Tovar, So Good: Rockies Extend Ezequiel Tovar

Up until now, the Rockies had made very little noise this offseason. After agreeing to extensions with Germán Márquez and Charlie Blackmon just before the 2023 season wrapped up, Colorado spent a mere $3.5 million on major league free agent deals in the six months since, the fewest of any team in the majors. Yet, at the tail end of a long, quiet winter, the Rockies finally made headlines, when on Sunday they signed 22-year-old Ezequiel Tovar to a long-term contract extension. The deal, which begins right away, will pay Tovar $63.5 million over the next seven years. After that, the Rockies have a $20.5 million team option for 2031, the shortstop’s age-29 season.
Across three offseasons at the helm for Colorado, general manager Bill Schmidt has largely avoided multi-year free agent deals, with one notable exception: Kris Bryant and the seven-year, $182 million pact he signed before the 2022 season. Over the past two winters, the Rockies are one of only three teams not to have signed a single multi-year free agent deal; the other two clubs, the Pirates and Orioles, have outspent Colorado by totals of $37.71 million and $10.13 million, respectively. However, free agency isn’t the only way for teams to keep players around for longer periods of time. Under Schmidt, the Rockies have signed eight players to multi-year extensions; only the Braves have extended more players on multi-year deals in that span. Atlanta has gotten far more extension attention, but this is how Colorado operates, too.
Even so, the Tovar deal represents a different approach for the Rockies because it is the first time that Schmidt has extended a player with fewer than four years of service. It’s also the longest extension the Rockies have awarded since February 2019, when they signed Nolan Arenado to an eight-year, $260 million deal that began in 2020. Moreover, while we have started to see more and more pre-arb players signing long-term extensions around the majors, many of those players either are stars or have star potential. Perhaps the only good comp for Tovar’s extension is the eight-year, $50 million deal Keibert Ruiz signed with the Nationals after putting up a 91 wRC+ and 1.8 WAR in 2022, his first full season. Then again, even Ruiz arguably had a higher ceiling at the time. Tovar might be in a class of his own when it comes to low-ceiling, high-floor youngsters signing lucrative long-term deals.
Entering the 2023 season, Eric Longenhagen and Tess Taruskin ranked Tovar no. 41 on our Top 100 Prospects list, describing him as “a fantastic defensive shortstop” with “poor plate discipline” that “somewhat undermines his excellent bat-to-ball skill.” One year later, Tovar is no longer a prospect, but that remains the prevailing report. He finished his debut season with the lowest walk rate and the second-highest O-Swing% among qualified NL batters. He also finished with 16 OAA and 13 DRS; the only shortstop to outpace him in both metrics was Dansby Swanson. Despite his 70 wRC+, worst among qualified NL hitters, Tovar finished his rookie season with 1.6 WAR. That’s hardly star-level performance, but a 1.6-WAR player is still a big league regular.
Let’s get the bad stuff out of the way first: Tovar’s offensive numbers last season were pitiful. One of the only areas in which he was above average was batting average, and Coors Field likely inflated that number. His plate discipline was dreadful, as expected, but so were his contact skills, which came as something of a surprise. Tovar ranked 66th out of 72 qualified NL hitters in contact rate, and he wasn’t just whiffing on pitches outside the zone. While his O-Contact% was poor, his Z-Contact% also came in below league average.
On the bright side, when he did manage to put the ball in play, Tovar showed flashes of his promising hit tool. His .378 xwOBAcon was a few ticks above league average, thanks to his line drive tendencies. He ranked in the 71st percentile in Baseball Savant’s Sweet-Spot% and finished seventh among qualified NL players in line drive rate. If he can make more contact, especially on pitches in the strike zone, his offensive numbers will improve even if he never adds a lick of discipline to his game. If he can improve his plate discipline, then all the better. For what it’s worth, he significantly improved his walk rate during his final season in the minor leagues, prompting his Double-A manager, Chris Denorfia, to rave about Tovar’s growth. “He’s made this developmental jump,” Denorfia told David Laurila in 2022. “Something clicked to where he’s recognizing situations where pitchers are going to try to get him to chase.” Plate discipline is a different animal in the majors than in the minors, but still, it’s worth acknowledging that this is a skill he has successfully improved in the past.
Tovar also showed off 69th-percentile sprint speed in 2023. He won’t ever be a weapon on the basepaths, but with speed like that, he should be a better base runner than his numbers last year would suggest; he went 11-for-16 on stolen base attempts and was worth -0.6 BsR. Long story short, this is a player with much more offensive potential than we saw last season, and he has a strong enough glove to allow him to nurse his growing pains at the highest level while still contributing positive value to his club.
Courtesy of Dan Szymborski, here is what the ZiPS projections envision for Tovar over the next eight years:
| Year | BA | OBP | SLG | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | SO | SB | OPS+ | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | .259 | .300 | .424 | 552 | 75 | 143 | 32 | 4 | 17 | 76 | 28 | 142 | 11 | 87 | 2.2 |
| 2025 | .263 | .306 | .438 | 562 | 79 | 148 | 33 | 4 | 19 | 81 | 30 | 138 | 11 | 91 | 2.6 |
| 2026 | .266 | .310 | .442 | 568 | 82 | 151 | 34 | 3 | 20 | 84 | 32 | 133 | 11 | 94 | 2.9 |
| 2027 | .267 | .313 | .448 | 572 | 85 | 153 | 34 | 3 | 21 | 86 | 34 | 129 | 10 | 96 | 3.1 |
| 2028 | .267 | .313 | .446 | 574 | 85 | 153 | 34 | 3 | 21 | 87 | 35 | 125 | 10 | 96 | 3.1 |
| 2029 | .266 | .314 | .445 | 571 | 86 | 152 | 33 | 3 | 21 | 86 | 36 | 122 | 9 | 96 | 3.2 |
| 2030 | .268 | .317 | .449 | 563 | 85 | 151 | 33 | 3 | 21 | 86 | 36 | 121 | 8 | 97 | 3.2 |
| 2031 | .270 | .318 | .453 | 552 | 84 | 149 | 32 | 3 | 21 | 84 | 35 | 119 | 8 | 99 | 3.2 |
With projections like that, ZiPS would give Tovar $92 million over seven years. That’s more than he’ll make even if the Rockies pick up his team option for an eighth year.
With all that in mind, it’s easy to see why the Rockies offered Tovar a long-term extension. We’ve already seen his floor, and it’s rather sturdy — he can be a valuable player even if he’s the worst hitter in the league. The Rockies could do a heck of a lot worse than pay $9 million per year for seven seasons of a 1.5-win shortstop. What’s more, it won’t take much for this deal to pay dividends in Colorado. If Tovar’s hit tool progresses against big league pitching, he would blossom into an above-average shortstop throughout his twenties.
As for Tovar, his youth has gifted him the rare opportunity to cash in now without giving up the chance to sign another long-term deal. His $63.5 million guarantee is more than the vast majority of players will earn in their careers, yet he can still reach free agency before his 30th birthday. If Colorado picks up its club option, Tovar will have to wait another year to test the open market. Yet, if the Rockies are comfortable paying $20.5 million for his services (even the Rockies, and even in 2031 dollars), that suggests Tovar will be playing well enough to cash in on the free agent market at 30 years old. The two or three free agent years he is losing aren’t nothing, especially for a glove-first player. Still, Tovar had to sacrifice something for lifelong financial security, and it’s not difficult to understand why he made that choice.
Ultimately, this is a rock solid move for both sides. The Rockies are betting they secured three additional years with an excellent shortstop at price tag well below market value. If that doesn’t work out, they’re only slightly overpaying one of the better defensive players in baseball. Meanwhile, Tovar gets to work out his kinks at the MLB level without ever having to worry about money, and if everything goes according to plan, he can still sign a lucrative free agent deal in the 2030s. Now, both sides can get to work on what they need to do next: Tovar will try to improve his plate discipline, while the Rockies will look to acquire, develop, and yes, extend the stars who can help them escape the NL West basement.
Leo has written for FanGraphs, MLB Trade Rumors, Baseball Prospectus, and Lindy’s Sports. You can follow him on Bluesky @leomorgenstern.bsky.social.
Blind squirrels and nuts, I guess
I also thought of the Keibert Ruiz deal, which somehow looks like it is going to turn out badly for the Nationals. And this one might too, but the logic for the Ruiz contract was good and it’s the same here. What else are they going to spend money on that helps them going forward?
Why isn’t this ‘Tovar, To Good’? Cowards
Believe me, we considered both options! But “So Good” tested better with the focus groups and I stand by it
So far, so Tov
It will be fascinating to see, twenty years from now when we have more data on how these contracts play out, whether or not long-term early career contracts lead to young players outperforming their career projections (due to the presumed security benefit) more often than players that have a more traditional free agency path.
Whether or not they do outperform non-extension players, we won’t really be able to say it’s because of some “presumed security benefit”. There are countless other reasons we might see that result. One big one could be a selection bias where the players who are offered extensions are the ones teams have evaluated to be most likely to exceed their projections
Teams look at these contracts though a different lens of weather or not in aggregate they capture excess value league wide.
Career projections are iffy for the first couple of years in the bigs with a huge amount of variance. That said it would be interesting to look back and see if teams picked the right players, they have a lot more information than the public does. It would also be great if we can say certain teams do better than others but at that point the sample size is going to be too small to do a meaningful statistically analysis. Another consideration would be are certain positions or profiles more likely to succeed or fail. For instance a SS with a good bat should be more likely to succeed because of they struggle defensively they are easy to move to another position, a SS with defensive profile and a weak bat basically is only useful at SS (or potentially 2b). So it’s likely those players are higher risk.
As a comparable it’s really interesting to look back at past rookies of the year or rookie leaders in war or ops+. Many of them washed out of the league or were not offered a multi year contract on reaching FA.
I was gonna call him this generation’s Rey Ordonez cause he is a pretty bad hitter right now between his bad plate discipline AND bad contact skills. But then I looked up Rey’s number and bah gawd he makes Tovar look like prime Nomar.
Well, I dunno, a 2.5-3WAR player for the next 7-8 years seems kind of nice to pencil in.
That sounds good, but then you look at the depth charts and they’ve just committed for 7-8 years to a player who lands them at 27th place in the shortstop rankings.
27th this year. If he matches his projections and is a 2.5-3 WAR guy at peak, that would put them more in the middle of the pack in the rankings (assuming a similar distribution as this year). The Rockies aren’t doing this for 2024
Not really a fan of these extensions for non-top prospects. Even if Tovar becomes a really good player, what have you really gained? Two slightly discounted years of free agency beyond the 6 years of service time. That’s not enough reward for the massive risk, especially given that you are overpaying a bit for his pre-arb and arb years.
They’ll have gained the right to pay “a really good player” $30m for his age 28 and 29 seasons, without having to pay for his 33-35 seasons.
For me that’s not nearly enough reward for the large amount of risk. I wrote something similar on the Keibert Ruiz article when it came out and most people disagreed with me then as well. Yet now people are calling that contract a bust.
You just shouldn’t give these types of contracts to a guy that had a 77 OPS+ in his rookie year. Take advantage of your 6 years of pre-FA service time then move on, or sigh him to an (yes, more expensive) extension later when he’s more of a sure thing.
I’m not as down on these as you seem to be, but I do prefer these contracts for high upside rather than high floor guys (guys who could be offensive juggernauts mainly. I like this one better than Ruiz purely because I think Tovar has some routes to get to a decent bat and his defense is special.
But the downside just isn’t significant, unless you’re in, say, Cleveland’s financial situation.
Leaving aside Albies, a Strider easily pays for a Kingery, a Singleton, an Polanco, and a Straw.
Missed pun opportunity. Tov means good in Hebrew. I have a feeling Leo Morgenstern knows this.