So You Wanna Buy a Baseball Team
In a postseason full of headline-grabbing stories (the ball is de-juiced! Gerrit Cole is a cyborg! The Nationals win in the playoffs now!), a quiet bulletin came out on Wednesday. Bloomberg’s Scott Soshnick reported that Major League Baseball will now allow investment funds to take minority stakes in teams.
The news cycle moved on. The Yankees-Astros game was postponed! What will A.J. Hinch and Aaron Boone do with their rotation flexibility? Did you know Juan Soto isn’t yet 21? There are big baseball things happening right now! Investment mumbo-jumbo has a way of fading to the background.
I’m here to tell you that it matters. Not in an urgent, baseball-ends-today way, but in a way that could change the nature of the sport long-term. This story might not be on everyone’s radar right now, but it’s important to consider the ramifications and conflicts of interest that can arise from a small change.
To understand what this decision means, we’ll need a little background. First, let’s talk about what an investment fund is. It’s a broad term by design, one that encompasses many different ways of pooling together money. Without further comment from MLB, we can’t know the exact specifications of what they’ll allow, but we can make some educated guessed. A college endowment? Definitely. A special purpose fund raising money from 100 rich people to invest in teams? Certainly — one has already been started, and it plans to raise $500 million to purchase minority stakes.
What about a pension fund? Pension funds’ preferred tax status mirrors that of college endowments, and the two invest in very similar ways. A hedge fund? Baseball will have to spell out the rules, but that doesn’t seem so different from letting endowments or pensions own minority shares, and it’s certainly not much different than a special purpose vehicle. Heck, hedge funds are largely specialized investment pools already, and endowments and pensions make up a sizable portion of hedge fund assets under management.
There are some details that we’ll simply need to see. What about a mutual fund? Could a fund provider create a closed-end fund that invests in a team, or even a pool of teams? That hasn’t been spelled out. Could an ETF do the same? That would require some deft financial engineering, as ETF shares need a creation/redemption mechanism that would be at odds with the way major league ownership works, but closed-end funds behave roughly the same way.
Regardless, the general idea of this new policy is to allow a wider population of groups of people to purchase minority stakes in teams, bringing to the ownership table broad pools of money rather than single individuals. Why does baseball want to do that? Per Bloomberg: “It’s MLB’s answer to a problem affecting all the major U.S. sports leagues: Teams’ multibillion-dollar valuations have made it difficult for part-owners — known as limited partners, or LPs — to find buyers for their stakes when it’s time to sell.”
Your mileage may vary as to whether that is a problem worth solving, but let’s explain the issue. Think of it this way: let’s say a team is worth $2 billion. In theory, 49% of that team should cost $980 million, and, as so few teams change hands, that should be a valuable commodity. In practice, however, it’s hard to find a billionaire who wants to plunk down $980 million to not run the ship, to have the garish red button that says “Press for High-Dollar Free Agent” just out of reach.
Ownership structures vary, and the majority owner won’t always have complete final say over team decisions, but for our purposes here, the majority owner is the decider. The difference between 51% control and 49% control is meaningful, and it follows that not every stake is equally desirable.
To be sure, there are still plenty of good reasons to be a minority owner in a sports team. If you’d been a minority owner of the Marlins since Jeffrey Loria bought them in 2003, you would have realized a 14.4% annualized return on your investment, roughly double the return you would have gotten by investing in the S&P 500. You could sit in the owner’s box whenever you wanted, and you’d have a sweet championship ring to show your friends at the yacht club.
But even with those benefits, it’s not quite the same. Minority stakes should trade at a discount when decision-making power is a key reason to own something, and sports teams definitely fit that bill. So minority stakes aren’t as appealing as majority stakes, and that’s fine. There’s some market-clearing price for that.
The problem comes when you try to sell a billion dollars worth of minority stakes, and only a small pool of people are eligible to buy. When teams cost $125 million, you might be able to cobble together 12 well-to-do businesspeople and get them to each pony up $5 million, getting you a $60 million minority share. It’s trickier to get $50 million from each of them, let alone $100 million. Minority stakes in teams simply don’t have enough demand, it seems, to meet the supply of people wanting to cash in on their gains, and it’s creating an illiquid market.
Opening up ownership to investment funds is a good way to bolster demand. Find an investment with an expected return of 14% a year and you’ll have no trouble attracting institutional investors to buy a share. It’s not at all a question of whether there’s enough money bouncing around — CalPERS, the pension fund for California’s public employees, had a total market value of $381.49 billion as of October 14, and they’re one of many pension funds struggling to find returns. Funds like that would surely love to invest $500 million, or even $5 billion, into something with such a high return.
But in solving the plight of the minority-stake-holding millionaires, baseball would create a new problem. Think about this CalPERS money as if it were your pension, or part of your retirement savings. You, Alex Smallbanks, might have a 0.000262% interest in CalPERS (if you had a million dollars coming to you), or you might have far less. You won’t be part-owner of the Dodgers in a meaningful way, even if the fund were to invest in a 25% stake in the team.
It’s rational, and even prudent, for an investment fund to prioritize profit to the exclusion of everything else. Depending on the type of investment fund, its decision-makers might even have what’s called fiduciary duty, the responsibility to act in a way that best serves the client’s financial interests regardless of their own views. For most businesses, that isn’t a problem. If a fund buys a stake in, say, a publicly traded pizza company, the system works. The pizza company tries to make as much money as possible, consumers try to get the best deal on their pizza, and everyone, for the most part, is fine with this kind of bargain — the pizza company’s success, measured in dollars, equates to the pensionholder’s success, and the company succeeds by making the best pizza for the lowest price.
That’s how capitalism works, and while I’m not going to get into a debate about the merits of that economic system as a whole, you don’t have to be a skeptic to realize that the system might not work that well for sports teams. Sports teams, at least nominally, aren’t run as profit-maximizing enterprises with no other goals. They’re civic enterprises, competing for titles, and they care about winning for its own sake.
To some extent, that’s a naive view. Teams care a ton about payroll, and every time that the Red Sox say they’re working to get below the tax threshold or the Blue Jays brag about years of control, the cracks in that worldview grow slightly wider.
But those cracks come about because we want owners to care exclusively about making the team the best it can be, while they only care partially. That’s not the same as being purely profit-driven, not even a little bit. Ask an owner if they’d accept a deal that would cost them $20 million upfront, net them $15 million in increased revenue, and guarantee them a World Series title, and I’m pretty sure they’d take it even if they knew it was a small money loser. You probably don’t buy a sports team and not want the prestige at all.
But it wouldn’t work that way if ownership were an investment fund. The fund has a duty to its stakeholders to maximize profit. Those stakeholders don’t vote on every single decision that every company the fund has any interest in makes; the fund makes decisions on their behalf by trying to maximize profit.
Let’s go back to our Alex Smallbanks example from above. You, Alex, have a small share of every single investment your pension fund makes, but you almost certainly don’t know the names of all the companies, bonds, and derivatives the fund invests in. You probably wouldn’t even know you were a part owner of a baseball team. As far as you’re concerned, your pension is just a number that grows, and it’s in your interest to have that number grow as quickly as possible.
Now imagine the process a pension-owned team would have to go through to construct its roster. Want a fourth outfielder? You better be able to show that the fourth outfielder will increase revenue by more than his salary, through increased attendance or a better TV deal or a greater likelihood of playoff berths and the accompanying windfall.
It gets even murkier when you consider how this works with baseball’s current revenue environment. Between revenue sharing and TV deals that lock in for decades at a time, there’s an argument to be made that trying to win isn’t economical anymore, that you should collect RSN fees and revenue sharing and cool it on player expenditures. That’s bad for baseball, and it feels like it’s already happening to some extent, but what we’ve seen so far might pale in comparison to what would happen if every decision had to maximize profit.
Of course, that’s not what baseball is proposing right now. As reported, they’re only offering minority stakes. In theory, the majority owners who are in control today will still be in control even if an investment fund buys up their minority stakes. But in practice, it’s a dangerous road. We aren’t privy to the internal articles of incorporation for ownership groups, but what’s to stop a hedge fund from teaming up with a billionaire to jointly buy a team, with the hedge fund acquiring a 49% stake but also dictating profit-maximizing rules the majority owner must follow? What’s to stop two investment funds from each acquiring 30% stakes, then teaming up to vote together and acquire effective control?
Without more details, we’re left to make educated guesses about the consequences of this decision. Maybe MLB has all the loopholes covered, and it will just be business as usual, the changing minority stakeholders invisible to our eyes. Maybe they had this figured out all along, and streamlining the market for buying and selling teams will be beneficial. Heck, maybe widening the ownership pool will help curtail some of the sport’s worst player-acquisition practices — owners get access to a team’s books and records, and pension funds and endowments have little tolerance for the types of behavior some teams have exhibited in the past.
But I’m skeptical. It seems pretty clear to me that maximizing profit and maximizing winning won’t always have the same solution. It’s also clear that investment funds will come down on the profit-maximization side of the equation every time. They should! They have a fiduciary responsibility to the people whose money they’re managing.
A college professor once told me something that has stuck with me ever since. Corporations are incredible vehicles for maximizing profit. Put them in any scenario, and they’ll tend towards profit optimization. The goal of regulation, then, should be to design incentives for these companies such that profit-maximizing behavior also maximizes the greater good.
Baseball, right now, doesn’t have regulations that maximize the greater good of the sport. There’s no salary floor, and little that stops teams from manipulating players’ service time to delay the free agency of young stars and keep payrolls down. Put a team in the hands of an exclusively profit-maximizing actor, rather than a sometimes profit-maximizing actor, and I don’t think we’d like the results.
It’s still early days in this discussion. Someday, presumably, an owner will want to cash out a majority share and won’t be able to find a suitable bidder, and they’ll pressure the league to allow investment funds to take majority stakes. When that happens, I hope there’s an earnest and realistic discourse about it. Investment funds are a practical way of letting many people invest intelligently without having to become subject matter experts in every single industry. I’m just not sure that baseball, as it’s currently set up, is ready for the pure dollar efficiency they bring.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
So in a few years, it will be like Sears or other huge brands destroyed by funds….. And that’s an example, not the main cause of Sears fall…. And I say this as someone that has an MBA and was a leader in a huge org….. Investment firms would be bad for the game. Very bad.
That said, I’m not sure what long term alternative there is….
I’m sure the trends in the retail industry had nothing to do with Sears declaring Chapter 11. Let’s not forget that investment firms have absolutely zero responsibility for any of the success stories we see today (Amazon, Uber/Lyft, Facebook).
Uber/Lyft are not success stories. They are extremely unprofitable ventures whose only hope is that they solve driverless cars and fire all the drivers. I have no idea what the investors in Uber/Lyft are thinking; their path towards actually being a business that makes money instead of loses it is perilously slim.
Besides, you and Mike are talking about two different things. Funding startups is different than having a leveraged buyout of a longtime brand, stripping the company of resources while piling up more debt and declaring Chapter 11.
This comment made me genuinely curious about the success of Uber, as I just assumed that it was a huge successful business; then I looked it up, and sure enough, I found that they were operating at a $5 billion loss. Thank you for the information.
Uber’s objective is to bankrupt taxis and public transport, so they become a monopoly. They’re dumping public transportation.
That’s always the knock against disruption. They’re attacking my status quo and I don’t like it.
Yea they lose a lot of money right now because they are fighting over market share and are still in growth mode.
Uber loses a billion dollars a QUARTER. Also, their exit strategy is to suddenly own a fleet of rapidly depreciating assets that they will have to insure. Super fun.
I’m not saying it’s the best biz idea ever, I’m an uber/lyft profitability skeptic myself, but there’s no way a startup going from a literal figment of an idea to being valued over a billion dollars is not defined as a success.
So the $5 billion number is a little high, because a lot of it is related to them going public. But it’s still bleeding more than a billion dollars every quarter. Every quarter! The argument is that “they’re expanding, of course they’re losing money” but it doesn’t change the fact that the “rides” part of their business is losing money. So what’s happening right now is that investors are “subsidizing” your ride on Uber–the exact number depends on how you calculate it, somewhere in between 20% and 40%. I would expect a similar number for Lyft as well (although Lyft’s numbers don’t get as much scrutiny, I can’t imagine they’re that different).
For a long time, people operated under the assumption that their plan was to be like Amazon–take a loss to drive out competition, then make money. But while Amazon was certainly willing to take a loss on many of their specific transactions, that’s not revolutionary–it’s the idea of a loss leader. You lose money on the thing that gets the customer in the door, to sell them something nicer or higher profit margin or something (this is why the rotisserie chickens at your local supermarket are likely so cheap). But they can’t do that; the only thing they’re offering is a ride. Amazon never lost this much money, not even close to it. Instead, they have to dramatically raise prices, which leaves them vulnerable to people turning to things like cars or buses or other alternatives instead; or they have to cut costs, which is virtually impossible unless they master driverless cars and fire the drivers. Also, they’ve somehow managed to avoid all of the relevant regulations that govern them, including on paying their workers, and their continued profitability requires them continuing to flout regulations and get away with them. All of this is to say, they’re screwed.
They have uber eats which grew 149% in 2018.
Uber’s also a weird valuation because it’s essentially driven by a single fund (softbank vision fund) funded in essence by a single investor (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). Saudi Arabia is basically subsidizing everyone’s rideshare. VC is in a….. very weird place right now.
Softbank?!? Isn’t that the group that poured all that money into WeWork? I hope the King likes losing money.
Yeah, same fund as WeWork. Vision fund is screwing everything up in terms of valuing companies like this. They (softbank) burned 7 billion dollars pre IPO on Uber, an are now nearly a billion underwater on their stock (per bloomberg). I was told that Uber’s bankers had to call in a ton of favors to even make the market on the IPO (that is, no one wanted to buy the stock), but I can’t find independent confirmation of that online.
That’s an interesting point, that Saudi Arabia is one of Uber’s largest backers. Is that true? Saudi Arabia’s economy is obviously built on oil…studies show that services like Uber and Lyft actually INCREASE the amount of traffic on the road — and, with it, fuel consumption. I wonder if the KSA has this in mind?
First of all, Uber had a TON of wealthy private investors who bought in before they came public with their IPO.
Second, Softbank is a Japanese company, not Saudi. It is run by Masayoshi Son. They are the largest investor in the (thankfully) massively devalued WeWork.
Softbank (a japanese bank) raised money from KSA for their vision fund- 48 billion or so of the 50 billion “Vision Fund” is KSA sovereign wealth. It’s unusual that a fund is basically funded by a single actor, but not as rare as you’d think. It’s VERY unusual that it was so poorly disguised. They must love Son, for some reason.
The Vision Fund put 7.6 billion in cash into uber, for a stake that’s 1 billion underwater after the IPO (irony is that even early investors are taking a bath).
KSA—–> Son’s Vision fund at Softbank—-> Uber. It’s not that complicated, in an industry that tends to be complicated. the proportion of Uber’s operating costs that 7.6 billion that softbank lit on fire represents? I dunno, seems like roughly 60-70% of their losses, as far as the roadshow suggested.
Amazon lost money for a decade before it made money.
Rides are subsidized by investors and drivers who make next to nothing after accounting for their auto insurance, depreciation on their car, gas and tolls, the double tax hit for Social Security, and health care coverage.
They lose money on literally every ride. The ringer has a good video on YouTube if you’re curious.
https://youtu.be/-RUBCU_6mjc
Uber/Lyft went from $0 to multi-billion dollar valuations in less than 10 years–I would define that as success. Their IPOs created millionaires overnight among ordinary employees who were granted stock options.
Sears had a high likelihood of going bankrupt regardless of the PE investors. Just walk into a Sears store 3 years ago and you can see why. Those stores were so old, and out of touch with today’s consumer and market environment (see: Amazon). The firms were investing in the Sears brand, which despite its declining sales and market share still had value, in hopes or revitalizing and turning around the business. Difficult to do so without an abundance of capital, which can be made available through debt. The retail industry traditionally run high debt loads to begin with.
There are thousands of success stories in the leveraged buyout space. Many are business of which you and I have never heard. Most businesses that have IPO’d and were owned by a PE firm are likely a very nice return for the private investors (which usually include pensions and endowments as beneficiaries, so the layman wins as well). Companies sold privately also yield strong returns since strategic buyers are willing to pay a premium, and even other firms are willing to pay up since there is so much capital floating around in the private markets. The media never covers these stories though; they only cover the stories when jobs are lost and debt was used, and yes it’s a shame that jobs are lost no doubt, but many jobs are created within portfolio companies of the investment industry as well, and this is often overlooked.
Their valuations are absolutely meaningless. Look at WeWork right now. Same story, different dance.
Wework has legit conflict of interest and governance issues. Different story.
Absolutely agree. You have researched the business model.
The trouble here is that you’re defining “success” as “make a bunch of money for investors who manage to cash out.” The fact that investment funds define success in this way is exactly what this article highlights as a problem re: MLB. (It is also, arguably, a problem in every industry for labor, consumers, and the environment)
Uber employees were not turned into millionaires the way early employees of Microsoft were. Drivers remain exploited and poor. Don’t know what fairy takes you’ve been told but you’re way off.
uber doesnt consider drivers employees, the state of california does though…
Piggybacking on this, those companies are losing absurd amounts of money. Billions upon billions. Even the spinoffs are getting killed as well. I’m sure they know something that we don’t, but I am unsure what it could possibly be.
I have a guess, but it’s nothing more than that. To a certain extent, people who are the top of the company (or any company at all) have been deliberately selected for their optimism about the future. The way this is supposed to work is that investors stop giving them money, because objectively the business model is totally unsustainable, but that’s not happening. So they just keep on plugging away with what their plan is, despite it being a waste of money.
To a certain extent, what they know is that as long as people keep on giving them more money, they can keep on drawing salaries. I don’t think they’re deliberately operating a Ponzi scheme–I think they really do believe they’ll make money someday–but the end result here is going to look like it: The people who got in at the beginning but cashed out are going to be really happy they did…and those who stick around until the end are going to lose it all.
shades of crypto…
until 2018 Amazon’s only profitable division was AWS (which, to be fair, they basically owned nearly all of the infrastructure on which the internet is built)
Are all y’all trying to tell me you’d rather own a farm stand that rakes in a net profit of 200k a year than Amazon or Uber???
Yes, I’d rather own a farm stand with a net profit of 200K a year than Uber. Amazon would be a more difficult choice, personally. Then again, I’m not necessarily looking to completely maximize my wealth accumulation.
If I had a stake in Uber, the primary value of it for me would be finding some other sucker to pay me money for it, so I can invest in something else.
Amazon is clearly a different story.
Than Uber, yes, because there is no realistic, sustainable path to profitability for Uber. Amazon is not a good comp for Uber.
How is it possible for anyone to compare Amazon and Uber?
Everything people say about Uber now they said about Amazon ten years ago.
Of course they were also saying it about Yahoo and Pets.com.
sears hasn’t had a profit since 2011 soo….
Uber is losing a lot of money.
Uber stocks have fell about 25% in five months since the IPO.
Uber still has a market cap of $55B.
These are all true.
Calling Uber “not a success story” is applying an unrealistically narrow definition of ‘success’.
It has been very successful at enriching people who got in at the ground floor, so they personally have been extremely successful, but as a business it’s pretty bad. The whole point is to make more than you spend, and not only is it not doing that now there’s almost no path to doing it in the future.
This, it’s similar to a pyramid scheme. Keep recruiting investors for the founders and early backers to cash out. Then let it crash. I doubt that was the conscious plan at the start. However, that’s essentially what will happen to Uber barring a miracle.
Futbol Club Barcelona & Real Madrid are owned by their socis. Like the Green Bay Packers. They have more revenue than any baseball team.
Can’t speak for the futbol, but Green Bay Packers stock can’t be sold by shareholders once purchased. So the franchise is not something that can be invested in, as described by this article.
AAPV, if a company has a lot of “revenue” but generates no profit is that a good thing?
Real Madrid is able to generate tons of profit. Forbes values it at $4.2 billion and globally it competes with Dallas Cowboys, NYY, and Manchester United as the most valuable sports franchises . In addition to attendance and other ‘local’ revenue, it generates sponsorship (eg 1.8 billion over 10 years from Adidas), media rights, etc.
The difference is that because the owners are basically the fans, those profits get plowed back into the product on the field and in the stadium.
BVB Dortmund in the Bundesliga is a publicly traded company in Germany.
Was going to make a comparison to some European soccer teams, but I don’t know quite how it works in Spain with those clubs, but isn’t that Packers “ownership” thing mostly a myth anyway? They offer “stock” only once every few decades and the stock can’t go up or down and you can’t sell it. From what I understand, the only things Packers “shareholders” receive is a trip to the annual meeting and a certificate, with the special ability to buy exclusive merch. It sounds like a fan club to me, rather than an actual wise investment. It’s more like people actually buy it so they can say they “own” a football team, when in reality, they are essentially just another fan, who gets some special perks.
Now, there are several European soccer clubs and European racing teams that are publicly traded, but I’m not as familiar with how it would work to be an investor of those, but I imagine it’s not like the Packers at all.
It sounds like a fan club to me, rather than an actual wise investment.
Depends what you define as ‘wise’ investment. You define that as extracting money from the business in order to fund a vacation for yourself? As putting in the capital needed to fund a team in order to watch a better team play the sport on the field?
The first definition is presumably the one that MLB owners now want to encourage – and no doubt that will be the definition that is most attractive to the hedge fund, pension fund, and luxury-box buying crowd who are perfectly content to suck on the taxpayer-teat for that ‘fan club’ perk without actually paying the cost.
Just throwing this out there for discussion, but what do you guys think about having the cities where teams reside able to invest in those teams, in concert with them receiving redevelopment funds for new stadiums and other things. I’ve often thought this could be a best-case scenario for the future of team ownership, and it could also help prevent teams from relocating, which is something I hope we can all agree is terrible.
I think everyone except MLB can agree that teams relocating is terrible. For MLB that threat is exactly what allows owners to suck at the taxpayer teat.
well if teams are going to use tax money to fund their stadiums, citizens who pay taxes to fund said stadium should get monetary value back. “oh but you get a new stadium!” doesnt cut it if me and others have to fund your business and you privatize the profits.
FTR, Sears hasn’t earned a profit since 2011.
And it’s not like Sears is dead. It’s in Chapter 11, so it can restructure and come back, and their CEO is going down (or up) with that ship it seems no matter what.
Fine, I could have named about 10000000 companies that no one has heard of……and I literally said it wasn’t the main reason….bur sure.
bankruptcies are definitely not the majority of outcomes for PE. if they were, there would not be a PE industry. there’s numerous unheard stories of companies growing like weeds, and as a result, job creation, due to PE capital infusions.
Sears failed because they weren’t customer focused 25-30 years ago. Good products but poor customer experience.
Just like with taxis once ridesharing appeared!
https://prospect.org/economy/sears-gutted-ceo/
and if you want the ‘establishment’ article
https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamhartung/2016/02/11/the-5-ways-ed-lampert-destroyed-sears
Sears failed because it was systematically and deliberately destroyed by its PE owners
Lampert runs ESL Investments, which is a hedge fund, not a PE fund.
Lots of reasons Sears failed, but all stem from being a dinosaur and unable to drastically adapt their business model.
We already have a team in MLB that is owned by an investment vehicle: Atlanta Braves. They are owned by Liberty Media, which is really a tax advantaged mutual fund. I worked for a company that was owned by Liberty Media. They are lawyers and accountants who own pieces of many companies and big stakes in a couple, the Braves and Sirius XM radio. They are maximizing shareholder value and minimizing taxes. It’s what they do.
The Braves have a league average payroll. They are in the 10th largest TV market. With two teams in NY, LA, Chi, and SF, they should be about 14th in payroll, which is where they are, so it may not be all doom and gloom.
Liberty Media basically sells itself to investors as a fund that has specific expertise in sports and media as well. They do seem able to extract excess value and ARE interested in the quality of the product. However, I can think of a ton of other private equity and private equity adjacent firms that would just try to strip the teams down to the studs if they think it’s unprofitable to have a good product on the field.
I can think of a few private individual owners who would just try to strip the team down to the studs as well, if they thought it was unprofitable to have a good product on the field.
Thanks for your level-headed response, a reprieve from the lurid dystopias imagined by the other commenters on this thread — all from what, selling a baseball team? Here’s what going to happen:
1) Current owners (including minority ones) benefit since their shares are more liquid and more bidders can pursue teams.
2) As team sale prices go up, long-term returns go down so this little $10B industry won’t add to the income/wealth inequality worries that tomerafan panics about.
3) Ticket prices are demand-driven, so no, they won’t skyrocket.
4) Baseball decision-making won’t change much. For all the talk about correlation between payroll and wins, there’s not much talk about causation. Every team follows the Astros/Cubs model: build a team organically first through the draft/J2/player development/prospect trades and then spend money on free agents or through trades for veterans to finish the team. And then, here’s the key part, hope that extra spending actually works, ie, the players you signed continue to be good, which is no where near a given.
A pension fund or hedge fund isn’t going full Loria because they care not only about operating income but also about the long-term value of the team brand. This is how they maximize the sale price of the team when they’re ready to sell.
Great writing by Ben Clemens — some of the best I’ve seen on this site and I’ve seen a lot of good writing here.
Thank you. That was exactly what I was thinking reading the article. A LOT of concern about short term “profit taking” at the expense of the quality of the franchise. Problem is that hurts the long term valuation of the asset.
Obviously, you don’t want to operate at a loss, but, the best way to build the value of the asset is to win. & hopefully win profitably. Honestly, a smart owner might pay someone like Jeff Luhnow, Brian Cashman or Andrew Friedman, $10 or even $20 million a year to do his thing. They have certainly proven they can win by building a solid organization, using analytics, finding inefficiencies, etc..without the “Dombowski model” of just spending big. Hire someone like that, build it up, win big for 3-4 years & you can sell at a high point..& I’ll bet the return is higher than any “Raze it to the studs” model.
I’m not sure the Braves’ ownership arrangement is the best model for corporate ownership of sports franchises. It’s my understanding that a condition of the approval of the sale of the Braves to Liberty Media as part of a larger deal was that Liberty Media would remain at arms length from the running of the franchise. Salaries and payroll are not dictated by Liberty but rather by the team’s cash flow and revenues. The Braves can reinvest the team’s profits in payroll, or as we’ve seen lately, in development ventures. Those decisions are entirely up to Braves executives, though, and any interference by Liberty would be a violation of the conditions of the sale of the franchise.
Do you have any more information on this? This is the first I’ve heard of these conditions.
Link to 2016 interview with the Liberty Media CEO. One note is that they HAVE increased the payroll, and the team value has roughly doubled (to 1.5 billion from 800 million)
“https://www.ajc.com/sports/baseball/ceo-maffei-liberty-media-happy-owners-braves/qvS4HE93k40aypyrsZMfeN/”
They increased payroll because of the Battery driving up the Braves “black box.” They used way more of the battery money to pay down debt to deal with MLB’s debt rules which they had previously ignored. One of the concerns going forward is that this is the model, the Battery has a higher ROI than the team, so the Braves will essentially be held to assume debt for a real estate venture. Liberty grows the Battery, the Braves assume and pay off the debt, the Braves/Battery increase in valuation which helps Liberty.
Even then, they can’t put it all into debt so the payroll increases. That’s fine. But don’t forget the left hand in all this, it is predicated on a very heavily criticised move out of Atlanta and into a partially publicly funded stadium in an area ripe for development. Most teams won’t be able to do that and I don’t know that anyone here thinks we should encourage it if they could. Without the Battery I can’t imagine a scenario where the Braves increase payroll, or even maintain it.
And all this ignores my own personal fear of conflicts of interest. Liberty very nearly bought the media companies that the Braves contract with. The Braves already have a terrible tv deal, but imagine if that had happened. Liberty would’ve been faced with a choice, realize profits with the Braves by giving them a market deal, or with the media company. If they’d gone with the former they can’t use the money, it belongs to the Braves. If they choose the latter they can use it, or give it to the Braves. There’s no logical reason not to do the latter. I wouldn’t have ruled out the Braves TV deal getting even worse.
It does seem like a case of perverse incentives. I guess the big question is, what exactly drives the valuation of a sports team? Obviously the big one is the local market, but how does a team’s performance or historic significance/reputation in the sport drive the value of the team? Is it a notable amount? Because the impact of the team’s success seems like the only viable way to align the incentive of profit and team success.
But I’ll be the first to admit I have no idea how that gets accounted for.
This is well written and thorough from the baseball side of things, but I would encourage you to also consider the non-baseball side of things. It’s not popular to be a believer in capitalism these days, but amidst all the discussion of wealth inequality in society is that fact that public markets are literally shrinking in size in terms of the number count of investment opportunities. Sophisticated investors are allocating more of their capital to private markets, which can create a self-fulfilling cycle.
The impacts on professional sport can be managed through the league’s terms of the standard limited partner agreement; see, for example, the NFL. But the impact on society is greater if only billionaires or hundred-millionaires can invest in the types of asset classes where “you would have realized a 14.4% annualized return on your investment, roughly double the return you would have gotten by investing in the S&P 500.”
Ordinary investors who do their research are finding that one of the many reasons for muted forward projections of stock market returns is the shrinking size of the opportunity set – creating a perceived need for mom and pop investors to have investments in non-public assets in order to earn return streams consistent with historical expectations. And even if the average family is not thinking about this, their pension plan administrator and retirement plan custodian are.
As a result, markets are changing to democratize private investing and expand access so that more people can participate, since numerous studies show (and common sense provides) that most private assets outside of small businesses are owned by either retirement plans, endowments, and the already-wealthy. There are interesting discussions to be had about whether this should be the case, whether small or less sophisticated investors could or should invest in less liquid assets, etc. but the data is what it is.
This, for me, is more important than the baseball side of things. Absent structural changes to the way we invest, as a society, we will not solve (or perhaps even dent) the issue of wealth inequality when the (perceived) highest-performing assets are only available to a relatively select few. This affects not only sports franchises but private real estate, growth/buyout investments, etc. Perhaps this could have been avoided in an age where pensions were a more dominant form of influence on retirement, but it’s not the case now.
Your points are interesting, but as he had a column to write (already, perhaps, among the longest at FG?), his clear statement on the fact seems reasonable:
“That’s how capitalism works, and while I’m not going to get into a debate about the merits of that economic system as a whole, you don’t have to be a skeptic to realize that the system might not work that well for sports teams.”
I like Notgraphs, but I also like that the column was about baseball and not about how/why to democratize investments. Ben did an incredible job making this readable for just about any baseball fan while showing us how to dig deeper if we want to–thanks to him and Meg!
Your point is fair and well taken, and my comment was in no way meant as a criticism of the article itself. I agree – Ben did a great job with tricky material in a sports setting.
I think an interesting point raised by this article and this comment is that the teams are only really worth as much as people can pay for them. If your pool of potential buyers is like 5 people, and they already own a team, that $2 billion valuation might as well be in Zimbabwean dollars. This is already a problem in private equity, where a bad bet on a firm can result in the assets getting sold for pennies on the dollar (Domino’s deal that Dave Brandon messed up comes immediately to mind) in part because the potential buyers know the market is very small and can lean on the selling firm.
Creating team derivatives provides more liquidity here, but the risks are huge. My intuition has always been that sports team making any profit at all is a relatively recent phenomenon, and not guaranteed if we have another recession. Like, I’m almost certain sports teams’ value is going to be perfectly correlated with the market, and that’s not great for an alternative asset strategy.
Yeah, this isn’t good at all. You’re going to have financial institutions try to buy up stakes in teams and use it for who-knows-what financial derivative/debt-financing is legal at the time, funneling the profits elsewhere and stripping payroll. In theory, this is taken care of by requiring them to be minority stakes, but a lot of minority stakes are going to make an interesting team ownership structure that we can’t really predict. And it’s going to push prices so much higher that not even regular old billionaires are going to be able to be a majority owner, hastening the end of this model. I think it’s safe to say that baseball as an institution has been served well by capitalism in the past, but you really don’t want to enable vulture capitalists another window into baseball ownership.
I think this is an excellent article. As far as I can tell, the economics and law are well explained. The author lays out how all the relevant parties can act in their own best interest — nobody is a bad guy, but we still might end up in a bad situation.
The question that comes to mind is why now?
Some possibilities are:
– helping teams with big debt loads reduce the bill but retain control (Marlins, Dodgers?)
– Helping smaller market teams: Cleveland needs to buy out minority owner Sherman and Sherman might need cash for the KC rebuild (maybe a stadium?). Maybe Oakland’s new stadium/relocation?
– Insurance against the decline of tbe RSNs. Team values are based on today’s revenue streams, so maybe opening up ownership sources and increasing competition for shares might offset lost value if RSN revenues go down and streaming doesn’t fill tbe gap.
Those funds need to be careful: buying into a baseball team might be a short term revenue boost and a long term revenue drop. Baseball team ownership has long operated on the “bigger fool” model and sooner or later team values will exceed the available fools. Especially if a wealth tax actually manifests.
Caveal emptor.
Interesting about insurance against the decline of RSNs. We know that cable will be dead sooner rather than later, and the money can’t keep exploding like it has in the past decade or so. This new type of ownership could be the next great ownership-money-making scheme
“Corporations are incredible vehicles for maximizing profit. Put them in any scenario, and they’ll tend towards profit optimization. The goal of regulation, then, should be to design incentives for these companies such that profit-maximizing behavior also maximizes the greater good.”
This is incredibly optimistic and in the globalization scenario patently impossible, just look at the NBA and China.
Profit maximization has existed in MLB, and professional sport, for decades. There are fewer and fewer crazy solitary owners who are willing to break the bank for a key free agent, and more teams that used to be owned by tech corporations (Nintendo, Mariners) or that are currently owned by a gigantic corporation (Rogers, Blue Jays). Further to that, this corporatization/investmentization is not unique to MLB. When the Raptors won this year’s NBA championship, the first person they gave the trophy to was… the CEO of Bell Canada, the gigantic telco that co-owns the franchise. And even the NHL Maple Leafs were owned by a teachers’ pension plan for nearly two decades, and they turned out all right.
The drawback of all this is that one questions whether the investment fund / big corporation actually “cares” about the team, or cares more about making a buck. Unfortunately, this is nothing new, and is an issue that bothers the fan bases of those “big corp” teams. We need more crazy owners.
MLB doesn’t have real revenue sharing like other leagues……IF the entire system changes, then different ownership structures might be good for the game. Heck, different ownership structures might lead to changing how revenue is divided, and other parts of the financial system of MLB….
The last of the “prestige” owners was probably Illitch.
These days teams (even tbe Yankees and Red Sox) are run as businesses expected to be profitable.
The only real difference is the window of profitability: some teams are willing to dip into the red for a year or two in return for downstream profits while others expect a profit each and every year and tie payroll solely to attendance. Some believe you need to spend money to make money while others want constant cash. The latter are the reason why contributors to revenue sharing hate the system. The Yankees in particular claim they don’t mind paying if the money ends up on the playing field but certain owners are known to pocket their revenue sharing income.
Question – isn’t this kind of already what happened with the Dodgers? I can’t remember the details, but it wasn’t something like the owners were investment fund managers who leveraged the assets from their investments to buy the Dodgers?
The McCourts did this. They somehow bought the Dodgers almost entirely on credit, broke the Dodgers up into about a zillion different entities, leveraged it to the hilt, and lived it up. The financial shenanigans McCourt engaged in to do this is nearly impossible to overstate.
I think I’ll wait on the doom-and-gloomish assumptions until we know more about what *exactly* MLB is on about here. Green Bay Packers, anyone?
I understand the author’s premise that allowing ownership structures of this kind needs to be handled *the right way*, but do we really think that the KKRs and Cerberuses (Cerberi?) of the world would be worse owners than 1980s George Steinbrenner, Jeffrey Lauria, the Wilpons or Marge Schott?
I mean, I’d bet a ton of money on Carl Icahn or Ackman turning the Mets around even if they ran it like a micromanaged fiefdom, let alone if they bought it and told their guys to manage it. It’s stunning to me that leagues tolerate as much mismanagement from ownership as they do.
How was George bad? His team skyrocketed in value, and they won a lot of games…..the others? Agreed…..
Lauria was really bad.
The others were “merely” stupid.
No intelligence test needed to buy a team.
That’s why I qualified him as 1980s George Steinbrenner — he was universally (in NYC) despised at that time.
Alright wealthy readers of Fangraphs. Now is our time! If we just got a small donation of 1 million each we could finally show what we are capable of.
There is an oxymoron in your first sentence
There’s at least some evidence that relatives of owners/executives have been commenters in the past; Fangraphs is/was a very niche site focused on monetary valuations of incredibly expensive employees. Every corner of the internet is not necessarily populated by your generic interpretation of e.g. a redditor.
Take a joke, man
Clearly.
I think there is an upside to this development that Ben and the commentators below have missed. This change could conceivably allow the Cities where the teams are located to invest in the teams as Minority Owners. Cities could also demand a minority equity stake in the team through an investment vehicle in exchange for public funding of stadiums. If the requirements ultimately further erode to allow investment funds to take majority stakes in teams host Cities could conceivably acquire majority ownership via an investment fund.
City ownership of a team has worked well for Green Bay and the Packers.
Joan Kroc did try to give the Padres to the City of San Diego only to be blocked by the other owners and might have actually succeeded if these types of investors were allowed back in the 80s.
I don’t want Chicago politicians anywhere near my teams.
Demanding an equity stake is just a different way of asking for the team to pay for the stadium, though, right? If they kick and scream anytime a city asks them to pitch in cash, I’m not sure why anything would be different if the city demanded equity.
Generally the debt terms for public financing are far superior to what private companies can receive.
To clarify, municipal bonds are tax advantaged, which allows for a much lower interest rate in many cases.
I look forward to the day when NewYorkYankessInvestCo, through a web of subsidiary organizations, purchases a majority share of the Kansas City Royals and turns them into a AAAA farm team.
Oh, back to the 50’s?
Look at the history of tbe 50’S KC A’s and 60’s Cleveland trades with NYY.
This problem already exists, so I am not sure the rule change is that consequential, especially if investment funds are restricted to minority stakes. The bottom line is baseball has become such a good business that prospective owners are no longer simply competitive sportsmen looking for an expensive toy, but rather investors looking for both asset appreciation and annual income. And, what makes baseball such a good business is revenue is no longer tied directly to attendance, which tended to be elastic with regard to actually winning games. Shared revenue and long-term TV contracts alone are enough to sustain profitability through losing seasons, so there is no urgency to win.
Unfortunately, I don’t see the likes of Steinbrenner, Ilitch, Kuaffman re-emerging. Today’s owners want to win, but only to the degree it maximizes profit margin. That’s why the MLBPA should push for a financial based incentive for teams to win games. Maybe something like this (https://tinyurl.com/y99jwbtk) could get owners to rekindle their competitive spirit.
As much a side effect of data-driven decision making as the reluctance to pay big bucks to aging one-dimensional players.
Can’t expect owners to be smart one way and silly another.
(Though it still happens from time to time.)
I may be wrong about this, but doesn’t the winning team of the Premier League in England get a huge cash prize as well? That’s more of a financial incentive for winning teams. That expensive free agent could pay for itself with a World Series win
Sure, but even the best team on paper doesn’t usually win the World Series. Doesn’t the Premier League not have a playoffs? Much easier to predict who will have the best 162-win record over who will win the championship.
There’s still a risk/reward calculation to be done, but the prize would have to be extremely high to justify signing that ~30 million player on a win % basis alone (this is of course not considering extra revenue from increased interest, which varies wildly by player and market).
Some things that might be relevant but I haven’t seen mentioned:
1) The potential for new income streams from sports betting changing the revenue structure of MLB teams in a meaningful way at the same time as new investors are allowed in. Presumably these income streams have even less relationship to salaries, player development, and analytics expenditure than regular attendance and broadcasting revenues might (even fixed tv contracts depend upon the solvency of the networks), reducing at least relative marginal profitability of these kinds of expenditures.
2) The new CBA. How it shakes out could have enormous influence on the capacity of team ownership to strip down expenditures. The NHL and NBA have more than a few corporate teams (both of Toronto’s, NY rangers and knicks), but both have meaningful salary floors in comparison to MLB’s effective salary floor of 25*league minimum.
3) The classic argument for vertical integration is avoiding double marginalization. Internalizing the market between tv networks and sports teams avoids this problem, and is much more easily financed when a greater variety of vehicles are available given that corporations generally own RSNs. The behaviour of some teams like the Yankees ownership group taking big shares in their RSN would seem to be motivated by this, and could actually increase the marginal financial incentive to spend. Of course, the other attraction for ownership encompassing both teams and RSNs as I understand it is avoiding revenue sharing, and since revenue sharing is somewhat conditional on it being spent at small market teams, that could sufficiently countervail the avoided double marginalization.
This article’s understanding of business and economics is not awful, but it is a bit lacking. Prestige is an invaluable asset. It creates brand equity. The MLB team owner would accept that hypothetical deal only because the recognition of winning a World Series would lead to an increase in attendance, TV ratings, jersey sales, memorabilia sales, etc… that would grossly outweigh the $5 million cost differential. In fact, the only reason teams try to win at all is because that success comes with increased profitability. It’s all about the brand, and that has always been the case. Yankees have more revenues than the Mets for a reason. They also have more championships. Ditto for Giants vs Jets (NFL), etc…
The “how does 4th outfielder improve our bottom line” conversations were happening years ago. Ask the Mets, who are notorious for not signing the 4th outfielder, needing a 4th outfielder, and ending up with a first baseman in the outfield. Ask the Nats, who went “all in” but completely ignored relief pitchers. At the same time, relief pitchers just happened to be the most overpriced commodity in the current market. Sports teams do not make those types of decisions if profitability is not the driver. Moneyball is over a decade old. The steroid era just “happened” to coincide with a huge spike in free agent salaries.
I could name examples for hours, but my point is that this article underestimates the extent to which sports have ALWAYS been profit driven, and overestimates the extent to which the changes will negatively affect MLB dynamics. One of MLB’s biggest problems is that profit and success aren’t as closely aligned as they are with other sports. While other sports have poured in anti-tanking efforts, and structured salaries such that marginal improvements are always still beneficial (and also allow more teams into the playoffs), MLB has been slow to the take.
That is mainly a topic for a whole other conversation, but I say that to tie back into my original point. A sport is at its best when value creation and success are entirely congruent. Baseball was already there for a long time. If anything, the new investors might help baseball get back to that state.
This just isn’t true. There are clearly some sports owners who are not maximizing current profit or even PV. It’s more prevalent in European soccer, perhaps, where lots of big teams lose money (https://www.offtheball.com/soccer/why-are-premier-league-clubs-still-losing-money-249178/). You could argue that the increase in the team brand equity is what those owners are looking for, rather than actual cash flows, and that that is what’s driving the increases in team value, but that brand equity is only worth something to the extent that someone else values it, for precisely the same reasons. Non-material incentives can matter to ownership when ownership is concentrated.
Increase in team equity = bigger fool theory. Buy low, wait a few years, sell high.
There’s less of that kind of team flipping these days so the most common way to convert equity into cash is through minority shares.
Sorry, I guess I should have spent a few sentences on explaining brand equity in the first place. People only care about brand equity because it is a huge driver in cash flows. They are one in the same. It means more fans and more revenues in the long term. That is the whole point of brand equity. Yankees don’t have 27 rings because they have a large market, they have a large market because they have 27 rings. Most fans are bandwagon by nature. Success breeds way more interest, way more sales, way more ratings, etc…
That is why the value of the GS Warriors has gone up almost 500%, for example:
https://957thegame.radio.com/articles/forbes-values-golden-state-warriors-35-billion-no-3-nba-and-315-million-time-joe-lacob-and
Soccer teams are focusing on brand equity because what they actually want is to secure profitability and large revenues 5 years, 10 years, and 30 years down the road. The best way to do that is by building brand equity. It’s just like any marketing. Companies spend millions running commercials, ads, etc.. when they could just pocket that cash. Sports are no different, except people don’t realize that player signings, winning games etc… are also forms of marketing. Anything that associates your business with positive experiences = marketing, and it drives more sales in the long term. Sports will always pursue that because all businesses pursue that.
The author is correct in saying that teams have always been trying to chase this prestige and this level of reverence from fans. Where he missed the mark is on the “why.” He seems to think sports are different from other businesses when in reality they are exactly the same. Teams only chase that prestige because prestige is the most profitable thing in the world. The way to obtain that brand power has always been with sustained success.
I just don’t see it like any other investment. If you invest in a chocolate company, aside from profiting, you probably want to see that it tastes good when you try it. It goes much further with sports. I just don’t see people loving their team in a 100-loss season, regardless of whether they’re making money. For one thing, you stand to make way more money in a winning season and for another you’re watching the product you invested in on TV every night.
In other words, if you saw people puking up the chocolate you invested in on TV every night, you’d likely not feel good about the investment even if the Wall Street Journal said you were making money at the moment.
I actually view this as a business that would actually care about the product, whereas pure profit motivation is NOT good all around in other businesses like a pizza corporation. Does that pizza corporation care about the health of its customers? The environment? Paying its fair share of taxes?
It does if the incentives are correct. That’s what I think Ben was getting at in his brief mention of regulatory incentives. The pizza corporation would dump all of its grease into the creek down the road if it wasn’t afraid of violating environmental laws and being fined more than the benefit of improperly dumping the grease (Plus any goodwill loss of customers, etc). They won’t ever care just because they’re nice.
Ben, thanks for making this so well written. I’ve been reading Fangraphs nearly every day for what must be close to a decade and I think this might be my first post. There have been plenty of times I’ve felt strongly about situations relating to how a team is run (Cleveland not even offering a QO to Brantley..) but this is easily the most I have been moved by a potential shift in the landscape of the sport.
It should be clear to all of us that it will be bad for virtually everyone (literally any fan who isn’t also an owner of a team) if teams begin taking a hardcore position on profit maximization. This will be a focus that is aimed towards making money instead of the “greater good” which in baseball’s case is winning, or at least staying competitive for a sustained period of time.
I don’t know about everyone else, but despite my fascination with the business side of the league, it’s never been about the profitability of those decisions, it’s been the efficiency and foresight and shrewdness of the decisionmakers that construct rosters that keeps me intrigued in the “behind the scenes” action. I of course always judge those decisions by their likelihood of helping teams win, whether now or later, and not how much more they will put into ownerships pockets – because I’m part of that pool made up of “virtually everyone”.
There are plenty of parallels for us to look at as evidence of this in the world outside of sports. It’s bad for almost all of us (regular people/workers who are not ludicrously wealthy) when companies decide to maximize profit instead of investing in their worker’s well-being and their capabilities through higher wages, benefits, education, training, infrastructure to support them, etc. We are all better off when that next incremental million goes into literally anything other than more profit for ownership.
It’s the same with government/policy too, where almost all of us (everyone who isn’t just completely ludicrously wealthy) is way worse off when plans to reduce the taxes on the incredibly wealthy are imposed (essentially maximizing their profit) because there is immediately less emphasis (money available) for actions towards furthering things that fall under “the greater good”, or things that benefit society as a whole such as better healthcare for everyone, better and safer roads for us to drive on, better training for emergency workers, etc.
There is no scenario, barring one where these funds are expressly forbidden from making their investment contingent upon the maximization of profit where this will not be detrimental to the sport, and that isn’t going to happen, because none of these funds are going to want to invest in the “next 2010 Tigers” and then have the “next Ilitch” decide to go for broke for a decade before he passes away instead of helping them beat the S&P. That’s not a risk that I imagine them taking, and even if that were forbidden, what’s going to stop behind the scenes deals where there’s a quid pro quo agreement to reach “some target each year for the next 5 years regardless of the product on the field”. If these sorts of funds can invest in teams whatsoever we’ll have no way of knowing or trusting that ownership is hellbent on winning, and we already have enough questions around that without this fuel being added to the fire.
We should all be pushing for the greater good of baseball rather than our sport becoming yet another vehicle for wealth accumulation. We live in a country and world riddled by them as it is.
Great, now Bob Nutting will take investment and have a legitimate excuse for never spending any money on his roster.
I put this under someone else’s comment also….but it is possible that more fund ownership leads to fundamental changes in how revenues are shared among teams, creation of a salary floor, and other things that are good for the league overall….sort of the other side of the coin….
I think it is far from trivial that baseball clubs solely focused on maximizing profit is necessarily bad for the sport.
It might be bad for the fans of that particular team (especially compared to having a sugar daddy like Mike Illitch).
But if all 30 teams were completely owned by 30 different hedge funds all trying to maximize their profit, is the product on the field going to be necessarily worse for the fans?
It will be different, sure. But worse? Maybe, maybe not.
This is a really good point, and this is perhaps a bizarre back-end way we could get to parity: Teams like the Yankees, Dodgers, Red Sox, Cubs, and Giants have way more potential earning power than teams like the Royals or Reds. So if we actually had a perfectly competitive market (stop laughing), we would expect funds to buy into those organizations more, exert more pressure to stop spending money, and bring it more in line with the small-market owners (who presumably care more about actually winning).
It would never actually work this way for a variety of reasons, and it would screw the players who mostly get paid because big market ownership make moves to win, but it would be an interesting outcome.
Hockey’s most valuable franchise (Toronto) was owned by the Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan through the early 2000s. They didn’t win anything, but spent to the cap every year.
Since being acquired by two of Canada’s largest media companies (Bell and Rogers) who are also accountable to their shareholders, they haven’t been afraid to spend tons of money on players and things the cap doesn’t cover (staff, facilities, etc). They also structure their contracts so that their stars get the majority of their money in lump-sum payments on the first day of the season, as opposed to throughout the year as revenue comes in; something only a massively cash-rich enterprise could do.
All of this comes with the massive caveat that owning the Leafs and having the Leafs do well is arguably in the best interests of Bell/Rogers shareholders, because those companies also broadcast the team’s games and in theory more people watch if they’re doing better.
Anyway… all this to say is that this already happens in the NHL and the world hasn’t ended.
I believe the point of the article is we criticize baseball ownership but can we meet the obligations of ownership (investors) and run the business in a manner we think is better. Very thought provoking.
I’m a finance professor and I mostly agree, but we do have the example of the Green Bay Packers. You would think a city would look to maximize revenues, but they try to win in Green Bay. I know it’s not exactly the same, but I think you get my point.
>Baseball, right now, doesn’t have regulations that maximize the greater good of the sport.
Baseball has no governing body that is not simply a puppet of MLB. That’s really the problem here. The particulars of how teams are owned or even how a single league is managed only becomes a ‘concern’ when competition in the sport itself can be killed off by MLB.
It’s odd why sports governing bodies don’t really exist much in the US. They exist for individual sports – like USGA and USTA. But for team sports, they only seem to exist at the state-level for high school sports.
When the professional leagues (MLB, NBA, NFL) ARE the governing body, they have a clear and obvious interest not to ‘maximize the greater good of the sport’. They don’t want adults to ‘play’ baseball in a league of their own. They want them simply to attend/watch other people playing the sport. Not a sport but merely a passive recreation.
This is a fantastic piece, Ben. The balanced, nuanced takes are what I live for.
This speaks to one thing–teams are overvalued. There’s no liquidity for the assets changing hands. That means the asset is priced too high relative to the stream of expected returns over the holding period. Most teams likely have weak to negative cash flows from operations. Most teams don’t make money year-to-year, and this is a greater fools market for returns. Sure there is ton of non-financial value of being the guy who controls the team. But for the rest of the folks propping up that guy with their capital–good luck. Investment vehicles in the form of pooled investments for wealthy individuals will likely be the way in which MLB opens up investment. People wanting a piece of the action–i.e. greater fools. College endowments should stay far away. Bad liquidity, little to no profits/dividends annually. MLB is definitely not a growth industry. Hard pass.
Minority ownership stakes have nothing to do with day-to-day profitability. If you buy two percent of the Cincinnati Reds for $200 million in 2019, then turn around and sell that same two percent in 2025, you expect to sell for $240 million, or so. A not-immodest 20% gain in six years. Six years spent as an owner of a local sports franchise. That’s what MLB is hoping to conjure.
I understand the thinking but this seems to me like looking for a problem that will never exist. Or, more properly, a problem that already exists to some degree and would get no worse if investment funds were allowed ownership.
You mention the Marlins. Has there ever been a better example of a ownership deliberately wrecking a team’s competitiveness in order to squeeze every penny out of them? The result? The Marlins have the lowest projected value of any MLB club.
And as far not spending extra money to win…. That directly impacts the value of a franchise. Look no further than the team’s in New York City for proof. The Mets are run on the cheap and their team is valued at $2.3 billion, while the Yankees are valued at twice that amount at $4.6 billion (per Forbes in April, 2019). Investments in sports teams will be viewed like investments in rare at and collectible cars – the profit comes in the capital appreciation, not in year by year cash flow.
This should impact large market teams more than small. An investment entity should desire the Yankees or Dodgers over the Pirates. Large market teams generate more profit from ticket and corp box sales, merchandise, and branding. Moreover, their financial abilities shield them from complete tear downs so there’s no 5 year rebuild plans eroding the aforementioned revenue streams. If an investment fund were to buy 20% of the Pirates their only course of action during troubled times is to hold and ride things out or sell and take their appreciation, an appreciation possibly damaged by a lessening of ownership demand and an increase to ownership availability.