The State of Starters in 2024

Jonathan Hui-USA TODAY Sports

I won’t sugarcoat it for you, friends. It’s a tough time to be a major league starting pitcher. Their ligaments are under threat like never before. Their workloads aren’t far behind. For a variety of reasons, the old style of starting pitcher is quickly headed toward extinction and we’re transitioning to a new way of doing things.

That all seems like the obvious truth. But I decided to go to the data and make sure. As Malice of the Clipse (and yes, fine, Edgar Allan Poe) memorably said, “Believe half what you see, none of what you heard.” I’m not sure exactly where that leaves you, since I’m going to be telling you what I saw, but that’s an epistemological question for another day. Let me just give you the data.

So far this year, there have been 452 games, and thus 904 starts. Starters have completed 4,735 1/3 innings, or 5.24 innings per start, and they’ve thrown an average of 86.2 pitches to get there. They’ve averaged 94.1 mph with their four-seamers, yet despite all that velocity, they’ve thrown fastballs of any type just 54.9% of the time. This isn’t Opening Day starters, or anything of that nature; it’s just whoever has picked up the ball for the first pitch on each side.

For a lot of people, that’s all the evidence they need. 86 pitches? Gross. 5.24 innings? That’s nothing. Back in my day (2008), 34 different pitchers topped 200 innings. Surely, these are the lowest innings pitched and pitches per start in history, and surely that’s connected to everyone throwing so dang hard and not throwing as many fastballs, right?

I’m not really sure how to prove the second part of that previous sentence, but the first part isn’t quite accurate: Those 86 pitches and 5.24 innings per start are not the fewest in history but some of the fewest. You see, the decline of the starting pitcher is not a 2024 story; if anything, the decreasing workload of starting pitchers is a pandemic story. I isolated the first day in each season where there had been at least 904 starts and compared them to this year to control for the fact that pitcher workloads follow a predictable ramp-up at the beginning of the year. Here’s the data for 2018-2024:

Starters, at the Start of the Year
Year Through Starts IP/Start Pitches/Start
2018 5/3/18 920 5.46 90.1
2019 5/1/19 908 5.28 87.6
2020 8/28/20 930 4.73 79.2
2021 5/5/21 906 5.07 83.1
2022 5/11/22 928 4.91 80.2
2023 5/3/23 926 5.18 86.9
2024 4/30/24 904 5.24 86.2

A trend that started in 2019 accelerated thanks to the strange and compressed start to the 2020 season. It continued in 2021 and 2022 (post-pandemic ramp-up was strange, and then the lockout made spring training shorter) before rebounding in 2023, and this year looks a lot like last year. Pitchers are completing slightly more innings per start, though. Why? Fewer homers:

Starter Workload and True Outcome Rate
Year IP/Start Pitches/Start K% BB% HR/FB HR/9
2018 5.46 90.1 21.8% 8.4% 12.9% 1.19
2019 5.28 87.6 22.6% 8.2% 14.3% 1.34
2020 4.73 79.2 22.4% 8.4% 16.1% 1.46
2021 5.07 83.1 24.0% 8.1% 14.0% 1.22
2022 4.91 80.2 21.8% 8.1% 10.6% 1.01
2023 5.18 86.9 22.2% 8.2% 12.9% 1.26
2024 5.24 86.2 22.2% 8.1% 11.0% 1.08

Again, all of these statistics are from similar time periods within each year, with the exception of 2020, when the season started in late July. I don’t think this is a weather story. Balls aren’t leaving the park as frequently, which means that starters are recording slightly more outs per appearance. That just makes good sense to me.

The next part of this story is to compare the piddling workloads of the present to the supposed king-sized portions of the past. There’s just one problem – that’s not how the data looks. In 2008, the first year that Pitchf/x tracked every pitch thrown, starters completed 5.75 innings per game and threw 93.5 pitches to do so (through May 3 and 914 starts). In fact, per-game starter workloads haven’t declined much at all over the last 17 years:

Starters, at the Start of the Year
Year Through Starts IP/Start Pitches/Start
2008 5/3/08 914 5.75 93.5
2009 5/9/09 908 5.78 95.2
2010 5/8/10 910 5.91 97.6
2011 5/4/2011 904 6.01 96.8
2012 5/9/12 926 6.01 96.1
2013 5/5/2013 918 5.83 95.1
2014 5/4/14 922 5.90 95.8
2015 5/9/15 904 5.78 92.5
2016 5/8/16 930 5.73 94.2
2017 5/7/17 928 5.61 91.7
2018 5/3/18 920 5.46 90.1
2019 5/1/19 908 5.28 87.6
2020 8/28/20 930 4.73 79.2
2021 5/5/21 906 5.07 83.1
2022 5/11/22 928 4.91 80.2
2023 5/3/23 926 5.18 86.9
2024 4/30/24 904 5.24 86.2

Wait, really? In the halcyon days of the mid-2000s, starters were managing only seven more pitches per start on average than they are now. Even if we take the high water mark of our data set, it’s only 10 more pitches. That’s with the current injury epidemic, the rise of openers, the intense focus on the times-through-the-order penalty, and all that. Ten pitches isn’t nothing, but it’s also not some unbridgeable gap.

Three-quarters of an inning – the gap between the recent high water mark of 6.01 innings per start in 2010 and this year’s data – sounds more significant than 10 pitches. The truth is, though, that the number of pitches it takes to record an out has been shockingly consistent over time. In 2008, it took 5.42 pitches on average to record one out. That number got as low as 5.33 in 2012, a year that featured low rates of each of the three true outcomes. So far this year, starters have needed 5.49 pitches per out. The average across the last 17 years is 5.46.

In other words, 10 pitches and three-quarters of an inning are closely correlated. If starters were posting strikeout rates below 20% and allowing less than one home run per nine innings, they’d probably be pitching slightly deeper into games today.

If there’s one worrisome sign about this year, it’s that a decline in home run rate hasn’t increased innings pitched totals as much as you’d expect. But that’s small potatoes in the grand scheme of things. In fact, most of this is small potatoes in the grand scheme of things. I’m sure that the fans and pundits bemoaning the decline and fall of the starting pitcher empire are referring to something more dramatic than losing fewer than 10 pitches per game.

For me, a bigger question is what will happen as the season wears on. From 2008 through 2019, workloads remained stable between the first month of the season and the rest of the year, whether you care more about innings pitched or pitches per start. But the relationship has broken down since then, and with good reason. Three of the last four years have been oddballs in one way or another, which makes pattern recognition difficult. In 2022, workloads increased markedly as the year wore on, with pitchers throwing nearly five more pitches per game than in the early going. In 2023, workloads declined by two pitches per start as the year progressed. They pitched just as many innings, though. There’s certainly no strong correlation in any direction here.

Where does that leave us? I’m sure this isn’t satisfying, but I don’t see much signal. Pitchers are inarguably working less deep into games than they used to. But things haven’t changed much over the past few years, and it’s just not the kind of sea change that people make it out to be. In 2008, starters faced 25 batters per game on average. In 2024 so far, they’re facing 22. That’s different! But let’s not kid ourselves — starters today aren’t always coming out as soon as they go twice through the order, just as they weren’t all pitching into the eighth inning in the mid-2000s.

Are injuries playing a role? I mean, probably! What role? I’m not sure. Is decreasing fastball usage, or increasing fastball velocity, or increasing strikeout rate the prime driver? None of those are obvious conclusions. Are the very worst pitchers better than they used to be, and thus are the shortest starts longer than they used to be, which in turn would hide some of the decline in top pitcher workloads? Quite possibly so – thanks to Meg Rowley for pointing this one out, and you can expect a follow-up that digs into that very question next week. The number of possible interpretations here is huge because the data looks so similar from one year to the next.

The only thing I’m comfortable saying is that for all the justified worry about pitcher workloads declining and pitcher injuries increasing, this year’s replacements have been quite reasonable when it comes to soaking up innings and retiring batters. Is a deader ball helping them? Very likely. But whatever you hear about the pitching crisis is about as true as it was in 2019. Pitching simply doesn’t work like it used to – but it still works pretty well at the end of the day.





Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Twitter @_Ben_Clemens.

63 Comments
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sadtrombonemember
4 months ago

I love this because it gets at the big problem that MLB either doesn’t understand or doesn’t think is important: The goals that they (and others) seem to want are at cross-purposes.

Let’s say they (whoever “they” are) want starters to go farther in games. One way to do that is to tamp down offense, so that there are fewer homers and fewer balls in play.
But MLB wants there to be more offense, and in particular more balls in play, so then the pitch counts get up higher and starters get pulled earlier as they are less effective. Also, then the games get longer because you have longer innings.
So then they institute a pitch clock to get the games shorter (and then shorten the time limit on it), and while the jury is still very much out on this one, that could very well exacerbate injury problems, which is probably leading teams to be more conservative with their starters. (For skeptics of this relationship between pitch clocks and arm injuries: This is a case where the perception may matter more than the reality of it.)
And the problem with ramping up offense once the hitter makes contact with the ball is that it makes strikeouts more valuable. That incentivizes teams to tell their pitchers to go all out. But that also incentivizes teams to pull the pitchers earlier, partly because it ups the pitch count per batter rather than pitching to contact, and partly because the guys are just throwing harder.

All of these problems are connected to each other, so that if you try to solve one solution your make another problem more prominent, kind of like a knot puzzle. I don’t know what the next step is, but I’m pretty sure that whatever it does will have more unintended consequences that will lead to complaints about how the game is going.

Raulmember
4 months ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

If limiting pitch counts saves pitchers, makes them more effective, and prolongs careers, why haven’t we seen an increase in the average career length? Where are all these pitchers that are still dominating into their late 30s and early 40s? The Dodgers haven’t had a 200 inning pitcher in years and nearly everyone they have gets hurt. For 20 years we have to keep reading this stuff about pitch counts and “third time through the order” and all this stuff and guys still get hurt. Relievers are mostly still meh. And nobody today is lasting any longer than they ever have.

HappyFunBallmember
4 months ago
Reply to  Raul

Well, pitchers ARE becoming more effective. Strikeout rates go up in a very continual rate year over year. That’s all about velocity and wicked breakers, of course, and those most certainly do not prolong careers.

If modern day managers kept pitchers out there for 120+ on the regular or gave 90 innings to just a handful of trusted relievers, you’d see teams blow out their entire staff by the All Star break.

“Effective” and “Length” (in games or of careers) are forces that work in opposition of one another.

Raulmember
4 months ago
Reply to  HappyFunBall

Maybe. But I’m not advocating for 120 pitch starts for everyone. Certainly though, pitchers don’t all need to be capped at 95 or 100. And I’m not sure why there’s such a fear of having a pitcher go 3 or 4 times through the order. When people talk about average ERA in the later innings…yeah, that’s an average. And it makes poor sense to me to base a decision on an average all the time because it fails to consider the context of the game. The 3rd time through the order vs the Braves isn’t the same as the 3rd time vs the Pirates. It doesn’t consider who is coming up to the plate, or how that pitcher is looking on a particular day. Right? And the response is “well, err on the side of caution”. For what? So that maybe this pitcher tosses 140 innings at Age 38 instead of Age 37? I’m not seeing a convincing argument here for all this …delicate behavior. It’s like everyone looked at Mark Prior and freaked out and ignored all the other guys who were fine. Mike Mussina was built like a twig. This might be cherry picking but I’m just illustrating a point. If a guy is gonna get hurt, he’s gonna get hurt.

Last edited 4 months ago by Raul
tootblan
4 months ago
Reply to  Raul

I agree, I don’t know what the answer is but for about a generation now we’ve seen teams try to keep pitchers healthy with strict pitch counts, seasonal innings caps, extra rest, pitcher shutdowns after getting drafted…and injuries are more common now than ever. At some point you have to wonder if any of the injury mitigation efforts are effective at all, and if not then there’s really no point in doing any of them.

HappyFunBallmember
4 months ago
Reply to  Raul

That’s easy. Management and front offices are inherently conservative when it comes to their fragile multimillion dollar toys vis a vis keeping their jobs.

If a manager pushes a pitcher too far, and they break, or even if they just give up that extra run that loses the game, that’s a very visible failing. When you pull the guy early, and the next reliever fails, oops! But since the converse is merely a “what if?” exercise, it’s far less painful

Lanidrac
4 months ago
Reply to  Raul

Yeah, it’s never been a hard and fast rule. Managers will still let their starters pitch significantly over 100 pitches when they’re really dealing (and not on an innings count for the season), and the third time through the order penalty is only one factor managers consider when deciding how soon to remove their starter.

However, in general, both of those factors are very logical to keep in mind on a game-to-game basis.

fjtorres
4 months ago
Reply to  HappyFunBall

Cleveland is running on their relievers.
Unless they start getting more 7 starts (1 so far) they might prove or disprove the latter approach. Even if it works all season, I wouldn’t bet on them for ’25 and beyond.

HappyFunBallmember
4 months ago
Reply to  fjtorres

Nothing so fungible as a short reliever. Don’t even bother learning their names. Unless one ascends to the vaunted title of “Closer”, they are almost as likely to be on another team or out of MLB as they are to be an effective piece of next year’s bullpen.

youppi4pm
4 months ago
Reply to  Raul

Third time through the order has nothing to do with injury prevention.

And you should look into shoulder injuries vs. elbow injuries. Yes, pitchers are still getting hurt. But they’re getting hurt differently. Not from over-use (pitch counts helped). But because of over-exertion.

Raulmember
4 months ago
Reply to  youppi4pm

Third time through the order is one of the other excuses to pulling back on pitchers. That’s why I bring it up. If the argument for pitch counts is difficult to defend, the pivot is to move the argument toward effectiveness in the 6th, 7th, 8th innings.

Last edited 4 months ago by Raul
dezremember
4 months ago
Reply to  Raul

3rd time through the order data is actionable and defensible and has nothing to do with preventing arm injuries. I think moves made on this basis demonstrates intelligence. (And yes, teams still make nuanced decisions and don’t adhere to averages 100% of the time.) Also, pitching career length could be linked to any number of factors aside from pitcher health. The game has changed over many decades, including a whole bunch of significant changes in the last 30 years. Teams need to think of new ways to optimize their rosters given the ever changing landscape. and it’s been demonstrated repeatedly that teams who adjust first to available data will reap a larger competitive advantage. So I’d expect to see even more workload management strategies being employed. And rightly so, I think.

Last edited 4 months ago by dezre
fanofthemanmember
4 months ago
Reply to  youppi4pm

That’s a fascinating distinction- I’d be incredibly interested to see what major league players and coaches said about distinguishing between overuse and overexertion

fjtorres
4 months ago
Reply to  fanoftheman

That might be what the union was griping about by raising the pitch clock issue: it takes pitchers days to recover between starts so it wouldn’t be out of the question that they need time between pitches for the muscles and ligaments to recover from the exertion. And, of course, different pitchers needing different recovery times. It might even explain the fast workers vs slowpokes of the pre-clock era.

Way more data still needed but there might over time be a correlation for different pitcher types.

Lanidrac
4 months ago
Reply to  Raul

You might have a point with career length, but limiting pitch counts obviously means that IP/season would go down, just as it has, so your argument about 200 IP pitchers doesn’t work.

Also keep in mind that the pitch count strategy is something that has been in use to some degree over the last 30 or 40 years. It’s not a recent change.

As for the “third time through the order” strategy, that’s about getting better game results, not about limiting injuries.

Last edited 4 months ago by Lanidrac
Raulmember
4 months ago
Reply to  Lanidrac

Fair enough. What I’m having difficulty getting my head around is: if monitoring pitch counts and innings is supposed to protect a pitcher, and therefore protect the team’s investment in him, then I would expect to see a team reap more out of that investment over the long term. Right? Because that’s the whole point. Now if after 30-40 years we don’t have the data to show a *significant* improvement in this area, then I see no point in continuing to do it.

If we’re limiting pitches in a given start, I’d expect to see more starts from that pitcher.

If we’re limiting innings in a given year, I’d expect to see more years from that pitcher.

Look, I’m eager to learn here. Guys at FG are way smarter than I am. I want to understand what’s illogical about this.

sadtrombonemember
4 months ago
Reply to  Raul

I would wonder whether throwing half as many pitches 5 mph faster might offset throwing less. My personal opinion is that the increase in velocity and “stuff” is the primary cause of injury and the attempt to manage injuries through workload only blunt it. The other thing is that there some selection issues because we are better at repairing arms now. Before, less durable pitchers would get removed more permanently, making it impossible for them to get hurt repeatedly.

But even if what you say is true (and it might be, this is the biggest remaining question we don’t know the answer to)it doesn’t entirely matter that it doesn’t work. What matters in this specific case is that others *believe* that it works.

Roger McDowell Hot Foot
4 months ago
Reply to  Raul

If limiting pitch counts saves pitchers, makes them more effective, and prolongs careers, why haven’t we seen an increase in the average career length?

Principally, because MLB workload isn’t total lifetime workload and so managing the former has only a limited effect on the latter. I’m starting to feel like a broken record posting this in the comments, but it’s the single biggest takeaway from Jeff Passan’s book on arm injuries — guys hitting the majors now have vastly more pitches already on their odometer, i.e. larger preexisting workload, and so they’re getting injured apparently “sooner” and “more frequently,” but only relative to their MLB workloads. The largest systemic problems here are the ones causing pitchers to be throwing more and more at younger and younger ages. By the time a given pitcher makes his MLB debut, most of the damage has probably already been done.

hughduffy
4 months ago
Reply to  Raul

Limiting pitch counts doesn’t save pitchers. What limiting pitch counts does is prevent injuries we know happen way more frequently with high pitch counts. High pitch counts are correlated with future injury. Very high pitch counts are strongly correlated with future injury.

Why are some pitchers able to throw more pitches and avoid injury? Because the problem isn’t the number of pitches thrown, it is the number of pitches thrown while fatigued. In other words, pitch counts are a rough proxy for measuring pitcher fatigue. Why is fatigue important? When pitchers are fatigued, their mechanics can break down, their muscles aren’t as protective of joints and ligaments, and that leads to injury. At least, that’s the working hypothesis many have been working under.

It’s why teams monitor fastball velocity, why they monitor the number of times a pitcher has gotten up to throw and had to sit back down, and why they ramp up pitch counts slowly during Spring Training (also noting that the first six weeks of starting throwing again is the most likely time a pitcher will suffer an injury).

Pitch counts have reduced one source of injury. There are many more. Pitchers throw harder, with more effort, more spin, and a slippery ball like MLB uses is probably a source of elbow injuries.

The aging curve is real, and we can’t expect many ballplayers to be great after 35 (without performance enhancing drugs), except the true outliers.

mikejuntmember
4 months ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

And the biggest problem is that teams and pitchers both believe (correctly, IMO) that only pitchers throwing filthy stuff max-effort will get guys out. If we had nothing but incentives to get teams to run out guys throwing with less velocity and more endurance, the consequence would be an offensive explosion. Very few guys succeed in modern MLB with a command-over-velocity skillset, and those who do have very fragile profiles that often don’t last very long.

That is why teams are so focused on max effort pitching. You’d have to combine it with something that gave pitchers back an advantage, or you’d have 90s offense again.

LenFuego
4 months ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

(For skeptics of this relationship between pitch clocks and arm injuries: This is a case where the perception may matter more than the reality of it.)”

True … unless perhaps, as I suspect, the reality turns out to be that arm injuries *decrease* with the pitch clock. Extra rest between pitches allows pitchers to “reload” that arm to throw the ball at an extremely high velocity and/or spin rate … so if it is the strain of those higher velocity/spin rates that contributes to injury rates, tiring arms a bit, thus defusing that ability to “reload”, will lower injury rates.

Lanidrac
4 months ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

Well, more balls in play might actually lead to lower pitch counts. While it means more runners on base, it also means fewer pitches per PA. I’m not sure which factor would overpower the other.