Taking A Stab at Valuing the Farm Systems
This morning, Kiley McDaniel released the FanGraphs Top 200 Prospects list, providing a remarkable source of information. We’re obviously biased, but Kiley’s doing great work with the prospect information provided here on the site. One of my favorite things he’s doing is working to break down the barriers of the ordinal ranked list, providing Future Value grades that allow for more reasonable tiers of prospects, so that less time is spent arguing over whether a particular player should be #23 or #28 on a particular list.
So, I wanted to see if I could come up with a piece that would complement the information he’s presenting, using the value of having additional information beyond just ordinal ranking. To that end, I took latest prospect valuation estimates from Kevin Creagh and Steve DiMiceli, and attempted to convert their tiered valuation estimations into numbers based on the Future Value calculations Kiley attached to each prospect on his list.
As I noted when we discussed the prospect valuation work a few months ago, the data is fascinating, but also slightly problematic for this purpose. For instance, here’s the table of values for prospect tiers according to Creagh and DiMiceli.
| Tier | Number of Players | Avg. WAR | Surplus Value | % Less than 3 WAR | % Zero WAR or less |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hitters #1-10 | 53 | 15.6 | $48.4M | 13% | 9% |
| Hitters #11-25 | 34 | 12.5 | $38.3M | 32% | 9% |
| Hitters #26-50 | 86 | 6.8 | $20.3M | 50% | 31% |
| Hitters #51-75 | 97 | 5 | $14.5M | 57% | 44% |
| Hitters #76-100 | 96 | 4.1 | $11.6M | 65% | 42% |
| Pitchers #1-10 | 18 | 13.1 | $40.4M | 6% | 0% |
| Pitchers #11-25 | 47 | 8.1 | $24.5M | 45% | 28% |
| Pitchers #26-50 | 77 | 6.3 | $18.7M | 42% | 25% |
| Pitchers #51-75 | 94 | 3.4 | $9.4M | 70% | 48% |
| Pitchers #76-100 | 105 | 3.5 | $9.6M | 67% | 45% |
While there’s no clear right way to break prospects into larger groups, the #1-#10, #11-#25, #26-#50, #51-#75, and #76-#100 tiers don’t quite match Kiley’s FV tiers from his list. So, with the caveat that all of these are estimates based on estimates, I attempted to align the surplus value allocations from their research to Kiley’s FV tiers. This is what that matching produced.
Position Players
70 FV: $55M
65 FV: $45M
60 FV: $40M
55 FV: $20M
50 FV: $10M
45+ FV: $5M
Pitchers
70 FV: $50M
65 FV: $45M
60 FV: $25M
55 FV: $15M
50 FV: $10M
45+ FV: $5M
The counts don’t line up exactly with the tiers produced by Creagh and DiMiceli, but they are close, and this does seem to be somewhat of a weaker prospect class than usual, with a lot of high-risk guys ranking quite highly. As has been supported by essentially every analysis of prospect performance, the players at the high end are worth far more than the guys towards the bottom of the list, as one great prospect is likely to outperform even a half dozen lower level guys.
With these estimated values applied to each member of the Top 200, I then summed the data at the team level in order to give ourselves something like a overall valuation of for each team’s prospects who appeared on the Top 200. Again, these are estimates based on estimates, so none of this is intended to be precise to the dollar; it is simply an effort to expand a bit on Kiley’s information and give us an idea of the overall value of each team’s placement on his list.
Anyway, caveats aside, here is how each team’s farm systems stack up based on applying the valuation model to Kiley’s Future Value grades.
And a table for those who prefer such things.
| Team | Surplus Value |
|---|---|
| CHC | $225,000,000 |
| MIN | $180,000,000 |
| TEX | $170,000,000 |
| LAD | $135,000,000 |
| BOS | $130,000,000 |
| NYM | $130,000,000 |
| ATL | $120,000,000 |
| HOU | $115,000,000 |
| COL | $110,000,000 |
| CIN | $100,000,000 |
| CHW | $90,000,000 |
| NYY | $85,000,000 |
| TOR | $85,000,000 |
| WSH | $85,000,000 |
| KC | $80,000,000 |
| PIT | $80,000,000 |
| PHI | $75,000,000 |
| ARZ | $65,000,000 |
| BAL | $60,000,000 |
| CLE | $60,000,000 |
| SEA | $60,000,000 |
| STL | $55,000,000 |
| TB | $50,000,000 |
| SD | $45,000,000 |
| LAA | $30,000,000 |
| SF | $30,000,000 |
| MIL | $20,000,000 |
| OAK | $20,000,000 |
| MIA | $15,000,000 |
| DET | $10,000,000 |
As you’d expect, the Cubs come out on top, with their collection of talent estimated to save them a little over $200 million over the team-controlled years of guys like Kris Bryant, Addison Russell, and Jorge Soler. They have both premium talent and depth, and will probably grade out as the best farm system in baseball any almost any kind of measure you’d want to use.
Interestingly, however, the Twins jump to #2 on overall value by this method, as having Byron Buxton makes up for not having as much prospect depth as some other teams. For instance, the Braves placed three more players on the Top 200 than the Twins did, but this methodology values the Twins system at $60 million more in future savings, because Buxton, Miguel Sano, and Jose Berrios provide significant expected value to the organization.
While the Braves have more players on the Top 200 than any other organization, they’re all in that 45+ to 55 FV range, where the long-term values just aren’t as high as they are with more premium talent. There’s certainly value in having a large quantity of prospect depth, but history has shown that you’re probably better off with a few high-end guys rather than multiple mid-tier prospects. The Braves farm system still comes out looking quite strong relative to the rest of the league, but this knocks them down a few pegs for lacking a true standout talent.
When he finishes his team write-ups, Kiley will have his own farm system rankings, and they may or may not look anything like these. There are enough assumptions made in this attempt to not take these literally, or to say that these are the final word on farm system valuations. But as you look at the list, I think this serves as a useful reminder of how much more the guys at the top matter than the guys in the middle and at the end. Quantity is great, but when it to prospects, quality comes at a premium.
Dave is the Managing Editor of FanGraphs.
So the Cubs have by far the best farm system in baseball, a decent team at the MLB level, have a smart and progressive front office, arguably the best manager in the game, an ownership willing to spend money, and one of the biggest fanbases in MLB…. I’m curious how they’ll find a way to continue to suck.
I feel the same way about the Dodgers, just replacing “suck” with “fall short of the World Series.” Sigh.
Mattingly
Yes… that is the primary difference, but probably the smallest factor of those mentioned. And of course they don’t have the best farm system but it’s clearly upper third.
Well, before Epstein came over, they had precisely 2 of those things (1 of which doesn’t directly help teams win games). I know this sounds crazy, but…give it a few years 🙂
Blame us!
Didn’t you see Back to the Future II? Cubs in ’15!
Just ask any White Sox or Cardinals fan. They seem to always think of something. Usually it’s just because we’re the cubs.
Isn’t that all they need? Well that, and over 100 years of history. Take that sample size to the bank.
I find it simple — prospects aren’t MLB players and until they actually make it and prosper, it’s just so much hand waiving and opinion. Also, there seems to always be too much emphasis on measurables and not enough ‘he’s a ball player’ and how he might fit in a team as an integral component.
They won’t suck, that would be too easy. They will be good, but will find new cruel and unusual ways to lose in the end. Talk to A’s fans if you want to know how to prepare for this type of thing.
How would the Moncada data point factor in? If 70FV guys are valued at $55M then how do we reconcile Moncada possibly going for 80-100M when all is said and done?
Is that surplus value though? So it’s not the value of the prospects, but how much surplus value they are expected to produce. If Bryant was a free agent he would likely make way more than $55 million over what would be his six years of team control.
But Moncada will apparently be subject to the normal salary arbitration system, so his surplus value (excluding the signing bonus) should be equivalent to a drafted 70 FV player.
I think brian is on the right track by suggesting that Moncada is getting a ton of money because teams have few opportunities to buy young cost-controlled talent through a competitive bidding process.
Supply and demand. If all prospects were suddenly thrust on the market teams probably wouldn’t pay as much as they will if there are only 1 or 2 elite talents available. Because if you don’t get one guy there are dozens of others you can sign.
That’s my thought at least. Could be completely off base.
Yeah, I think this explains it, in large part. Moancada will go for $80m because of artificially restricted supply, in that he’s the only one of these players that can actually be purchased with just cash. The other point above about surplus value vs. contract value is probably the other part of it.
It’s not quite just cash. The team that signs him, if it’s not the Yankees or Red Sox who have already incurred the penalty, will have forfeit all signings of any premium Latin American player for the next two years as well.
Sure, that’s true. What I meant is this is one of the only ways you can actually bid for an 18 or 19 year old. I guess “just cash” isn’t necessary — no other players like him can be purchased at all.
@Brian – Good points. Supply and demand would certainly play a role, but even with restricted supply it wouldn’t make sense to throw considerably more money at the player than the expected value.
The opportunity cost of that excess $25-$45M buys a pretty darn good MLB-ready player. Unless the team is awash with money they don’t know what to do with (possible for NYY, LA), they place a higher success rate on the player, or project massive inflation that we’re not properly accounting for there is little reason to make an upside-down investment. $0.02 worth…
Well, theoretically the answer is 0 because free markets and stuff.
55 is way to low. Just do the math. 30 WAR accumulated over 6-7 years. 180-210 value at market value of 7 million /WAR. Salary at 1/2 that through 6 years, so that’s 90-105 million surplus value, less development and acquisition costs of say 20 million which brings it down to 70-95 million, or in Moncadas case, -10 to 25 million (40-50 million bonus + tax) depending on bonus and market value of WAR.
Median 6 year WAR output is not even close to 30 WAR for any of the prospects. Do you really think Kris Bryant’s average outcome will be a 5 WAR/yr player!?!
You need to look at the bust-rate and average WAR of top-10 prospects. I wouldn’t consider $55m surplus value conservative at all considering the volatility of top prospect outcomes.
Just to be clear what these values represent or do not represent.
Are you stating that every player in the Cubs system could be traded for every player in the Twins system plus $45 million in future salary relief spread out over many hypothetical future years? That would be a fair trade?
Keep in mind it’s looking at “Top 200” prospects only, although the value provided by those outside of the Top 200 has probably been comparatively small (versus the Top 200).
I may be a robot.
Hi, Robot.
Chicago’s potential surplus value is more than twice as much as two other top third systems – and that doesn’t include Baez or Soler. It’s incredible what Theo’s been able to do.
It does include Soler. But yeah, it’s pretty stacked. They’ll officially graduate him and Bryant this season and still probably be around the top five. Getting Addison Russell last year was just unfair.
Yea pretty much. Taking out Bryant and Soler would put their system at about $130, which would be tied for 5th
Zero Playoff appearances in a Big market is not “incredible”. Looks like he has them on the path to being great, but let’s see them make the playoffs before calling his work “incredible”
Given the team he was handed, what he’s done has absolutely been incredible.
It helps when your team loses nearly 90 games in 5 straight seasons
We’re not talking about a Cardinals-like situation here. Playoffs and quality prospect turn-over year after year.
I’ll stroke Theo’s ego when the Cubs have a sustained run of success; not before.
Completely Agree, Alice. I think the Cubs will be contenders for the foreseeable future, but I’m not going to give Theo any credit for what has yet to happen.
Geez, no more Mr. Nice Guy.
No more Mr. Cleeee–eeee-eeean!
I thought clowns ate Alice while he slept.
He did pretty OK in Boston producing winning teams and productive farm systems, which was his stated goal when he began with both teams.
And before anyone suggests Boston was ‘saved’ by Cherington, let’s remember that not only was Cherington his right-hand throughout, but he is basically a carbon copy of Epstein – right down to the monotone voice.
The Cubs have accomplished nothing. Zero. Zilch. Nada. Congrats on winning the games best farm system by a lot…. 2012 KC Royals say hello. 2009 Texas Rangers headed by Justin Smoak and other can’t miss players. They’re prospects, that’s it. They will not all pan out. If they are lucky, 3 will.
The 2011 Rangers and 2014 Royals say hello.
It’s not exactly like Theo’s picks have been clear. Bryant and Schwarber were both picks that lots of people questioned at that time, and have turned out fantastically. Being in that position is nice, but he’s done an excellent job of picking.
Bryant was listed as the 3rd best draft prospect pre-draft and went 2nd overall. While there’s the idea that the Cubs were reportedly looking for pitching, there’s also the idea that you don’t draft for need (especially not in the first round). Nobody questioned the Cubs taking Bryant because he was a questionable pick there, but they were surprised (slightly) by them taking a hitter. Which the selected hitter was the consensus best hitter in the draft.
http://www.baseballamerica.com/college/2013-top-250-draft-prospects-may-17-jonathan-gray-takes-top-spot/
Is there any way to fold in how far these players are from contributing? As an example, Bryant and Buxton are both 70 FV guys, but Bryant has already shown that he can rake at AAA and should get his shot this year, whereas Buxton has played exactly one game above High-A.
I have two thoughts on that. First, Bryant contributing immediately is worth more, just because you have to discount Buxton to present value. Second, Buxton carries more risk, because he hasn’t shown that he can perform at as high a level yet – there’s more that can go wrong between A+ and the majors than AAA and the majors. So if Bryant and Buxton have comparable ceilings, but Buxton is further away, Bryant has to be worth more, no?
Ooh, that’s really interesting. I think time-to-majors is baked into the FV ranking somewhat (via the “Risk” rating), but a discount rate might still reveal somethings. Lordy, it would probably make the Cubs look even further ahead of the rest of the league.
The adjustment includes distance to the MLB. That’s why Bryant’s ahead of Buxton on a lot of these lists, despite Buxton’s greater upside.
To use fake, hypothetical numbers, it would be that Buxton’s got a 60% chance of being a 5 WAR player, and Bryant’s got a 75% chance of being a 4 WAR player.
The people who have Bryant marginally ahead of Buxton would then argue that Bryant’s got an 80% chance or Buxton’s got a 55% chance, and the ones with Buxton ahead of Bryant would think that Buxton has a 65% chance or that Bryant has a 70% chance.
Risk is already factored into the valuations.
You look at any top 5 in Baseball America’s various top 100s, you’ll find some brutal beats. Even players who make it and play – Delmon Young and BJ Upton were #2 and #3 for the Rays in 2004. Followed by Edwin Jackson. Assuming this kind of value is optimistic. Or possibly delusional. The other factor is farm systems trade constantly, Beane just gave the Cubs a big chunk of their future value to vault over the Twins and Rangers for this exercise. But I’d always think about the “Woods” – Kerry and Brandon – when thinking of future big league players. Prospects will break your heart.
Expected Value.
And you look at the league as a whole, every year, and you see established players falling off cliffs, too. Verlander, Hamilton, Carl Crawford, etc. The list goes on. Baseball players aren’t robots, whether they’re prospects or All Stars, and it is not a secret. I’m so very tired of people who believe they have some exclusive grasp on the idea that not all prospects make it, as if everyone is so completely deluded. It’s the same with people that think they are exclusively privy to the knowledge that projections are flawed systems.
Carl Crawford’s still an average player, though.
Well, there’s a huge strawman. In all my years I’ve yet to see a single, non-delusional poster assert that they have some special insight to prospects going belly up and, therefore, are the only ones understand that….
What I do see is people pointing out that these rankings are just so much hand-waiving with not a great deal of correlation with what happens. For the Giants, Gary Brown was considered a legit, 5-tool CF prospect and, for a couple of years, the #1 ranked prospect in the system.
Now he doesn’t crack Top-10s and even misses many Top-20 lists. Yeah, he’s got a -5-tool body that could make him be a great CF, but it really looks like he has a zero-tool head.
And Kyle Crick, the best Giants pitching prospect since Bumgarner, is dropping down the lists as well. The guy just can’t master his control and, on many lists, he’s been passed my Mella and Beede.
So, until they’re in the majors and putting on proof of their competency, it’s just hand-waiving and special pleading.
“Prospects will break your heart.”
Or sometimes develop into Hall-of-Famers, All-Stars, or solid everyday players.
No, they’re not surefire successes. But neither are they uniformly failures.
I am undecided on my robot status.
Indeed. Lots of outcomes. Including guys coming from off top 100 or 200 lists.
Maybe you should be a Bad Robot.
Mostly they fail. The numbers tell us that with a 5.6 year average MLB career, from rookie season to ‘career over,’ and 180-to-200 prospects working their way through the minors as they to get onto an MLB roster.
There’s just no way that anything but a fraction will make it in any significant way.
Mike Trout alone will deliver close to 200 million in surplus value to the Angels. Some of the Cubs will bust. And if Bryant delivers they could hit that value anyway.
Mike Trout keeps them coming back, that’s for sure. There are more Ruben Rivera’s then Mike Trouts though. And there are plenty of high WAR guys such as Pablo Sandoval or Ben Zobrist that didn’t sniff prospect lists.
This is my favorite comment in this thread, and so many 3-5 WAR seasons have come from guys who didn’t even make a top 100 (much less being at the back end or whatever). Ranking prospects is arbitrary especially when position players and pitchers are on the same list and a large portion are teenagers in A ball. The error bars are naturally so large that I’m unsure of the value in assigning dollar values here. Player growth/changes in production occur most swiftly in the early to mid 20s, but they get dollar valuations like they’re static?
Here’s an example: Buxton tears a labrum this year and ten years from now we look back on his MLB career as a couple cups of coffee sandwiched around a couple .200/.250/.350s or something. Minnesota’s farm system loses a full third of its value based on one event.
welcome to statistics, friend. it’s all about doing our best to predict outcomes with too many sources of variation to account for deterministically.
I understand – I’ve been following prospects fairly closely for almost 15 years and there are some great examples posted by others in this thread that suggest there is too much human element here to quantify as a strict production per $ statistic.
Buxton sure has been hurt a lot early in his career.
This. Prospect variance of developmental result is so high that org rankings are largely meaningless. We can tell thin orgs from stocked orgs without a ranking. We can pick a handful of ultra-high ceiling prospects out of the pile without org rankings. When you consider the extent to an org ranking in the format presented here is so powerfully influenced by having a single ultra-value guy like Buxton, is it rational to even talk about an ‘org’ ranking as opposed to a prospect ranking? Then there’s the issue that an org ranking plummets as soon as s guy reaches an arbitrary and fairly low level of major league innings. It would make far more sense for guys to be followed over their first two years or large number of innings played or the like, because a guy’s level, and thus his development, isn’t usually really settled until something like that. ‘Young talent and coming prospects’ is a FAR better picture than who still qualifies down on the Farm. Looking at the Cubs, the Mariners, and Boston in aggregate this year and next for ‘prospects and young grads’ makes far more sense—but we don’t do things that way, so the picture or relative organizational developmental success is really, really skewed by these kinds of annual rankings, to the point of silliness, really.
I know folks want to do these exercises, but to me they are the least interesting aspect of following prospects be acquired, traded, develop, or stall. (I’m not saying that to criticize the intent of the post. Folks want these posts. My reaction is the same to similar content elsewhere on the net too.)
Projection =/= Assumption…the point here is to help gauge where organizations are heading not make definitive claims regarding future success
Risk is already factored into the valuations.
I wouldn’t consider Kerry Wood a bust by any means. 27 Career WAR, 117 ERA+, and 4 consecutive seasons of 2.8 WAR or better, including a 6.2. Wasn’t an all timer, and had a lot of wasted potential due to injuries, but he was a very solid player.
The thing about quantity is that, if the guys in the middle and at the end are young enough, they can move up the lists as the top end guys graduate. Kiley has done some great work, exploring systems top to bottom and giving detailed analysis on tons of players. The Mets system for example, has players like Rosario and Marcos Molina, who Kiley has in his top 100 but are far away from the majors. They will hopefully move up and become the top end guys where the real value is. In that respect it is good to have a deep system as well as one stocked with high end guys. It just so happens that a lot of the teams with high-end talent are also deep.
I think if they’re young and in a low level, they’re also more likely to fade away and never become anything than the guys who have established themselves at AA/AAA. Their youth leads to more upside and more downside. I think if those players were expected to continue to climb the list, they would just be higher on the list to start with.
True. But it helps to have a lot of them since some won’t pan out. Kiley doesn’t mention it, but some are scared off by Molina’s delivery, which he sort of short-arms. In any event, out of Molina, Rosario, and Dominic Smith (who is in the honorable mentions), as well as Nimmo and Herrera (unless 1 loses status this year), who are more advanced levels but young for the levels, you still have a chance at 1-2 becoming top end prospects and a stocked system next year, along with guys coming up who are off the radar now starting to replace them at the back end.
I actually think Cecchini could be top 100 next year as well. Kiley tends to like the high-ceiling guys, but Cecchini put up a 101 wRC+ at age 20, mostly with a good bb-k ratio and some pop, and if he can handle ss and shows a little more progress with the bat this year he starts to look like a 2 WAR floor guy.
Curious about the statement that in MLB you’d rather have one top prospect than multiple mid-tier guys — whereas in the NFL it seems smart minds (like Belichick) have realized the opposite is true when it comes to the draft.
Any ideas as to why that might be?
Because MLB is more similar to the NBA than to the NFL. Although even in the NFL, you have plenty of SB winners that got there through a #1 pick, or by trading up (due to the QB effect). We have Indy, Denver, Dallas in the last 25 years, totaling 6 SB.
Completely disagree. MLB and the NBA are nothing alike. The NBA is a star driven league. Your chances of success are inherently tied to having a top 10 player. Each roster only has 12 players and only five share the court at once. In the NBA, a player like LeBron can influence 80% of the possessions, especially during playoff time when they are on the court for 40+ minutes of a 48 minute game. MLB and the NFL are more similar in that both have large roster sizes and attrition rates. The big difference is that NFL is QB driven in much the same way NBA is star driven. What makes the NFL different, and what makes Belichick’s propensity to trade down and hoard draft picks a smart tactic, is again, injuries and roster size. With a 53 man roster and such a high probability for injury, quality depth is more important than star power at non-QB positions. The big difference between the NFL and MLB is QBs rarely get seriously hurt relative to other positions and MLB’s closest equivalent from an impact standpoint, starting pitchers, happen to get hurt a lot.
It would be more comparable if MLB teams played once a week and the starting pitcher started every game, with maybe 2 or 3 back up starters who only pitch if the main starter gets hurt. In that world, Clayton Kershaw can singlehandedly turn a .500 team into the best team in baseball.
Eli Manning would like to chat.
In baseball you have years of data evaluating a player. You know how they have fared at varying levels of competition. It’s easy to isolate – you can compare the prospect’s numbers to others in the league.
You just don’t have that in football. It’s hard to separate individual from team/coach/competition. How much credit should a deep threat receiver get for working with a terrible QB? Or a system designed for short passing? How much credit does a lineman deserve? What percentage of the running game belongs to him? It’s too hard to quantify. When you don’t know how much is separating the top from the bottom, maybe the shotgun approach is best?
Baseball is unique in that for the most part, it is a team sport of individual battles. Outstanding players have very little opportunity to make everyone around them better (Andrelton Simmons making ground ball pitchers look great is pretty unique). Batting, in particular, is very much about the individual (as long as you’re ignoring RsBI, which most Fangraphs readers should already know).
I think the graph from this article is very telling. There is a huge gap between the top ten prospects and everyone else. There is not however, a huge difference between those ranked from 50 to 200. So to answer your question, it’s better to have one top prospect, because in baseball the top ten or so prospects are really the only ones who are a sure-thing for producing at an above average level in the majors. After that there is a huge drop off, and the difference between prospects becomes significantly less.
Article: http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/katoh-projections-for-the-top-200-prospects/
But as I posted below, just because prospect value is top-heavy doesn’t necessarily mean this is true: “You’re probably better off with a few high-end guys rather than multiple mid-tier prospects.”
In fact, given what we know about how teams like the A’s are built, couldn’t the opposite be true?
Oakland, for example, had only 3 player-seasons worth 4+ WAR in the past three years, of 128 total leaguewide. They’ve won 88, 96 and 94 games in those years. That type of success with very few “star” performances seems to point to the value of having a lot of mid-level players/prospects.
That merely says it is worthwhile for an MLB team to tank a season in order to get a top 3-5 draft pick.
I disagree with that strategy.
Except we’re not talking about the top 10 picks in the draft, we’re talking about the top 10 prospects in baseball. The correlation between those two things is not very high. Though we do know that the draft has this same sort of relationship, where the difference between the #1 overall and the #15 overall pick is probably bigger than between the 15th and 20th rounds, the draft has an extra layer of variation that prospects lists don’t have. A first-rounder who becomes a top-10 prospect in baseball in a sense has already succeeded.
Oh puhleeze. The only reason a draft order v prospect rank correlation doesn’t work is because of ‘signability concerns’ – ie a top-drafting team deliberately doesn’t choose the BPA because they are emphasizing something else. But it is still the top-drafting teams who make that decision.
There are 28 60-value or above prospects on this list. 6 were intl FA signings. 10 were top-10 picks. 9 fell out of top-10 because of ‘signability’ (all went by end of 1st round supplemental). 1 fell out of top 10 because of injury. 2 are legitimate ‘draft surprises’ (Pederson, Glasnow). That is an extremely high correlation.
Yeah – I think i actually disagree with the statement. If this top-heavy farm valuation method is accurate, then a ‘fair trade’ would be:
Cubs and Cards swap farm systems with the Cards paying the Cubs $170mm for the privilege.
Seems to me that this seriously seriously understates the value of a farm system that is regularly able to churn out above-average RP’s, back of rotation SP’s, 4th OF, utility players, backups, etc. Many of those ‘prospects’ will never sniff a top100 list. And while the names may change too often to produce the huge $ value of a single cost-controlled elite prospect, that sort of system will also never produce perpetually sucky MLB teams either.
Look at the KC Royals as an example. They had the indisputably great farm system a few years ago – AND they have now achieved the dream of high-draft pick team of getting to a World Series.
Their 5star prospects from 2011 were – Moustakas, Lamb, Hosmer, Myers, Montgomery. Their lower tier prospects then were – Duffy, Ventura, Perez, Giavotella, Crow, Will Smith, Coleman, Collins.
It is ludicrous to assume that the lower tier basically contributed next to nothing while the ‘elite prospects’ were the ones who led the Royals to the promised land.
Yeah, I think that’s the direction I’m leaning, too — to succeed, a franchise needs unsung organizational depth as much as a single star prospect/player (since, unlike the NBA, that one player can only impact a game 4-5 times on offense plus some small number of times on defense).
So while I agree it’s pretty clear that the dropoff between #10 and #50 is large (and larger than you might see in the NFL), I’m not sure that means you’d rather have the #10 prospect than something like 50, 70 and 90.
friendly reminder that will middlebrooks, jackie bradley jr, and anthony ranaudo all were guys who had $10 mil or higher “expected values” by these types of calculations in the past. You have to take these things with a grain of salt
especially when you look at teams with prospects who have huge hype trains
correct swihart to 50 fv and owens to 50 fv and the red sox are down to the middle of the pack
And lots of players over-perform their projections as well. That’s kind of the whole point of calling them projections 🙂
I’m not sure you understand how the concept of expected value works. Guys like Middlebrooks bring the expected value down. Guys like Mike Trout bring it back up. That’s why you look at 50+ players in each category.
nope, that ain’t me.
must just be a red sox fan annoyed that this article didn’t rank his system elite.
and seemingly bitter about the recent red sox prospect failures too, looks like.
That interpretation doesn’t make any sense at all.
interpret it any way you want, but that guy ain’t everdiso, so you guys are responding to an unserious post intended to make no sense.
As opposed to your regular serious posts that make no sense.
Do the Red Sox pay for all the real estate they own inside your brain?
the 5th best system ain’t elite. Far from it in fact
red sox prospects fail at a rate higher than their counterparts from other teams when controlling for their average rank on prospect lists
I’ve got calculations to prove it, but I’m not going to share them
I think its sweet that you guys can take your frustrations out on me, but unfortunately its not my fault that your $200,000,000 team finished in last place. or that your prospects fizzled. that wasn’t my fault. shooting the messenger never helps.
but go ahead and keep shooting. I’m happy to take it if it makes you feel better about your team.
^ not the real everdiso. you can tell because of their grammar and because I know my facts and the red sox did not run a $200mil payroll last year
of course I know that the red sox won the world series and have done so 3 times in the past decade, it’s not about that
its about a systematic overrating of their prospects through industry “experts” and of their 2015 team from “projection systems” that have a clear bias that it seems like only I can see through
everdiso from 7:39 is an imitator
red sox won the world series in 2013. your post makes it sound like it was this past season
the rest of your points make have been supposed to come off as sarcastic but in reality are solid points
10 Million is not a lot of WAR these days. You could argue Middlebrooks provided that in his rookie year.
Risk is already factored into the valuations.
Question: For those who prefer such things, should there be an associated FanTables.com?
Call em “Fables” for short?
” but history has shown that you’re probably better off with a few high-end guys rather than multiple mid-tier prospects.” What history are you talking about?
Dave, when you update the Trade Value series later this year, it would be interesting to add the “surplus value” calculation to the MLB players so we can compare that surplus to what you’re estimating from these prospects. For instance, Bryant, at 70 FV, is projected for $55M in surplus (estimate). How would that compare to the surplus Machado is delivering today, who was mentioned in the same segment with Bryant in July (http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/2014-trade-value-the-top-10/). Are prospects “worth” more than MLB “stars” who have yet to peak? Just a question.
Something wrong with the surplus values. As I rememeber, Kiley had
FV WAR (daves surplus value)
70-5 (55)
65-4 (45)
60-3 (40)
55-2.5 (20)
50-20 (10)
45-15 (5)
Over 6 years, at that annual WAR and assuming 50% surplus value at a market rate of 6 million /WAR and a devleopment acquisition cost of 20 million, the surplus value should look like this
FV-Accumulated WAR – Surplus Value
70-30-90
65-24-52
60-18-39
55-15-25
50-12-16
45-9-7
This is close to Daves numbers at the lower end, but the top prospects are being severely undervalued IMO
55 is way to low. Just do the math. 30 WAR accumulated over 6-7 years. 180-210 value at market value of 7 million /WAR. Salary at 1/2 that through 6 years, so that’s 90-105 million surplus value, less development and acquisition costs of say 20 million which brings it down to 70-95 million, or in Moncadas case, -10 to 25 million (40-50 million bonus + tax) depending on bonus and market value of WAR.
The issue is that Dave’s source uses real numbers based on actual performance, rather than existing in a fantasy land in which all prospects actually pan out.
70 FV should be 70 million surplus value
He’s talking about how much prospects who are ranked as having 70 FV actually turn out, not how valuable a true 70 player would be in their first 6 years.
I’d like to see the variation in this value over time..
And GM…
A useful tool when constructing models like this is to take a data set where we know the outcome, and see how close the model comes to “predicting” what actually happened. How does this model look if you apply it to farm systems and prospects of 5 or 10 years ago? If it values those systems more or less in accordance with the way they have actually produced major leaguers with value, then there may be something to it. I remain skeptical of the extreme variations shown in the graph above until that is done, however.
Oh, you mean like the research that led to these valuations, which was based on the actual production of Top 100 prospects in a data set spanning over 20 years (1994-2005)?
http://www.thepointofpittsburgh.com/how-much-an-mlb-prospect-is-worth-updated-trade-surplus-values/
This isn’t a “model.” It’s a historical record of how valuable tiers of prospects have been, on average, over the last 20 years.
I’m Boulder there be some sort of discount value applied to prospects due to variance/volatility/uncertainty?
Boulder Discount applied? Value good.
“The counts don’t line up exactly with the tiers produced by Creagh and DiMiceli, but they are close, and this does seem to be somewhat of a weaker prospect class than usual, with a lot of high-risk guys ranking quite highly.”
I predicted the draft slot restrictions probably would chase away the multisport talent.
Possible relation?