The Padres Have a Complicated Future

Padres fans in 2023 don’t have a ton to be excited about. The Friars have been in win-now mode for the last four seasons and are staring down their second losing campaign during that span. One of the two winning seasons was kind of ruined — for everyone in the world — by a raging pandemic, leaving fans with only one year that was both normal and an enjoyable experience since 2010. Unlike a lot of teams with a similar performance record, it’s not for lack of investment in the team. Just a few months after the gigantic trade that brought Juan Soto to town, the team signed Xander Bogaerts to a $280 million contract and kept Manny Machado from opting out with an even spicier $350 million pact. The Padres also agreed on a $100 million contract for Joe Musgrove and locked up Yu Darvish for $108 million. That’s more than $800 million, so we’re not talking about the case of, say, the White Sox having issues in part because they couldn’t be bothered to fill giant holes in the lineup because that would have required money.
As gloomy as the season feels right now, there are still legitimate reasons to think the Padres are a good baseball team. Their 68–54 Pythagorean record is 10 wins above their actual record, and records derived from run differential are more predictive than win-loss record. The projections all still agree there’s a lot to like and similarly have a good record, relatively speaking, of predicting the future. And this holds true even when talking about teams with the largest disagreement between the projections and the record. Looking at the 25 teams that FanGraphs like better than their seasonal winning percentage the most, coin flips missed their rest-of-season winning percentages by an average of 86 points, season to-date records by 81 points, and FanGraphs records by 65 points. Those 25 teams had played .396 ball through August 14 of their seasons; FanGraphs projected a .476 RoS winning percentage, and the actual RoS winning percentage for those teams was .458. We weren’t imagining things.
But the fundamental problem the Padres face is that it’s simply far too late to be the team they hoped they were. Our projections still believe they are a .572 team, but that’s only good enough for a 19% chance of making the postseason with a divisional probability that rounds to zero; the ZiPS projections have it at 15%. While those are still pretty good odds, especially compared to how the season has felt, it’s still far more likely than not that this year ends up being a dark companion to the 2021 season that also ended in stunningly bleak fashion.
And here’s the problem: the Padres project to be worse in the future than they are now. You could say that about most teams, but the Padres are also a team that has a massive amount of payroll already tied up in a declining roster, an unsigned Soto approaching free agency, and probably not a lot of room left to grow in a payroll sense. Complicating things even further is the financial collapse of Bally Sports, as the team has not yet figured out how to replace that revenue. Forbes estimated the Padres lost $53 million in 2022, and things are likely to get worse from there. Peter (Seidler) actually saw a wolf.
Running some up-to-date projections for players signed long-term demonstrates the enormity of the team’s challenge. I’m going to start with the Padres’ core of six players who have guaranteed contracts with annual salaries of at $10 million or more through at least the 2026 season. Whatever happens elsewhere on the team, these six are almost certainly going to be part of the foundation.
| Year | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | SO | SB | OPS+ | DR | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | .265 | .332 | .465 | 533 | 81 | 141 | 27 | 1 | 26 | 90 | 55 | 108 | 6 | 123 | 6 | 4.7 |
| 2025 | .256 | .324 | .438 | 504 | 73 | 129 | 24 | 1 | 22 | 80 | 52 | 104 | 5 | 114 | 5 | 3.7 |
| 2026 | .251 | .319 | .423 | 471 | 65 | 118 | 22 | 1 | 19 | 70 | 48 | 98 | 4 | 108 | 4 | 2.9 |
| 2027 | .247 | .315 | .409 | 430 | 57 | 106 | 20 | 1 | 16 | 60 | 43 | 92 | 3 | 103 | 2 | 2.3 |
| 2028 | .234 | .303 | .371 | 385 | 48 | 90 | 17 | 0 | 12 | 50 | 38 | 86 | 3 | 90 | 1 | 1.3 |
| 2029 | .227 | .295 | .353 | 326 | 39 | 74 | 14 | 0 | 9 | 40 | 32 | 76 | 2 | 83 | 0 | 0.6 |
| 2030 | .226 | .293 | .349 | 261 | 30 | 59 | 11 | 0 | 7 | 31 | 25 | 61 | 1 | 81 | -1 | 0.3 |
| 2031 | .223 | .290 | .342 | 193 | 22 | 43 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 22 | 18 | 46 | 1 | 78 | -1 | 0.1 |
| 2032 | .215 | .287 | .319 | 135 | 15 | 29 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 15 | 13 | 33 | 1 | 72 | -1 | 0.0 |
| 2033 | .227 | .289 | .347 | 75 | 8 | 17 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 18 | 0 | 79 | -1 | 0.0 |
You may cringe looking at the end of Machado’s contract, but ZiPS already expected that before the season. Machado put together a strong enough July — though he’s slumped since then and is nursing a sore hamstring — and experienced a clear return to defensive form to cause his 2024-and-on projections to tick up slightly. While ZiPS didn’t like the deal, it doesn’t like it any less than it did in February.
| Year | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | SO | SB | OPS+ | DR | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | .266 | .342 | .406 | 534 | 75 | 142 | 27 | 0 | 16 | 65 | 58 | 112 | 10 | 111 | -1 | 4.1 |
| 2025 | .259 | .335 | .392 | 505 | 68 | 131 | 25 | 0 | 14 | 59 | 55 | 107 | 8 | 105 | -1 | 3.3 |
| 2026 | .252 | .327 | .375 | 469 | 61 | 118 | 22 | 0 | 12 | 52 | 50 | 101 | 7 | 99 | -2 | 2.5 |
| 2027 | .247 | .322 | .364 | 429 | 53 | 106 | 20 | 0 | 10 | 45 | 45 | 95 | 6 | 94 | -3 | 1.9 |
| 2028 | .242 | .318 | .351 | 376 | 46 | 91 | 17 | 0 | 8 | 38 | 40 | 86 | 4 | 90 | -3 | 1.3 |
| 2029 | .232 | .307 | .331 | 311 | 36 | 72 | 13 | 0 | 6 | 29 | 32 | 75 | 3 | 81 | -4 | 0.6 |
| 2030 | .231 | .305 | .328 | 229 | 25 | 53 | 10 | 0 | 4 | 21 | 23 | 55 | 2 | 80 | -3 | 0.3 |
| 2031 | .226 | .301 | .323 | 155 | 17 | 35 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 14 | 15 | 38 | 1 | 77 | -3 | 0.1 |
| 2032 | .231 | .302 | .327 | 104 | 11 | 24 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 10 | 26 | 1 | 78 | -2 | 0.1 |
Bogaerts was mired in a deep slump in May and June, aided by a sore wrist, but has hit a more Xanderian .290/.351/.413 since the start of July, in-line with preseason expectations. As with Machado’s recent deal, the Padres go into this contract knowing that they’re paying for Bogaerts to decline.
| Year | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | SO | SB | OPS+ | DR | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | .243 | .327 | .405 | 538 | 77 | 131 | 30 | 6 | 15 | 69 | 57 | 110 | 5 | 106 | 3 | 2.2 |
| 2025 | .239 | .322 | .395 | 506 | 71 | 121 | 27 | 5 | 14 | 62 | 53 | 105 | 5 | 102 | 3 | 1.7 |
| 2026 | .237 | .320 | .385 | 465 | 64 | 110 | 25 | 4 | 12 | 55 | 49 | 98 | 4 | 99 | 2 | 1.3 |
| 2027 | .229 | .312 | .369 | 406 | 54 | 93 | 21 | 3 | 10 | 47 | 42 | 88 | 3 | 93 | 2 | 0.8 |
| 2028 | .225 | .310 | .355 | 324 | 42 | 73 | 17 | 2 | 7 | 36 | 34 | 73 | 2 | 88 | 1 | 0.4 |
| 2029 | .224 | .306 | .355 | 228 | 29 | 51 | 11 | 2 | 5 | 24 | 23 | 53 | 2 | 87 | 1 | 0.3 |
| 2030 | .216 | .299 | .338 | 148 | 18 | 32 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 15 | 15 | 35 | 1 | 80 | 0 | 0.0 |
This is a bit of an awkward projection because it highlights an assumption in team construction that turned out not to be true. Typically, a decent defensive second baseman who can credibly fake playing shortstop will usually fare well at first base, but that just has not happened, at least so far, with Jake Cronenworth. With Ha-Seong Kim 김하성 firmly entrenched as a starter, the Padres have a player with value but not a logical place to play him in order to get that value. The difference is extreme enough that ZiPS thinks that Cronenworth is now more than a win per season less valuable at first than second base.
| Year | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | SO | SB | OPS+ | DR | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | .244 | .325 | .409 | 545 | 78 | 133 | 30 | 6 | 16 | 69 | 56 | 109 | 5 | 107 | 3 | 3.6 |
| 2025 | .240 | .321 | .395 | 517 | 72 | 124 | 28 | 5 | 14 | 64 | 53 | 104 | 4 | 102 | 2 | 2.9 |
| 2026 | .234 | .318 | .383 | 483 | 67 | 113 | 25 | 4 | 13 | 58 | 50 | 99 | 4 | 98 | 1 | 2.4 |
| 2027 | .231 | .313 | .371 | 442 | 59 | 102 | 23 | 3 | 11 | 51 | 45 | 92 | 3 | 93 | 0 | 1.8 |
| 2028 | .224 | .306 | .358 | 388 | 50 | 87 | 19 | 3 | 9 | 42 | 39 | 84 | 2 | 88 | -1 | 1.2 |
| 2029 | .216 | .297 | .332 | 319 | 39 | 69 | 15 | 2 | 6 | 33 | 31 | 72 | 2 | 78 | -1 | 0.4 |
| 2030 | .216 | .297 | .331 | 236 | 28 | 51 | 11 | 2 | 4 | 24 | 23 | 53 | 1 | 78 | -2 | 0.3 |
Add in the fact that Cronenworth is having a down year (and a pretty odd one in terms of Statcast data), and there’s just a lot less reason to like his future than there was before.
| Year | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | SO | SB | OPS+ | DR | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | .264 | .336 | .537 | 518 | 95 | 137 | 29 | 2 | 36 | 98 | 53 | 128 | 23 | 142 | 7 | 5.4 |
| 2025 | .265 | .340 | .535 | 529 | 99 | 140 | 30 | 1 | 37 | 101 | 57 | 127 | 22 | 143 | 6 | 5.6 |
| 2026 | .261 | .339 | .528 | 536 | 100 | 140 | 30 | 1 | 37 | 101 | 60 | 127 | 20 | 141 | 6 | 5.5 |
| 2027 | .258 | .338 | .518 | 535 | 100 | 138 | 29 | 1 | 36 | 99 | 61 | 125 | 18 | 138 | 6 | 5.2 |
| 2028 | .254 | .336 | .505 | 527 | 97 | 134 | 28 | 1 | 34 | 94 | 61 | 123 | 15 | 134 | 6 | 4.8 |
| 2029 | .251 | .332 | .495 | 513 | 92 | 129 | 27 | 1 | 32 | 89 | 59 | 120 | 13 | 130 | 5 | 4.4 |
| 2030 | .253 | .334 | .494 | 490 | 87 | 124 | 26 | 1 | 30 | 84 | 57 | 116 | 11 | 131 | 5 | 4.2 |
| 2031 | .251 | .330 | .486 | 467 | 81 | 117 | 24 | 1 | 28 | 78 | 53 | 111 | 10 | 127 | 4 | 3.7 |
| 2032 | .248 | .328 | .478 | 467 | 80 | 116 | 24 | 1 | 27 | 76 | 53 | 112 | 9 | 125 | 4 | 3.5 |
| 2033 | .245 | .324 | .463 | 441 | 73 | 108 | 22 | 1 | 24 | 70 | 49 | 107 | 7 | 119 | 3 | 2.9 |
| 2034 | .240 | .320 | .449 | 408 | 65 | 98 | 20 | 1 | 21 | 62 | 45 | 100 | 6 | 115 | 3 | 2.3 |
Where the positional gods punished the Padres with Cronenworth, they were far kinder here. Tatis’ bat isn’t quite where it was, but he’s actually turned out to be an excellent defensive outfielder, at least so far. Given his age, he’s the one player who projects to finish out his contract as a plus contributor to the team.
| Year | W | L | S | ERA | G | GS | IP | H | ER | HR | BB | SO | ERA+ | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 4.20 | 26 | 26 | 160.7 | 142 | 75 | 24 | 42 | 154 | 91 | 1.4 |
| 2025 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 4.52 | 23 | 23 | 137.3 | 129 | 69 | 23 | 38 | 126 | 84 | 0.6 |
| 2026 | 6 | 9 | 0 | 4.97 | 20 | 20 | 117.7 | 117 | 65 | 22 | 37 | 104 | 77 | -0.1 |
| 2027 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 5.47 | 15 | 15 | 82.3 | 88 | 50 | 17 | 29 | 69 | 70 | -0.6 |
ZiPS was always fairly pessimistic about the Darvish extension, and without him reversing the continued slow decline in his peripherals, it hasn’t changed direction since the start of the season. While I always say “hitters age, pitchers break,” Darvish is at an age where cliffs do, in fact, beckon. ZiPS didn’t even want to project the final two seasons of his extension; I’ll be kind and not force it to, so we’ll call those zero-WAR seasons, which is sunnier than what ZiPS would say if I made it.
| Year | W | L | S | ERA | G | GS | IP | H | ER | HR | BB | SO | ERA+ | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 10 | 7 | 0 | 3.38 | 26 | 26 | 154.7 | 135 | 58 | 17 | 35 | 148 | 113 | 2.9 |
| 2025 | 9 | 6 | 0 | 3.51 | 24 | 24 | 138.3 | 127 | 54 | 17 | 32 | 129 | 108 | 2.3 |
| 2026 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 3.75 | 21 | 21 | 124.7 | 118 | 52 | 16 | 31 | 112 | 101 | 1.7 |
| 2027 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 4.02 | 18 | 18 | 107.3 | 107 | 48 | 15 | 29 | 93 | 95 | 1.1 |
The performance projections of Musgrove have stayed about the same — hardly surprising considering that when he was healthy, he was having a similar season to last year. But his return this season remains up in the air, and new injuries create new risk for a pitcher, so his projected innings totals have dropped considerably.
OK, let’s throw everybody into one table, complete with their salaries.
| Player | 2024 WAR | 2024 ($M) | 2025 WAR | 2025 ($M) | 2026 WAR | 2026 ($M) | 2027 WAR | 2027 ($M) | 2028 WAR | 2028 ($M) | 2029 WAR | 2029 ($M) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Machado | 4.7 | $17.1 | 3.7 | $17.1 | 2.9 | $25.1 | 2.3 | $39.1 | 1.3 | $39.1 | 0.6 | $39.1 |
| Bogaerts | 4.1 | $25.5 | 3.3 | $25.5 | 2.5 | $25.5 | 1.9 | $25.5 | 1.3 | $25.5 | 0.6 | $25.5 |
| Cronenworth | 2.2 | $7.3 | 1.7 | $11.3 | 1.3 | $12.3 | 0.8 | $12.3 | 0.4 | $12.3 | 0.3 | $12.3 |
| Tatis Jr. | 5.4 | $11.7 | 5.6 | $20.7 | 5.5 | $20.7 | 5.2 | $25.7 | 4.8 | $25.7 | 4.4 | $36.7 |
| Darvish | 1.4 | $16.0 | 0.6 | $21.0 | -0.1 | $16.0 | -0.6 | $15.0 | 0.0 | $15.0 | 0.0 | $0.0 |
| Musgrove | 2.9 | $20.0 | 2.3 | $20.0 | 1.7 | $20.0 | 1.1 | $20.0 | 0.0 | $0.0 | 0.0 | $0.0 |
| Totals | 20.7 | $97.6 | 17.2 | $115.6 | 13.8 | $119.6 | 10.7 | $137.6 | 7.8 | $117.6 | 5.9 | $113.6 |
If the projections hold true, these six will make up less than a third of the WAR needed to be a 90-win team as soon as 2026, when they combine for $120 million in salary. Unless the team continues to spend more and more money, it’s going to get harder and harder to use dollars to patch holes, which means that the farm system has to get back to producing very quickly. The Padres aren’t likely to be able to win on the backs of these six players for very long, which means that they likely have to come up with a whole new core of talent around these players.
The risk here is one of dynastic failure. I’m not calling the Padres a dynasty in terms of baseball success, but more how the term has been used historically. Lots of warlords in history managed to get a throne, but to establish long-term rule, they had to survive the transition to the next rulers. The Astros are an example of a team that has avoided dynastic failure; only a handful of the players on the team that won the World Series in 2017 were still on the roster when Houston won the World Series in 2022. Only Jose Altuve and Alex Bregman remain among the Astros’ offensive contributors today, and the only pitcher still in Houston, Lance McCullers Jr., won’t pitch again until 2024 [and Verlander who I forgot about for some very odd reason -DS]. They basically came up with nearly an entirely new team in five years.
Baseball history is riddled with successful teams that were unable to transition to the next era without a significant interregnum, such as the Utley-Howard Phillies and the Tigers during the peak Miguel Cabrera years. But those Phillies won a World Series, and while the Tigers didn’t, they had more playoff success than these Padres teams have had. To achieve that success, the Padres are going to have to be extremely creative over the next five years, lest they end up as one of the great “what ifs” in baseball history. Spending money and having a few big stars won’t be enough.
Dan Szymborski is a senior writer for FanGraphs and the developer of the ZiPS projection system. He was a writer for ESPN.com from 2010-2018, a regular guest on a number of radio shows and podcasts, and a voting BBWAA member. He also maintains a terrible Twitter account at @DSzymborski.
Yeah, but what if you add in the WAR they’ll get for $12.2M/yr to Hosmer for the next two years?? That’s got to help, right?
Even I have limits to my cruelty.
Plus, Hosmer’s scoops at 1B aren’t counted in WAR but are worth at least 4 wins.
And he hits barrels (but no, not *actual* barrels).
Didn’t even realize he was still playing. Good call on his part not to take that opt out.
More like most obvious call in the history of time.
it is unfathomable that Preller still has a job. Signing Bogarts only makes sense if they’re going to let Machado opt out, because then you can extend Kim, but instead they locked in five bad years of Machado and then locked up Jack Cronenworth to play a lousy first base, and with the combined money those two are getting that would have been more than enough to keep Soto.
some deals are bad in hindsight, like a lot of what the Mets did in the off-season; there was risk and it didn’t work, but it was pretty reasonable see the idea. the Padres’ offseason was bad in foresight, just a colossal self-made mess by a GM who, more than anyone, seems to care more than anything about having “his guys.” i’ve lost track of how many Rangers players and staffers have somehow wound up on the Padres since Preller’s been there, and given the frequency you’d think he’d have plucked at least one guy from the Rangers who’s actually good.
and the other thing, really, is that this is all perfectly salvageable. Cronenworth’s contact is movable by eating a bit of salary; do that and lock up Kim, even if he’s now going to be way more expensive. they’re going to be stuck with Bogaerts and Machado but at least one of them can DH from time to time instead of building a two-player platoon for some reason. (it is weird that the Padres and the Mets spent as much as they did and yet both decided to try to Moneyball at DH when J.D. Martinez was right there)
i’m not even a Padres fan, but they’ve got great fans, a great ballpark, a great booth and great vibes. they’ve even got an owner willing to spend, he’s just giving the checkbook to a guy who operates like someone who snorts a line of coke at 3 A.M and says, to no one in particular, “dude, let’s open a restaurant”
also: yes, their run differential suggests they’d be better, but it’s still half of what the Dodgers’ is in a supposed down year, and it’s pretty clear at this point that overperforming run differential is strongly tied to bullpen depth and to a lesser extent, situational hitting in terms of lineup depth (the 2021 Giants are the poster children for this.) The Padres bullpen is Josh Hader and guys who are decidedly not Josh Hader, and their bench doesn’t have any real depth because they built a roster with five shortstops
I’d say the Dodgers are a pretty good example of a dynasty (transitioned from Colletti to an expansive Friedman with a more supportive ownership, and yet, Justin Turner is in Boston and Mookie Betts is in LA)
“ it’s pretty clear at this point that overperforming run differential is strongly tied to bullpen depth and to a lesser extent, situational hitting in terms of lineup depth (the 2021 Giants are the poster children for this.)”
Respectfully, it’s pretty clear that overperforming run differential is almost entirely random.
Allow me to agree with Jupiter Brando and support his claim that a deep bullpen and virtually complete control of the 8th and 9th is the key to winning more games than the run differential would suggest. I offer the Orioles and Felix Bautista as a solid reason the Orioles have 74 wins instead of the 66 that run differential shows.
Again with respect, anyone who wants to dispute this needs to provide a statistically rigorous study, not narrative examples and supposition.
There are plenty of rigorous studies supporting the null case.
I did this late last year.
The r^2 on the bottom image is 0.024
And yeah, I kinda flipped the axes as this was done for a Twitter thread, but it doesn’t actually change anything.
I’m curious how much influence those handful of teams with >160 ERA- are having on this regression. Seems like that attenuates the effect a fair amount
Obviously there’s a lot of variation but just eyeballing the graph, it looks like going from 100 to 50 could be worth upwards of 5 wins vs Pythag in expectation
That’s not what the graph means.
Hmm, I assumed the y-axis was win % but you’re right there’s no label. Thanks for the clarification.
i overstated it a bit with “strongly” but there is definitely a correlation
my dude, a correlation of .024 is not in any way meaningful, this analysis does not support your belief.
That was the r^2 value – so r is -0.16 – I don’t know how many data points there are but there might be enough that that is significant – but it would still be very weak correlation at best.
The way I was taught to read r^2 is “X% of the change in A can be explained by B”
So 2.4% of the change in Pythag over/under performance can be explained by bullen.
That’s not remotely anything other than random.
My comment was a (slightly) pedantic point – r^2 measures effect size, not correlation.
There is a very weak correlation (the critical value for a 5% one tailed test with 100 data points is 0.1654 – I’ve not counted how many points there are, but I think there is more than 100).
And because the correlation is so weak, it gives a miniscule effect size. Though do note that Dan only gave the r^2 for the second graph (with the top closer ERA-), not the overall bullpen.
I don’t actually have it front of me, but it was absurdly close to zero. Like you get a non-zero in the third decimal place.
I think the most important part is that 0.024 times 162 is four games. You can beat your run differential by a little bit with elite relievers and lose a little bit if you don’t have them but it a whole lot of what we are seeing is luck.
R^2 is the percentage of variance in the dependent variable attributable to variance in the independent variable.
Simple way to illustrate why that doesn’t work: The inputs were only the pythagorean win percentage overperformance and ERA-. How would the model know that it was 0.024 times 162 games and not 50 or 500?
Basically, if the difference in the model between a league average closer and the best closer ever was 5 wins of Pythagorean overperformance per 162, with an r^2 of 0.024, the demonstrated relationship is only good enough to say the difference between the average closer and best closer ever was about *0.1* wins of Pythagorean performance per 162 games.
Think of r-squared like this: X% of A can be predicted by B.
Book definition “the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that can be explained by the independent variable.”
With r-squared being 0.024, that means 2.4% of the value of pythag is predicted by closer ERA-
Ya I don’t get it either. I was surprised they didn’t let Machado go with a sigh of relief and signed some placeholder at 1B. They would actually have been better off bringing back Hosmer than Machado. That was nothing compared to my shock at the signing of Bogaerts, a very good but not great player, for the gigantic amount of money that he got. I can think of very few teams that needed Machado and Bogaerts less than the Padres.
A NYY/Pads trade this season around Machado might have saved both of their wild card runs; I wonder if they consider it while watching their division rivals compete instead.
The Padres wouldn’t be breathing any sigh of relief if Machado opted out of 5/$150m.
I do think Xander was signed as a Machado opt-out contingency. Then early in Spring Training Peter Seidler came out talking about how retaining Machado was his top priority… Then voila, the Machado mega extension was signed. I love Ha-seong Kim as much as anyone, but I don’t think even the staunchest of HSK defenders believed he would be en route to down ballot MVP votes! But on the issue of farm replenishment, the Padres do have Jackson Merrill and Ethan Salas coming in soon (ask Longenhagen!)
I think the reason he hasn’t been fired is because he’s doing what the owner wants. I don’t think the ownership is out there giving him a blank check and doing whatever they want. I think that’s what is happening with the Mets. But with the Padres, I think ownership is giving them a budget and then saying “on top of that, you can do whatever it takes to keep Machado / Cronenworth / etc”. Otherwise this team would have signed Justin Verlander and Nathan Eovaldi instead of Michael Wacha and Seth Lugo (which weirdly has mostly worked out for them).
Now, that doesn’t change the fact that it made zero sense to sign everyone to those huge extensions or give a contract that big to Xander Bogaerts. Aside from those, he’s done a decent job. But those extensions are nuts.
Lately. He did make some very silly trades at the beginning of his tenure (Grandal for Kemp especially)
Yeah, I think there’s a lot of similarities with Billy Eppler in that the owners are calling enough of the shots to diffuse responsibility without the GMs being successful or strong enough to talk the owners into butting out. Cashman was able to build the Yankees because he kept Steinbrenner from meddling while still producing wins; those days may be behind him, but that’s not yet with Preller or Eppler have shown.
I believe Justin Verlander was on the 2017 Astros and is there now.
Ivan Grushenko, you are technically correct–the best kind of correct!
I added a note.
I’m definitely getting dumber considering I wrote about his trade and have watched two of his three starts back in Houston and I *still* forgot he was back in Houston when I wrote that sentence.
Based on everything I’ve learned playing Immaculate Grid, one’s memory does, in fact, start to decline in your 40’s. And Josh Donaldson was drafted by the Cubs, but never played for them (that’s gotten me twice, and almost got me yesterday).
Immaculate Grid sets me up for feeling smart and having a good memory about 15% of the time and is an exercise in frustration and forgetfulness the other 85%.
“WHAT DO YOU MEAN MATT MANTEI WAS NEVER AN ALL-STAR?! TINO MARTINEZ WASN’T A GOLD GLOVER FOR THE YANKEES?? HOW DID I FORGET ABOUT BOBBY JENKS?! WAS IT 1994 TORONTO ALEX GONZALEZ OR 1998 FLORIDA ALEX GONAZLEZ? DAMMIT…”
Padres have a miserable future thanks to their contracts Preller clogged up payroll with for the foreseeable future. Xander, Cronenworth, Darvish and Machado (2.0), Suarez, Hosmer retained money are all horrific contracts that give them zero flexibility piled on top of fine Tatis and Musgrove deals. And that’s not to mention whatever new deals they want for Kim, Soto, Snell and Hader. Salas and Merrill will be great but they don’t have any blue chips behind them. And where is Merrill going to play? Just a mountain of issues that are unfixable. They need a real GM, not Preller’s MLB the Show experiment
Other than a declining Darvish and a hurting Musgrove, the Padres have no starting pitcher under contract beyond this season, and it doesn’t seem there’s much immediate help on the farm. Grim.
I think the future is pretty clear: They’re going to re-sign Blake Snell and Josh Hader to a massive deals, offer $600M to Shohei Ohtani and dare him to reject it, and try to do it all over again. I actually think it might work this time if they bring the whole team back; they have a good run differential and good projections. The team shouldn’t be too deep into their decline phase.
Now in four years, when they have a 41 year old Yu Darvish, and a 35 year old Manny Machado and Xander Bogaerts and Blake Snell and Joe Musgrove, it’s going to get pretty ugly. Right now they’re in the YOLO phase.
Or yeah? Well think of all the extra playoff tshirts and parking. That’ll cover at least $50 MIIIILION DOLLARS (Note: Austin powers voice) so no prob, eh? Except that will barely cover the hole in the TV contract so I got no idea how this is going to work. Wow.
Even the Padres expected W/L feels like a bit of a disappointment, given all the stars they have.
Just a weird team (so far). They got one of Machado’s random down years this season, and Soto clearly is not the next Ted Williams after all, but you can’t complain too much about the individual performances. Kim turning into a star makes up for a lot of it anyway.
Even the pitching staff has been alright in the aggregate, though the components are a bit weird. Just an odd team.
Remember when people wanted Soto over Acuna?
Come now. Acuña is a year older than Soto and has been a lesser hitter by every measure. At this time last year, Acuña was Soto’s age, and he was in the midst of a 2.1-win season (it would have been worth 2.7 wins prorated over 155 games). Soto has never put up less than 3.7 WAR in a season. Also, Acuña has had 2 of his 4 full seasons substantially disrupted by injury, and Soto has never played less than 150 games.
Who is “people” here? When he was called up there was an article on this site about how Acuna had a good shot at the Hall of Fame when he had something like 20 PAs. He has topped the trade value list repeatedly, and when he hasn’t he has been Top 5. I have heard lots of people say that Juan Soto is the best hitter in the league and that hasn’t come to fruition but he’s still 10 points ahead of Acuna in career wRC+ so it’s not like this is super strong evidence for Acuna being over Soto, it’s more that Acuna is a functional defender and excellent base runner.
I’ll admit, it’s probably only a handful of people on here I once commented on (probably).
It feels good to be right about something to strangers on the internet. Whoever they may have been.
Machado has the same xwOBA as last year, he’s just not getting lucky as fuck anymore. Not really random.
Machado was so weird to watch early in the year. The balls have always come off his bat weird, like hooked or sliced. But early in the year it looked like he wasn’t trying at all. Now no one can describe him as a high effort guy, but he looked like zero effort early
Another complicated aspect of the Padres’ future is that despite how disappointing this season has been, they are 2nd in attendance in NL (3rd in MLB).
The only seasons when the Padres ranked top 30% in attendance among NL teams are 2021, 2022, and 2023.
So on one hand, the Padres’ strategy of going for big names is paying dividends.
On the other hand, from 2002 to 2019, Padres had above league average payroll exactly once (26th in MLB during this time).
From 2021 to 2023, they are 5th in spending.
It isn’t that hard to boost attendance when you double your payroll in three years, especially when a lot of the new commitments are long term contracts for aging stars.
(Every long term contract is expected to have negative value at the tail end, but the expected distribution of that value is still quite different for
10 year contract to a 26 year old Machado
vs.
11 year contract to a 30 year old Machado)
Again, teams typically raise their payroll after their prospects have graduated and formed the core of the winning ball club and payroll continues rising as these prospects reach their arbitration years and FA. High.payroll without winning doesn’t typically lead to sustained high attendance. The current Padres may be an exception because of their commitment to being a top-3 payroll continuously.
I will simply never fathom why they looked at one of the best middle infielders in baseball in Ha-Seong Kim, and decided to muddle their mess with a significantly less capable shortstop, just so they could move Cronenworth—already a scratch hitter at 2nd—to 1st. Just super unnecessary team building.
It’s kinda interesting to compare the Padres to the White Sox in terms of total opposite behavior, no?
CHW refused to give big deals in either money or prospects for stars, and instead threw a bunch of money at relievers, so they had just 2 winning/playoff seasons outta 4 when they were supposed to be good. Padres threw huge dollars at said stars, but mostly neglected their bullpen, and thus are on track to do the same over the same 2020-2023 period.
Now, SDP is obviously more likely to be decent next year, but I don’t particularly like their chances in an NL West division that is probably only getting tougher between the Dodgers’ FA spending rebounding (Shohei?), the youthful DBacks likely improving, and the Giants doing whatever the hell it is they do to remain Wild Card decent. May God have mercy upon the Rockies.
CHW is definitely not going to be actually good next year, but if they put together a like 75 win talent team and meander into some run differential luck, they might win that pathetic AL Central. Their future farther afield is not nearly as dim: they don’t have any truly *bad* long-term money like the Padres, and the farm system has rebounded to respectability, mostly of infield and catching prospects ready in ’24 or ’25.
Neither CHW nor SDP’s rebuilds worked; they sparked brightly, and then fizzled out. But the flipside to Jerry Reinsdorf’s Scroogeian approach to baseball ownership is that the embers of the CHW rebuild are much easier to work with to reload and try again than San Diego’s.
I suspect that 2023 might be a local minimum for the ALC for a while.
The only team I see them being strictly better than next year is KC, and it takes a lot of luck to beat out three teams that you are, at best, equal with.
Buxton is not quite as high-variance: he is a DH now. Correa’s leg issue scared off other teams. They’re not a *bad* team, but their rotation is losing three guys this offseason, and Lopez is a FA after next year. I just don’t see too much upside beyond like 88ish wins.
The Guardians will be similar in quality. Their pitching is always very strong, though I think Bieber/McKenzie are also #2/3s not CYA; Bieber has dropped off since the sticky stuff ban, and while I like him I just don’t see CYA contender type stuff from McKenzie. They have an issue where all almost their top hitting prospects are high-contact low-pop middle infielders, and there’s only so many of those guys you can put on the field. That profile doesn’t work at first base or right field.
I don’t know what the hell is going on in Detroit, but it’s not looking great. The Royals are just a mess.
Well, if the Padres actually manage to win the World Series within the next couple of years while most of the big contracts are still providing good value, then you could argue otherwise.
Of course! The problem is that they are (1) very much not making the playoffs every year and (2) if they do, it’s pretty likely to be wild card not division. The odds are not in their favor; they may have just one, if that, playoff appearance.
Giving whatever it takes for a superstar can help forge championship caliber teams; Dombrowski specializes in that kind of team-building. But even he had restraint, such that the Tigers or Red Sox weren’t totally marooned for a decade— the failed rebuilding of the Tigers is due to Al Avila’s failings, not Miggy’s remaining money, nor are the Red Sox badly handcuffed by Sale’s deal. The Nats have Strasburg and Corbin, but the latter is a free agent after next year and Strasburg’s contract is presumably heavily medically insured.
The Padres are another matter. They don’t have a World Series appearance. If they don’t get one in the next couple years, they could be boned for a very long time.
Strasburg is not medically insured– that recently came out, I think in Jesse Dougherty’s (wapo) piece sometime within the last 6 months
I think that teams built by huge amounts of money seem to underperform in clutch situations. Some win a ton anyways but underperform in one run games relative to their overall success. I feel it’s because many guys go all out less when the paycheck is relatively huge. Particularly on defense. I can’t prove this, but I have felt this for years. Perhaps it’s worth one of you better skilled mathematician’s spending time to prove me wrong.
Easy on the recency bias there, friend. The Pads are a mess, but the Dodgers, Rangers, and Blue Jays have all created winning teams this way (and I’d argue the Cubs success has a lot to do with spending money on Swanson, Bellinger, etc.). And imagine if the Giants hadn’t been outbid by the Yankees at the last minute…the NL West would truly be obscene.
Money can be poorly-spent, but not spending isn’t why a team will win more one run games (which, I’ll be honest, is a correlation I don’t understand at all).
you definitely cannot prove this
I have questions about Melvin–not answers! Just questions.
The Padres took two out of three from the Orioles, took two out of three from the Rays, and they swept the Rangers.
The Padres also lost five our of six to the Pirates, lost two our of three to the Royals, and lost a series to the Nationals.
Those games weren’t about pitching. The bats weren’t showing up.
It seems to me that there must be a difference between getting the most out of second and third tier players, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, motivating superstars with huge contracts.
I’m not sure that what works with one works with the other, and Melvin seems to be better at getting the most of the marginal guys than keeping the big contract guys on point.
It’s baseball – bad teams beat good teams all the time. The A’s beat the Braves in a series. The Royals beat the Dodgers in a series (and last years 111 game winning Dodgers stomped all over the Padres in the regular season – but lost both series to the Pirates)
The Dodgers seem to always kept swept at least once a year by some basement-dweller. But yes, bad teams are extremely capable of winning short series against good teams, which is another reason the current playoff system is not terrific (go best-of-seven for every series like the NBA and then we’ll talk.)
No, having the playoffs last for over 2 months like in the NBA or NHL is what screws up a playoff system. MLB’s playoffs are fine as they are, especially now that there’s no longer a Wild Card play-in game.
I suspect this phenomenon has been remarkably consistent since Melvin came to the Padres. I’ll check the numbers, but like I said, I’ve still got more questions than answers here.
Still, I bet the Padres have been worse than other teams in their tier or better–when playing against Tier 5 and Tier 6 teams–even as they’ve held their own against Tier 1 and Tier 2 teams.
What’s the point of this kind of claim though? It seems like you’re arguing based on a hunch, and the conclusion would be what, some kind of psychological explanation? Just doesn’t seem productive, when team building and other more material causes for win outcomes are right there.
Do you think the problem with the bats in San Diego is that they don’t have enough talent? The big contract guys seem to always show up for big games against better teams–and not show up for small games against lesser teams.
Is there a difference between managing a Moneyball team made up of former underperformers and managing a team of guys with big contracts?
To whatever extent a manager makes a difference*, maybe the kind of manager you need to go all the way isn’t the kind of manager you need to get the most out of some lower tier players.
*Admittedly managers make less of a difference in the National league since the introduction of the designated hitter–because they have less to do.
Saw people knocking Preller above. It’s hard for a fanbase in a smaller market not to like a guy that inspires the owner to spend. Also, if you knock Preller for this move and that move, to be fair, you should probably give him credit for bringing in Kim and Tatis.
My question is about not trading Snell at the deadline.I look at what the Mets got for Scherzer and Verlander, and I want to know what the Padres were offered for Snell. I don’t think they can resign Snell. If they don’t go to the playoffs, not trading Snell was a mistake.
I assume its because Preller thinks he will get fired if he doesn’t make the playoffs. I’d have thought they could have traded Hader too – and get more back for Hader than what they gave up last year for him.
I think the knocks against Preller are justified. They still haven’t won 90 games in a season (they probably would have had 2020 been a normal season) and even if they manage to get to over .500 this year, that will be 3 winning seasons out of 10. He was suspended for 30 days for not being honest over medical information. While he has made some terrific trades, he has also made some shockers (trading away Trea Turner, the Matt Kemp trade)
He’s been there 10 years, he’s created a lot of headlines with eye catching moves, but not many headlines for winning games.
I forgot how time works! He’s been there 9 years.
I think Preller has until the end of the 2024 season to deliver, but I don’t know that for sure. Your point is still well taken.
People knock Preller because he’s been apparently greenlighted the ability to spend All The Money In The World and for the last four years his team has been anointed the team to beat, and all he has to show for it is a comprehensive beatdown at the hands of the Phils in the NLCS and a parade for securing a wild card slot.
Getting to the NLCS in 2022 wasn’t entirely unrelated to Preller’s trades, and beating the Mets and the Dodgers to get there wasn’t entirely unimpressive.
I’d rather be a fan of a team that wins games, instead of a team that spends. Preller emphatically has not been a GM that leads to winning games
Winning games and spending aren’t mutually exclusive. I maintain that spending is necessary but not sufficient if you want to go all the way. I know it’s statistically possible for small market teams to go all the way without spending big, but it’s not like it would be with a hard cap.
If the World Series featured the same markets as the Superbowl, the last four World Series would have featured either the Royals or the Reds. If you want to win the Series, you probably need to spend. If you don’t spend big, you’re probably not going all the way.
Winning causes spending more than spending causes winning. And the spending that causes winning is more likely the extensions to your team’s already very good 24- and 25yo’s than it is to FAs above 28.
Fangraphs writers and most fans equate spending, any spending, with applied effort at winning. But the real effort to sustained winning is in prospect identification and development, something that is opaque to us but that we know drives teams like the Dodgers, Guardians, Rays, Cardinals , Braves, and Astros to continually outperform teams at all spending levels.
NFLteams don’t have minor-league systems which are major drivers of MLB teams’ success. Thus, I don’t think the NFL’s payroll floors and caps inform how smaller market teams would compete under those in MLB. Maybe a team like the Texas Rangers have all its FA’s and home-grown players exceed their Zips forecast in a random year. But prospect selection and development is still the biggest deal.
In the Padres case, they had a top-2 farm system 3 years ago and smartly traded most of it for young win-now players like Soto, Cronenwoth, Musgrove, and Snell. Their free agents have actually performed well except for Hosmer. They have just been unlucky with injuries to their pitching and to Tatis. So even teams with strong farm systems and massive FA spending can fail and have years of losing in front of them as they maintain lots of dead money from all that spending on their books and the farm system dries up.
I don’t disagree, but this winter you can set your watch to every free agent signing analysis being a cut and paste of “sure there are red flags with Player Y, but Team X is trying to win now, and it’s nice to see an owner willing to invest in winning”.
Fangraphs is by no means alone to this, but it makes for pretty boring analysis when almost all money spent is viewed as good many spent. IMO it should still be ok to call out an obviously bad contract when it’s signed
It’s because the writers on this site are pro-labor so any signing that is seen as raising salaries is considered a good thing even if it’s a bad investment.
Agents and the MLB Network love Preller, but Padre fans not so much. His stars and scrubs roster construction model is falling for the second time and firing managers as scapegoats is getting old. What happens with Soto, Snell, and Hader will be interesting because the opportunity to refurbish the farm system was bypassed. Locking the core up for 10+ years makes pivoting very difficult.
They obviously have way too much talent to tear things down, but would it make sense to try some sort of mini-rebuild next season? Dump Cronenworth (for something) and Darvish (likely for nothing) and trade Soto for a hefty return.
Get under the tax and then see what happens in 2024 but would better positioned in 2025-onward. I mean, it’s not a great option, but I’m not sure there are even any decent options and I think taking on a little pain now could prevent the massive potential pain later.
See also: the 2017 Dodgers, whose starting lineup looked like this: Grandal, Bellinger, Forsythe, Seager, Turner, Taylor, Pederson, Puig.
They currently have four players remaining from that team: Kershaw, Urias, Chris Taylor and Austin Barnes (and Walker Buehler when he comes off the shelf).
This has always been my fear with Preller and Co., no plan beyond the immediate thrill of acquiring big names. They’re in a division with two teams who play the off-field game like a long session of Galactic Civilization (LA, SF), a team who has actually built a good farm system and is committed itself to a roadmap to being competitive (AZ), and one very special little man (COL). They can’t fuck around like this or they’re in risk of competing for the bottom of the standings with the Rox for the next decade.
I’m dying at “one very special little man.” It’s like when the 12th man comes off the bench to play the last 38 seconds of an NBA game with a 112-77 score and chucks it at the underside of the rim like Josh’s best friend in Big.
I still think site has overcompensated too much for owners’ cheapness, and treats almost all big contracts as good contracts. There so simply no rationalization to giving Machado that kind of money at his age, and then they doubled down by committing double-digit years to a 30 year old Boegarts. These were just not smart decisions, even if it might make you feel better from an economics standpoint
Those bad contracts are only part of the problem I see for the Padres. They also traded away much of what was one of baseball’s best farm systems. They could be rivalling the Braves and Dodgers as organizations with bright, sustainable futures. But they were too impatient and went after more stars like Soto. Also, I don’t see any sign that Preller and Seidler have admitted and acknowledged their mistakes. Instead they have MLB’s largest collection of bad contracts, a mediocre farm system, and a rather arrogant and impatient front office which doesn’t seem to be learning how to build a top notch organization.
Consolidating a bunch of their young talent for Soto is about the only move I wouldn’t criticize of recent Padres big moves. The strategic error, IMO, was giving Bogaerts about 15% more than anyone expected. That deal will definitively hinder the chance of keeping Soto long-term which is what you should have been laser-focused on once you pulled the trigger on the trade.
I think most of Preller’s behavior is easily explicable if he thinks he must all in on the current contention window and achieve a certain level of success with it in order to keep his job.
This isn’t super uncommon – part of organizations that do the long term game very well is by giving people enormous job security. Preller has not actually been very successful overall in SD – he hasn’t got it.
Go all in and leave someone else to clean up the mess is kind of the Dave Dombrowski method, except Dombrowski actually reaches and/or wins World Series with his teams and that tends to get people to feel it was justified. He still left Detroit and Boston’s rosters in relative shambles, and that’s probably how his Phillies tenure will end, too. That’s the game Preller has been trying to play, but his teams often take enormous bellyflops.
I can’t lie, that a bunch of the most hyped upstart teams of the last half decade or so have more or less ended with a wet splat is pretty entertaining (Padres, White Sox, heck, remember in like 2018 when the Twins were like that)
Do the Braves count?
Eta: Also the Orioles?
It really feels more like the “we’ve decided to spend a lot more money” teams are struggling: the Padres and Phillies (despite meeting in the 2022 NLCS, overall they’ve been disappointing the last few years), kinda the Mets. The Rangers look decent at this.
Thats true too!
The Braves are legitimately good – however, I don’t really think they were a hype team because they’re often good. The Orioles are pretty early in this cycle.
My observation is that what has happened for years now is that hardcore baseball fans and writers are so starved for things to be interesting and different that when a team that isnt one of the usual suspects looks like they might be poised to be competitive or interesting they get a lot of extra attention and focus. The top 1% or whatever of baseball watchers are perpetually starved for novelty and anything that promises novelty in which teams are good (especially when there isn’t any recent history of those teams being good) is catnip for them, and far more interesting than “oh look the Dodgers/Astros/Rays/etc did it again”.
Both the Orioles and Rangers are basically new entrants in this cycle – whether they continue to be competitive or it all falls apart ala CWS/SDP etc is for the future. The offseason of maximum hype for those franchises is still to come.
That isn’t to say that that can’t be interesting, but I think often weaknesses in those teams are overlooked exactly because of how novelty-seeking people can be. We see a similiar phenomenon with players that is somewhat muted by Ohtani being .. well, Ohtani, but still shows up in periodic obsession about guys who have ‘out of the norm’ skillsets. Sometimes those guys are Luis Arraez and are very successful with them – other times they are Willians Astudillo and there’s not actually any reason besides the fact that they are atypical to care about their performances.
Extremely online communities tend to be novelty-starved because the people who are in them the most consume enormous amounts of the baseline product and therefore get fairly bored of the things that are constants within it. Online baseball fandom follows these trends.
I think there’s room to be interested/exciting in dudes with extreme/unusual skillsets, as long as you’re realistic about how functionally useful that skill is to winning MLB games. Ruiz doesn’t look like he’s much above replacement, but his Billy Hamilton 2.0 act is still fun to watch and talk about.
It’s the Elly De La Cruz argument — dude has the loudest tools on the planet, but he’s still trending as “only” a 2-3 WAR guy right now.
People don’t like smart and disciplined investments that includes long term goals because it’s boring. It’s like the guy who buys the Ferrari gets all the attention but the guy who buys the affordable car is boring even if he will be richer long term.
They’ve got to trade Soto for cheap prospects right?
But they’ve been selling out Petco and they’ve cultivated a whole new generation of fans. So maybe the spending was worth it?
So, + or – 90 losses in 2029?
Almost certainly.
Oh come now don’t discount them getting there faster than 2029.
They might get there in 2023!
The nice thing about how fast the content cycle moves on the internet is that national writers can just continue praising the teams that go all in and criticizing the ones that rebuild, only to praise the teams that rebuilt and criticize the teams that went all in a few years later. It’s an endless cycle.
Rebuilding in the present is extremely unpopular, but having rebuilt in the past is the best. Going all in in the present is extremely popular, but having gone all in in the past is a disaster. There’s no need to reconcile the contradiction if we all commit to having a goldfish memory.
This is a perfect distillation of how I keep screwing up my life.
It applies to so many things in life. Eating healthy in the moment = not fun. Having eaten healthy in the past, later = fun. I think it’s important to be transparent and realistic about goal setting, because we have to navigate the balance between doing things that we want to do now and doing things that will benefit us in the long run all the time.
The Padres’ team building approach opened them up to massive downside with only moderate upside. The expensive end of free agency is always moderate upside, since you’re paying players so much that the amount of excess value they can provide is limited. The real value in free agency has always been in players you can develop to be better, not players who are already at the top of the sport. Obviously that can be hit or miss, (the Astros released 25 year old JD Martinez, and the Dodgers let Bellinger walk right before a major bounce back to all star caliber play). The best teams take a lot of shots on talented but flawed players and hit more often than they miss, which is how you build winners.
I am a big fan (and paid supporter of) FanGraphs, BP, the Athletic, and a lot of other great baseball journalism, but I think one of the shortcomings of sites like this is that it can be easy to not keep the holistic future of teams in perspective. Asking a baseball writer if a team should make win now trades and invest heavily in free agency is like asking a realtor if now is a good time to buy or sell a house – the answer is always yes. The excitement around a team that “goes for it” is good for business, and if it doesn’t work out, then there will be some new, hot team to write about in two years.
If, in three years, the Padres are a last place team with no really valuable trade assets (Tatis Jr. is still very good, but he has a full no trade I believe, and his contract is massive), it won’t matter one iota to a national writer like Ken Rosenthal, because he can just write about the Cubs or the Orioles or some other team that is young and good (probably the Dodgers, Rays, and Braves still).
Angels south.