The Baseball Equivalent of Throwing on the One Yard Line
Last night, the New England Patriots snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, intercepting a pass on their own goal line with just 30 seconds to spare. Before the play, Advanced NFL Stats gave the Seahawks an 88 percent chance of winning, as most teams end up converting 2nd-and-1 into a touchdown in that situation. Of course, most teams run the ball into the endzone from a yard out, and in the aftermath of the game, the primary focus was on Seattle’s decision to throw the ball rather than run it.
On both NBC and Twitter, incredulity seemed to be the most popular reaction. The overwhelming consensus appears to be that the Seahawks screwed up, and simply should have run the ball. The tenor of the commentary suggested that any other play call was demonstrably wrong; 2nd-and-1 from that spot on the field, with a running back like Marshawn Lynch, throwing the ball should apparent not have even been a consideration.
Of course, the reaction is inextricably tied to the result. Had the play worked, we’d likely be spending this morning hearing about what a genius Pete Carroll is for his creative play calling, zigging when the Patrios expected him to zag. This isn’t to say that throwing the ball was definitively the right decision, but I’m naturally wary of analysis that suggests that there is ever only one correct strategy to deploy, with no other decision ever being reasonable to consider. But because I don’t know football well enough to have an informed opinion, I started wondering what the baseball equivalent would be to the Super Bowl’s ending.
My initial reaction was to think of something like a dominant closer throwing a rarely used pitch in an 0-2 count in the ninth inning of the final game of the World Series. This is the element of surprise play, attempting to trick an opponent with a play they aren’t expecting, rather than simply attempting to beat them with your best weapon. And we actually just saw the Giants do exactly this two years ago.
The final pitch of the World Series came on Sergio Romo throwing a belt-high fastball down the middle to the best hitter in baseball. Buster Posey, on the decision after the game:
“That guy,” Posey said an hour later, shaking his own head in amazement. “He shook to a fastball there. That shows the type of guts he has and faith in what he’s got. It’s just a great job by him. This is not a knock, but he throws 88 or 89, but he’s got a plus, plus slider.”
Everyone in the world, Cabrera included, was expecting a slider. Romo has a great slider and a meh fastball. As Jeff noted in that post, Romo had thrown a slider 85 percent of the time in two strike counts that year, and had gotten even more extreme with his pitch selection in that World Series. He had an unhittable slider, got into a slider count, and then instead chose to throw Cabrera a hittable fastball instead. The element of surprise worked; Cabrera took strike three and the Giants were the World Series champions.
But the more I thought about that situation, the less comfortable I was with the analogy. The Giants were trying to win the World Series, but they had no chance to lose it if things went wrong. They were up three games to none at that point, and holding a 4-3 lead in the 10th inning of Game Four. Even if Cabrera crushes the fastball for a home run, it’s only a tied game, and the Giants would get to keep playing. And even if they lost that game, they’d have had three more chances to win one game. Romo’s fastball didn’t give the Tigers a chance to win the World Series had it gone wrong, and if you change the stakes to Game Seven, maybe he doesn’t throw that pitch.
So maybe we need to find a comparable baseball situation that isn’t a closer protecting a lead. After all, while win probability had the Seahawks as the favorites at that point, they were still losing, and failure to score meant that they didn’t have another chance. Perhaps we need something like the tying run on third and the winning on second base, with nobody out, and a great hitter at the plate. According to the Win Expectancy charts, that situation results in the team down a run winning 71% of the time, so to get up to the 88% mark from the Super Bowl, the batter/pitcher match-up would have to really favor the hitter. To tilt the numbers even farther in favor of the offense, we probably need to put a runner on first base as well — taking away the intentional walk and raising the initial Win Expectancy to 74% — and then also start the count in the hitter’s favor; we’ll say 2-0, since failure on the next pitch would have left two more opportunities, just as it would have for the Seahawks.
So, that’s perhaps a comparable situation from a win probability standpoint. Bottom of the 9th inning in Game Seven of the World Series, down a run, but with the bases loaded and nobody out, and your best hitter at the plate, with the count already worked 2-0 in his favor. But what’s the surprise play there? The defense wouldn’t be expecting a bunt, but a bunt doesn’t present a win-or-lose dynamic, as the runner on second base isn’t scoring on anything short of a defensive debacle. Stealing home would also be a wildly unexpected attempt, but again, that doesn’t offer the win-if-it-works incentive, and the rally doesn’t end if it fails.
Instead, you need some kind of strategy that results in both the runners on second and third scoring on a successful execution, but the inning ending on a failure. Basically, you need the downside to be a triple play.
And that means a hit-and-run. All the runners take off with the pitch, and the guy at the plate is told to simply hit the ball on the ground; if it finds a hole, the runner from second scores easily and they win, and even if it ends up going right at a fielding, sending the runners means that they can’t get the force at home, so they’d get to send another hitter up with a chance to drive in the go-ahead run from third base and less than two outs. That chance would be wiped out if the batter hit a line drive right at an infielder near a base, turning one out into three outs in short order. Maybe it would look something like this.
From a win probability and risk/reward standpoint, this probably comes close, and it really is hard to imagine a manager calling for a hit-and-run in that situation in the World Series.
But when comparing this situation to the last play of the Super Bowl, this does fail on one important element of the Seahawks play call: the match-up variable. The Seahawks specifically chose to throw the ball in response to the Patriots defensive package, and the post-game rationale was essentially a game theory argument. If everyone in the world thinks you have to run there, then throwing the ball has a higher probability of success than it would on any random play during the game, since the defense is specifically aligned to stop a run play.
You don’t get that on a hit-and-run, really, because it’s not designed to exploit the flaws in a defensive alignment. The best baseball equivalent of throwing the ball against a goal line defense is probably something like bunting against the shift, which is not at all a controversial strategy when its deployed. It’s pretty widely accepted that if a team is overstacking their infielders on one side of the ball, a good hitter should attempt to go the other way, even if he’s a dead pull hitter whose strength is hitting the ball hard to the pull field.
From a strategic perspective, a better fit would be bunting against the shift, but there are very few plays in baseball where a bunt can decide the game in favor of both teams at the same time, depending on the outcome. And, of course, teams don’t overshift the right side of the infield when there are runners on second and third.
So perhaps we back to the beginning. Perhaps the closest corollary we could get is if Romo’s fastball to Cabrera came in Game Seven, and if there had been a runner on first base, so that a home run from Cabrera allowed the Tigers to walk off as World Series champs.
If the World Series had been on the line, would it still have been wrong for Romo to go for deception rather than playing to his strength? Was it clearly the wrong call for him to throw Cabrera a middle-middle fastball rather than his dominant slider because of the risk of Cabrera hitting it to the moon? Or was it the right call because the stakes were lower for the Giants in that situation?
I don’t think I have an answer. Instinctually, I’m against the idea that there is ever only one correct decision to make, even if your opponent knows that’s what’s coming. But on the other hand, if you have a dominant weapon that almost always works in spite of the lack of surprise, is the final play of the championship game really a time to be messing with game theory, or should you just let your best go up against their best and accept the result?
I’m probably a bit more sympathetic to the Seahawks play call than the national response, but I don’t know football or game theory well enough to say that it was justifiable. I do wonder, though, how different Romo’s decision to throw Cabrera a fastball really was. The circumstances weren’t exactly the same, but the concept was similar. Do we think Romo’s pitch selection was insane, even though it worked? Or are we just allowing the result of the play to define whether or not the idea was sound?
Dave is the Managing Editor of FanGraphs.
I don’t think those are good analogies because it isn’t obvious that running is safer than throwing, at least in terms of turnovers; throws at the one have a very low interception rate (Bill Barnwell said the turnover rate is about even). Romo’s fastball, or the hit and run, are high risk choices.
But the part of the analogy I like is that Romo’s fastball was down the middle; most would say, if you are going to throw the fastball there, miss off the plate. Similarly some might say that, if you are going to throw at the one in that situation, miss low where it can’t as easily be intercepted, even if it lowers the odds of scoring on that play.
Hay, the big difference is that Romo had already thrown a bunch of sliders so Cabrera was probably geared up to hit it, and he probably could do damage with it.
On the other hand, I don’t think the Patriots could have done anything to stop Lynch from scoring, even with three straight runs up the gut. If they wanted to switch things up, they could have used the read-option with the threat of Wilson keeping the ball and running it in.
Just neighing.
Oh I get it, neighing, because Elway has a horseface. That’s clever, you must be the first person to think of it!
TR, dude, that’s like his go to joke! It adds a little silliness to a world of statistics and arm mechanics. Enjoy the insanity and the inanity. I’ll let you off with a warning.
As for you, John Elway, do you have any comment on the fact that “My Little Pony” actually appeared in a Super Bowl commercial? Are you excited for the further advancement of equines into sports or are you disappointed that Ponyville cheers for the Colts? Perhaps both?
Hay JPA, no probs with the My Little Pony stuff. And I don’t care who Ponyville roots for as long as they don’t end up in a Nationwide ad.
Is that a Frau Blucher joke?
Or miss high if you’re going to miss, where if your guy doesn’t catch it, no one will catch it. Like the TD pass to Matthews at the end of the first half.
It wasn’t so much the decision to pass, but the particular passing play. A quick slant at the one has increased dangers and less chance for success for a similar reason that running it does: the box is stacked; the defense needs to defend a much smaller territory.
That’s right. If they wanted a pass play in that situation, they probably trotted out the worst possible option.
You NEVER miss high on a throw to the middle of the field. A) there is most likely a saftey behind him who could make a play and B) high balls are more likely to be deflected up and defenders make more plays on those than receivers. If your going to miss on that throw you miss low and in.
this all goes to the point that a short slant was the LAST play anyone expected, so it’s success rate would hypothetically increase. However, the CB said they had been coached on that formation and knew where the ball was going, so interception
the reason why no one would expect that play is because it’s such a bad idea to call that play. no one intelligent play caller would do it.
if other the other team isn’t expecting something, it’s because it has a low probability of working.
See, to me, the quick slant there is not even the worse possible play call there. Not that it’s a great call, but it’s not terrible. The turnover rate is not really high on that play. And the Seahawks liked the matchup for a reason – Wilson read the coverage, and it was a pick play. Pick plays vs. man coverage are extremely effective.
A worse play call to me: a toss sweep. You never go laterally on the goal line because the defense is up and the possibilities of a serious loss in yardage and being tackled in bounds, requiring the Seahawks to burn their last timeout and therefore meaning that running on third down would be extremely risky because they likely wouldn’t have been able to get a fourth down play off. And that’s not even considering the chance of a fumble, enhanced by the toss.
“A worse play call to me: a toss sweep.”
Are you kidding me? Even if you lose 5 yards, at least you still have the ball and 2 more downs to try to convert the game winning TD.
ANY running play > the pass play Seattle actually ran
Except that on goal line plays there are about as many turnovers on running plays as passing plays. Add the element of a toss to go awry and yeah, I think that’s a worse call. I’m not saying the slant was a good call – just that it’s possible to make a worse call. If only just.
The point is to go to the play that would allow the fans and players to sleep at night. Sure, he could have fumbled, but rule number one in sports is to go to your best in a tight situation. Rule number two is to go to the hot guy. Lynch was both. Instead, they ran a play that a guy who was taking orders at Popeyes Chicken several months earlier picked them off. As Woody Hayes once said, 3 things can happen on a pass play and 2 of them ain’t good. Lay it all out on the field, pound their best with your best. Instead, SEA went with trickeration. Bad move, no excuses.
When I was watching the game, and Seattle took their 2nd timeout after the long pass play, I said that I hope burning that timeout won’t come back to bite them because now they can’t run 3 times.
So I figured they’d probably throw on 2nd down, which would give them an option to either throw or run on either 3rd or 4th down, which would make the defense think the most on both future plays. But if they ran and were stopped short on 2nd down, they’d be forced to use their last timeout, which means everyone knows they’d probably throw on 3rd down to give them two more chances to score.
I thoguht it was the right move to pass on 2nd down, but I would have called a play action fake, and had Wilson roll out, with one tight end or tackle-eligible guy breaking to the outside. Maybe Wilson gets a clean shot at the end zone and waltzes in, or the receiver gets wide open, otherwise Wilson could just throw it away. I knew they weren’t going to attack the Pats’ corners on a fade route, and I am sure the Pats knew that too.
I wonder if Barnwell’s numbers (I didn’t see them) applied in that specific play, or in general. I could imagine (and my anecodtal memory supports) that INTs occur at a higher rate when you have a more shallow field, since there is a higher density of defenders.
I’m quite sure that they were just all plays at the one yard line, or something like that. So most of those were probably play action stuff where the guy is either wide open or you throw it in the seats. Which means that there might well have been more risk on that play than the run. So maybe the first part of what I said was wrong.
OTOH I still think you have to miss low with that throw. And Romo’s too.
Strange to see a discussion about late game QB issues, and use Romo, and not have it be Tony Romo.
From Barnwell’s piece:
On goal line opportunities from from at or inside the one yard line this season:
There have been 223 running plays that have generated 129 touchdowns (a 57.8 percent success rate) and two turnovers on fumbles.
There were 108 throws and those passes had produced 66 touchdowns (a success rate of 61.1 percent, down to 59.5 percent when you throw in three sacks) and zero interceptions.
It’s unfair to categorize all passes the same way like Flac says above. A play action roll out to a TE in the flat is usually easy money if the box is stacked against the run. And if he’s not open, the pass goes to the fans. That play happens every weekend.
Throwing an inside slant in a stacked box to an inexperienced receiver is super low percentage – especially when the other option is a large strong RB who excels in those situations.
Hey, when you’ve got a receiver as good and as tried and tested as ol-what’s-his-name-Lockette, you’ve just got to try and get it to him. You simply MUST.
When you think of world class receivers playing today, you think of Calvin Johnson and Dez Bryant and Demaryius Thomas and so-and-so Lockette.
Just goes to show that the lack of a big play, big bodied receiver hurt Seattle. The best plays IMO would be power run, read-option, play action rollout, or fade throw to the corner. They don’t have a receiver that can win that battle, but damn, there were a lot of better options than a quick slant.
You also have to account for the fact that Lynch is one the best, if not the best Rb’s in the league and probably the best bet in the NFL to pick up 1 yard in a goal line situation.
In Barnwells analysis, how many of those running attempts were by crappy backs with crappy O-Lines?
This. I mean, I really don’t get why you bother throwing it. Plus, Wilson hadn’t been making short passes all that well the whole game (12 completions total- whole game, half of which were longer routes). Plus, they have one of the best running backs in the game, which the Patriots had given up 100 yards to.
It’s like having Barry Bonds at the plate, bases loaded, bottom of the 9th, 3-0, and giving him a bunt sign or something for the “surprise” effect.
Exactly. The problem with Barnwell’s logic as is that he is looking at league wide numbers and then applying them to specific players in a specific sitiation.
The league wide success rate on running plays from the 1yd line may be 57.8% but the rest of the league doesnt have Marshawn Lynch(or Russel Wilson for that matter who may be the best running QB in the NFL), and none of those other situations were win the super bowl/lose the super bowl situations. So its kind of irrelevant information.
Its a bit like saying that the league wide SB% is 75% (i made that up, I dont know what it actually is) so therefore you have a 25% chance of throwing out Terrance Gore or Billy Hamilton.
Fans just don’t understand what goes into these decisions. The personnel dictated passing in that situation. Billy Beane would have done the exact same thing.
Also 9/11 was an inside job. Because our government is slick and masterful, not bumbling and inefficient.
Personnel dictating pass isn’t the same as personnel dictating slant.
Personnel has nothing on logic and common sense.
It isn’t just that they threw it. Had they run the typical fake dive/ roll out/ throw to the tight ends and fullbacks leaking out play, there would have been no argument. However, they not only threw it, they threw it with a particularly stupid formation. That play call would have been stupid from the 1 yard line regardless of the personnel or game situation. They forced the Patriots to put multiple defensive backs on the field. Then they forced them to stay in the middle of the field. Then they threw into the crowd.
This wasn’t the equivalent of Romo throwing a slow-ish fastball to Cabrera. It was the equivalent of Babe Ruth trying to steal second at the end of the 1926 world series. It wasn’t just a gamble, it was a stupid gamble.
I would have run it with Lynch, but I was dead.
I can’t follow a dance routine but even I would have given it to Lynch (except that the exchange is VERY difficult when you have flippers and not fingers).
There isn’t a perfect comparison to baseball for this. I think it’s important to note that the biggest issue with the play wasn’t necessarily the decision to pass, it was the type of pass that was the issue. I think a fade to the outside of the endzone, which has a very low risk of being a turnover, would have been a solid play call. The risk/reward for throwing a slant over the middle on the one yard line is what made that a really bad call to me.
Yes. Though everything about the play decision in Arizona was faulty. 1) Wrong personnel on the field for Seattle. Whose responsibility was it to get the right package in the prior play after the long reception. 2) Managing the remaining time. One timeout left; do the run, call if if comes short, pass on third down for six or stop the clock; one play left. 3) Pass at all. Lynch is terrific from that distance, it’s no more than a body lean, and he’d beat the Pats earlier in the game; he goes over left tackle, and furthermore he rarely fumbles anymore. 4) PASSING IN TRAFFIC IN THE MIDDLE OF THE FIELD. Sheesh, this was the stupidest part of all: Do not, do _NOT_ put the ball up for grabs, matchup regardless, throw a pass where only the receiver has a shot at the ball. 5) Obvious pass set up. Spread receivers made it obvious to the defense a pass was coming; if you’re going to pass there is has to be play action. 4) ‘Quick’ slant. It wasn’t quick, which would be a two step drop and fire, the play took to long so the defender had a complete read on the receiver’s route. 5) Calling a ‘slant.’ Not a bad play, but the offense was too close to the goal line for the play to develop. Except 6) the receiver didn’t even run a slant; he was moving parallel to the goal line not even in the end zone when the ball was thrown, terrible route. 7) Bad read by the quarterback, since the receiver wasn’t open. Although facing the quarterback, he had a man right on him, and there was sure to be contact as the ball was received. 8) Badly delivered pass. A slant pass in that situation, with a defender on the man’s back should be low in the gut if thrown at all so that it’s caught almost falling down into the end zone; no chance for a tipped ball, and a drop is a dead ball. Instead Wilson lead the receiver, giving the defender a great shot at the receiver’s hands. 9) Wrong number called to receive. Lockette is fairly good, but he’s an inexperienced guy, a rookie with 25 career receptions. It’s not necessarily a bad idea to throw to him—but not for all the marbles on 2nd down. Throw to your vets there; only cross things up if you’re looking for a surprise outcome if your money plays haven’t gone in.
Every single thing about the call was incredibly bad. There’s no really comparable ‘manager’s decision’ in baseball because managers simply don’t call for the plays as gameplay progresses. There would be two broadly comparable decisions in baseball, though, neither mentioned; one by a manager, one in the field. Both would have to be bottom of the 9th inning in a World Series, visitors have a one run lead, two out with one or more runners on. A) A manager could choose to give an IBB to a mediocre hitter to get a match-up, then bring in his match-up reliever only because of handedness even though the pitcher simply is not good and also is very inexperienced. The reliever grooves a pitch that leaves the park for a walk off loss of game and series. B) Same situation but bases loaded, one out; batter hits a deep dribbler to plate a run, but the players still try to turn right-side double play. Not enough time, though, and one of the runners beats it out while the man who advanced to 3B trots home for the win.
I would say that A) is the closest—but not that close. So many misjudgments had to go into the plan that pluck the ‘Hawks it’s mind-melting. This was brain lock on Seattle’s coaching. Pete Carroll has mad dumb offensive calls before, but for most of the last two years he quit doing this, largely because he handed the calls over to his OC . . . who is just not that great frankly, and we saw all Darrel Bevall’s worst side on the worst play in Super Bowl history.
Great comment I want to just highlight one part of it … the fact that this was a clock management situation for Seattle. I don’t get all the dimensions of it, but my understanding is that they couldn’t have just called for three runs to try to pound it in … and while they had a time out it made sense to conserve it in case of an emergency so they could still get the FG … so (the argument goes) they took a shot throwing on 2nd down because that meant they could run on third down without blowing their time out … ok I still don’t understand this, all I can say is, please Mr. New Commisioner NO CLOCKS IN BASEBALL
They were down 4 points at the end of the 4th quarter. They weren’t going to try for a field goal.
“Jeter” is a female noun?
They misused two timeouts earlier in the drive, and either one would have solved the issue.
By the time they started the play, with 26 seconds, they only had time for two runs. They easily could have been ready to go with 40 seconds, and that’s more than enough time for three runs with one timeout.
The clock management situation had more to do with making sure the Patriots did not get the ball back with enough time to score. The conventional decision would have been:
A) Run a semi-hurryup offense, snap the ball on second down with about 45 seconds to go and one timeout. This gives Seattle a chance to run three times without having to worry about running out of clock. The downside to this, which most people are overlooking despite being mentioned by the OC in the press conference, is that if Lynch scores, TOm Brady gets the ball back with 40 seconds, two timeouts, and a chance to drive for the game tying field goal. THerefore they got cute and went with:
B) Run the clock all the way down to 26 seconds before second down. This guarantees that Tom Brady can not get the ball back with any more than 20-24 seconds to go. The obvious downside is that Seattle is now putting itself under time pressure, so they only have time for two running plays instead of three. If they still had two timeouts, they would have had enough time to run on every play.
Strategy B, IMO, was perfectly sound. It was a gambit designed to keep the ball out of Brady’s hands. It backfired, IMO, because of horrible play calling and not-so-good execution.
One quibble: Ricardo Lockette is a fairly good player… on special teams, when he’s not getting dumb penalties.
Otherwise, he has 25 catches in four years, and is best friends with Colin Kaepernick.
I’m glad you posted a piece with this headline because, as I drove back home from watching the game last night, I started wondering what the baseball equivalent would be.
My thought, however, was that baseball is a much more molecular game than football. To me, pitch location and movement – for all the size of its consequences – is as minuscule and chancy as a linebacker missing a tackle, or Tom Brady throwing the ball just over the receiver’s hands. As I dwelled on the question, I thought that the baseball equivalent must be a bigger decision, responsibility for which rests squarely on the manager. Your hit-and-run is a good example. I thought of two examples:
– baserunning blunders. The hit-and-run in your post is a great example; a very consequential steal might be another. (If Dave Roberts had been thrown out in the 2004 ALCS, how would we feel about that decision? What if the Royals had sent Alex Gordon and he’d been thrown out by a mile?)
– pitching matchups. To me, this is where the real comparisons lie. Choosing to run or throw the ball, in football, might have a better baseball analogy in choosing the matchup. So for similar baseball blunders we can look at Matt Williams neglecting his best pitchers in 2014 NLDS Game 4, Alexi Ogando’s repeated use in the 2011 World Series, or Ralph Branca coming off two days’ rest, after a start, to face Bobby Thomson.
The New York Times, this morning, also cites the Red Sox not bringing in a defensive substitute for Bill Buckner.
Buster Olney also made the Pete Carroll — Grady Little connection, which seemed right on a macro level, if not micro.
You know what I spend a bizarre amount of time thinking about? 2006 World Series Game 1. DET rolls with budding superstar Justin Verlander, who’s obviously the best thing since buttered scones. Tony La Russa announced STL will start Anthony Reyes, who has all of 18 career starts. Reyes’ last regular season start had lasted 0.2 innings – he got 2 guys out and gave up 2 home runs.
And then Reyes pitches the game of his life and Verlander pitches the exact opposite.
How smart did Tony La Russa look then? How smart was he, really? Don’t you think that was just nuts?
Hay, what about the Cardinals using a rookie who hadn’t pitched in weeks to pitch the bottom of the 9th, instead of their closer?
Still don’t get that one.
1. Reyes was the only starter available on normal rest.
2. I don’t get that decision either (at John Elway)
Goddamn, that Cardinals team won the WS with a rotation of a great Chris Carpenter, and the miserable and mediocre Jason Marquis, Jeff Suppan, Mulder, Reyes, Jeff Weaver and Sidney Ponson getting all but 2 starts on the season. None of those pitchers other than Carp had an FIP under 4.70 or an ERA under 4.12.
2006 Pujols was really insanely awesome, of course.
I think the proper analogy would be taking Romo out of the game and bringing Marco Scutaro in to pitch…
LMHAO!!!!!!!
but the batter is only aware of the pitching change once the ball is released
Lynch was 1-5 from the 1yd line this year… Im guessing that played a role in the descision
Yup 1 for 5 from the one. 2Tube for no gain, and 2 runs for negative yardage. That Butler guy made a heck of a play. Had he not jumped the pass the way he did Seattle is champs.
So football coaches are also prone to the small sample size problem!
Lynch had 3 downs to run it in. (On 4th down you need to go for it.)
Iirc, they only had one timeout; a run on third down would have been risky (assuming a second down run and TO burned their last chance to stop the clock).
If they hadn’t lollygagged 34 seconds off the play clock, they had time for three runs.
LOLLYGAGGERS!
Lynch was 1-5 on such plays because Seattle’s OC Bevall is a moron. Nearly all of those short-and-goal runs were dead up the gut against a stacked box. Seattle’s offensive line isn’t big enough or good enough to win those. An actually competent OC would be calling an over tackle run, so the offensive line could submarine the DL while they try to to sideways, and then Marshawn leans in.
But in fact no, that prior history had nothing to do with the call. Carroll and Bevall both stated that the plan was for Lynch to run on 3rd and even 4th down, but that on 2nd down they didn’t have their short yardage personnel package on the field, and so were passing in essence to kill the clock so that they _could_ change personnel without using their last timeout. Incredibly stupid way of killing the clock to begin with, wasting a down—Carroll’s exact verbiage—to do it . . . and if so why throw to a rookie in the middle of a crowded field on a play the coaches didn’t even expect to score with? Much, much better to hand off to Lynch to run _off tackle_ in that situation. Lynch rarely breaks a run outside, but against a stacked box he actually has the speed to get to the corner, where he’ll likely have a favorable physical match-up on a secondary defensive man, or at worst a linebacker trying to stop him but moving laterally. If Lynch is stopped short—unlikely in those situations—you call the timeout, and then pass on 3rd down for six or to stop the clock for one more play.
Stupid, stupid, unforgivable decision making. I sincerely hope Seattle’s OC never calls another play for the org. It’s not about designating a goat: it’s about removing a guy who isn’t good enough for somebody else who is. I’ll give Pete Carroll forgiveness on this; he is not an offensive coach, a gambler by nature, and recognized two years ago that somebody else should make his team’s key offensive calls. That somebody did—and blew it on a legendary scale.
I’m not arguing the play calling but 1-for-5 and the 1 took three attempts, which there wasn’t likely time for. Plus, the off-tackle was sniffed out earlier by the Patriots for a loss.
I would’ve gone with Lynch, timeout, fade pass, Lynch if it had to come down to it but I’m not in that situation.
I think Pete may have been outsmarted by the 1-for-5 SSS nonsense, too. It happens.
None of the analogies feel right. If the Seahawks run, and fail, they still have two chances (and have used up more clock). The play call was defensible on 4th down, but not on second, where a hand off or quarterback keeper were the much better option. It would be like intentionally walking home a run against Barry Bonds, while up by 3, with less two outs in the ninth. At minimum, you can throw low away and mitigate the chance of the home run without putting the tying run on 2nd.
The thing about trying a pass on second down is that without an interception it would have meant they had three chances at the touchdown. If they ran every time, they would have only had two chances since there wasn’t enough time to do three runs and they only had one timeout left.
2nd run; TO. 3rd, quick pass; six, or stop the clock. 4th, best play, best players; time doesn’t matter. No excuse to throw in the middle of the field on 2nd down, and really a poor decision period.
What Bevall did is that he decided to call a play that fit his comfort zone for who Seattle had on the field, not a play that was goddamit, going to get in the end zone. The OC was looking at the trees, not the forest, so to speak, and deked himself into an utter bonehead call.
Again, the situation is like a baseball manger intentionally walking a beatable hitter to face a much better hitter with men on because the manager was obsessed with getting handedness advantages regardless of the quality of his pitcher or true game situation. That call might be ‘right’ on an index card, but is wrong in reality and on the field of play.
I don’t disagree with you, my point was just that they couldn’t run it three times. The choice was either two runs and a pass, or two runs. I think passing it was defensible, but I agree that throwing right into a pile of people was a poor choice.
The author is correct there is no one correct answer, but passing on 2nd down is totally defensible and the coach and coordinator shouldn’t be crucified for that decision.
If you run on 2nd you have to pass on 3rd and the defense knows it. IF you pass on 2nd down and it’s incomplete the defense has to play honest on both 3rd and 4th down.
You can’t run on both 2nd and 3rd down you’ll run out of clock and never get a 4th down play off.
I would compare the final minute of the Super Bowl to….
Bases loaded, 1-0 game, bottom 9th, one out – Barry Bonds in all his juiced glory up.. Other team takes out Trevor Hoffman to bring in washed up Bobby Jones (Pats not calling time out with Seattle on the 1)…
Then Bonds tries to lay down a suicide squeeze (throwing ball at 1 when you have Lynch)
That’s an interesting comparison, where the offense in baseball makes the wrong choice. That does fit the Super Bowl game situation better. Hmm, interesting.
Supposing it was bases loaded, bottom of the 9th, two outs, men on 2nd and 3rd. Rod Carew at the plate in his prime; opposing manager brings in a mediocre reliever. Reliever can’t find the strike zone, but first base is open; the offense could live with a walk. —But inexplicably, Carew keeps swinging at pitches he can barely reach because his manager keeps signaling to swing away since he’s his team’s best bat. Carew gets himself out on a handful of pitches, in large part because his manager (or the manager’s bench coach more aptly) is a moron.
That would fit the actual Super Bowl situation in that the offense in that situation was behind, and had to score but was in an actually decent situation to do so if they didn’t get brain lock. Unfortunately . . . .
Here’s the winner IMO
Suppose it was tying run at 3rd, bottom of the 9th, inexplicably Salvy Perez keeps swinging at balls over the strike zone because he just can’t help himself …
Confirmation bias is a stinky cologne
The Drakkar Noir of logical fallacies, as it were.
lol had to look up what drakkar noir was, honestly I thought it could’ve been anything
Which Bobby Jones, the black one or the white one?
Uhh…I mean, the Lefty or the Righty?
The golfer
Carroll said it was a matchup decision: Seattle showed pass but planned to run, expecting NE to defend against the pass. NE defended run instead, so Seattle went with pass. Carroll even said the pass was basically a plan to “waste” a play to set up the last 2 downs. Thus, my vote for a comp would be:
Bottom 9, 1 out, bases loaded, home team down 1
The visiting starting pitcher is still in.
Batter A = next scheduled batter
Batter B = on deck
Batter C = pinch hitter
Batters A & B are the team’s best hitters.
Batter B has a big match-up advantage over the closer and/or a disadvantage against the starter
Batter C has the opposite
Home team pinch hits Batter C for A, expecting visiting team to bring in the closer.
Visiting team leaves the starter in
Batter C hits into a double play
Basically, the home team tries to “waste” an at-bat on Batter C to set up the match-up they want for Batter B. The visitors call their bluff, knowing the Batter B match up is the real threat. The starter is pretty gassed, though, so leaving him in is still pretty gutsy.
Interesting idea but to me the comparison of Cabrera hitting a home run seems a bit of a stretch — Seattle was inside the 5 yd line. Hitting a home run for a player is like completing a Hail Mary from the 50 yd line. The go ahead touchdown was more of a probability of happening than anyone hitting a game winning homerun.
Maybe the best baseball analogy is Eck’s back door slider to Gibson.
Except everyone in the world expected the back door slider and Eck went with the anticipated play. So not really apt.
I think what was particularly egregious on Seattle’s call was the fact that they had a timeout left – which is to say that they could’ve run the ball at least once with virtually zero risk of losing the game (Short of a fumble, of course). With 20+ seconds on the clock, the Seahawks could’ve called timeout and still had enough left for two more pass plays (or even pass-to-run) if it failed. With 1 yard to go, there was every incentive to use a player whose best strength was to **manufacture** one yard.
exploring that further. If the Seahawks run on the first play and fail, they have to use the timeout. So then the Seahawks probably have to run a pass play. Only on 4th down would they have the choice between running and passing.
This goes to the game theory point, though. The most obvious sequence would have been run – pass – ??? (most exciting super bowl finish of recent memory, if they got to it).
Passing on that first attempt — and doing it quickly before the run D had any chance to adapt — was the whole idea. A bad one, imo, but the reasoning isn’t completely boneheaded.
From the game theory stand point there might be an argument for a pass on 2nd down. But only if it’s a _quick play_, only off play action, not in the middle of the field, and not to the number called. If you have Jerry Rice in the slot, he beats the jam on quickness and is in the end zone with body position when the ball is thrown, yes, you might win that matchup. Lockette didn’t beat the jam, didn’t run a slant (he was going sideways out of necessity), the play took to long, and the ball would have gone hight out of the back of the end zone.
But that’s game theory. Players are real people, and their confidence and intentions matter. It was clear from remarks after the game and since that Seattle’s players, to a man, didn’t understand the call. They had no confidence in it, in other words. What game theory leaves out is game psychology. The players WANTED the ball in the hands of Marshawn Lynch because they knew that even if it was impossible he would do the superhumanly possible to score on that down.
Game theory, baseball, football, any sport, always has to have game psychology factored into the computation. This is too often missed in stats-leaning perspective. Analytics down block, tackle, catch, swing, or pitch. They show what happens in the macro and in aggregate, but not what motivates players to make the kind of catch Jermaine Kearse had just made in the micro and the win-or-lose moment. The coaches called a dumb play the players didn’t really understand or have confidence in, and the lack of execution reflected that. Game theory: play, over.
Good thoughts. My point was merely that, to the extent that this play was looking to capitalize on “surprise” and the game theory argument Dave refers to, going run — pass — ??? certainly wouldn’t achieve that element of surprise on the first two attempts.
The risk of ruin was much, much higher on that particular pass play than a running play.
It should have never been considered
Read Barnwell’s piece on Grantland. The risk of ruin wasn’t higher. Fumbles by running backs at the goal line occur at about the same frequency.
But Barnwell specifically said that those numbers were in a vacuum, and the game wasn’t in a vacuum. They don’t account for Wilson throwing 4-5 interceptions in the playoffs, or Lynch only having one rushing fumble all year (and no lost fumbles).
Both of the things you offer provide zero predictive value. Wilson throwing a bunch of picks in the first half of the NFC title game has zero bearing on that situation. Fumbles happen. In the 2012 playoffs, Lynch fumbled twice in a span of 23 carries.
It was simply a matter of poor execution and luck on several fronts. Wilson’s throw was poor. It should have been low and slightly behind Lockett as opposed to leading him toward the middle of the field. Lockett failed to box out a corner back he outweighs by 20 lbs. And it took a fifth string rookie corner, who Seattle was picking on all game, to jump that route and make the play of his life.
The bottom line, the risk of ruin was not much, much higher as the op suggested. The Pats got lucky in that Seattle screwed up every single thing possible on that play while their rookie made a play that his own coach probably didn’t think he’d make.
What’s the predictive value on Barnwell’s information? You have the best running back in the league and a QB who’s thrown too many picks recently. I’ll take that into account before I care about how often other RB’s fumble the ball.
Seahawks should have kicked a field goal
I’d take that gamble.
how does this not have any likes? Do people not realize the line was 1 for the entire week?
Someone had NFC 7, AFC 8 in the office pool.
This seems like a coaching blunder since Pete didn’t put the ball in the hands of his best player. So maybe the real comparison would be something closer to benching Cabrera in that at bat, just to put in a scrub lefty bench guy simply for the L/R matchup. So if my proposed situation failed, then we would all be talking about how Leyland took the bat out of his best hitter’s hands just like the world is saying today.
You mean like having Homer Simpson bat for Darryl Strawberry?
excellent
This is what good managers do to win ballgames.
Talking about bad plays, how does one bean a hitter in softball, much less with the bases loaded in a walk off situation?
Okay, let’s go over the ground rules.
You can’t leave first until you chug a beer.
Any man scoring has to chug a beer.
You have to chug a beer at the top of all odd-numbered innings.
Oh, and the fourth inning is the beer inning.
Nevermind.
Last game of the year, Brent, can’t hold anything back now.
Interesting takeaway, for the stat-driven folks:
Over the 2014-15 NFL season, passing plays from the 1-yard line resulted in a TD 61% of the time (on 109 attempts) whereas running plays resulted in a TD on 58% of those tries (223 attempts).
I would have run it on 2nd down and then called that last timeout had Lynch not scored, but the play call wasn’t nearly as bad as it is being made out to be based on the result.
61% pass success vs 58% run success is an interesting stat but the scenario last night is not the same as a regular season game scenario. Higher stakes, you know? Also, how many of those 61% were slants into the middle of the field versus a corner fade or a high pass to back of end zone?
and the best running back in the NFL since Emmit Smith who would be carrying the ball
Best RB since Emmit Smith? La’Daniania Tomlinson, Marshall Faulk, Adrian Peterson, Jerome Bettis, Curtis Martin, and at least 25 other guys wave hello.
The real takeaway here is that teams pass from the 1 yard line 1/3 of the time. This is not a rare occurrence, but so many people are acting like it was a completely crazy idea and that is was obvious that you have to give the ball to Lynch in that spot. The reality is that deploying a mixed strategy on the goal line is standard practice for all of these teams.
…just not an inside slant when you are facing a goal line defense, with defenders thusly bunched in the middle of the field.
Except if you actually watch the play the only two guys close to the ball were the intended receiver and his assigned defender.
Maybe Alex Gordon trying to steal home would have been the surprise, akin to the pass play, while holding him would be like running the ball.
This was actually a softball equivalent, but the analogy I can think of was when Mr. Burns brought in Homer Simpson as a right-handed pinch hitter in Darryl Strawberry’s place with the game on the line. Of course, that decision worked for him…
Ideal play calling, IMO:
QB keeper up middle
If no TD, call last TO and run WR corner fade
If no TD, play was hopefully incomplete. Run any play with Lynch
Live with the results
Passing is not a good call at that field position because DBs and CBs are instructed to cheat and try to get INTs.
Obviously it is easy to second guess after the fact but even if you “catch them off guard” and sneak in a slant play for the TD, it is still a bad call. You have ALREADY put the team in a position to win — don’t beat yourselves at that point by trying to be clever.
Amendment:
First play run the read option. Let Wilson decide where the run should go at the snap.
If they were going to pass, why throw a pass like that where the defense is bunched up and will be selling out to jump the route?
Everyone expects the run so do a quick play action and hit the tight end or fullback who’s probably wide open. Throw it away if no one is open then line up and run it on third.
How about Casey Stengel bringing in Bob Kuzava to get key outs in the 1951 and 1952 World Series? It was deemed unconventional to bring him in in those high-leverage situations. Or Connie Mack’s decision to start Howard Ehmke in Game 1 of the World Series in 1929?
Of course, unlike the Seahawks, those decisions worked.
Ehmke is not quite applicable as it was Game 1 so if things went badly it was possible to recover. Mack also had the genius to let Ehmke go scout the Cubs for a week. Up to that point in history, it is likely that no pitcher was better prepared for a start than Howard. It would have looked very strange superficially but it makes more sense with all the information.
I agree, but starting Ehmke was viewed with great surprise at the time. A 35-year-old with 8 starts to his name that season, when Mack had Grove and Earnshaw. Mack said it had to do with Ehmke’s pitching arsenal (slow stuff, I think) which he said would particularly befuddle the aggressive Cubs. He was right – 13 Ks, CG victory.
World Series game 7, having your slow runner attempt to steal 2nd with 2 outs in the 9th, down a run, world’s second best hitter at the plate. That would *never* happen, right? (1926)
Yeah, that’s a pretty good analogy. Ruth wasn’t that slow: he did steal 11 bases that year!
Bottom of the ninth runners on 2nd and 3rd one out, up one; you choose to walk an average batter so your left handed relief pitcher can face a overall better hitter but who also hits left handed.
Ops home run, all the strategy is forgotten and how could walk avg play to face better player manager must be stupid.
Baseball is totally vested in deception, that’s what the game is all about.
Football is many times sheer force. I don’t think there is an direct analogy
Perhaps, but Pete Carroll used a game theory explanation to justify his decision.
You can only take advantage of the element of surprise if your opponent is placed in a situation in which they are at a disadvantage. The key to Seattle’s play was to line up two receivers on the right, have the inner receiver and defender impede the outer defensive back while the outer receiver runs the slant – a pick play. But because the Patriots were expecting a run, the inner defender tried to get up field, the inner receiver did not move him back and the outer defender was not impeded at all — in fact, his distance to the ball was about the same as the target receiver. It was basically a jump ball where a interception was as likely as a completion.
To me what is getting largely overlooked in the postgame coach-crucifying is that the DB made a great play. I saw the same thing that you did, that it was a pick play. The outer defender saw the pick, diagnosed the play and the route instantaneously (smart, prepared player) who then had the athleticism to react and just beat the receiver to the spot where the ball was being thrown. And then finished the play. If he’s not 100% on every aspect of that play, he doesn’t make that interception.
Malcolm Butler made a play for the ages, and all anyone can talk about is the coaching decision. There ain’t no justice.
Agreed 1000%.
Bad play call or not, that play probably ends up as an interception about as often as a hand off ends up a fumble.
Obviously no one cares about this play if it doesn’t get intercepted. To me that’s the number one thing we have to think about when deciding how bad this play call was. When calling this play, was there a 10% chance of an interception? Less? If there’s a 1% chance this play results in an interception, then criticizing because that’s what happened is totally wrong.
It’s not just an interception that’s a bad outcome.
A sack… the win probability drops dramatically (it becomes 3rd downn and takes the ability to run out of the equation, and the clock runs so you probably have to take your last TO)
A holding penalty… the win probability drops dramatically (you get the down back but again the run is taken out of the game).
And one of the benefits of throwing (a pass interference or defensive holding penalty) is completely negated at the 1 yard line as the only impact is it being first down instead of 2nd down.
The issue is not the result, it’s the decision. It would have been a boneheaded call even if they score the TD. That people would have criticized it less (or not at all) doesn’t make it any less boneheaded.
A sack on a quick pass like that is basically impossible.
Would a holding penalty be more likely on a pass like that than on a run?
That’s my point, people are criticizing because it didn’t work. It’s being talked about like the worst play call of all time. Why, because there was a 1% chance of an interception and it happened?
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Poor execution by Wilson. He has to know to throw the ball away if he doe not have a clear opening, since they had 2 more chances, but he is young and young guys make mistakes. Also, these guys are competitors so they try to make plays sometimes that are not there to make, even veterans. Also, he was asked to do something he had not done all game, throwing short in tight coverage. Bad call on so many levels
Baseball has 1 or 2 decision makers on these type of plays… the pitcher and the catcher or the manager and the bench coach….
Romo definitely went off script himself as evidenced by the Posey and Bochy interview.
The thing that gets me with the Seahawks is that play went through a review process of at least 10 coaches and players and still made the cut. A truly WTF moment and I can’t think of a more boneheaded committee play in all of sports.
Well, every one is saying that running Lynch is a no-brainer. But of his 24 carries, 2 went for no gain and 2 for 1 yd, which means that not quite 20% of the time, he doesn’t make it in. I dunno if being in goal line makes that more likely or not, but they don’t have time for 3 runs – they have 1 timeout at this point. So, 3 plays means 1 pass, and if they run here and want 3 plays, the 2nd is the pass.
I think it’s a reasonable decision – without the interception, it maximizes the chances for a win. It just didn’t.
a goal line situation would theoretically lower Lynch’s odds of picking up a yard, considering the defense will dislike a 2 yard run as much as a 50 yard run at the goal line
Not necessarily true. Had the Seahawks decided early on to perform a series of run plays, they could have simply ran a no-huddle offense to save an extra few precious seconds on the clock, which would have been invaluable given the circumstances. A failed run and a quick TO would have left likely over 30 seconds remaining on the clock. Another run play could then be attempted, after which a few more seconds would have expired. At that point, the Seahawks would still have had sufficient time to perform one final run play.
Sure, my suggestion wouldn’t allow the Seahawks time to prepare proper offensive schemes, but I think you have to prioritize the three run attempts over any other combination of plays with possible fewer attempts, especially given the inherent very high probability of success.
I actually brought up such an analogy to a family member right after the play occurred: Tie ballgame, bottom of the 9th, bases loaded, no outs, and a 3-0 count. The play? The runner from third tries to steal home.
While the analogy may not fit the bill in terms of likelihood of occurrence or end result, I think it serves to underscore the absolute unnecessary nature of that play call. Under different circumstances for the Seahawks, such as going up against a staunch run defense or having a poor running back, you could make somewhat of an argument for attempting such a play. However, the Seahawks possess one of the best running backs in the league who had no trouble handling the Patriot defense up to that point, and a quarterback in Russell Wilson who, while more than adequate for his position and role, is not among the most accurate prolific or experienced QBs in the league, and who would have needed to operate in very tight windows of opportunities. With 3 attempts left to win the game, it was a most ludicrous call, though the play itself may have been well designed. Any fewer attempts and it would be an entirely different story.
The baseball equivalent would simply need to infer the unnecessary risk involved in running that play. Though in my analogy the game would not have ended as a result of the caught stealing, the same could be said for a failure of the designed play, as an interception would not have been the only outcome that resulted in a failed designation.
Steal of home… yes, this fits, especially if your hitter is a fly-ball guy. And you make a good point about Wilson that lines up with what I was thinking this morning. If you have Payton Manning or John Elway or Dan Marino in their primes at QB, then this is not a bad call (in fact, I watched the Dolphins with Marino do this very thing many times, and it nearly always worked for them). But Russell Wilson?
I think this wins.
I realize this doesn’t line up with the win if you succeed, lose if you don’t premise, nor do the percentages line up, but I was thinking the following, I’ll add in some stipulations to make it more likely that you lose if you fail.
Bottom of the 10th, both closers are spent, Cabrera at the plate with a runner on third and one out, tie game, 2,3, and 4 hitters up next inning for the visiting team. Squeeze play.
For a baseball analogy that could’ve swung the results either way, the first one that comes to mind is Wainwright throwing Beltran a strike on an 0-2 count in Game 7 of the 2006 NLCS. Bases loaded, 2 run 9th inning lead in a decisive game, shaky rookie reliever, and the best bat for the Mets up. Granted, it was a helluva curve but it was a ballsy decision to give Beltran anything to hit there.
Here’s mine: Bottom of the 9th, one out, winning run on 2nd and another runner on 1st. Your opponent has their lefty closer on the mound, and he’s been dominant. Your batter is a light-hitting lefty center fielder with ground-ball tendencies. You have a right-handed slugger on the bench. What do you do?
You leave the lefty CF in to bat… because you’ve got data showing that in 7 previous plate appearances against the other team’s closer, your lefty CF has 4 hits. Matchup! Of course, it’s based on a ridiculously small sample size, and most likely your lefty grounds into a double play to end the game. But, hey, matchup!
Using the Romo/Cabrera example, it seems like the best analogy would be for Leyland to remove Cabrera for an inferior left-handed batter.
Kolton Wong getting picked off first seems like a similar call. His run was worthless.
I think it’s more like Mariano Rivera not throwing his cutter. His cutter, even if you know it’s coming, you can’t do any damage to (usually). You could line up 22 guys on the other side, Lynch is getting that yard.
Blue Jays,Giants in world series, tie game, Reyes on third, Donaldson, Bautista, Encarnacion up next, nobody out. Meh giants reliever pitching, Blue Jays have no relievers except for…. Ricky Romero. Its extra innings and next inning mad bum is pitching, they need a run now or they will let one in next inning from ricky. Reyes attempts to steal home.
Isn’t it interesting how the rating of every decision is based mostly on hindsight? On the one hand it’s correct: The outcome is what matters the most. On the other hand: You can’t control what the other team, what other players do. You have to look at the thought process that went into making the decision.
For example: Great job by Sergio Romo on the pitch that won the World Series! But when Tanaka threw a 0-2 fastball (instead of his splitter) to Mike Napoli, who hit it out of the park to win the game for the Sox, everyone was questioning the pitch.
But Napoli just outsmarted Tanaka and McCann, in kind of the same way Butler did in the Super Bowl. Nobody would have talked twice about the Seahawks’s decision if it had been a TD…
And – what about Belichick letting the time run down so much? That could’ve easily cost them a chance at a comeback…
It was not that Tanaka threw a FB, it was that he executed it poorly. That ball should have been thrown nowhere near the strike zone and should have been a pitch Napoli could only chase but not hit. It was way too hittable.
I think it was supposed to surprise Napoli and strike him out looking. But you could be right too.
If you are going to lose, lose with your strength. Wilson was effective throwing deep, but was asked to throw short and in a crowd. He had already been intercepted 4 times this post season. It happens a lot that the wrong pitch or the wrong call by a manager still works out, often by random chance, although in baseball a wrong pitch gets an out more often than not .
Carroll made the wrong call. Maybe going with his strength wouldn’t have worked out, Lynch could have fumbled or got stopped, but I bet everyone in Seattle would feel a lot better about the loss.
Pete Carroll, Seattles Grady Little
Football is business. They need to put cork in the footballs to make throwable, but cork is rare, so it is valuable. Interception! I understand the business.
This article from fivethirtyeight re the Super Bowl ending should be of interest to the Fangraphs crowd:
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/a-head-coach-botched-the-end-of-the-super-bowl-and-it-wasnt-pete-carroll/
So the narrative is now that Belichick used game theory on his timeout calling and it worked?
The points of this article are (1) the narrative that the Seahawks blew it with their play call is based on the outcome after the fact, not the probability before the fact and (2) the Patriots won despite Belichick not calling timeouts, not because of it.
I like your umlauts.
It wasn’t just about Seattle throwing the ball it was the choice to throw the ball on a hot route in the middle of the field. I stood up in shock and awe at the decision screaming, what are they thinking before Wilson even threw the ball. If they had executed a play-action, a boot-leg, or a shot at the corner of the end zone (similar to the touchdown the Patriots scored on the previous drive) than I think Seattle would of at least had another shot at the end zone.
The most comparable play in baseball, at least from an emotional standpoint, and from very recent memory, was Alex Gordon’s triple in Game 7 of the World Series and the decision to not attempt to score from third base. Of course, that play only ties the game, but still my sport instinct/emotion was the same…What are you doing?!!
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/alex-gordon-barely-had-a-chance/
I wonder how many QBs in the league would, in that same situation, get into the huddle and say “Ok guys, we’re not running that shit play, we’re gonna do this instead” and run a play other than what the coach called. Surely some of the more experienced veteran QBs would?
I dunno. Peyton Manning is the master of doing that, and his success rate is less than stellar in the post. Though I do see where you’re going with that. I know Peyton would have done it, but at least there’s an excuse if they do pass. PS flops or not, it’s Peyton Manning throwing the ball and not some running QB. But he would have changed the play.
I’d say it is the equivalent of chewing sun flower seeds instead of gum.
“Romo’s fastball didn’t give the Tigers a chance to win the World Series had it gone wrong”
Exactly. It’s not the baseball equivalent of throwing on the one-yard line.
Bottom of the 9th, down by 1 run, bases loaded, the count is 3-2 but there’s only 1 out! The coach sends the signal to make a suicide, the batter fouls to the back, the catcher catches the ball and doubles off the runner in 3rd eliminating more than one opportunity to win the game
I did not watch the stupor bowl and have not watched maimball, or the Negro Felons League for decades, but I did read this while wondering why any baseball fan would try to equate baseball with maimball…
After reading I wondered why you did not title it, “The Maimball Equivalent of Striking Out.”
My entree: being theAstros and having Brad Lidge on the hill while winning 5-3 in the ninth inning and having Pujols up with two out and two on. They don’t walk him, they pitch to him and he hits a three run shot.
I cannot think of a single play in any sport I’ve seen that was that much a layup that they blew, except maybe Luis Castillo dropping a two out pop up and losing the game, but that wasn’t game seven of the World Series.
Don’t know if anybody’s mentioned it, but Mark Wohlers throwing a slider to Leyritz to blow a 6-3 lead. Granted, there are several differences, but this is the thing that keeps popping into my head every time I think of that play. The only thing that can really beat you is the 3-run HR, and he can’t hit your fastball unless he gets lucky and plops one the opposite field. Instead, he gave him a pitch he can not only get around on, but one Wohlers can hang and make a mistake on. Kinda like the INT. Of course Wohlers can deliver a fastball in the wheelhouse the same way Lynch can run into a wall of defenders, but there’s a better chance of him getting away with it and living to play another day. But instead they both went with the mistake-prone choice. Wohlers gave up a HR that completed a huge comeback, NYY ties and later goes on to win, Braves miss opportunity to go up 3-1.
NOT BRINGING IN KIMBREL
Babe Ruth’s 1926 caught stealing is a virtually exact comparable to the goal line INT:
– Lost a decisive game on the spot
– Counter-intuitive; fat Babe running?
– A one-score game (3-2 Cardinals, top 9; an extra-base hit would tie it)
– A poor percentage play given the big picture. Bob Meusel, a dangerous slugger in his own right, was up, not some skinny shortstop.
After the game, Babe told the writers, “I wasn’t doing any (bleeping) good at first base.” But the difference in probability between Meusel getting a single vs. a double/triple/HR and Babe getting thrown out… you decide.
Correction – the game was at Yankee Stadium. It was the bottom of the 9th, which makes it an even dumber decision. Meusel could have WON the game on the spot (can you imagine?)