Top 19 Prospects: Boston Red Sox
Below is an analysis of the prospects in the farm system of the Boston Red Sox. Scouting reports are compiled with information provided by industry sources as well as from our own (both Eric Longenhagen’s and Kiley McDaniel’s) observations. For more information on the 20-80 scouting scale by which all of our prospect content is governed you can click here. For further explanation of the merits and drawbacks of Future Value, read this.
We’d also like to extend our condolences to the friends and family of the late Daniel Flores, as well as the Red Sox international scouting department. We were excited to watch Daniel play baseball and can’t imagine what those who anticipated watching him grow up have dealt with since his untimely passing.
Rk | Name | Age | High Level | Position | ETA | FV |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Michael Chavis | 22 | AA | 1B | 2018 | 50 |
2 | Jay Groome | 19 | A | LHP | 2021 | 50 |
3 | Tanner Houck | 21 | A- | RHP | 2019 | 45 |
4 | Sam Travis | 24 | MLB | 1B | 2018 | 45 |
5 | Bryan Mata | 18 | A | RHP | 2021 | 45 |
6 | Jalen Beeks | 24 | AAA | LHP | 2018 | 45 |
7 | Darwinzon Hernandez | 21 | A | LHP | 2021 | 45 |
8 | Danny Diaz | 17 | R | 3B | 2022 | 40 |
9 | Mike Shawaryn | 23 | A+ | RHP | 2019 | 40 |
10 | Cole Brannen | 19 | A- | OF | 2022 | 40 |
11 | Bobby Dalbec | 22 | A | 3B | 2021 | 40 |
12 | Josh Ockimey | 22 | AA | 1B | 2020 | 40 |
13 | C.J. Chatham | 23 | A | SS | 2020 | 40 |
14 | Ty Buttrey | 25 | AAA | RHP | 2018 | 40 |
15 | Alex Scherff | 20 | R | RHP | 2022 | 40 |
16 | Tzu-Wei Lin | 24 | MLB | UTIL | 2018 | 40 |
17 | Joan Martinez | 21 | R | RHP | 2021 | 40 |
18 | Roniel Raudes | 20 | A+ | RHP | 2020 | 40 |
19 | Bobby Poyner | 25 | MLB | LHP | 2018 | 40 |
Age | 21 | Height | 5’10 | Weight | 210 | Bat/Throw | R/R |
---|
Hit | Raw Power | Game Power | Run | Fielding | Throw |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
30/40 | 65/65 | 50/60 | 40/40 | 40/45 | 55/55 |
If you were to look just at Chavis’s 2016 stats and with the knowledge that he was only a viable defensive fit at first base, you’d call him a non-prospect. This dip in production was brought about by a broken finger, and in 2017, Chavis was back to taking monster hacks that produce comfortably plus raw power. He’s going to strike out, and he isn’t especially patient, but he has a good chance to get to most of that power and do enough damage to profile at first base. Chavis has the arm for third base but lacks the horizontal mobility to profile there in a vacuum. Boston has shown a willingness to put up with less lateral range on their infield, but a left side of the infield which features Chavis and Xander Bogaerts together is probably too heavy-footed for comfort, even with proactive defensive positioning. Chavis projects to first base and has dealt with an oblique injury this spring.
Age | 18 | Height | 6’6 | Weight | 220 | Bat/Throw | L/L |
---|
Fastball | Curveball | Changeup | Command |
---|---|---|---|
55/55 | 55/65 | 40/50 | 40/50 |
Groome still touts the fastball/curveball combination that made him such a dynamite amateur prospect, but his 2017 season was marred by injury (an intercostal strain in his first start and forearm soreness late in the summer), an absence of changeup development, and questions about his conditioning. He sits 91-93, will touch 96 and could have some fastball projection if he rebuilds his once-promising frame into something leaner and more flexible. His changeup just needs reps, but those can only be had if Groome is getting ahead of hitters and into counts where his changeup can be used, so his fastball command will need to develop first. There’s still time for him to become a front-end starter, but the timeline has shifted back following a fruitless first full season. The 2018 campaign, meanwhile, is off to an inauspicious beginning with Groome set to start it on the DL with a flexor strain.
Age | 21 | Height | 6’5 | Weight | 220 | Bat/Throw | R/R |
---|
Fastball | Slider | Curveball | Changeup | Command |
---|---|---|---|---|
60/60 | 55/60 | 50/55 | 40/45 | 40/50 |
Houck was a low-slot righty in college. Between that and the lack of a changeup, many teams worried he’d be vulnerable to opposite-handed hitters and considered him a likely reliever. In the last six months, however, the Red Sox have altered Houck’s stride direction and posture in such a way that has functionally changed his arm slot, and Houck has added a second breaking ball that is flashing plus. He’s also working more with a four-seamer rather than a sinker, and his new fastball plane is better suited for it. Already much different than he was last summer, Houck could have a breakout year.
Age | 23 | Height | 6’0 | Weight | 205 | Bat/Throw | R/R |
---|
Hit | Raw Power | Game Power | Run | Fielding | Throw |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
50/55 | 50/50 | 45/50 | 40/30 | 40/45 | 40/40 |
Travis has been a bat-only prospect since his days at Indiana, when he was still playing a lot of third base. He has developed almost exactly as was expected, moving from third to first base, where his lack of raw power is more problematic. Travis isn’t totally without pop, but his swing has never produced enough airborne contact to tap into it and he hit 50% of balls in play on the ground last year. His swing has been altered this spring, with his hands loading a bit lower. The result appears more fluid and athletic. His swing is still rather flat-planed, but it’s better and gives Travis some breakout potential.
Age | 18 | Height | 6’3 | Weight | 160 | Bat/Throw | R/R |
---|
Fastball | Curveball | Changeup | Command |
---|---|---|---|
50/55 | 50/55 | 50/55 | 40/55 |
Mata has advanced pitchability for his age. He can throw his curveball for strikes or bury it beneath the zone, knows how to set up his changeup to both-handed hitters, and has good arm-side command of a running, low-90s fastball. Mata’s arm slot has dropped since he arrived in the States and now resides in the low-three-quarters area. This descent has created more tail on the pitch, which has also gotten harder as Mata has now begun to fill out — and, though he doesn’t appear athletic, Mata has retained his advanced command through this mechanical change despite having filled out more quickly than anticipated. If things continue to break right — and they have so far — Mata will end up with a bunch of above-average pitches and 55 or 60 command. Teenagers with this kind of stuff typically come off the board in the sandwich or second round.
Age | 23 | Height | 5’11 | Weight | 195 | Bat/Throw | L/L |
---|
Fastball | Curveball | Changeup | Command |
---|---|---|---|
45/45 | 50/55 | 55/60 | 45/50 |
Beeks’ stuff ticked up in 2017 and he amassed strikeout rates of 28% and 24%, respectively, in just under 150 innings at Double- and Triple-A. He sits 90-93, will touch 95, and flashes a plus curveball and changeup. His command is fringey, his delivery somewhat stiff, and it’s possible these issues funnel him to the bullpen. His command doesn’t have far to go to profile neatly in a rotation. If it gets there, it doesn’t matter if it looks a little ugly as he does it. He’s a near-ready No. 4/5 starter.
Age | 20 | Height | 6’2 | Weight | 185 | Bat/Throw | L/L |
---|
Fastball | Slider | Curveball | Changeup | Command |
---|---|---|---|---|
60/60 | 40/45 | 55/60 | 40/45 | 40/45 |
He isn’t as quick-armed as the legendary lefty, but Hernandez’s delivery is Billy Wagner’s fraternal mechanical twin. When the fastball is at its best, it’s 93-96 for an entire outing and plays up due to the deceptive quickness of Hernandez’s arm action and down-mound extension. There are instances when Hernandez doesn’t clear his front side and his pitches sail up into the left-handed batter’s box. This strike-throwing issue, coupled with a shallow present repertoire, makes Hernandez a risky bet to stick as a starter. It’s best not to overthink this one, though. This is a 21-year-old lefty with plus heat and a plus hook. If he were a draft-eligible college prospect with a chance to start, he’d be discussed as a late first rounder. For a club that regarded him as a reliever, he’s still be considered a late-second-round or early-third-round pick.
Age | 17 | Height | 6’1 | Weight | 170 | Bat/Throw | R/R |
---|
Hit | Raw Power | Game Power | Run | Fielding | Throw |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
25/55 | 50/60 | 20/55 | 50/40 | 40/55 | 60/60 |
Diaz signed for $1.6 million out of Venezuela in July of 2017. He had among the best present raw power and physicality in his July 2 class and still has some room to add more as he matures. He’s graceful, athletic, and in possession of the actions and footwork to play the infield, with plenty of arm for the left side. His bat is tough to project, with few in-game looks against quality pitching from which to draw, but it’s not any more volatile than that of the other hitters in this FV tier and Diaz has more upside. He’s a long-term project, but could be an above-average regular.
Age | 22 | Height | 6’2 | Weight | 200 | Bat/Throw | R/R |
---|
Fastball | Slider | Changeup | Command |
---|---|---|---|
50/50 | 55/60 | 50/55 | 45/50 |
Shawaryn’s fastball velocity has been roller-coasting since his sophomore year at Maryland. It dipped down a bit in 2017 but has been comfortably in the low 90s this spring, up to 95. Shawaryn’s slider is average in a vacuum but plays way up due to his violent arm action and low slot. He also has terrific command of it and will back-foot it to left-handed hitters. His fading changeup helps reduce his exposure to platoon issues that might otherwise disqualify him from the rotation. That said, there is some concern about Shawaryn’s fastball, which lacks plane, inviting too much air-ball contact. As long as his fastball remains hard enough to play at the big-league level, he’ll be a fine back-end starter.
Age | 18 | Height | 6’0 | Weight | 170 | Bat/Throw | L/R |
---|
Hit | Raw Power | Game Power | Run | Fielding | Throw |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
20/50 | 50/55 | 20/40 | 55/50 | 40/45 | 50/50 |
Recovery from hamate surgery muted Brannen’s well-rounded skillset during his senior spring, but at various times throughout his high-school career he showed signs of viable center-field defense, solid-average raw power, and some feel to hit, though not for in-game power matching the raw. Brannen’s upper body is loose and rotational through contact, but there’s disagreement about how hitterish his hands/wrists, which are a bit stiff, are going to be. There’s a path to an everyday big-league role here if Brannen improves in center and hits.
Age | 22 | Height | 6’4 | Weight | 225 | Bat/Throw | R/R |
---|
Hit | Raw Power | Game Power | Run | Fielding | Throw |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
30/40 | 70/70 | 30/60 | 40/40 | 45/50 | 55/55 |
We’ve now had two consecutive uneven years from Dalbec, who was bad as a junior at U of A, then went nuts with a new swing in pro ball after the draft, and then hit for power in 2017 (over half his balls in play had exit velocities over 100 mph) while striking out in 37% of his plate appearances amid injury. If there’s new info about Dalbec from 2017, it is that he continued to show above-average patience at the plate. He’s athletic enough to play third, so there’s a little extra room for the strikeout issues to breath if they don’t improve. He could be Joey Gallo or Jake Lamb; he could also be Juan Francisco.
Age | 21 | Height | 6’1 | Weight | 215 | Bat/Throw | L/R |
---|
Hit | Raw Power | Game Power | Run | Fielding | Throw |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
30/40 | 60/60 | 40/55 | 30/30 | 40/45 | 40/40 |
Similar to Dalbec in many ways, Ockimey has better plate discipline (and some of the better ball/strike recognition in the minors) and handedness, but is less athletic and has nowhere to go on the defensive spectrum. He might be a DH-only player with strikeout issues stemming from stiffness and a lack of bat control. Ockimey might benefit from a more athletic swing, something that incorporates more movement than his current, hands-only iteration, but some scouts don’t know if he’s athletic enough to maintain it. He has special power in his hands and wrists, and will be a three-true-outcomes everyday first baseman if everything clicks.
Age | 22 | Height | 6’4 | Weight | 185 | Bat/Throw | R/R |
---|
Hit | Raw Power | Game Power | Run | Fielding | Throw |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
35/45 | 45/45 | 30/40 | 50/50 | 50/55 | 60/60 |
Chatham hasn’t played much in pro ball due to injury. In 2017, he was limited to just seven games by a severe hamstring issue. In college, he looked good at short despite his twiggy, gangly-looking frame, and his offensive output may have been masked by hand injuries. He continues to project as a potential low-end regular and likely utilityman on tools, but he’s also earning an injury-prone label and his time horizon to the big leagues has shifted dramatically.
Age | 24 | Height | 6’6 | Weight | 230 | Bat/Throw | L/R |
---|
Fastball | Slider | Changeup | Command |
---|---|---|---|
70/70 | 40/45 | 60/60 | 40/40 |
A behemoth sinker/changeup prospect, Buttrey will touch 100 and sit 94-97. His delivery lacks fluidity it detracts from his ability to command his fastball, but there’s enough strike-throwing ability and stuff to comfortably project Buttrey in a relief role, and he has a non-zero chance to be a late-inning arm.
Age | 20 | Height | 6’3 | Weight | 205 | Bat/Throw | S/R |
---|
Fastball | Curveball | Changeup | Command |
---|---|---|---|
55/60 | 45/50 | 40/50 | 30/40 |
Scherff is one of two well-regarded high-school draftees from 2017 who are already 20 and have yet to throw a pro pitch. The other is Marlins lefty Trevor Rogers. Scherff’s fastball velocity ticked way up when he got himself in better shape in high school, and he was up to 97 on the summer showcase circuit before his senior year. Though he’s built like a Greek god, Scherff is a below-average athlete and lacks flexibility in his lower half. His delivery is awkward-looking and stiff, leading to command troubles and inconsistent secondary quality. He’ll show you an average changeup and curveball, but his feel for both is raw for a 20-year-old. That said, Scherff has arm strength and works hard. It’s likely that at least one of his secondaries becomes a consistent weapon and enables him to have a big-league role.
Age | 23 | Height | 5’9 | Weight | 155 | Bat/Throw | L/R |
---|
Hit | Raw Power | Game Power | Run | Fielding | Throw |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
50/50 | 40/40 | 30/40 | 50/50 | 45/50 | 50/50 |
Lin made a swing change that enabled him to get to more power (now 40 instead of 30) in games than he had previously. He’s passable at short, saw more time in center field last year, and continued to display an excellent approach and solid bat-to-ball skills. He projects to play a multi-positional utility role.
Age | 21 | Height | 6’3 | Weight | 195 | Bat/Throw | R/R |
---|
Fastball | Slider | Command |
---|---|---|
60/60 | 50/60 | 30/40 |
Martinez is a low-slot howitzer whose fastball sits in the mid- to upper 90s, topping out at 99. His delivery looks like Mychal Givens‘, but Martinez doesn’t have a slider of that quality yet. He’s only working in relief and needs to develop a full grade of command to profile, but he’s a potential late-inning arm.
Age | 19 | Height | 6’1 | Weight | 160 | Bat/Throw | R/R |
---|
Fastball | Curveball | Changeup | Command |
---|---|---|---|
40/45 | 45/50 | 55/60 | 45/60 |
The wispy, hyper-athletic Nicaraguan with the eccentric, pre-pitch, overhead glove swirl, sits 89-91, will touch 93, and has a plus changeup. His lack of velocity and good breaking ball limit his ceiling (there’s probably not going to be more velocity here) and Raudes’ command took a step backward on paper last season, but he should bounce back and continues to profile as a back-end starter. He’ll pitch as a 20-year-old all season and could reach Double-A.
Age | 24 | Height | 6’0 | Weight | 205 | Bat/Throw | L/L |
---|
Fastball | Changeup | Cutter | Command |
---|---|---|---|
50/50 | 55/60 | 45/50 | 55/55 |
Poyner has a 168:30 strikeout-to-walk ratio in his minor-league career and has done that with a fastball that barely crests 90 mph. He’s not even obviously deceptive or mechanically unique, but it’s hard to pick up what Poyner is throwing as the ball leaves his hand. This is especially true for his changeup. Whatever sorcery is at work here should play in single-inning bullpen stints.
Grouped by type and listed in order of preference within each category.
Incomplete Profiles
Brett Netzer, 2B
Trenton Kemp, OF
Kyri Washington, OF
Tate Matheny, OF
Netzer was the team’s third-round pick out of UNC-Charlotte. He can hit and his swing has natural loft, but there’s very little raw power there. He’ll move onto the main section of the list if he hits well this year. Kemp and Washington have huge raw power but troubling swing-and-miss issues. Matheny has fourth-outfielder tools.
Relief Arms
Kyle Martin, RHP
Austin Maddox, RHP
Travis Lakins, RHP
Jake Thompson, RHP
Devon Fisher, RHP
Jordan Weems, RHP
Zach Schellenger, RHP
Williams Jerez, LHP
Martin sits 92-94, touches 96, and has a plus changeup. He was DFA’d last September. Maddox is currently dealing with shoulder trouble, but when healthy he has a mid-90s fastball that will touch 98 and two viable secondaries. He’s a big guy with a heavy, long arm action and he has trouble commanding his offerings. Lakins has a 55 fastball, 60 curve, and 50 change but has trouble staying healthy. Thompson touches 96, has a chance for a 55 or 60 slider and 40 command. He’s a stone-cold middle-relief prospect. Fisher is a converted catcher who has been up to 97. Weems is also a convert with a chance for two 55s in a fastball and change. Schellenger touched 100 in college at Seton Hall but was 91-94 last summer. Jerez throws hard (93-96, t98) but has no clearly viable secondary offering.
Rotation Depth/Long Men
Chandler Shepherd, RHP
Jhonathan Diaz, LHP
Hildemaro Requena, RHP
Trey Ball, LHP
Eduard Bazardo, RHP
Diaz has shown a plus curveball and 55 changeup but has fringe velo. Requena is a sinker/curveball/command righty, the type that carves at lower levels. Ball and Shepherd should patch big-league holes when they arise this year. Shepherd touches 96 and has a 55 curveball. Ball is a fringey cutter/curveball guy.
Catching Depth
Austin Rei, C
Roldani Baldwin, C
Rei has 50 raw power and a solid approach, as well as a decent chance to catch. Baldwin has 55 raw power and is an okay receiver, but his arm strength and mobility are issues.
Projection Bats
Antoni Flores, SS
Pedro Castellanos, 1B/OF
Kervin Suarez, INF
Jecorrah Arnold, 3B
Lorenzo Cedrola, OF
Flores is a typical J2 shortstop prospect with zero present physicality but actions that look right. His physical tools are all 30s and 40s right now and he needs to fill out. You really need to project on Castellanos’s power for him to profile at first or in an outfield corner, but he has the frame for it and has already shown competent pitch selection and bat-to-ball skills in affiliated ball. Cedrola is similar but has 3 power right now. Suarez has good feel to hit from the right side and is probably a utility guy unless he grows into more power than is anticipated given his frame. Arnold has some bat speed and an athletic build.
Selected by Carson Cistulli from any player who received less than a 40 FV.
Tyler Hill, OF
Of the five players in the South Atlantic League last year who recorded a speed score equivalent to or better than Hill’s 7.4 mark, all but one of them recorded a plurality of their defensive starts in center field. Colorado prospect Willie Abreu, the only other hitter to start more often in a corner-outfield spot, did so in deference to Manuel Melendez — that is, one of the other four players with a higher speed score than Hill. The point: on paper, Hill has the sort of speed that tends to profile in center; in reality, however, he seems to lack the requisite instinct for the position.
As to how that affects his future value, it’s not great. It also means, however, that Hill possesses more physical talent than the typical fringe prospect. Nor is he “merely” an athlete: Hill’s swinging-strike rate ranked in top quintile among Sally League hitters last year, and he recorded an almost precisely league average isolated-power figure. If this were a former top draft pick, the outcome would be less than ideal. Hill was a 19th-rounder, though, who’s been age appropriate for his levels.
The Red Sox have shown the ability to develop players from within and have six homegrown stars on the big-league roster. (I counted Hanley.) But the farm system, right now, is below average. It’s uneven, at least. There’s plenty of pitching depth in the organization (and plenty of good changeups, a trait pervasive enough throughout the system that I consider it a core developmental competency), but it’s very thin up the middle. It probably won’t be an issue for a while, because the big-league team is so stacked. While the talent in Boston is roughly comparable to what one finds in the Bronx, however, that’s not the case for the players back in Fort Myers and Tampa, where the Yankees have a big advantage. Because the Red Sox are likely to compete, this list is likely to thin out at some point this summer. The glut of upper-level power-hitting first-base prospects is the most obvious source of trade bait.
Eric Longenhagen is from Catasauqua, PA and currently lives in Tempe, AZ. He spent four years working for the Phillies Triple-A affiliate, two with Baseball Info Solutions and two contributing to prospect coverage at ESPN.com. Previous work can also be found at Sports On Earth, CrashburnAlley and Prospect Insider.
The Dombroski Effect
Well, the Sox have, in the years since Dombrowski was hired:
-graduated Andrew Benintendi (65FV)
-graduated Rafael Devers (55FV)
-turned Michael Kopech (60FV), Yoan Moncada (65FV) + into four low-cost years of Chris Sale (80FV)
-traded Anderson Espinoza (who didn’t pitch in 2017) for 2.5 low-cost years of Drew Pomeranz, who to this point has been a 3-win player for them
Not so much a “Dombrowski Effect” as a “Prospect Graduation” and “Prudent Trades” Effect.
Fair points. Also, I’m assuming the (80FV) only represents the April – July Chris Sale, and not the Frail Sale that gets embarrassed when it matters most. Jury is still out on that trade
Well, if you’re going to root your arguments in small sample sizes, there’s nothing I can really do to argue those points.
It is worth noting, however, that without his performance in April-August, the Red Sox would have been duking it out with the Twins and some other modest contender for Wild Card spots.
Dombrowski has always had good trade success in these types of moves and thus the “Dombrowski Effect” defined as dealing the future at max value for current star players. Win now, pay for it later is his MO.
That’s the painful part. None of these are “bad trades” in a vacuum. But 2021 is looking pretty grim.
That’s the competitive cycle for you, though. The Red Sox will likely have been contenders from 2016-2020, which, by any reasonable standard, would be a slam dunk.
If he doesn’t make the Sale trade, does the 2017-2020 window look nearly as good? Probably not. Kopech probably won’t be a consistent performer until 2020 (2019 at the earliest, presuming he doesn’t fall under the knife between now and then). Luis Alexander Basabe isn’t a top-100 guy, and Moncada has serious swing-and-miss issues to work through before he even scrapes Sale’s present value to the club.
By 2020, they’ll still have Benintendi and Devers, and a shot to re-sign Betts with the Ramirez and Sandoval deals off the books.
Sorry for the wall of text, but I’m a huge Dombrowski apologist. He never got the Tigers the big one, but he turned a team that literally lost 75% of its games in 2003 and was awful for years prior into one that was in the playoff picture for all but two years between 2006-2016 with a couple of WS appearances.
Show me a team that can honestly project a 2021 team with an error bar of plus/minus 10 games.
It’s interesting in theory, but in practise it doesn’t work. And I would claim that it doesn’t work even for small or middle market teams, let alone the Red Sox or Yankees.
Exactly. Are Sox fans (or any fans) really that worried about how steep the bill may be due in 2021? Seriously? You’ve got a great team now that can win it all, isn’t that the point?
Exactly. The number of Red Sox fans, including some real baseball writers, Chicken Littleing ‘What will become of us?’ about 2021 is truly a phenomena particular to off-season internet wheel spinning. The Sox have promoted players aggressively and successfully and traded wisely and they’re in the race. Right here. Right now. And for years to come. During that time, they’ll restock the farm system, make more trades, sign free agents and create new possibilities. The only thing that worries me about 2021 are rising sea levels and nuclear war – not Chris Sale’s next contract.
So the Espinosa trade did work out in the sense that Espinosa promptly blew out his arm and Pomeranz’s arm has (against all odds) remained attached. That said, I still think trading a Top 20 prospect in-season for a guy with as many questions as Pomeranz (then and now) was not a wise move. Those sorts of prospects can land much, much better pitchers than Pomeranz with fewer question marks.
Of course, the Red Sox would have been worse off had they taken my advice and kept Espinosa because of his arm blowing out, so my concern is more about process than results. And I think that the trade for Sale was really great, and the Kimbrel trade seems to have worked out too. Dombrowski generally makes good trades.
It would be helpful if you nominated a couple of pitchers who are “much” better than Pomeranz, let alone “much, much better.”
He’s cheap and he’s 29 and he’s physically imposing. Over the last four years he’s had a HR/9 of roughly 1.0 and a FIP of slightly under 4 and a WHIP at a commendable 1.1 or so.
Ace? No, he isn’t an ace. Health problems? Yes. But you can’t really call him out for not being a good value pitcher at the rate he’s paid.
He’s a huge value given the production they get, but the Red Sox don’t need “value” the same way other teams do because they’re so freaking rich. And the health risk is even higher than most pitchers.
The Red Sox made a few errors. They thought they could get by with the rotation they had. Then traded for Pomeranz; the control helped but it also drove up the cost dramatically. But they essentially paid for long-term control at his absolute peak value (mid-season) instead of paying for short-term control at peak value and then using their financial advantage to splurge later…or, even better, paying for short-term control earlier and then trading Espinosa for a better (albeit likely more expensive in one way or another) controllable starter later.
This is, BTW, a defensible Dombrowski characteristic. He’s not into “efficiency,” when he wants to upgrade he just goes and does it. More often than not, he comes out ahead. Because Espinosa blew out his arm, this time he did too! But this one did not play well to the Red Sox’s comparative advantages.
In the end, it’s not a big deal. Splurging on David Price instead of Zack Greinke was almost certainly a bigger mistake.
2 years of Gray and Cole returned 2 top 100’s + a top 200, so I agree that giving up Espinosa for Pomeranz — who is more 2.5 WAR to Gray & Cole’s 3 WAR — was rich, but Dombrowski seems to be really good at knowing when the industry overvalues his players. This is exemplified in the trades of Maybin & Miller (both regarded as Top-10 prospects iirc) for Miguel Cabrera and Fister for Robbie Ray (Fangraphs loved Fister and hated this trade). Maybe he knew that surgery would play a bigger role in Espinosa’s future than Pomeranz’s.
I agree–Dombrowski’s strategy has yielded good results overall. It’s more like “sell high on your prospects” rather than “get a good return for the valuation of your prospects.”
That said, I think that Dombrowski is a case of a guy executing his strategy really well, more so than the strategy itself being optimal. Lesser GMs have tried to win now and had far less to show for it.
Getting guys like Miguel Cabrera for Miller/Maybin or Pomeranz for Espinosas is very much getting a good return. I think it’s slightly amusing that many process people don’t seem to recognize Dombrowski has a process of his own, it just runs counter to much of the industry. And he’s been very successful at it.
Well, his strategy is the old-school strategy. He just did it better than everyone else, which is why he still has a job and all the other old-school GMs don’t.
I would also argue that getting Miguel Cabrera and getting Drew Pomeranz are two dramatically different levels of “good” returns.
While the Fister-Ray trade certainly look better now than it did then, Dave Stewart deserves far more credit than Dombrowski on Robbie Ray.
Also, if you use bWAR instead of fWAR, the valuation changes dramatically.
Here’s a question I don’t think you thought of within your comment…was Espinosa grossly overrated? We’re talking about a guy with elite stuff that is 3-4 years away in the best case scenario. One could say that he traded risk for risk (a pitcher half a decade away, which is far both in terms of development and not getting through unscathed) for a talented, albeit often injured MLB pitcher who can help now. I don’t think it was a bad deal for either side, to be honest. SD was trying to rebuild with high ceiling talent, Boston needed a good pitcher now. Pitchers that far away are, in my opinion, grossly overrated on prospect lists (I’d cite my own team’s Shane Baz for a recent example). There’s just so much that can go wrong, I don’t think it’s factored in enough.
I have no idea if he was overrated. He was young, but he was also incredibly dominant and he had the “stuff” to back it up. But maybe it is always a mistake to rate pitchers that high when they are at that young a level. In the aggregate, you would likely do pretty well for yourself if you traded any pitcher if they had any buzz about them before they hit AA.
One thing that KATOH always reminded me of was that the pitchers were always, always rated lower than the hitters. The top 20 players would have maybe two pitchers in there. The bust rate for pitchers is high! Alex Reyes and Brent Honeywell and AJ Puk were on the fast track to the majors and they blew out their arms just before they got there.
Pitching prospects are mega lottery tickets and hitters are pick six lottery tickets. The odds are obviously longer on pitchers but when you hit…. That’s why I’ll give Dombrowski credit for the Sale acquisition. But let’s also not forget prospect gurus (KLAW) would have bet dollars to donuts (or bacon strips in his case) that Sale’s arm would fail off. Knowing (or guessing correctly) what prospects to trade and when is even more important than developing talent.
Would seem to be fair to also include the the $217 million dollars given to David Price in this rundown.