Boston wants Hamels really, really bad. They refuse to go away. Their fans will
not go away. Boston has lust in their hearts and loins for Cole Hamels.
I’l do them one better. I’ll include Kenny Giles giving the Red Sox a true Game One
punch along with $40 million.
In return the Phillies get the position package they actually need to be sure they
get someone good:
Mookie Betts
Xander Bogaerts
Blake Swihart
Rafael Devers
That’s the only way this works for the Phillies.
Another possibility that no one here mentioned is TEXAS. They arguably need
two more starters and they definitely need a Hamels class starter.
Hamels straight up for:
Rougned Odor
Jorge Alfaro
Nomar Mazara.
If the Rangers want significant money – which they probably do – then the
Phillies need Joey Gallo.
This is what works for the Phillies, a team that with vastly decreased attendance
in 2015 will still bank tens of millions in after tax profit.
congratulations, you’re the only commentor worse than me
I’d like to observe you in real life. From afar, quite probably behind some thick glass.
Luckily, there are already observation areas set up in mental institutions.
Boring.
Your crusade is falling on deaf ears and your trade proposals are equally stupid
This actually makes a lot of sense. But I wouldn’t stop there if I was RAJ. I would trade Betts for Stanton, Yelich, and Jose Fernandez. Bogaerts could fetch McCutchen, Cole, and Polanco. Then dangle Swihart and get Tanaka and Pineda. Finally Devers for Mike Trout. That’s the only way this truly works for the Phillies.
Those Kiley Red Sox rankings are consistently higher than the rest of the industry and the Hedges ranking is way lower. Hedges is #23 on BP’s list for instance.
BP’s list is a little different. I’m not saying it’s wrong, but they have Meyer at 14 (FG #71), Mondesi at 27 (FG #61), Piscotty at at 32 (FG #81), and Tim Anderson (#39) ahead of Carlos Rodon (#41). I don’t think I’ve seen anyone consider Carlos Rodon outside of the top 20, let alone behind Tim Anderson.
There are probably a few other examples as well. Kind of goes to show that, while these help us understand who to watch for and what we should be looking for, there’s a great deal of volatility amongst top prospects. Dave just published an article noting that approximately 70% of top prospects fail.
Speaking of being consistently higher than the rest of the industry, BP have always been the high guys on Hedges, going back to when Jason Parks was around. He adores Hedges
Also, I thought Kiley was pretty clear that ordinal rank was much less important than tier, so discussing the difference between 50 and 30 is not really that informative.
There’s more industry lists with Hedges off or in the back 25 than top 50
Jeff, thanks for writing this. This article did two things for me:
1. It broke the news to me that the Padres did, in fact, offer Hunter Renfroe and Austin Hedges to Philadelphia for Cole Hamels.
2. The article immediately helped calm me down after I was outraged that the Phillies rejected such an offer.
My only hope is this doesn’t turn into another famous declined trade; the Kris Benson for Ryan Howard and Chase Utley trade that wasn’t to be. Bless your heart, Dave Littlefield.
That urban legend continues to grow. It used to be Benson for Howard but DL said no because we had Brad Eldred coming up.
I did not realize that was an urban legend. I’d also always heard that Chase Utley was involved in that trade.
Since I can’t edit my comment, I’ll just say that I’m sorry for propagating an urban legend.
I think there is some truth to the Howard part, I had never seen the Utley one though. No one really knows and DL was so awful that they may have offered the Liberty Bell and he passed so he could correct an earlier mistake and reacquire Joey Bats (then jose bautista).
The other part of it is that MLB forced the Pirates to decrease payroll (something about debt ratio) and since Benson got hurt, he had to move AmRam. Of course he didn’t have to hand him to CHC for nothing.
Barry Zito for Utley and Howard after 2002 was another almost-deal.
Never on the table.
Deal was Ryan Howard to Pittsburgh for Kip Wells. Not an urban legend. Baseball America published an article about this deal
around 2007 – 2008.
Pittsburgh said no. The phillies traded Thome instead.
With assumption that no money is exchanged, I don’t think “Jeff Francoeur” production under club control would be a bad deal for the Phillies. With cost savings, Philles could turn around and make a nice offer for Moncada.
Phillies don’t care about cost savings. And the point of a rebuild is to get you know, building blocks.
It is not about cost savings. It is about using money that is currently going to Hamels on building blocks (Moncada is a top 10 prospect for which 96 million would go a long way to acquiring albeit on a less than team friendly payment schedule). For other teams, Padres in this case, why trade club controlled production for Hamels when the same amount of value can be acquired on free agency for near the same price? For the Padres, this is what they essentially did by signing Shields instead of trading for Hamels.
Your comment is self-contradictory.
The more I’ve thought about it, the more I’m becoming uncertain the Phillies SHOULD take a stab at Moncada. Yes, he’s a unique talent that’s going to be poised to do great things…but the Phillies are in the middle of a complete rebuild. They need a lot of quality prospects, not just one guy who’s The One.
Apparently, the Phillies are going to be aggressive come July 2, 2015, on the international market instead (source: http://www.thegoodphight.com/2015/2/18/8062221/the-phillies-are-not-signing-yoan-moncada-or-any-other-big-name-ifa). This is the way the team should be going, as an influx of IFA’s will help boost the farm.
If the farm was already strong and ripe with talent (like the Dodgers’), then I’d be all for signing Moncada. Right now, though, it doesn’t make sense for a rebuilding club to go all in on a guy who’s gonna cost an arm and a leg and keep them from signing IFAs for a year or two.
I think you’re right. The sort of team (other than the “gobs of money lying around” team) that makes sense is a team that is seemingly on the precipice of contention.
Of course, given the parity in the league right now, that exact model fits about 10-12 different teams, and it’s not like anybody is going to say “no, we certainly couldn’t use a 19 year old oozing with talent.”
Moncada is worth more than everyone the Yankees signed during this July 2nd period.
Five first round picks or Bryce Harper?
What are the Phillies last ten first round picks?
I’m not talking about the draft. I’m talking about bringing in a bunch of good, quality players through the July 2nd period. If the Phillies could draft well on top of bringing in quality IFAs, then that’d be icing on the cake. If you’ll notice, the Yankees were once in a similar situation to the Phillies now; barren farm, aging team, etc. They went all out and signed a ton of IFAs while they had the chance. They now have one of the top farms in the majors, and it’s the depth of their farm system that has given them the luxury of pursuing a Yoan Moncada type player. The Phillies are pursuing the same strategy this July 2nd, but it’ll be too late to grab Moncada by then. However, it will give them the chance to go sign the next Yoan Moncada, whoever that may be. Moncada is not god; there’ll be others.
” the Yankees were once in a similar situation to the Phillies now; barren farm, aging team, etc. They went all out and signed a ton of IFAs while they had the chance”
The Yankees did that in the current signing period which has nothing
to do with the rating of their farm system.
Moncada is a rarity in this period. Signings during this period are
dominated by younger players (allegedly 16 or 17 years old) who are many years away if they work out. Most of them do not. The failure rate is extraordinarily high. Even players who receive huge bonuses frequently fail.
Moncada is like a Kris Bryant out of college or a freak like Harper
from high school (actually junior college).
So is there an implication that Ruben Amaro is, indeed, crazy but just not for this particular action? If so is Ruben more along the lines of bark at the moon lunacy, or more of someone who seems very reasonable until he stands up and you realize he is not only not wearing any pants but somehow got hold of “Jem is truly outrageous” boxer shorts? And how does this compare to other general managers? Are there market inefficiencies here to be taken advantage?
Sorry, silly day today.
So, FG which is it? Is Amaro nuts for asking for so much for a guy with very limited surplus value or is Amaro justified in wanting 2 top 100 prospects? We have had articles arguing both sides for months now.
He’s not going to get an elite-level prospect, like he seems to be holding out for. But I think he can do better than these two prospects, personally, because I don’t love Renfroe, and I don’t think Hedges is the kind of guy who could cost a lot to acquire on the market. If he doesn’t hit, he’s a defensive-specialist backup. Hamels’ value is a little higher than I estimated in November or whenever it was, and I think the Padres’ offer is close, but a little short.
OK, thanks for the clarification.
Then you are implicitly stating that Billy Beane is an imbecile
Hamels is way better than “The Shark” and Addison Russell is way better than Blake Swihart or Xander Bogaerts. I would take Russell over both
Swihart and Bogaerts.
If that doesn’t make sense to you then you should be doing something else
with your time.
The trade deadline is a seller’s market. This has been covered. Which is why Amaro may get a better deal if he waits until July.
Everyone, including the staff here, please ignore all posts by Free_AEC. The only way to shake a troll is to ignore him or her (or robot built by Kirk Gibson to test the grit of sabermetric people).
Well there is the simlple fact that the Shark’s contract/team control offered serious surplus value, and Hamels’ remaining control does not. If the Phillies eat a good $20-$30 million, well they might not get Addison Russell, but they’d get some better guys than Renfroe and Hedges.
I didn’t see your post before I made mine. Sorry. I’d appreciate it if someone would make the argument that Hamels offers surplus value and how.
Hamels, per ZiPS/Steamer, is like a 3.5 win guy next year. I’m going to ignore his option year because I’m not paid to do this.
So, for the next four years, factoring in the usual decline, he’s worth 11 wins. Price of a win this off-season was at least $7M, probably $7.5M. Plus there’s inflation. I think using $8M over the life of the deal is fair, accordingly.
So that’s $88M. He’s owed $90M.
Now, the way you get to surplus value is any of the following (a) not using FIP-based WAR and acknowledging that Hamels is a beast at run prevention; (b) otherwise bumping up his projection; (c) being more optimistic about his ability to stay good as he ages; (d) factoring in more inflation.
If instead of starting at 3.5 wins you started at 4.5, boom, he’s worth $120M and you have $30M surplus.
What if Hamels does not decline in the usual way?
Are you aware that Hamels has a bionic pitching elbow? He has to
carry a medical certificate with him because he cannot pass through
a metal detector successfully.
On the issue of surplus value, how much surplus value is average
for a World Series winner? Which MLB team begins the 2015
season with the most surplus value?
What is the evidence that he is a “beast at run prevention”? His FIP and ERA are within .21 of each other. He had an ERA higher than his FIP as recently as 2013.
I think Jeff is right, and the “Amaro is wrong in asking for the moon” narrative is overdone. Amaro has good reason to ask for impact propects, not the “good, not great” ones the other clubs are more willing to offer. They to get all-star caliber talent here, quality not quantity. That’s hard to pull off, but there is no harm in pushing for it, and he’s right to do so.
But, if he ends up with nothing, it seems he would have been better off paring down his expectations. If Hamel’s is healthy, he should be able to get a good return at the deadline – not Addison Russel good, but I think he will do better than this offer.
“But, if he ends up with nothing”
That’s what the Phillies have been offered for Hamels.
When are you going to understand that with Hamels, Howard, Lee, Utley etc. on the 2015 payroll and with vastly decreased attendance
the Phillies owners will bank tens of millions in after tax profits?
The Phillies either get what they need or they don’t.
There is no middle ground.
Why does it need to be one or the other? Amaro can be asking too much, but that doesn’t mean 2 top-100 prospects is too much. Also, Jeff can disagree with others on the site — there’s not a Fangraphs party line.
PH just likes to come to fangraphs every day to complain about it.
I’d much rather have Shields, Renfroe, Hedges and $16M over the next five years than have Hamels.
I agree Hedges has limited value as a prospect, but even if you aren’t high on Renfroe that is about the best offer I see the Phillies getting right now.
They could gamble and get a higher return near the deadline, if Hamels is really dealing and a team really needs front-line SP… or Hamels gets injured and they get nothing ala Cliff Lee.
Phillies have money and need prospects — I think everyone would agree with that. Thus, they should pay as much of Cole Hamels’ salary as is necessary to get the prospects that they want.
The fact that they won’t do this indicates to me that RAJ is not good at his job.
Taking Hamels as a 3.5 WAR pitcher (Zips has 3.7 and Steamer 2.7 so this is taking mostly his best projection) and applying a half a win a year, and starting with $7.5M/WAR and 5% inflation, I get Hamels’ next 4 years at just under $88M, when he’s owed $96 million. Meaning his remaining deal would be a slight overpay if he was a free agent.
Based on this, Amaro would indeed be in the wrong not to take 2 top 100 prospects in exchange for a slightly overpriced asset. This is without knowing how much San Diego wanted the Phillies to eat though. If it was less than $20 million, I think they would still be in the wrong. Hedges and Renafroe may not be Addison Russell-level assets, but they at least crack $12M surplus value put together.
Exactly
He’s not necessarily “wrong” to bet on waiting for another team to give in and give him his ransom. It’s very risky and arguably stupid, but not “wrong”. It’s a legitimate strategy.
What’s the 155 of Lester project to? You’re also basing that argument completely off fWAR. Hamels was a 6 win pitcher in bWAR in 2014. There’s going to be 3 win pitchers next off season getting paid more than Hamels with more money committed. All while the same age. You can sign Greinke into his late 30s, waste your entire 2015 and lose a draft pick. Scarcity increases value.
“Hamels was a 6 win pitcher in bWAR in 2014”
Yeah, and a 3 win pitcher the year before. Either way, I’ll side with the projections for this year rather than last year’s results.
“There’s going to be 3 win pitchers next off season getting paid more than Hamels with more money committed”
Doubtful, considering the supply on the market next year, and the fact that Shields didn’t get more money than Hamels is currently guaranteed.
Maybe Porcello, but that’s because he offers more prime years.
Where do you see that he was a 3 win pitcher in 2013? When I look up bWAR in 2013, it shows 4.6 WAR.
“You’re also basing that argument completely off fWAR.”
False. Zips used ERA-based WAR.
“What’s the 155 of Lester project to? ”
Zips find Lester to be a win better than Hamels. So starting with 4.5 WAR and using the same $7.5M/win, 5% inflation, and a half a win decline, 6 years of Lester comes out to $162 million, or a little more than the $155M he was guaranteed. So any team would have been better off outbidding the Cubs for Lester (with no draft pick loss) rather than trading talent for the rights to Hamels’ contract.
Two problems with this though.
First, the $/WAR is for market-length contracts. You can’t sign a pitcher of Hamels’ caliber for 4 years.
Second, he’s not viewed as a 3.5 WAR pitcher. The last time he was worth less than 3.5 WAR was his rookie season in 2006. And since his ERA has been under his FIP by about 20 points over the course of 1,800 innings, maybe fip-based WAR undervalues him.
“First, the $/WAR is for market-length contracts. You can’t sign a pitcher of Hamels’ caliber for 4 years.”
That doesn’t matter, this is factored into surplus value.
“Second, he’s not viewed as a 3.5 WAR pitcher.”
Well, he is, by the projections. In fact, Steamer doesn’t even see him as that good. Zips has 3.7, Steamer at 2.7. It’s pretty generous to overwhelming side with the better projection. And Zips WAR isn’t FIP based by the way, it’s ERA based.
Length of contract absolutely matters. If you have him at $7.5MM per projected WAR on a 1-year deal, there’s not much downside. Worst case scenario, he misses the season and you waste money for a year. If you have him at $7.5MM per projected WAR on a 7-year deal, there’s a ton of downside. Early-season TJ surgery will wipe out 1.5-2 seasons, and shoulder surgery can wipe out even more. If you can get your ace on a 4-year deal when other aces are getting 6-7 year deals, that absolutely matters.
“Well, he is, by the projections”. That only matters if front offices are giving out contracts based on Steamer or Zips, rather than their own projection systems. Whether or not you (or Steamer) agree, many people view him as an ace. According to his baseball reference page, his WAR totals from 2010-2014 have been:
2010: 5.4
2011: 6.6
2012: 4.6
2013: 4.6
2014: 6.6
Those seem to be more in line with the perception of Hamels as a pitcher. Steamer views him as the equivalent of Shields or Lackey, and we know that front offices don’t see him that way (there’s absolutely no way he’d get a Shields-like contract if he was a free agent this past off-season).
“Length of contract absolutely matters. If you have him at $7.5MM per projected WAR on a 1-year deal, there’s not much downside. Worst case scenario, he misses the season and you waste money for a year. If you have him at $7.5MM per projected WAR on a 7-year deal, there’s a ton of downside. Early-season TJ surgery will wipe out 1.5-2 seasons, and shoulder surgery can wipe out even more. If you can get your ace on a 4-year deal when other aces are getting 6-7 year deals, that absolutely matters.”
No, it doesn’t matter. You get less downside but you get less upside too. And while Hamels probably would get more than 4+1 on the open market, he’d probably get a lower AAV too.
““Well, he is, by the projections”. That only matters if front offices are giving out contracts based on Steamer or Zips, rather than their own projection systems.”
Again, doesn’t matter. The public projections are the best we got. You have no idea what other baseball teams think of Cole Hamels…except that there’s a gap between what Ruben Amaro thinks he’s worth, and the rest of the league. Not sure why you would find that encouraging.
“Those seem to be more in line with the perception of Hamels as a pitcher. ”
Not sure how you can claim to have any idea what Cole Hamel’s value is to other teams.
” Steamer views him as the equivalent of Shields or Lackey, and we know that front offices don’t see him that way (there’s absolutely no way he’d get a Shields-like contract if he was a free agent this past off-season).”
You’re changing the argument here. We’ve been discussing Zips, who thinks Hamels is better than Shields and Lackey. And Zips still doesn’t think it’s worth trading for Hamels.
Basically, you’re saying that Amaro is looking for a “high-upside, risk free trade”. So:
* He’s not looking for prospects. Until a prospect is put in 500-900 AB’s or 200 innings pitched, you’re not really going to know what you have. The only “proven”, risk free talent is MLB talent.
* In that case, Amaro is pretty much holding out for Mike Trout and Buster Posey. Yes, that would be a good trade. Good luck getting it.
* No matter how good the player is, his value risks diminishing with time. What if Hammels has a season ending injury? What will he be worth then? What if he’s just out for the standard 45 day “strained oblique” injury? How does that impact his market value? What if he has a horrible start, i.e. goes 0 for 5 with a 5+ ERA? Hey, that even happens occasionally to hall of famers.
* Generating COMPETITIVE offers is the only way Amaro can reap the greatest reward for his star player. By delaying, Amaro has arguably reduced the value because at least one suitor (Padres) have dropped out of the running. Teams are pretty much set with their pitching by spring training. Either they’ve locked up the talent they think they need for 2015, or they can’t afford a Hammel’s. Yes, if Kershaw requires TJ surgery after the first day of throwing, the Dodgers might conceivably spring top prospects for Hammels. Should Amaro be waiting for that?
Amaro’s rebuilding goal should have been to gather the best possible prospects during the 2014 off-season, convince the Philly fans that help is on the way, and creatively benefit fans for sticking it out during 2015 (i.e. freebies, promotions, ticket discounts, community activities, etc.). He still has a major piece of that puzzle unmoved.
Time waits on no man. Any way that one looks at this, Amaro’s indecision has cost Philadelphia. By delaying, he has failed his primary objective. The only question remaining is how much Amaro’s indecision will cost Philly fans.
“Amaro is pretty much holding out for Mike Trout and Buster Posey”
If Betts, Bogaerts, Swihart and Devers are individually the equals of Trout and Posey then why did Boston sign Rusney Castillo, Hanley Ramirez and Pablo Sandoval?
An even better question to ask – which no “professional” baseball writer will –
is why didn’t the offensively challenged Phillies sign those three players? The
Phillies have the money to have done so.
Your critique is misguided and Amaro is neither the Public Relations director or Marketing director. He is the responsible party to a group of talent evaluators including scouts, MiLB managers, coaches, statisticians and others, aiming to optimize player assets.
Cole Hamels is “Amaro’s” best current asset by a mile, and the contract is fair. These days a fair contract, especially for a dependable and always-healthy player, is worth a whole lot.
This article is about Hedges and Renfroe not being a whole lot, and it’s spot on.
I think theres a much higher chance of the prospects that were untouchable not being able to hit at double A out of the gate than Cole Hamels track record. Even if Hamels loses 1 mph on his fastball hes going to be fine. He pitches off the best left handed change up in baseball.
I think what many critics of RA are having a hard time with is that there seems to be a bifurcated approach to valuation. Hamels is viewed as cost, not as performance. We look at the last five years, immediately regress them, and then say he’s barely worth his current contract, so the return should be modest. Then, we say all the really good prospects are potentially worth so much more than Hamels that they need to be valued at their ceilings. Sure, if you as asked me if I would take Johnny Bench as a rookie, or Cole Hamels as an aging pitcher, I’d take Bench in a heartbeat. But that isn’t the real question. If Hamels is worth 4 WAR next year–worse than any of his previous five years, and the pitcher he is replacing is replacement value, for a team in contention, those incremental wins can mean the difference between a playoff spot, or a division, or go home. If I’m RA, I just can’t accept an offer with modest return. I’d rather stick with what I have, hope he continues to perform, and perhaps an opportunity will arise later on.
Then, we say all the really good prospects are potentially worth so much more than Hamels that they need to be valued at their ceilings.
Nope, no one is saying this. The prospect valuations account for the high risk of the prospect busting or failing to become great. Even with that factored in, multiple top prospects are worth more than Hamels.
I’m not sure a straight open-market $/WAR calculation is the best way to approach this (or any other trade, but hey, that’s a different problem). For one, we should be looking at marginal WAR, rather than context-neutral WAR, when assessing the value Hamels would bring to specific teams.
On top of that, you need to adjust the monetary value for the fact that the dollar value of wins doesn’t scale in a linear manner. So if you’re, for instance, a contending team with a weakness in your rotation (*cough* . . . Red Sox), Hamels value is going to be an awful lot more than $6M/win.
Which doesn’t mean the Red Sox should give up their top assets–just that I don’t agree with the folks arguing that Hamels doesn’t have any excess value on his contract. The Phillies still should eat as much of it as they can in order to get the best prospects possible, but I won’t be surprised if they eventually get an offer that beats Renfroe/Herges.
So…do it, then. Tell us the correct monetary value of Cole Hamels’ added wins to the Red Sox. And show your work.
I would still argue it’s situational, and that is demonstrated by the behavior, every year, of GM’s of possibly contending teams at the deadline. They give up future performance for present performance. Perhaps that’s not they way the numbers dictate their optimal theoretical long term interests lie, but, nevertheless, that’s what they do. My point is that the internals of every team’s potential is not static, but dynamic, and if adding a big boost over replacement value by giving up future return gets you to the WS, you certainly think about it. Because the opportunity to get there is etherial. It comes and goes with age, with expiring contracts, with injuries, and with unexpected underperformance.
That’s borderline tautological. But the fact that it’s not static doesn’t prevent you from telling me what the correct number is right now. So go ahead.
If you don’t, the criticism of the presented model is punchless.
Arc, I wasn’t criticizing, I was commenting–there’s a difference. In my experience, actual behavior, rather than a “scientific” approach based on numbers that include not just subjective analysis but objective weightings, sometimes can be more important. If you want to claim that the rigor of your approach is better, I’m not going to argue too strenuously. Rather, I would point out that it only takes one GM to break the model and make the deal, and all the predicative aspects of numbers-crunching go right out the window. Let me suggest to you that tautology or not, there will always be a Lerner or a Illich who tosses the spread sheet aside and says “do it, I don’t care if I’m overpaying”.
I don’t like playing games. You like your numbers, you think your approach is more valid and others lack intellectual integrity–that’s fine. I’m a fan who appreciates the work done by the authors of Fangraphs to enrich the experience, and I don’t need to insult others to make my point.
Actually, the Red Sox would get one of the smallest upgrades from adding Hamels, because of their depth from the 5th spot down, which is what Hamels would be replacing. According to this fangraphs article: http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/finding-a-place-for-james-shields/ the Red Sox would get only 1.6 wins out of signing Shields, tied for 29th with the Indians’ similarly deep rotation, and in front of just the Nationals’ ridiculous super rotation.
Now, the Red Sox would expect more production from Hamels to Shields, but so would everyone else, so the team order wouldn’t change much. Even though the Red Sox may lack a “true top of rotation starter”, they would receive the least value of any team that’s not the Nationals from acquiring him.
You still have the win curve argument, but as the White Sox, Marlins and Padres have shown, the win curve is less dramatic than we previously thought.
And since marginal wins a team gets from Hamels is almost always going to be lower than the context neutral ones (no team has a negative WAR starter in their first 5 spots) you’re doing yourself no favors. This is only increasing the gap between the value a team would receive from Hamels and his guaranteed contract. This is all beside the fact that on the open market it’s simply context neutral wins that determine the price tag, not any specific team’s marginal upgrade.
How many wins is throwing Hamels 3 times in a 7 games series vs throwing Rick Porcello 3 times worth?
Between 0 and 3.
Based on the unlikelihood of it coming to that, probably less than half a win. Porcello’s pretty good, the drop-off isn’t that much in such a small amount of innings.
This is again, beside the fact that if Boston thought having a top of rotation starter was important, they would have signed one of the 3 elite starters this off season.
Also this: http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/giving-a-questionable-start-to-baseballs-best-starter/
A couple thoughts:
“Actually, the Red Sox would get one of the smallest upgrades from adding Hamels, because of their depth from the 5th spot down, which is what Hamels would be replacing. According to this fangraphs article: http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/finding-a-place-for-james-shields/ the Red Sox would get only 1.6 wins out of signing Shields, tied for 29th with the Indians’ similarly deep rotation, and in front of just the Nationals’ ridiculous super rotation.”
It’s interesting that the Red Sox are ranked as gaining among the smallest marginal benefit. For what it’s worth, the 1.6 win figure uses Shields’ super-conservative 2.6 WAR Steamer projection. If we use ZiPS and think Hamels is a 3.7 WAR pitcher, the marginal difference is 2.7 WAR (it’s above 3 if we’re looking at RA9 WAR).
http://www.hardballtimes.com/diamond-dollars-the-economics-of-winning-in-baseball-part-1/
http://blog.philbirnbaum.com/2010/04/marginal-value-of-win-in-baseball.html
It’s been demonstrated (see above for an example) that the marginal value of a win peaks around ~90 wins, and FG currently has the Sox forecast at 89. Gennaro’s research, while eight years old, indicated at the time that the multiplier for the value of wins in this range was between 2x and 3x, which suggests that the ‘market value’ (at least to the Red Sox, and before even considering my whole ‘marginal WAR’shebang) of Cole Hamels to the 2015 Sox would be . . .
($6M/WAR)*(2.5)*(3.5 WAR)=$52.5M
Now, maybe you think 2.5 is too high a multiplier. Maybe you think it should only be 2. And maybe you think the 3.5 WAR estimate is wrong, and we should use Steamer’s 2.7 WAR figure. In that case, his value in 2015 would be:
($6M/WAR)*2*(2.5 WAR)=$30M
“You still have the win curve argument, but as the White Sox, Marlins and Padres have shown, the win curve is less dramatic than we previously thought.”
I’m not sure that they’ve shown anything yet, unless you can demonstrate that the revenue bump between a high-70s and 90-win season has materially decreased since 2007.
“And since marginal wins a team gets from Hamels is almost always going to be lower than the context neutral ones (no team has a negative WAR starter in their first 5 spots) you’re doing yourself no favors. This is only increasing the gap between the value a team would receive from Hamels and his guaranteed contract.”
The problem with this argument is that unless you assume every free agent signed is replacing a negative-WAR guy, the dollars teams spend per marginal WAR added are *drastically* higher than the dollars they spend per context-neutral WAR. So while I used $6M/WAR in my figures above as a simplification, the number would like be higher. I’m not going to go back and calculate it because I’d have to look at every single free agent signed this offseason and their respective teams’ before and after depth charts, but my point is that it likely increases Hamels value relative to his contract. I mean, Hamels is going to lose about 1 WAR of value if you look at things marginally instead of context-neutrally.
So take our most pessimistic equation above:
($6M/WAR)*2*(2.5 WAR)=$30M
Drop a win and you get:
($6M/WAR)*2*(1.5 WAR)=$18M
Or if you wanted to use ZiPS’ 3.7 WAR figure:
($6M/WAR)*2*(2.7 WAR)=$32.4M
Except $6M is going to be way, way, too low if we’re looking at marginal instead of context neutral WAR.
“This is all beside the fact that on the open market it’s simply context neutral wins that determine the price tag, not any specific team’s marginal upgrade.”
Context neutral WAR, and the average amount of dollars spent on them, are a market aggregate, and don’t really reflect the individual economics of teams. They’re useful to retroactively describe a market, but not hugely useful in analyzing the value of a specific transaction to a specific team. Teams absolutely have internal valuations (basically, marginal WAR times however they value a marginal win), and they absolutely use those to make decisions rather than aggregated $/WAR over an entire market.
In general, I’m not really trying to argue that the Red Sox necessarily should pursue Hamels–I wouldn’t, if I was in their place, give up Bogaerts or anything like that for him. What I’m arguing is that we should analyze this from the perspective of a specific team’s strategy and access to assets, and viewed that way it’s pretty clear that the claim that Hamels doesn’t have any surplus value (at least in the short-term) isn’t really accurate.
“It’s interesting that the Red Sox are ranked as gaining among the smallest marginal benefit. For what it’s worth, the 1.6 win figure uses Shields’ super-conservative 2.6 WAR Steamer projection. If we use ZiPS and think Hamels is a 3.7 WAR pitcher, the marginal difference is 2.7 WAR (it’s above 3 if we’re looking at RA9 WAR)”
This is all hand-waving though, and doesn’t do anything to defeat the point that Boston still had the second-smallest increase. Every other team is getting a similar bump from Shields to Hamels.
As for the analysis on win multipliers, yes I would agree the old research is outdated, and that’s a position that’s been argued by the writers that analyse contracts here. The way I would think of it is in terms of amount of games the team is reasonably in contention. If the team A 80 win team is going to look like a hot streak away from contention for a lot longer of the year than a 75 win team. is still in playoff hunt that team is still worth watching. That is essentially the story of the Royals last year, and the Padres offseason. A .500 team is some good luck away from a second wild card, which has also became much more important since that research has been done. Teams have acted as such, with teams that don’t figure to have much of a chance to compete never the less valuing the present highly (the White Sox, Padres, and Marlins).
“The problem with this argument is that unless you assume every free agent signed is replacing a negative-WAR guy, the dollars teams spend per marginal WAR added are *drastically* higher than the dollars they spend per context-neutral WAR.”
No, not negative WAR, just close enough to replacement value. Not sure why you would think that. That’s why the Cardinals were the high bidders for Peralta last year: They got replacement value from SS the year before so they had the most to gain. Same reason the Cubs added Lester to the front of their rotation, again, filling a close to replacement level hole. This is the norm in free agency, though there are of course exceptions. It’s why Dave Cameron called the Scherzer signing one of the worst transactions of the year: because the marginal benefit was really low compared to the price, since they knocked Roark out of the rotation.
“Context neutral WAR, and the average amount of dollars spent on them, are a market aggregate, and don’t really reflect the individual economics of teams. They’re useful to retroactively describe a market, but not hugely useful in analyzing the value of a specific transaction to a specific team”
They very much ARE useful in analyzing a specific transaction, because that is going rate that they will have to pay regardless of how much marginal wins it brings the team in that specific situation. The market sets the going rate of WAR, then each team has to weight the marginal benefit of that addition. The team with the most marginal benefit is going to come out on top most the time, because they’re the closest.
So yes, teams are looking to buy marginal wins, that is true, but they must buy them at the context neutral rate that is set by the market. So each WAR costs $7.5M but GMs are willing to spend more than $7.5 million for a marginal win. But not *drastically* more as you imply, and the market bares that out. And even if it was drastically more, it still means the teams will the lowest performance at that position is still willing to pay more.
And it also STILL means, even if we follow your argument, that a team would have been STILL been better off simply bidding higher for one of Sherzer/Lester/Shields, who won’t cost close to MLB ready prospects. Boston could have simply blown away the Nationals offer for Sherzer, or the Cubs offer for Lester, if they actually get as high of a multiplier as you’re suggesting at their point in the win curve.
One of many problems with the total fixation on surplus value as opposed to performance is the implicit assumption that having $23 million in hand is worth the same to a team as paying a player “full value” at $23M. Ben Cherington running around Fenway park waving $23 million at fans does not do as much to help the Red Sox win games as paying that money to an ace pitcher. To say that paying Cole Hamels his full value is essentially a zero gain is silly. How many other options do the Red Sox (or Padres or anyone) have to convert cash into 200+ innings of a 125 or better ERA+?
Hamels, like most star players, is a very scarce resource. Cash, for baseball team, is not.
No, Hamels will not net “three elite prospects” as fans and media dopes dream of. He will not get the next Mike Trout either. He is most assuredly worth more than two borderline prospects like Renfroe and Hedges who are highly unlikely ever to contribute meaningfully at the major league level.
Even keeping Hamels for the full length of the contract makes more sense for the Phillies than swapping him for next to nothing. Asking for a single likely major league contributor in exchange for a durable ace at a reasonable contract does not exactly seem unrealistic.
fixation on surplus value as opposed to performance
Nope, you’ve already misunderstood. Performance is already accounted for in surplus value; it’s baked in. Surplus value is not accounted for in performance.
You’re not advocating for making a decision based on *different* information. You’re advocating making the decision based on *less* information.
Hamels, like most star players, is a very scarce resource. Cash, for baseball team, is not.
That’s absurd. Their total cash is irrelevant. The cash they have available to spend matters a lot. And not only is that scarce, it’s scarcity is a direct function of how much and how well they pay attention to – wait for it – surplus value!
That assumes elite talent is just sitting out there waiting to be purchased over the counter whenever a GM calls his broker to place the order. We have many teams with lots of cash and literally nothing good to spend it on. If they don’t spend it on a Hamels or Shields or Scherzer their other option may well be to just sit on it and get nothing in return like poor savers getting zero percent interest rates.
If you’d rather spread that cash into a bunch of mid-level talent than putting it all on one potentially fragile arm, that’s another story. Maybe diversification is the wiser strategy. But to suggest an elite player is inherently worthless just because of a surplus value analysis ignores reality.
Sir, id like a 4 win pitcher on a 5 year deal. Yes, the one from the pile you have a box in the back. Oh its going to cost that much? Ill just wait till next year and waste another season of my players peaks.
What? That comment didn’t assume that at all. You are boxing with shadows.
This is a silly comment, especially since you’re combining Hamels with Shields and Scherzer. The elite talent WAS available over the counter, it was during the off season. Why would any team would trade valuable assets for Hamels and his contract when they could have just bid more for Sherzer/Shields/Lester? Or McCarthy for that matter, since the fact that the Dodger’s signed him so that they didn’t have to trade talent for a $23M/year starter.
The market that Amaro should be going for is the teams that couldn’t afford to sign one of Sherzer/Lester/Shields. And to do that, they’ll have to eat some salary. That is what will convince another team to part with a valuable prospect.
What makes you think he has the extra cash? He signed the two biggest position players of the offseason, and passed on all 3 of the best pitchers.
“Hamels, like most star players, is a very scarce resource. Cash, for baseball team, is not.”
Yes, and Cherington passed on all 3 good pitchers that only cost cash. So why, instead of paying one of those guys the market rate, would he TRADE PROSPECTS for the right to pay someone MORE than the market rate?
Furthermore, that $23 million is not just wasted. For one, there are luxury tax considerations. For two, the world does not end at the end the season. Those resources can be used more efficiently next year, when they might have an actual hole. As is, the Red Sox roster is set and Hamels simply isn’t a big enough upgrade over their other options to justify an above market price plus prospects. Amaro will have to eat a lot of salary in order to get a good prospect.
“To say that paying Cole Hamels his full value is essentially a zero gain is silly.”
Well, when you adjust that to “over his full value”, not at all. It’s what every team does when they bow out of a free agent bidding war, by definition. Especially if for some reason signing the player to an above market deal cost you prospects close to the MLB level.
But then why would any team ever sign a player like Hamels (or Kershaw or Scherzer or Sandoval, etc.) to a big contract? If they become worthless to a team the instant they sign a “full value” contract, why would any team ever agree to do so?
They are not worthless. They are worth what they are worth which is typically around what they signed their contract for. Sometimes more, sometimes less depending on the quality of the GM/agent/team needs.
Top 100 prospects are typically worth more than their contracts because the MLB player’s association threw young players and minor league players under the bus and are paid significantly less than what they are worth. The majority of the teams operate under the premise that they need a “X” amount of club control fWAR to compete for the playoffs because they can’t afford to pay every player 7.5 million per fWAR for an entire team.
Say 35 expected fWAR is the level needed to compete for playoffs. That means a team needs to spend approximately 260 million to make the playoffs without surplus value. Most teams can’t afford 260 million on their payroll so they are going to need to severely backload deals or acquire enough surplus value that payroll plus surplus value equals or exceeds 260 million.
Surplus value is not the biggest driver for teams that may want to get from just out of playoff contention into contention or for teams with large enough revenues that being efficient with money is their biggest concern. The Phillies best hope to acquire good prospects for Hamels is to find a team that has money to burn or is willing to sacrifice future value for a likely depreciating asset for playoff contention.
However, the longer the Phillies hold Hamels, the likelier it is that age catches up with him. While Hamels is still fair market value now, I would not expect that to be the case next year.
Joe Joe covered most of this. I’ll just say that no, they’re not worthless. It’s just that by definition the player/contract combination shouldn’t be able to be traded for value in return because if that was the case, the other team would simply outbid for the player in the first place on the free agent market. The price the player gets is the highest price a team was willing to pay, without giving up talent. It doesn’t make sense that a team could outbid all other teams for a player and then trade that player and all the salary involved in exchange for significant value back. Consequently, it doesn’t make sense that Boston would not invest in one of the 3 elite FA pitchers and instead trade talent for a deficit value contract.
Furthermore, we’re talking about not Hamels whole contract, but the last 4 of a 6 year deal, plus the buyout in the 7th. Typically the first couple years of a contract of this nature are the most surplus-laden years, with the hope being that the player produces minimal deficits in the later years so that it evens out enough. Boston (or any other team) would be trading talent for the rights to those decline years, without even getting the good years that makes those contracts worthwhile.
I will say though, that if Amaro eats as much as $20-$30 million, that turns Hamels into a much more attractive asset. In doing so he could get a lower payroll team that can’t readily afford a $20+ million/year pitcher to kick in a valuable prospect or two. And I imagine that will probably be what eventually happens. That’s what Dodger’s did with Kemp, and it was a pretty brilliant move considering they got 3 years of Grandal and 1 year of Rollins in return for eating $32 million of Kemp’s salary.
To add on again, let’s say the Phillies eat a whole $28 million, making the remaining deal $68 million over 4 years. That’s a cheaper deal than Shields got and Hamels is about a half a win better. So that’s something that would entice a team who can’t currently pay the going rate for a 3+ WAR pitcher and thus didn’t sign one of the 3 big free agent options. There’s also the matter that Hamels’ remaining control comes with less guaranteed years than Sherzer and Lester got, although he’s probably a tier below Lester.
If the Phillies do that, and they can certainly afford to, they’ll get a return that they’re pleased with.
Jeff, I think you’re a great writer, and I might just be the bitter-old-man-who-yells-at-the-neighbor-kids-on-his-lawn of prospects…
“He also has a fairly raw approach, and in his only exposure to Double-A, spanning 251 plate appearances, he posted a .659 OPS. That by no means dooms him, but he hasn’t yet performed against advanced competition, and it’s these sorts of guys who are more boom-or-bust.”
Didn’t this guy get drafted, like, a year and a half ago? And the A+ to AA jump is arguably the most difficult. And also, San Diego’s AA affiliate is notoriously hell on hitters.
Not exactly a Renfroe super fan, but I don’t get the pessimism there. Maybe if he makes no progress with his next half to 2/3 of a season there this year.
Didnt Renfroe also crush it in the AFL?
Phillies beat writers say that Rosenthal is wrong. That Padres never offered both Hedges and Renfroe or the deal would have been done.
If the Padres add in Wisler along with Renfroe and Hedges, then I think we’ve got a solid deal in the making. Figure, on average, one of these guys is a starter, one a backup, and one flames out. None are A-level.
The Red Sox don’t want to move the prospects they’ve recently moved up to the major leagues nor Swihart or Rodriguez. I think they can do a package of Owens and Bradley Jr. or Owens, Margot and either Barnes or Johnson. Marrero could also be a piece in the deal. I like these options better than the Padres’ prospects and Amaro should try to get them to bid against each other.
Either way, one of these two teams should step up. Hamels has clear surplus value ($30-40MM in comparison to an equally situated FA including no draft pick compensation) and is the only #1-type starter available between now and the trade deadline. The Phillies can always add in a sweetener like cash or an extra player. One of these two teams should act to get it done. On the flip side, if Hamels makes it to the trade deadline in good health, similar offers should be there.
There’s a ton of great analysis on this thread about what Hamels is “worth” and what are “good value” returns for him, but it seems these discussions are all answering the wrong question.
The question doesn’t seem to be “what is fair return for an ace?” it seems to be “what is a fair return for a big contract in terms of prospects and money?”
RAJ has repeatedly overvalued his assets and not maximized their return when available. Everyone knows that. But other GMs are telling him that his asking price is too high. With an already-limited number of teams that can take on that contract, even fewer have the cash, resources and desire to meet the asking price.
Maybe it makes sense to do a trade of Swihart plus others if Philly picks up a good chunk of the contract, but RAJ won’t do that.
To me, it looks like a game of chicken and RAJ is going to lose. Frankly, if I’m him, rather than shoot for Boston to take the full contract and give up Swihart/Betts, I ask for 3 next-tier prospects plus and add ~$5M/yr. Maybe Devers + JBJ + Brian Johnson and a high-risk guy like Simon Mercedes gets it done.
It’s not the best return, but the alternative is to hold Hamels until the deadline when nobody can afford his price tag (or RAJ’s), then next offseason when teams go for Samardzija, etc. and balk again at the asking price.
At some point, RAJ has to move his centerpiece and just let the rebuilding process begin. Stop trying to figure out “fair return for an ace” and figure out “fair return for a big contract in prospects and money, when your team has a limited number of potential trade partners.”