The Cubs Still Need Yu Darvish

(Photo: Keith Allison)
In a time that has been marked by the emergence of “super teams,” the Chicago Cubs of the last three years are one of the few clubs worthy of that description. They’ve averaged 97 regular-season wins, won two division titles, advanced to the National League Championship Series three times, and quite famously claimed a World Series title in 2016.
In that context, last season might be regarded as a disappointment. They won “only” 92 games during the regular season and then failed to get back to the World Series, losing in five games to the Dodgers. Much of the Cubs’ lack of success — which, admittedly, is a relative term in this case — has been attributed to a hangover effect from the long and satisfying World Series run. The Cubs were projected for 96 wins at the beginning of the 2017 season. Despite adding Jose Quintana at the deadline, the club finished four games under that mark.
As presently constructed, Chicago remains both excellent and flawed. Projected once again to cross the 90-win threshold, the Cubs’ roster nevertheless features some questions. Yu Darvish is the answer to the most prominent of those — namely, the club’s rotation depth.
Travis Sawchik argued three months ago that the Cubs are the best fit for the best pitcher on the market. Since that time, the team has signed Tyler Chatwood to fill a spot in the rotation. That seems promising.
At the same time, though, the Cardinals have made some moves on the margins and put themselves within striking distance. Entering Last season, for example, the Cubs featured a 10-game cushion over the Cardinals in our projections. As of today, however, Chicago’s projected lead over the St. Louis is just four games. The Cardinals got better, adding Marcell Ozuna to bolster their outfield.
As the forecasts suggest, the Cubs remain in a better position than the Cardinals. All things being equal, that’s good for Chicago. There are some warning signs, though.
Consider, for example, some of the assumptions on which the projections are built:
- That Addison Russell will bounce back offensively, play a full season, and contribute 2.9 WAR. He had an 84 wRC+ and was worth 1.4 WAR in 385 plate appearances last year.
- That Jason Heyward will continue to get closer to his pre-Cubs form and produce 2.4 WAR. He had just an 88 wRC+ last year, a season after recording a 71 wRC+. He contributed 0.9 WAR last year.
- That Ben Zobrist, at age 37, will bounce back and be worth 1.7 WAR. He had an 82 wRC+ last season was barely better than replacement level, with 0.3 WAR.
- That Kyle Schwarber will rebound offensively and produce 2.0 WAR in fewer plate appearances than last season’s 1.5 WAR season.
- That Anthony Rizzo will find his 2016 form and get to five wins instead of the four he contributed last season.
That’s just the position players. The Cubs do still have considerable depth on the hitting side should some of those players fail to rebound, with Javier Baez and Ian Happ representing talent that can play all over the diamond. At the same time, those two are already projected for full-time utility jobs and Jon Jay, who was a solid role player last season, has departed.
Given these projections, it is easier to find downside. If the players above repeat their seasons from last year instead of regressing positively, the Cubs look more like an 86-win team, and that is going to make them vulnerable to missing the playoffs. It’s not a likely outcome, of course, but the possibility is much more real than it was a year ago.
The position-player side of things isn’t the real problem for the Cubs, though. Even if the group above performed five wins below expectations, Chicago would still be a top-10 team. Meanwhile, the bullpen should be fine, even without Wade Davis. The addition of Steve Cishek and Brandon Morrow, as well as a full year of Justin Wilson, should address Davis’ absence.
As for the rotation, it should be fine, too. That said, there are some assumptions baked into the projections here, as well. Some are more realistic than others.
Consider:
- That Kyle Hendricks pitches a full season at last year’s good, but not great, level after losing a quarter of the season to right-hand tendinitis last season.
- That the 34-year-old Jon Lester pitches better than he did last season when he had a 2.7 WAR and 4.10 FIP, and that he remains healthy despite a short stint on the disabled list due to left shoulder fatigue and lat muscle tightness.
- That Tyler Chatwood pitches better now that he’s done pitching half his games in Coors Field.
- That Mike Montgomery can pitch 140 quality innings as a starter, something he’s never done before in the majors.
None of these assumptions is so improbable as to give the team much trouble. The problem is depth — or rather, the lack thereof. After Chatwood and Montgomery, the Cubs have:
- Eddie Butler, who walked nearly as many batters as he struck out last season and is projected at roughly replacement level.
- Luke Farrell, who was picked up off of waivers and projects at replacement level.
- Adbert Alzolay, who is a good prospect, but probably won’t be ready to contribute until 2019.
- Alec Mills, who pitched only 28 innings in the minors last year.
- Jen-Ho Tseng, who doesn’t miss a lot of bats and got shelled in his one MLB start last year.
If the issue were only the starting five, that would be fine. Teams usually need about eight starting pitchers for extended stretches, though — and more just for spot starts. The organization, meanwhile, has had a difficult time developing their own pitchers, as Travis Sawchik noted earlier this month. Jake Arrieta and Kyle Hendricks were both developed by the club, to some degree. Even then, though, they were acquired from other clubs. Either way, the fact remains that there are few internal solutions at the moment.
If the Cubs were to lose even one of Chatwood or Montgomery, the rotation would take a significant hit. If they were to lose one of their top three — that is, Hendricks, Lester, or Quintana — the drop-off would be very steep. The Cubs should add another starter, regardless, and rumors surrounding Alex Cobb make some sense. He would provide stability for the back of the rotation and allow Montgomery to bolster the bullpen while providing the option to step into the rotation should someone get hurt.
We’ve arrived at almost the end of this post without more than a passing mention of the player mentioned the title, but Yu Darvish is a free agent in need of a large contract, and the Cubs are financially able to offer him that large contract. Chicago has only about $160 million committed to the 2018 season and about the same for next season with arbitration raises. They’ve opened each of the past two campaigns about $10 million higher than that amount, and because the Cubs did not go over the competitive-balance tax threshold last season, tax penalties would be lower for the club this season and wouldn’t reach the 50% mark until 2020. They might not even have to go over the tax amount this season if they spread out Darvish’s contract over eight years instead of the six it will likely take to sign him.
If the Cubs offer Darvish six years and $150 million, the tax hit is $25 million. If they offer him that same $150 million over eight years, the tax hit is just under $19 million and the present value of the contract goes down slightly. A trade for a good pitcher doesn’t seem like a plausible scenario for the Cubs. They lack the talent on the farm to pull this off, and while they have depth at the major-league level, most of the depth is already projected for a big role this season, lessening the on-field impact of a trade.
That really just leaves Darvish if the Cubs want to keep pace with the Los Angeles Dodgers and put a healthy distance between themselves and the Cardinals. There are rumors that teams such as the Twins and Brewers have inquired about Darvish, but given the high level of talent on the Cubs roster at the moment and the importance of maximizing their core, there isn’t much a of a reason for the Cubs to be outbid by a small-market team. Darvish only costs money and a rotation slot is readily available. He’s unlikely to be blocking anyone anytime soon.
Craig Edwards can be found on twitter @craigjedwards.
“They’ve … advanced to the National League Championship Series twice, and quite famously claimed a World Series title in 2016.”
thrice
“In that context, last season might be regarded as a disappointment. They won “only” 92 games during the regular season and then failed to advance out of a division series against the Nationals.”
wah?
thanks. brain cramp. already fixed.
Cameron took the editors with him to SD. Classic Dave.
“failed to advance out of a division series against the Nationals” is somewhat of a baseball oxymoron
sigh
The post was originally written by Craig in an alternate universe where all umpire crews know the baseball rulebook.
(And, no, I’m not a Nationals fan. Just still can’t believe that the umpires blew it on actually not knowing a written provision of the rulebook.)
Nvm
Signing Darvish makes a lot more sense when the alternative is that the Brewers sign him.
I was just thinking this. The Cubs sign Darvish, they’re once again the favorites over the Cards. The Brewers sign Darvish, then a few good breaks for the Brewers makes it a 3-team race for the division.
Eh, I’m not a huge fan of the “sign player x to keep him away from team y” school of thought. The Brewers might just sign one of Arrieta, Cobb, or Lynn instead. None of those players are Darvish, but they each project 1 or 2 wins lower.
IMO, that line of thinking can make more sense during the regular season when it might be truly possible to say that a player is the only upgrade available.
The effect of the leader signing Darvish might be to discourage a fringe rival from making any adds at all instead of forcing the fringe rival make a slightly lesser add. Call this a “first mover advantage” that usually works either not at all or only for the leading team.
I doubt the Brewers would be discouraged from long term adds, but even if it changes what they do, such as trading for Yelich alone instead of both Yelich and Straily (who has only 1 year of control left iirc), it has accomplished a lot.
You may be entirely correct that these “strategic effects” are often overblown, but they do have a non-zero role in player acquisition decisions. You are also correct that strategic effects are in most cases strongest mid-season when there is a smaller pool of players on the move. If I may make a less controversial claim, you would probably be appalled at how I do snake drafts.
I can see that under a specific set of circumstances.
My doubts here are tied more to the known situation: other (albeit not as good) pitching options who we know are also available. Wild card contention as a secondary goal is also a factor, both in general and in this specific case.
I do think that the rapid-fire Ohtani signing, Kinsler trade, Cozart signing by the Angels has discouraged teams like the Blue Jays, Rangers, and Mariners from making moves that would target 2018 improvement. Ohtani is such an unusual case, though, since his contract status means that the Angels get him at a league minimum salary and therefore kept their whole free agent budget available for other moves.
Cubs are already healthy favorites over the Cards.
Brewers are projected to finish nowhere close- 73 win current projection.
The Brewers are a weird case. Their record wasn’t fluky based on the runs that were scored. But the runs scored were fluky based on the underlying player performance.
I think you’re more interested in the second fact, while the Brewers are obviously believers in the first. I’m not sure what I believe right now–I don’t think I’m quite sold on the first fact yet–but it does seem pretty weird that a team this young would regress quite so much.
The Brewers seem to have the weak spots (SP, CF, C, 2B), prospects and payroll space to make huge improvements. In this sense, they could be a real concern to the Cubs and Cards.
ZiPS looks to be quite a bit higher on the Brewers. The Depth Chart WAR on the Brewers’ ZiPS write-up adds up to 31 WAR (without Nelson), which is a 79 win team. That’s a team that can justifiably see itself at least in the mix for wild card contention.
It’s simple. Spread the cost over the remainder of his lifetime to lower the hit against the luxury tax threshold.
I’m a little confused by “They might not even have to go over the tax amount this season if they spread out Darvish’s contract over eight years instead of the six it will likely take to sign him.” If we’re assuming he’d cost 6/150, why would he take 8/150? Why would the Cubs even want to offer him 8 for that matter? Am I missing something?
The idea is that something like 5 / $125 might be Darvish’s best offer right now, so more guaranteed money would be more attractive to Darvish even if spread over more years for a lower AAV.
Sure that makes sense. I just thought maybe he was alluding to a way they could spread the cap hit over a longer period than the contract was actually for. Seems like an odd way to illustrate the point when you could just compare 6/150 and 8/180, which would demonstrate that concept in a more realistic scenario.
“Meanwhile, the bullpen should be fine, even without Wade Davis. The addition of Steve Cishek and Brandon Morrow, as well as a full year of Justin Wilson, should address David’s absence.” Did you mean Davis instead?
yes thanks.
Questioning the projections so much is heretical.
That sounds a lot like what people in other countries said when America revolted against England in the Revolutionary War. It’s human nature to push the boundaries and make changes, to have their own opinions on things without just mindless following. “Heretical” ideas allow for more intelligent discussion.
Not really. The projections ignore anything that isn’t statistical. Such as injuries and changes to techniques or approaches. There are wide margins for error within projection systems, allowing for questioning of them.
Most anything that has already affected performance will be at least partly accounted for via proxy in the projections.
Injuries, age related decline or changes to techniques will, at least partly, be included for Schwarber, Lester, Heyward, Zobrist and others. Injuries, age related decline and technique changes have already happened to these players prior to this offseason, so to the extent that such things affect performance for these players, the projects will be affected.
So for Schwarber for example, his injury has already limited his game time, the projections take note of this and project him for less than 500 PA. But any changes from the end of last season to now- like his reported weight loss etc- will of course not affect the projections because such change has not yet had any effect on performance.
OTOH, projections don’t suffer from the same biases and inaccurate/irrational information processing that plagues the human brain. We are very prone to seeing patterns where none are there (anyone remember when it was a thing to rate player’s girlfriends as a proxy for confidence as a proxy for potential?)
*sees photo of Darvish*
*thinks to himself: man I thought he was a righty*
*reads caption*
I see what you did there.
didn’t even notice that lol
They did nothing; Yu frequently plays catch lefthanded
Billy Wagner was actually right handed. I wonder how hard he could’ve thrown if he didn’t have so many issues with his right arm as a kid.
The question to me is if the Cubs are better off to spend $25mil AAV on Darvish or say $17mil AAV on Cobb leaving $8mil for other improvements or midseason acquisitions to address an injury or under performance.
Anybody know why Tseng wouldn’t be first in line after Monty? He had a great year in minors in 17 following solid minor lg career. Saw both Cub outings last yr and after looking overwhelmed in his start he threw 3 hitless innings and looked good. Taking current group to June, seeing who is performing and who is available could be preferred to spending $150 M on a free agent.
even adding darvish, not much chance they win.
giving up eloy tho, lmao
Wow, Heyward for 2.4 wins? I’m rooting for the guy but I’m not counting on that.
I really think the question of whether the Cubs or Brewers or anyone signs Darvish comes to a pretty simple question:
Can you get him to stop tipping pitches?
Your level of interest should be driven largely by the answer to this question.
For the Cubs, he’d likely be the best starter on staff and give them a very good playoff rotation. In the era of the super-team, this is what it may take.
If they have $160 million committed, don’t they have about $30 million to spend without going over the luxury tax threshold? I don’t think signing Darvish to $25 mil aav is a big deal for them.
“…there isn’t much a of a reason for the Cubs to be outbid by a small-market team…”
unless, of course, the price is more than the player is worth.
He’s 31 and projected for 3.6 WAR, so a 150m 6-year deal has about -$10.5m in surplus value.
2018: 3.6, $32.4 market value, $25m salary, +$7.4m total surplus
2019: 3.1, $29.3 market value, $25m salary, +$11.7m total surplus
2020: 2.6, $25.8 market value, $25m salary, +$12.5m total surplus
2021: 2.1, $21.9 market value, $25m salary, +$9.4m total surplus
2022: 1.6, $17.4 market value, $25m salary, +$1.8m total surplus
2023: 1.1, $12.7 market value, $25m salary, -$10.5m total surplus
{5% annual growth in $/WAR included, 2023 est $/WAR $11.5m}
The Cubs shouldn’t bid well over market on Darvish simply because the author can see a downside scenario for certain Cubs’ projections: as if that isn’t true for all clubs.
Ehh, that $11.5mn is roughly 7.5% deviation from the prediction, which is well within one standard deviation even assuming your back-of-envelope math represents the likely development of both the player and the market. That might not be enough to tip a decision one way or the other.
Additionally, why should we assume that the Cubs’ valuation of WAR is the exact same as the central tendency of the overall market? Given their payroll and their window for contention they very well could price wins more dearly than other teams would. That’s kind of the whole point of this article, and several others on the site’s front page right now.
Win curve studies show that the value of an added win maxes out around $6.5m- we can round up to $7 for sake of conversation.
The free agent market value for a marginal projected WAR has always been a bit higher than the actual value of an added win, even at the most valuable part of the win curve.
There is nothing to suggest that the Cubs would, for some reason, value a added win much moreso than empiricism suggests. Even if they did, there is no reason to think that the Cubs would specifically value FA wins moreso than wins acquired by other methods of acquisition.
I didn’t say that the Cubs shouldn’t get Darvish. I simply showed that the common estimate of his contract value would be a bit underwater, if he made $25m over 6 years. The author is taking the more unsubstantiated and extreme position – that the Cubs ‘need’ Darvish. There is simply nothing suggesting that they need him – unless of course he is available for surplus value, however calculated. There is no evidence to suggest that Darvish is available for a surplus value contract- regardless of where teams are on the win curve.
It is of course true that certain clubs value wins more than others- but that does not mean that any club needs a dramatically overpriced FA, which Darvish may prove to be.
These endless articles promoting FAs spends are ignoring entirely the idea that clubs are doing well to not spend- I’ve seen zero fangraphs articles saying ‘Houston, LAD, and Chicago should continue to avoid FA overspends,’ but have seen almost 1-a-day arguing the opposite.
Can we please stop using this placeholder number of $/WAR to determine whether a team “should” pay a player X number of dollars? Swartz’s study doesn’t justify how $/WAR is being used here.
Teams want to improve the most they can for the least amount of dollars. The relevant numbers are not in any way the $/WAR number (which itself is just a measure of how efficient free agent spending has been in the past, not of expected value). The relevant numbers are these:
1) How much WAR do you want to add this offseason?
2) How much money do you have to spend?
3) How much WAR do you predict each player to have?
So let’s say the Cubs want to add another 4 WAR to their team. According to them, Darvish will get them there because he’s replacing Montgomery in the rotation, but they’re hesitant because he’s out of their price range. The Cubs have a figure in mind–$/WAR–that is only partially connected to the efficiency of past free agent market spending.
“As the forecasts suggest, the Cubs remain in a better position than the Cardinals. All things being equal, that’s good for Chicago.”
Is this meant to be obvious and repetitive?
“Since that time, the team has signed Tyler Chatwood to fill a spot in the rotation. That seems promising.”
Is this sarcastic or not? Because it seems like it is.
Typos:
“The problem is depth depth”
“tax penalties would be lower for the club season”
Does anyone read anything even once over before they post it on the Internet anymore?
I know right? The free content you’re reading having any kind of grammatical/spelling error, the nerve of these SOB’s.
If I were you I would boycott fangraphs comment section, let your voice not be heard – you know – in protest!
“If the players above repeat their seasons from last year instead of regressing positively …”
I guesstimate that 98% of the time that the word “regression” in all its forms is used in the baseball blogosphere it refers to negative regression. It was kind of refreshing to see regression (to the mean) used for something other than dismissing the likelihood that a player will continue to perform well.
Now if only someone could explain to me why Kris Bryant is still being projected to underperform his worst ever year by fWAR, I’d appreciate it. He’s 26 years old, in his only 3 years he has always had at least 6.5 fWAR, yet Depthcharts and Steamer both have him underperforming his career low …??? That’s not how regression to the mean is supposed to work.
A lot of those projections seem absurdly high. I do buy Schwarber bouncing back, but see no reason to believe on Heyward, Zobrist, or even Lester.
Considering this “emergence of superteams” is an unfounded narrative pushed without any argument or evidence advanced in support, the author might want to avoid using that as a premise to an article.