The Indians’ Pitching Was Bound to Be Underrated
I don’t think anyone expected that. Sure, the Indians always had a chance against the Red Sox, and having a chance means a shot at a series win, but no one would’ve forecast the Indians to move on with a sweep. The Indians produced against Red Sox pitching, scoring 15 times in three games. At least as importantly, the Red Sox didn’t produce against Indians pitching, scoring seven times while batting .214. The Indians, you remember, lost two of their three best starters toward the end of the year, and that seemed to spell almost certain doom.
But really, it shouldn’t have been taken that way. No one would want to lose Carlos Carrasco. No one would want to lose Danny Salazar. Both those guys would make the Indians a stronger playoff ballclub. But we just can’t get out of the habit of over-valuing a starting rotation. Especially come playoff time. Even though we all know the game in October is different, we just can’t quite get it to sink in. So the Indians’ playoff pitching staff was going to be underrated.
This is something I tried to address when I rated the playoff teams. I wanted to try to show how good the teams actually are, based on playoff rosters and on expected playoff playing time. I like that approach, and I think it’s important, but there’s a problem: Our depth charts can’t really account for exaggerated usage. We don’t have a mechanism to fold that in for certain relievers. If you watched, you know that Terry Francona was aggressive with his bullpen in the ALDS. How aggressive? Let’s begin by looking at a different team. Here is how Ned Yost allotted his playoff playing time last year:
This is based just on batters faced, and it doesn’t account for leverage. The four leaders are Royals starting pitchers. Then you get Kelvin Herrera, Ryan Madson, and Wade Davis. They got 9%, 7%, and 6% of the playing time, respectively. That’s not bad, for Yost — that’s more than a fifth of all plate appearances, being handled by the best of the bullpen.
Here’s the same plot for Terry Francona and the Indians in the ALDS:
Starter, starter, starter. Makes sense. But then you run into Andrew Miller (15%), Cody Allen (14%), and Bryan Shaw (8%). For the sake of a little history, we have all observed that Mariano Rivera was used pretty aggressively in the playoffs, right? Rivera consistently fluctuated a little around 10% October usage. Sometimes he came in at 9%, other times he came in at 11%. That’s an awful lot of pitches being thrown by Mariano Rivera, relatively speaking. Miller just topped that, and Allen just topped that. And relievers don’t get a lot better than Miller and Allen.
For reference, in August and September, Miller, Allen, and Shaw combined to handle 12.5% of the Indians’ plate appearances. In the three games against Boston, those three pitchers combined to handle 37.0% of the Indians’ plate appearances. So relative to the stretch run, their usage was three times heavier, and that’s extraordinary. Francona knows who his weapons are, and he’s not the least bit afraid to use them.
A fairly obvious point: These numbers are skewed, because the Indians just finished the series undefeated. It stands to reason at some point the Indians will lose, and Miller and Allen can’t be used this aggressively over and over. They’ll need some days off, or they’ll need some shorter assignments. But, I like this table. In the first line, you see the Indians pitching overall for the 2016 season. In the second line, you see 2016 pitching statistics weighted by ALDS usage.
| Split | K% | BB% | ERA- | FIP- | xFIP- |
| Regular Season | 23% | 8% | 90 | 92 | 89 |
| Playoffs (Weighted) | 27% | 7% | 75 | 81 | 77 |
The Indians’ ALDS pitchers, weighted by batters faced, had a combined 75 ERA- during the regular season. That was basically supported by the peripherals, so if you just take that line, the Indians kind of just had every single inning thrown by an equivalent of Corey Kluber. That’s not bad for a team that has only the one Corey Kluber. The usage pattern will have to change at least a little in the next series, but the good news for Cleveland is there’s even more depth that went almost untouched.
You’ve heard of Dan Otero. You might not know why. He feels like someone who’s floated around. Kind of gives the impression of being a generic sixth-inning sort. Otero actually just had a better season than Allen did, statistically, thanks to his constantly throwing strikes and keeping the ball on the ground. Zach McAllister is a power reliever who’s adjusted well to the bullpen after a few years of rotation inconsistency. And it’s increasingly looking like Danny Salazar will be available out of the bullpen in the ALCS, even without his arm strength built up. Though the injury and time off makes him a wild card, he has a track record of success, and he could conceivably plug any extra innings the top five relievers can’t already handle.
The Indians’ rotation isn’t close to full strength, and that isn’t good news for their chances. Kluber’s the only guy they feel like they know they can count on, and the other two or three options require the rather vigorous crossing of fingers. We’re conditioned to account for the rotation in a certain way, and that causes us to underrate how strong the Indians still actually are. But with the depth of their bullpen, and with the high-end talent of their bullpen, and with the aggressiveness of Terry Francona using his bullpen, the Indians aren’t positioned to give many of their important innings to their starters. Much of the workload is being shifted to relief, and relief pitching might be the Indians’ greatest strength.
Yeah, their pitching staff could be better. And yeah, in the end, Miller and Allen probably won’t combine for more than a quarter of the team’s total pitches. Everybody needs a break. But when it comes to the Indians’ bullpen, opponents don’t really get a break. That’s something Terry Francona damn sure understands.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.


Francona also did well in rotating his hitting lineups to get good matchups. Getting big hits from guys like Naquin and Crisp.
Also starting Chisenhall against Price. Chisenhall almost never plays against lefties but he was one of the few Indians who had a prior history of success against Price. A bit of a gamble but it obviously paid off.
I thought Texas should have started their bullpen in game 3, considering it was a must win game. Do you think we will see that at some point?
Do you think we may reach the stage where the teams stop using starting pitchers? Say 12-13 bullpen arms that each go 2 innings or one time through the lineup. Maybe 1 or 2 starting pitchers if you have good cheap starters available. You could even have a specialist closer still if you wanted and a specialist pitcher for the fifth inning when leading by loads then to rack up huge win totals. (I am assuming that pitcher would get the win when none of your pitchers ever go 5)
If that happened, I think we would see offense rapidly decrease … likely leading to rule changes prohibiting it.
Even dominant current starting pitchers would now be relievers, likely making them even more effective because now they could feature their 2 best pitches and put in max intensity into an inning or two. Managers would likely plan their usage to use their 3 best pitchers against their opponents “heart of the lineup”.
So, now an opposing team’s lineup faces the other teams 3 best pitchers, and only once. That is basically every single advantage to the pitcher.
I would, however, like to see that strategy used in a game 5 situation or final game scenario and see how it would play out. ( 9 relievers for 9 innings more or less). I think it would be a great strategy for a team that was running their 3rd or 4th starter out there just praying for a decent 4 or 5 innings.
Right now, the best arms in the game get 200 innings per year.
Would they be able to get anywhere near close to that if this strategy was adopted? If not, wouldn’t the increased number of innings given to lesser relievers significantly mitigate any gains?
I could imagine a low revenue team trying this. They could also potentially use their AAA team to increase their pool of pitchers.
A potential variation on this idea is to just have 2 or 3 starters and give the other starts to the bullpen. It also severely messes up opposition platoons.
The problem is that you only have 25 roster spots, so burning 5-6 arms in a game will eat through your pitching staff, leaving nobody left to throw during a long stretch in the regular season.
This was not meant to be a reply to you, Jay; it was intended for peakbear.
You can shuffle guys with options up and down during the season so less of a problem in that regard. Bigger problem is the triple a team would have the burned out arm you just sent down and increase strain on their staff (potentially young arms). If you have 10 guys with starting experience getting 6 innings a week from all them shouldn’t be hard.
No, I don’t think we will reach that point. Bullpens start running functionally thin even with 40 man rosters this time of year. Relievers get to hide from nasty platoon splits and bad match-ups – you take that away and they are less effective as well. I don’t believe that a RP-driven staff is the logical evolution of the game.
People have been theorizing about that for years now. It seems to me we are drifting that way. There are many such schemes:
– the 3×3 rotation: 3 platoons of 3 pitchers (so 9 total) each pitching 3 innings every 3rd day. With this plan, guys would face very, very few hitters a 2nd time, let alone a 3rd time. (This would have the added fun side impact of having 9 guys qualify for the ERA title if carried all the way through a season – which of course would never happen but still)
– Th Bill James plan – 3 starters only but cap each starter at 80 pitches or 5 innings, whichever comes first.
http://www.billjamesonline.com/the_three_man_starting_rotation/
Another side-effect of either plan (as you noted) is a likely concentration of wins in fewer pitchers meaning win totals would start expanding up to 30 or so.
“Another side-effect of either plan (as you noted) is a likely concentration of wins in fewer pitchers meaning win totals would start expanding up to 30 or so.”
Only if the same pitchers keep coming in as the first reliever. If the 9 pitchers rotate regularly, you’ll see dilution of wins, rather than concentration.
It’s an interesting idea, but I don’t think that a team can cover enough innings out of its pitchers that way.
Relievers currently max out at around 70 – 80 innings. Fangraphs shows 33 relievers in all of MLB who pitched over 70 innings this season. (Five of those hit 80 or more, with Brad Hand the leading reliever at 89.1 innings.) So it would be really stretching to get to even 1,000 innings from 12 or 13 pitchers with the workload of current relievers. We’d look to be 400+ innings short of what an MLB team needs to get through the regular season.
Maybe we can stretch that a bit with different usage, but we’re talking about on the order of a 50% increase in innings pitched by each player versus today.
As for stretching it with a minor league shuttle, that has its own problems. A team can only shuttle back and forth guys who are in one of their three option years. A player sent down needs to stay in the minors at least ten days. That’s an issue, because guys with tired arms can’t just be shuttled down for a few days. So there’s a reduction to the number of major league innings that we can expect from a pitcher on the minor league shuttle. We can’t just expect the same number of major league innings from a player who misses a month of the season via three 10-day stints in the minors. And that gets even more relevant because a guy on “rest” in the minors would need to pitch in games at least a little over his 10 days there, because he needs to stay sharp.
I think Ortiz alone absolutely squared up 3 balls for outs. He was really unlucky in the series, not to discredit the pitching.