Tom Glavine’s Allegedly Generous Strike Zone
People don’t really argue about Tom Glavine anymore. It’s been some years since he pitched, and we have younger, Troutier, Cabreraier things to argue about. But when people did argue about Tom Glavine — and they used to do it a lot — his critics routinely pointed to the same thing. And when Glavine was voted into the Hall of Fame just the other day on the first ballot, the old familiar argument popped up again in certain places. Glavine, many people believe, was a product of a strike zone that extended several inches off the outside of the plate.
An alleged strike zone, it should be said, that Glavine kind of allegedly earned. The theory is that Glavine established that area and was given the benefit of the doubt by the umpires because he could so consistently put the ball there. So, with his command, Glavine was said to get strikes on balls. That would be a credit to his ability, but that also puts hitters at a disadvantage, and a lot of people want to know how Glavine would’ve held up under a more uniform zone. There’s a belief that, had Glavine been more squeezed, he would’ve been punished more often. The only problem is that Glavine doesn’t seem to have been a product of his strike zone at all.
In one sense, it’s an impossible thing to investigate since most of Glavine’s career came before the dawn of the PITCHf/x era. But then, it didn’t come before the pitch-by-pitch-data era, which can work perfectly well enough for our purposes. Baseball-Reference has pitch data going back to 1988. That’s the same year Glavine became a full-time big-leaguer.
Of course, we don’t need to look at Glavine’s entire career. The part we’re really concerned with is the part that made Glavine who he became, the part that made Glavine a Hall of Famer. We needn’t focus on Glavine’s mediocre beginnings, and we needn’t focus on his wind-down with the Mets. Let’s just go ahead and isolate Tom Glavine between 1991-2002. Over those years, all with the Braves, Glavine accumulated the vast majority of his career WAR. Those are the years for which Glavine’s most known.
Now, the theory is that Glavine got to pitch to a wider zone than other pitchers. It’s basically the pitch-framing argument, except in this case people prefer to give more credit to the pitcher than to the catcher. In any event, this is something we should expect to see reflected in Glavine’s various rates of called strikes. If Glavine was getting more pitches out of the zone called strikes, we’d expect to see higher called-strike rates, since hitters would be more likely to take those pitches. That’s going to be our primary indicator.
In 2002, there were 126 qualified pitchers around baseball. Glavine ranked 23rd in called strikes per strike, and he ranked 47th in called-strike rate overall. In 1991, there were 116 qualified pitchers around baseball. Glavine ranked 85th in called strikes per strike, and he ranked 77th in called-strike rate overall. Below, a chart with all the data, expressed as percentiles among qualified big-leaguers. The higher the bar, the closer Glavine was to the league lead.
In called strikes per strike, Glavine maxed out at the 89th percentile in 2001. Overall, over the 12 years, he averaged the 46th percentile. In called-strike rate overall, Glavine maxed out at the 80th percentile in 2000. Overall, he averaged the 39th percentile. He averaged the 66th percentile in called strikeouts/total strikeouts, and he led baseball in called-strikeout ratio in 2001, but Glavine wasn’t a low-contact pitcher. The denominator there includes swinging strikeouts, and Glavine didn’t rack up a bunch of swinging third strikes, so his called-strikeout ratio looks higher. His overall rate of called strikeouts per plate appearance hovered in the vicinity of league-average.
You can see those bars sort of increasing over time. In called strikes per strike, Glavine averaged the 25th percentile between 1991-1995, and the 61st percentile between 1996-2002. As he got older, he started to get more strikes looking, but for one thing, he was good before that, and for another, his numbers were never crazy high. The way people talk about it, Glavine got one of the most generous strike zones ever. He actually had a far lower called-strike rate than Aaron Sele. He had a far lower called-strike rate than Livan Hernandez. Other high-called-strike pitchers included John Burkett, Matt Morris, Kirk Rueter, Frank Tanana, and Charles Nagy. Eventually Glavine got perhaps a more generous zone than average, but that isn’t the point that people argue. People argue his zone was particularly unfair, and that just doesn’t show up. Not during Glavine’s career prime.
What Glavine did do was suppress hits, even beyond getting help from Andruw Jones. He changed his approach with runners on base, issuing more walks while reducing quality contact. He was also terrific at suppressing home runs. Over those dozen years, 95 pitchers threw at least 1,000 innings, and Glavine ranked third in ascending order of dingers per inning, behind Greg Maddux and Kevin Brown. In these ways, Glavine managed to out-pitch what might be suggested by his raw rates of strikeouts and walks.
Even toward the end of his career, Glavine worked almost exclusively low and away against righties, and almost exclusively low and away against lefties. He went to other areas just often enough to change it up and keep the hitters guessing. His command was good enough to allow him to hammer those zones, and it’s no coincidence those are the zones where it’s most difficult for hitters to do real damage. When you pitch around the edges, you’re more likely to miss the edges, and you’re more likely to throw balls. Glavine never actually posted a particularly good strike rate. This can be offset by inducing weaker contact, which Glavine’s career demonstrates. And because Glavine threw a greater percentage of pitches away, from time to time he’d end up with a called strike that missed the plate completely. He wouldn’t necessarily get an extraordinary amount of them, but it doesn’t take many to stick in the memory. Glavine didn’t get way more called strikes than the rest of the population — I just suspect he got his called strikes in the same consistent areas. That’s what happens when you pitch to the same two spots.
This doesn’t conclusively prove anything. I imagine Glavine did have a more forgiving strike zone than the average pitcher, and he got more called strikes as he got older, potentially helping him to mitigate a career decline. It’s possible umpires were more willing to give him the benefit of the doubt. Certainly, he would’ve wound up with his share of called strikes over the borders of the opposite batter’s box. But, there’s a line of thought that Tom Glavine was a product of a skewed strike zone, biased in his favor. There’s a line of thought that Tom Glavine would’ve performed a lot worse if he had to pitch to more normal areas. The data suggests this isn’t actually true. What Tom Glavine was was a hell of a starting pitcher. For hitters, the opponent to worry about wasn’t the umpire. The opponent to worry about was Tom Glavine.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.

Excellent analysis, once again. As I mentioned here before, I think a lot of fans today might appreciate Glavine’s abilities more if FanGraphs had been around in the 1990s. (Or maybe they might just still be yelling “Unsustainable!” 20 years later …)
One thing you didn’t mention was the implementation of QuesTec in 2001. Glavine had a particularly poor year in ’01 (3.57 ERA, 1.413 WHIP, career-high 97 BB), and it was often suggested at the time that he would have never been a great pitcher if only his strike zone had been normal the whole time. Then, of course, he responded with a strong season in 2002 (2.96 ERA, 140 ERA+) and you didn’t hear a whole lot more about QuesTec for a while. Except from Phillies fans, but never mind them.
So people bought that in 2001 (when glavine was 35), the reason for a decline was Questec?
It was a simpler time.
As a reason for his immediate decline in performance, yes. It became a major controversy after he signed with the Mets in 2003 and struggled in Shea Stadium, which had a QuesTec camera (while Turner Field didn’t):
http://nypost.com/2003/07/04/questec-strikes-out-with-tom/
And Glavine wasn’t the only one:
http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/blog_article/10th-anniversary-curt-schilling-vs-questec-camera/
This was an excellent read until I saw the name Kirk Rueter, at which point, I became obligated to come down here and make a comment about Kirk Rueter. I don’t know if I actually go back and finish the article because I must bask in the glory of Woody.
Heading over to Nashville (IL) for a basketball tournament next month…should I stop by Hoyleton and visit the Rueter statue?
The only thing worse than Glavine’s wide strike zone is Pettitte’s balk pick-off move.
spoken like a true mets fan
Yes that move was RIDICULOUS. 99% of balks called were less blatant than that pickoff move he did 10+ times EVERY GAME.
Glavine’s basic MO was to not throw strikes unless the umpire made him throw strikes. And I’d say that’s just being smart.
He had a far lower called-strike rate than Livan Hernandez.
Had to throw that in there, right?
Still whining a game played 17 years ago, huh?
I’m not sure I’ll ever get over that game.
Livan’s career numbers were, to be fair, distorted by that one game.
Agree with your analysis – when you’re constantly throwing to the same side of the zone, all your generous strike calls are obviously going to be off that side of the plate.
However the second layer to the Glavine generous zone argument is that, whether true or not, people thought he gradually extended the zone outward as the game went on. The theory is that he had good enough command to start the game right on the corner of the zone, get the umpire used to seeing that as a strike, and then gradually extend outside the zone. If he were truly doing this, by the 2nd and 3rd time through the order I’d expect hitters would adjust and not just take those pitches for strikes, which would likely not show up in that data.
Not saying I have any idea if this is true but I could see where your argument would not be convincing to people who believe the above.
This is a great analysis … but completely wrong.
I actually watched Glavine pitch most of his games between 1995 and 2002 — and yes, he got a far wider strike zone than any other pitcher. There is nothing “alleged” about his getting strikes called several inches off the plate — it happened consistently. Glavine constantly hit that spot, and he constantly got that call. He was brilliant at it.
Do you think Glavine got more called strikes because of this? If so that contradicts the data. Otherwise hitters must have swung at his outside pitches more than usual. Too bad we don’t have pitchfx from that era.
I think he got the same amount of called strikes, they were just further off the edge. In other words, he still threw plenty of balls, but they were several inches off the plate.
“Do you think Glavine got more called strikes because of this? If so that contradicts the data.”
No, it doesn’t. At all.
The data is looking at something different than hes suggesting.
I would assume that hitters realized they couldn’t let those “outside” pitches go against Glavine because they knew umps were likely to call them as strikes, therefore making them swing at pitches Glavine threw that they normally wouldn’t swing at with another pitcher on the mound.
Also, even in today’s game established aces get more “benefit of the doubt” when it comes to outside or borderline strikes, with umps seeming to think that just because a really good pitcher has the ability to consistently put his pitches 2 inches off the plate, it should be called a strike. To me, that’s just completely flawed logic.
“In God we trust; all others must bring data.”
God: Defying empirical analysis by leading the universe in TWTW since 10,000 BCE.
The TTO – Father, Son, and HG.
So which are which?
Father – Home Run
Son – Walk (even on water)
HG – Strikeout
Ruh-roh Raggy, a Roly Roast!
William to Copernicus:
This is a great analysis…but completely wrong.
I’ve been watching the sun and firmament for years, and I know motion when I see it. So put away your clumsy math and data. My eyes do not deceive me.
But the methodology does have a major fault. If batters are consistently seeing balls off the plate being called for strikes, they will adjust and swing at balls in that location.
We could look at similar pitchers during the pitch f/x era and see if those who got more generous strike zones also got more called strikes overall. That would be the next step, though I imagine it’s already been taken. Just don’t have a link to a study handy, but I imagine it’s out there.
That was my first thought. It would also help explain why Glavine was able to consistently outpitch his peripherals (since it would make it difficult for hitters to make solid contact).
(And for the record, I am Braves’ fan and I always thought that Glavine and Maddux got far more leeway from umps than any pitchers).
Yep. And his catchers always set up outside of the catchers box. Some times one foot would be inline with the middle of the outside batters box. It was pretty blatant. So I bet catcher framing helped.
And his buddy Greg got that treatment too.
I agree. I watched the Braves those years as well and he would get more weakly hit ground balls the other way than strikeouts. He usually got ahead of the hitter and had them swing at a ball outside the zone to get themselves out. His strikeout numbers went up later IMO because when ahead in the count, he actually started to throw inside a little more while the hitter was looking away.
The only way the called third strike data would be valid is if no one had seen Glavine before. Everyone in the world knew Glavine lived off-speed, low and away. It wasn’t a mystery (certainly not to Mike Redmond). He got guys swinging at pitches they wouldn’t normally swing at and they pounded the ball into the dirt trying to pull a low outside pitch. Hitters could make contact because Glav wasn’t overpowering.
Guys like Glavine and Maddux are really impressive because they couldn’t just reach back and blow a hitter away with heat. They toyed with hitters with location, movement (Maddux), and change of speed. That’s just great pitching and they sustained it over a long time.
As I recall, Glavine himself talks about getting the benefit of the doubt (in the pre-QuesTec years) in John Feinstein’s book ‘Living on the Black’. I believe that he indicated that he thought all veteran pitchers got a wider strike zone than their younger counterparts. I’ll have to dig up the book.
But, evidently, not as wide a strike zone as young Cuban defectors.
I wish umpires were more generous with my strike zone.
No, Edison, first base is NOT in the strike zone.
I hear his plaque is going to be six inches wider than everybody else’s…
There are so many ways to get a low or high percentage of called strikes. This data is weak evidence that he did not elicit a larger than average strike zone. If we approach this from a Bayesian perspective, where the a priori probability is high based on reputation, observation and anecdotal evidence, that he had the benefit of a larger zone, for whatever reason, this data would not make much of a dent in that probability.
For one thing, I would suspect (I could be wrong) that a pitcher who gets lots of called strikes would have nasty stuff with lots of movement, a high K rate and a high BB rate. Glavine had neither.
He had a phenomenal change up with great command of that pitch. If you picture Glavine pitching, what do you see? I see him throwing that great change up low and away to RHB and getting them to swing at it – me screaming at the batter, “Everyone knows that is coming, why are you swinging at it?” Not called strikes, but swinging strikes.
I have no problem with the notions that he had a larger than average sized strike zone and a smaller than average called strike %. I don’t see those as necessarily competing notions and surely not mutually exclusive.
Correct. The analysis should be pitches that are out of the strike zone that are called strikes.
Of course, that data doesn’t exist for most of Glavine’s career so it is moot, but obviously a strike that is called a strike is a far different animal than a ball that is called a strike.
In other words, called strike % probably has more to do with a pitcher’s stuff and style such that he is able to somehow fool the batter into thinking that a pitch is out of the zone when in fact it is in the zone, than the size of the zone.
Is it not also likely that if a pitch is right on the down and away corner of the strike zone, a hitter is unlikely to be able to do much with it, and may be better taking it and hoping to get the call from the umpire? That should be even more the case if we’re talking about a pitch that’s actually 3-4 inches outside the zone.
Depends on whether the pitcher every came inside during the atbat. It’s like batters taking belly high pitches for balls when they could easily hammer them.
In other words, you adjust to the conditions at hand and play the percentages accordingly if you are smart.
We could test this. Just plot out pitchers during the pitch f/x era and look at the correlation of out-of-the-zone strikes to called strike rate.
Regarding his propensity to stop throwing strikes with runners on, that was a thing he admitted at the time, more than once. I forget the exact wording he tended to use, but one could paraphrase it as “I’d rather walk him than give up a multi-run homer.” He wasn’t the most likeable Brave we ever had, but the dude was no dummy.
He was also a case in which it seemed familiarity breeding contempt (so to speak) in baseball. During his first two years with the Mets, he was 20-28 with a 4.03 ERA. But against the Braves, he was 1-6 with a 8.77 ERA (7 starts, 37 innings, 10.7% of his starts and 9.4% of his innings, but 20.3% of his earned runs), and 19-22 with a 3.54 ERA (and apparently no run support) against the rest of baseball. After those two seasons, the effect evaporated.
It could, of course, have been a small sample size fluke, and I stuck with wins, losses, and ERA because I’m far too lazy to do maths for a throwaway comment. But watching it at the time, it was hard not to feel like his old teammates absolutely just knew his tricks and how to beat them, before time, adjustments, and roster turnover wiped the advantage out after a couple of years. They just seemed to have his number to an insane degree every time he pitched to them.
What was unlikeable about Tom Glavine?
Getting beat by him.
He called it ” not giving in to the strike zone”. Mazonne coined that phrase.
Surely the pitcher that got the most called strikes outside the zone must be Mariano Rivera. That guy never actually threw a strike, yet never walked anyone either. Also, there should be proper data available to test this for a sizeable chunk of Mo’s career. ….I suspect all Yankees catchers were great “framers” if they caught enough innings of Mo.
The metric you use as your primary indicator may be flawed and in a number of ways.
Your claim was this: “If Glavine was getting more pitches out of the zone called strikes, we’d expect to see higher called-strike rates, since hitters would be more likely to take those pitches. That’s going to be our primary indicator.”
Here are some concerns about that indicator:
(1) To the extent that it was believed that Glavine was given a more generous strike zone, batters would have adjusted by swinging at more balls near the fringe of the strike zone. That would mean Glavine induced more called AND swinging strikes just outside the typical strike zone.
(2) The data may be blurred by not distinguishing between strikes thrown near the center of the strike zone and strikes thrown near the perimeter. It’s possible that on pitches thrown near the center, Glavine induced more swings than average, and if so, this too would diminish the called strike ratio overall.
(3) Pitch type, and not just pitch location, may have an effect on called strike rate. Glavine relied far less on braking balls (sliders, curves) than was typical, essentially throwing fastballs and changeups. I suspect (and it should be easy to check) that breaking balls induce fewer swing than do fastball and changeups, and of that is true, that would depress Glavine’s called strike percentage.
The standard anti-Glavine argument also tends to assume that all other, non-Glavine pitchers got the exact same strike zone from umpires, and that Glavine was the outlier.
In reality, of course, various differences in pitcher delivery, catcher positioning, umpire on duty, home park, lighting, etc., led to different strike zones for virtually every pitcher.
Glavine’s was just easier to notice because he had such longevity and success.
The zone was low and wide for everybody. Of course the people who were throwing low and away the most were going to get the calls. Shame on anybody who had the opportunity to exploit the low and away zone but refused to do so.
If you didn’t know it already, you know Jeff is an AL fan after this article. I doubt any NL East fan could agree with you and keep a straight face. Even a Brave fan.
It is true that umps used to give an inch or so off the outside of plate to pretty much every pitcher. Glavine would get courtesy calls even further off the plate. It seemed like he got any close call if he fell behind or had runners on too.
Agreed. I watched him pitch plenty of times, and it was crystal clear that he got that pitch. When I would watch him pitch with my friends in the room, we could all see it. The announcers all saw it and mentioned it. The opposing teams talked about it.
If Pitch FX data came out and proved that he got the same number of calls as everybody else, then maybe a lot of people would humbly admit that there was some sort of illusion going on. But by just looking at called strike data, I don’t think that really shows whether or not he got an extra inch or two off of the outside corner.
He didn’t have a fastball that can blow away batters, and he didn’t use a big curveball either. He lived off of the plate much more than the average pitcher, and rarely threw to the middle of the plate (relatively to the average pitcher). Based on his pitching style, we’d expect him to get much fewer called strikes than average, because he was in the zone less than most pitchers. Yet at one point he was in the 89th percentile in called strike %. To me, that shows that he DID get more calls at pitches off the plate.
Project– someone get video of all of Glavine’s starts from 1991 to 2002 and make a call on every called ball and strike.
Might be a lot of work, maybe two people should split it.
….
Not it!
Of course, most of Glavine’s career came prior to the straight ahead camera angles that are in pretty much every stadium now. It’s a lot harder to tell what’s really a strike with the off-center cameras.
Also, not it.
Mets fan/Braves hater here. This is spot on. There is a reason that a guy who had such amazing command and control had 1,500 walks in his career. He was a master at expanding the zone and refusing to give in when he was in tough spots.
Then how the hell did he end up with 1,500 walks? Based on the arguments here, Glavine would have to throw a pitch in the on-deck circle to get an umpire to call a ball.
I think Greg Maddux also got that outside of the plate strike too, it wasn’t just Glavine. But, great control earns that respect.
Can’t blame the pitcher for getting a call (unless there is some kind of collusion going on). Fooling an umpire into calling a strike by subtly leading him off the plate is a skill and there is no reason to deny credit for it.
Can’t blame the pitcher for throwing a spitter. Fooling an umpire into not believing that you’re doctoring the ball is a skill, and there is no reason to deny credit for it.
It’s kind of a silly argument.
Isn’t the difference that one of those things is against the rules of baseball, and one is not?
Except trying to get a “borderline” or worse pitch called a strike isn’t cheating. Throwing a spit ball is cheating.
“Isn’t the difference that one of those things is against the rules of baseball, and one is not?”
The rules pretty clearly explain what a strike is. Throwing a ball outside the strike zone and having it be declared a strike is a violation of the rules.
it’s just the pitcher knowingly tricking the umpire into violating the rules, instead of directly violating them himself.
If we were talking a legal issue, the pitcher would be liable. So, same difference.
Hey, people have posed this issue, so I’m going to take a look at this tangential issue and then say I’ve figured out the original one.
Snarky but true.
I would be interested to see the data normalized for the type of pitcher. Pitchers with overwhelming stuff might get lots of called strikes because hitters just give up. Also, they may be more likely to just challenge hitters in the middle of the zone on counts like 0-0, 2-0, 3-0, and 3-1 when the hitter is probably taking in any case. A pitcher like Glavine might miss out on called strikes that lots of other pitchers get, because he always lived on the corners regardless of the count.
That’s my line of thinking as well. Take two extremes:
Pitcher A throws half of his pitches down the middle of the plate, and half of his pitches are 2 inches off the plate. The umpire is perfect, so the pitcher gets 50% called strikes and 50% balls.
Pitcher B throws every pitch 2 inches off of the plate. The umpire is generous, so half of them are erroneously called strikes. The pitcher gets 50% called strikes and 50% balls.
By looking at just the strike rate, you’d think they’re equal. The reality is that one pitcher was extremely lucky with his strike zone, while the other had a normal strike zone.
I really wish we were more inclined to look at pitching broken down by counts, since it changes both the pitcher’s and the hitter’s approach. For example, it would be much better to look at this Glavine question by only looking at 0-2, 1-2 counts where the pitcher is definitely not trying to be anywhere near the heart of the strike zone.
Also on the 0-2, 1-2 counts, the hitters should be swinging at everything they think is a strike. So if Glavine is getting called strikes on those counts, it means the hitter probably tracked it as a ball.
DNA+:
Two big problems with your rationale: (1) Hitters who take a called third strike are usually fooled by the pitch, not because they failed to recognize the pitch as a strike; and (2) Major League pitchers never intend to throw a pitch in the middle of the plate. Those are always mistakes.
Belloc,
My experience watching MLB tells me that sometimes hitters take a called third strike that clearly fooled them and was obviously in the strike zone. Other times, they will watch a called third strike that they think is a ball and will turn around and argue with the umpire, or will start running to first if it was a full count, or will start prepping for the next pitch and be caught off guard when they get wrung up. Who knows what the rates of these are, but both seem to happen every game.
Also, pitchers most definitely do pour fastballs straight down the middle on 3-0 counts when they are confident the batter has the take sign. In any case, no pitcher is pitching to the corners with the same intent 3-0 and 3-1 as they are 0-2, unless they are happier walking the batter than they are letting them swing (e.g. Barry Bonds treatment). And that is the point.
So I can’t see either of your big problems as big problems at all. Certainly there is noise in the system. However, all of this noise is also included in Sullivan’s analysis. I think what I am suggesting would be much less noisy.
Will have to re-watch this travesty of a game. The second pitch to Vizquel looked like a pretty classic Glavine strike:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-IPYodEFe0Y
Actually, that one looks like less of a strike than the first pitch to Lofton called a ball. And the ump seems off to the right.
Food for thought:
“Don’t believe it when you hear that a pitcher can throw the ball to a two-inch slot. A foot and a half is more like it, I mean with any consistency. When I first came up I thought major-league pitchers had pinpoint control, and I was worried that the best I could do was hit an area about a foot square. Then I found out that’s what everybody meant by pinpoint control, and that I had it.” — Jim Bouton
I’m not interested in taking anything away from Tom Glavine. Terrific pitcher & a worthy HOF’er.
I would like to see a laser strike zone tried at the lower levels for a few years and then expand upwards as the evidence allows (or not). Umpires are asked to do the nearly impossible re: borderline strikes and do, unfortunately miss the easy ones at what seems to be the most inopportune times. Just give it a try. I could give a shit about the ‘human element’. Just try to do the best we can to get it right. Perfection is not possible, but the current system is occasionally downright laughable.
Based on observation, it looked like Glavine got a lot more calls vs. R than L. That may be due to most (all?) CF cameras being on the 3B side.
Glavine’s splits vs. R and L look odd.
LD/GB/FB
vs. L: 21/57/22
vs. R: 22/42/36
BAPIP (supports more flyballs vs. righties)
vs. L: .296
vs. R: .281
IFFB%
vs. L: 6.9
vs. R: 9.8
HR/FB%
vs. L: 11.3
vs. R: 9.0
My guess is that righties dropped the bat head while reaching for the outside stuff, getting farther under them than did lefties did or had to (higher FB%, lower HR/FB and higher IFF% than lefties).
Didn’t need PFX. The overhead camera against the Pirates in 92 was good enough. Lloyd McClendon half way stepping across the plate to mash out outside bc to right on game 6 was great.
Glavine’s reputation alone could have helped him. If the hitters he faced believed that Glavine was being given a wider strike zone then they would be adjusting there approach at the plate when facing Glavine. Batters would swing pitches that they would otherwise take because they believed they would be called strikes. If this was true then the quality of contact against Glavine when he is ahead in the could should be worse than that against league average pitchers in the same counts.