The Argument Against Edwin Encarnacion
The title of this post serves is a warning, but not an absolute one. There’s a price at which just about any player becomes palatable. If Edwin Encarnacion were available to a team for just $1 this offseason, that team should sign him. For a number of reasons, Edwin Encarnacion will not be available for $1 this offseason. For a number of reasons, Edwin Encarnacion is going to earn much more than that. For a number of reasons, he’s likely to be overpaid for the services he’ll render.
Encarnacion, 33, just finished a season in which he hit 42 home runs and produced four wins above replacement. That matches very well with his last five seasons, during which he has averaged 39 homers and four wins above replacement. A standard decline from that level of production should make Encarnacion a very valuable player in this year’s free-agent class, but there are major warning signs.
In his piece on free-agent landmines, Dave Cameron wrote that Encarnacion was unlikely to be worth $100 million ($90 million in salary plus the value of the draft pick) unless he defies the aging process. How do we estimate Encarnacion’s worth? A couple ways, actually.
Let’s begin with a simple way — namely, by applying a standard aging curve to Encarnacion’s current 2017 projection. Encarnacion has been a steady four-win player for half a decade. If we were to see some decline, we might expect him to produce just a 3.5 WAR next season. Our current projections for Encarnacion estimate that he’ll record only a 2.3 WAR next season, however.
The difference for Encarnacion between losing half a win and losing more than one-and-half wins makes a big difference when attempting to calculate an appropriate free-agent valuation for him. If we were to give Encarnacion that 3.5 WAR projection for next season and then decrease it by half a win per season to account for age, that would place Encarnacion’s value for a four-year deal right at $100 million — assuming the value of a win in free agency is $8.5 million and factoring in 5.0% inflation after that. It makes Encarnacion’s likely deal seem very reasonable. Yet, the projections see his value as much lower, providing an estimated value more like this:
| Year | Age | WAR | $/WAR | Est. Contract |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | 34 | 2.3 | $8.5 M | $19.5 M |
| 2018 | 35 | 1.8 | $8.9 M | $16.1 M |
| 2019 | 36 | 1.3 | $9.4 M | $12.2 M |
| 2020 | 37 | 0.8 | $9.8 M | $7.9 M |
| Totals | 6.2 | $55.7 M |
Assumptions
Value: $8.5M/WAR with 5.0% inflation (for first 5 years)
Aging Curve: +0.25 WAR/yr (18-27), 0 WAR/yr (28-30),-0.5 WAR/yr (31-37),-0.75 WAR/yr (> 37)
So, that’s a pretty big difference. Nearly a $50 million difference. Whichever team ultimately signs Encarnacion is likely to be paying him based on his 2016 stats plus a standard aging curve. The projections suggest that would be a mistake. Thus Cameron’s characterization of Encarnacion as a “landmine.”
What might have led to such a pessimistic projection? A few different factors. We might look at the 42 homers Encarnacion hit in 2016 and and assume Encarnacion was just as powerful in previous years. Actually, though, he was just healthier. Encarnacion recorded 702 plate appearances in 2016; his homer rate per plate appearances was actually higher in both 2014 and 2015. On a rate basis, Encarnacion put up 3.3 WAR per 600 plate appearances in 2016, down from the 4.0 mark he put up the previous four seasons.
It wasn’t just numbers inflated by playing time that are a cause for concern. Encarnacion was slightly less powerful in 2016, as seen by his 14-point drop in ISO, and he struck out 25% more often, experiencing an increase in strikeout rate from 15.7% in 2015 to 19.7% last season. His fly-ball rate declined for the second straight season, and while he made up for that somewhat with the highest rate of home runs per fly ball in his career, that might not be sustainable going forward. In the context of greater offense overall throughout baseball last year, Encarnacion’s offense relative to the rest of baseball actually took a hit, dropping him from a 150 wRC+ in 2015 to a 134 wRC+ last year. His playing time masked the drop in quality.
That still doesn’t completely explain the 2.3 WAR next season, though. For that, let’s look at some similar players.
To do that, I looked for players from the last 50 years who recorded both (a) a WAR within 3.0 of Encarnacion’s 12 WAR from age-31 through age-33, and (b) a wRC+ within 10 points of Encarnacion’s 144 mark, and (c) a defensive figure worse than -10 runs (Encarnacion recorded a -40.5 DEF over that span, largely due to the DH positional adjustment). The players needed to be within 20% of Encarnacion’s 1,868 plate appearances and to have played a full season at age 33, while also recording a wRC+ within 20 points of Encarnacion’s 135 mark from 2016. That search yielded 14 players:
| AVERAGE | PA | HR | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | Def | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bernie Williams | 1948 | 75 | 0.317 | 0.401 | 0.526 | 142 | -21.9 | 14.6 |
| Ken Singleton | 1976 | 79 | 0.297 | 0.403 | 0.495 | 152 | -48.5 | 14.4 |
| Robin Yount | 2109 | 55 | 0.312 | 0.379 | 0.485 | 135 | -29.1 | 13.9 |
| Billy Williams | 2099 | 91 | 0.306 | 0.376 | 0.522 | 135 | -31.6 | 13.6 |
| Lance Berkman | 1896 | 88 | 0.289 | 0.402 | 0.530 | 142 | -28.5 | 13.2 |
| Jack Clark | 1769 | 88 | 0.255 | 0.415 | 0.492 | 152 | -43.1 | 12.7 |
| Tony Perez | 1888 | 75 | 0.287 | 0.358 | 0.484 | 135 | -16.5 | 12.6 |
| Cecil Cooper | 1859 | 74 | 0.313 | 0.347 | 0.512 | 140 | -25.9 | 12.5 |
| Reggie Jackson | 1724 | 88 | 0.285 | 0.371 | 0.524 | 147 | -36.8 | 12.1 |
| Paul O’Neill | 1646 | 62 | 0.317 | 0.416 | 0.526 | 142 | -31.2 | 11.1 |
| Carlos Delgado | 1872 | 107 | 0.292 | 0.401 | 0.572 | 147 | -52.6 | 11 |
| Dave Winfield | 1979 | 77 | 0.298 | 0.354 | 0.499 | 135 | -43.0 | 10.9 |
| Pedro Guerrero | 1717 | 54 | 0.314 | 0.394 | 0.485 | 145 | -50.7 | 9.7 |
| Dusty Baker | 1716 | 61 | 0.303 | 0.353 | 0.471 | 134 | -31.9 | 9.3 |
| AVERAGE | 1871 | 77 | 0.299 | 0.384 | 0.509 | 142 | -35.1 | 12.3 |
| Edwin Encarnacion | 1868 | 115 | 0.269 | 0.361 | 0.544 | 144 | -40.5 | 11.9 |
This isn’t that bad, at all. We see quite a few really good players on this list, including five Hall of Famers. While Encarnacion has the highest raw home-run total, all the players put up good-to-great power numbers given their eras. Before we get to the negatives, let’s take a look at a couple positives. Almost all the players in this sample played full seasons as 34-year-olds. Every player exceeded at least 400 plate appearances and the group averaged nearly 600 PA at that age. The second positive is that almost every player hit well. Just one player produced a wRC+ below 100 (Cecil Cooper), 10 of 14 players had a wRC+ above 110, and half had a wRC+ above 120. On the whole, the group averaged a 127 wRC+ at age-34.
The bad news? Despite hitting well, that group still averaged only 2.5 WAR, putting Encarnacion’s 125 wRC+ and 2.3 WAR right in line with these players considered here. It doesn’t get any better as these players age, either. Here are there stats from age 34 through 37, the potential four years of Encarnacion’s next contract.
| Name | PA | HR | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | Def | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Paul O’Neill | 2612 | 82 | 0.302 | 0.365 | 0.477 | 117 | -21.4 | 12.3 |
| Billy Williams | 2385 | 96 | 0.288 | 0.372 | 0.483 | 134 | -62.1 | 11.8 |
| Tony Perez | 2346 | 65 | 0.276 | 0.335 | 0.448 | 114 | -18.6 | 10.1 |
| Dave Winfield | 1938 | 76 | 0.286 | 0.368 | 0.483 | 131 | -40.4 | 9.7 |
| Reggie Jackson | 2062 | 109 | 0.257 | 0.355 | 0.488 | 132 | -69.9 | 7.6 |
| Jack Clark | 1349 | 58 | 0.245 | 0.39 | 0.45 | 132 | -30.3 | 6.5 |
| Lance Berkman | 1459 | 53 | 0.269 | 0.381 | 0.457 | 129 | -33.6 | 6.3 |
| Carlos Delgado | 2023 | 104 | 0.267 | 0.351 | 0.506 | 119 | -44.1 | 6.2 |
| Dusty Baker | 1571 | 36 | 0.264 | 0.351 | 0.39 | 113 | -20.9 | 5.7 |
| Robin Yount | 2397 | 43 | 0.257 | 0.33 | 0.381 | 97 | -17.9 | 5.3 |
| Ken Singleton | 2101 | 51 | 0.256 | 0.356 | 0.389 | 111 | -58.5 | 3.4 |
| Cecil Cooper | 2168 | 45 | 0.273 | 0.311 | 0.403 | 93 | -39.7 | 1.4 |
| Pedro Guerrero | 1185 | 22 | 0.269 | 0.322 | 0.382 | 93 | -26.8 | 0.3 |
| Bernie Williams | 2180 | 61 | 0.263 | 0.346 | 0.412 | 100 | -103 | -3.7 |
| AVERAGE | 1984 | 64 | 0.269 | 0.352 | 0.439 | 115 | -41.9 | 5.9 |
| ANNUAL AVG | 496 | 16 | 0.269 | 0.352 | 0.439 | 115 | -10.5 | 1.5 |
That 5.9 WAR average over four seasons is even worse than the 6.2 WAR figure at which we arrived before, when applying a standard aging curve to the 2.3 WAR projection. To be worth $100 million over the next four seasons, Encarnacion would need to be produce 11 wins during that span, a number that only two of the 14 players in this sample ever reached. It’s safe to say that Encarnacion isn’t going to limit himself to -21 runs below average on defense like Paul O’Neill did, leaving the Hall of Fame track of Billy Williams as the lone ray of hope. By age 37, four of the players from this group were no longer playing. Of the 11 who did play, only five were even above replacement, with the players totaling 0.9 WAR.
From 2012 to 2015, Encarnacion was a truly great hitter. He fell off a little bit last year; next season, he should fall off a little bit more. After that, even if he retains an above-average bat, his defensive liabilities are likely to render him a below-average player. Hitters with his profile have shown they can still hit, but they are unlikely to make a good contribution. It is good to be skeptical when we see a four-win season halved by projections the following season, but in this case, the projections seem closer to reality on Encarnacion’s future.
Craig Edwards can be found on twitter @craigjedwards.
I love seeing numbers that validate my gut.
I hear a lot of online watercooler chatter about how EE could take a career path similar to that of one David Ortiz. EE has had a career that has been relatively injury free, he wasn’t really a full time regular major league player until a little later than most players, and he also hasn’t played the field much in a few years. All of these things apparently have something to do with ones body breaking down, leading to the idea that EE can avoid the aging curve.
Now, I just made a lot of statements that regularly result in poor long-term Pujolsian decisions, but the real question here is essentially this: do players who primarily DH last longer than players who don’t?
Besides the fact that I don’t think it’s wise to anticipate that any given player will follow the path of an outlier, it should also be factored in WHY David Ortiz did what he did later in his career. He experienced a clear physical decline (something EE might be starting on now) early in his 30s, but then managed to push his production back up by changing his approach to hitting, trading some patience to “cheat” a little sooner on pitches to replace lost bat speed, while also learning to become a MUCH better hitter against LHP.
Some have said that David Ortiz was as good as hitter late as he was at his peak. That simply isn’t true. The bat speed, and the top-shelf power that went with it, went away and never returned. Ortiz succeeded in a different way, and again thanks to an overhaul in his approach.
You can never write off any given hitter’s ability to do this, but I wouldn’t bet on it. The only other hitter over the past decade or so who I saw do what Ortiz did (and, in fact, was the model that I said Ortiz would need to follow circa 2009 if he wanted to extend his career – I didn’t predict that Ortiz WOULD, because how could I know that, but I did predict that that was the kind of adjustment he would have to make, and he did just that) was Carlos Delgado after 2007. When Carlos Delgado and David Ortiz are the guys you’re hoping to mirror, you know you’re calling in a tall order.
If Ortiz was “cheating” on pitches to make up for declining bat speed, we would expect to see him severely exposed by breaking balls and off-speed, resulting in a noticeable decline in his walk rate. It seems very unlikely that simply “improving against LHP” would be remotely capable of closing that kind of gap.
Yet what we actually see is that Ortiz’s 2011-2016 walk rate is basically in line with his career norms. 2012 is oddly high, but that’s mostly explained by small sample size (only 90 games). Everything else is basically right there. His strikeout rates were actually BELOW his career norms for all of those years, and for most of them significantly below.
Also, just for giggles, his ISO was also exactly in line with career norms, though it did jump a solid 50 points this year (as did everyone).
Looking for other signs of your theory… A power hitter who is cheating on fastballs also can show up in Pull%, since they’re very literally selling out for more power. Ortiz’s 2016 Pull% is above his career norms (48% vs 44%), but the 2011-2016 span shows exactly his career average. So nothing interesting there.
When a hitter changes his approach, one really good way to spot it is to look at how he’s being pitched. Pitchers (well, team front offices really) are tremendously fast and accurate at spotting holes in swings and exploiting them. So when a hitter makes an adjustment, the pitch usage is almost always the first indicator. Here, we do see a slight difference in the 2011-2016 periods. Namely, Ortiz’s four-seam rate dropped a little bit while his two-seam, cutter and splitter rates picked up the slack. His off-speed rates (sliders, curves, changes) remained almost exactly in line with career norms. If he were cheating on fastballs, I would have expected pitchers to pound him with sliders and changeups away (LHP and RHP, respectively). Instead, we see exactly rate-standard stuff.
Something that we DO see in the 2011-2016 period is that Ortiz’s plate discipline got a bit worse. He offered at more pitches out of the zone from 2010 through the end of his career. But, as I said, this didn’t affect his walk rate at all, because he paired this with a bump in his contact rate, in- and out-of-zone. All this while his hard-hit rates remained basically static.
So oddly, no, we don’t see any evidence of Ortiz altering his approach to “cheat” on pitches to make up for declining bat speed. If anything, we see evidence of superior bat speed and control (his contact rates). Ortiz’s contact rates, btw, are absolutely stupid for someone with his ISO, but that’s a comment for another day.
I have no idea what Ortiz did that staved off his decline so completely, especially in light of his well-publicized injuries. Even PEDs can’t explain those numbers. He was just… incredibly good, and he was good in a way that almost no one else in the history of the game has been good. Not because he was the best hitter, but because he somehow managed to defy the aging curve that has applied to everyone from Ruth to Williams to Bonds.
I’ve been reading articles that say the Rockies should sign EE to fill the gaping hole at 1B. But can this fellow play defense?
The Rockies would be better off moving CarGo to 1b–question would be who takes over RF.
Stats and the eye test say he actually played 1B defense well last year, but it’s also important to remember that he only played 75 games there last season and hasn’t played 90+ games in the field since 2010. I’d feel comfortable with him playing 1B as a platoon with another DH/1B type, but I’m not sure I’d want to count on him as a full-time starting 1B.
EE defense has improved at 1B last few years. He’s very aware of fielding possibilities and can pick balls. I think he stays at 1B for next 3 years with his next team. His body isn’t ideal but he’s never been full time fielder. For any team with young power hitters his experience is value beyond the plays he makes.
“On a rate basis, Encarnacion put up 3.3 WAR per 600 plate appearances in 2017,”
Should say 2016, no?
Correct
I found this article really interesting. One thing that might have helped would have been to control for hitter type somehow. There’s a mix of high average, medium power guys like Pedro Guerrero and Robin Yount and more traditional sluggers like Lance Beekman and Reggie Jackson. Eyeballing it, it looks like the high average guys fared poorly (every .310 hitter except Paul O’Neil is in the bottom 5 for 34-37 WAR), and the high power guys fared better (all 5 guys who hit 80 or more homers are in the top 8). That kind of makes sense, given that power tends to age better than contact in general. Encarnacion is at the extreme high power low average end of the spectrum. I think your point still stands, given that only 1 of the 5 80 Homer hitters would have been worth a 100 million dollar contract, but it does make his odds of getting close seem better.
He is low-ish average (albeit not that low in context to the league who now bats like .255 or so vs almost 270 15 years ago – his 265 might be equivalent to .280 in 2000) but he acutally has slightly below average strikeout numbers.
his average will remain low-ish to to his pull and FB tendency but as Long he keeps the ball off the ground and out of the park he should be able to not plummet too much.
I would be more worried about low average hitters due to contact issues who can quickly be out of Baseball if they get above 30% Ks (Adam dunn for example).
I meant below average contact by the standards of his comps in the articles. He has the second lowest average and is a long ways behind third. Compared to 2016 in general, yeah, he’s roughly average. The point is that given similar near-elite performance, the power oriented method of producing at that level appears to age better than the contact oriented approach. Edwin, as an elite power hitter with OK contact skills, is likely to fare better than if it were the other way around, based on the comps presented.
I think he will age decently if he doesn’t get injured. I’m more worried about high strikeout sluggers but EE makes contact and takes his walks. at that age the body breaking down is a risk and thus I would give him 4 years max but I could see him keeping up a nice obp, power and maybe a 125 wRC+ on average over those 4 years if he stays healthy. (maybe something like 135,130,120,110).
of course all of that value is in the bat though and it is hard to put up 4 war just with the bat unless you hit like Ortiz.
Great article,still,someone will pony up.
RH power very hard to come by.
DH?
Of the top 10 in AL in slugging %, 8 were RHB.