Walking José Ramírez Is in the Eye of the Beholder

There is a rule in baseball that allows managers to intentionally walk opposing batters automatically. More specifically, “following the signal of the manager’s intention, the umpire will immediately award first base to the batter.” Depending on who you ask, it’s either a minor time saver or completely pointless.
There is a generally accepted practice in baseball that intentional walks are either issued at the start of a plate appearance, after first base becomes open, or when the count begins to favor a batter. You won’t find that anywhere in the rulebook, but it’s true nonetheless. It’s a common-sense practice: the only other time you can walk a batter intentionally is after a pitch tilts the count in the pitcher’s favor, and if an intentional walk makes sense then, it probably made sense before that pitch was thrown.
Baseball conventional wisdom isn’t always correct. In the case of when to intentionally walk a batter, though, it follows straightforward logic. Allow me to make an analogy. Let’s say you and I have made a strange deal. I have 60 seconds to accomplish some task – call it untangling a knot. If I manage it, you’ll owe me $10. Before I start, I make you an offer: you can just hand me $5 now and we’ll call the whole thing off. You can trade the possibility of a $10 loss for the certainty of a $5 loss.
Let’s further say that you turn me down, and that the clock starts. For the first 10 seconds, I don’t do anything — maybe I stubbed my toe and am hopping around in pain. After those 10 seconds, I offer you the same deal: for $5, we can call the same thing off. You wouldn’t take me up on it, of course. You liked your odds enough that you didn’t opt out before, and now I’m less likely to accomplish my task.
Anyway, Tony La Russa intentionally walked José Ramírez yesterday. He did so automatically, in keeping with the rules of the game, by signaling to the umpire from the dugout. He did it in contravention of the generally accepted practices of the game, though, by issuing the walk while Ramírez was behind 0-1 in the count.
In an abstract sense, it’s pretty clear why you wouldn’t do this. The knot-untangling game is a clunky analogy but it gets the point across. There’s no reason to run the numbers: by the numbers, the walk doesn’t make sense. But abstractions don’t always tell the whole story, so let’s look at the specific circumstances around this walk and see if any of them can shed some light on what happened here.
First, the situation. Ramírez came to bat with two outs in the fifth inning. Amed Rosario, the previous batter, had doubled to make the score 4-0 and now stood on second base. Davis Martin, the White Sox starter, stayed in to face Ramírez. Pitching coach Ethan Katz came out for a discussion with Martin. After that meeting came this pitch:
From there, La Russa had seen enough: he walked Ramírez. Martin recovered to strike Franmil Reyes out, escaping the inning. It didn’t matter, in either case; the Sox only scored once all game, and Cleveland held on to win 4-1.
Rather than endlessly speculate, let’s hear what La Russa said about his decision:
“…Sometimes… they get themselves out. And if they get good patience, it’s like an unintentional intentional walk. So that’s what Ethan went out to say, and the first pitch was on the plate. He fouled it off, so I said, well, put him on. I just think it’s lack of experience for Davis and understanding more about that situation. Because he’s smart enough to know to pitch off the plate and he got it on, cost him two runs. He was supposed to do it again, and after one strike, said no.”
First things first: that explains the pitching meeting. Katz was out there to tell Martin to pitch around Ramírez. Ramírez had singled in two runs in the third inning, as La Russa alluded to above. Easy peasy, right? He wanted Martin to get Ramírez to chase, Ramírez didn’t, let’s face the next batter.
Only, that description glosses over the change in count, which is the most meaningful thing that happened on that first pitch. If you’re looking to record an out, a foul ball is a pretty good place to start. José Ramírez is one of the best hitters in baseball. For his career, he’s hitting .279/.356/.507, and he’s better than that now. Even after 0-1 counts, he’s hitting .266/.307/.472 for a perfectly acceptable 106 wRC+.
But again, the question isn’t whether walking Ramírez made sense. I think I would have walked him there from the start, but I don’t believe it’s an obvious choice either way. The question, instead, is whether the information in that foul ball tilted the balance in favor of an intentional walk.
We know La Russa’s case: the pitch being on the plate proved to him that Martin couldn’t follow his instructions. He wanted pitches out of the zone, he didn’t get them, and he didn’t need to see anything more. It’s not that Ramírez made devastating contact – per Statcast, that foul ball was 63 mph off the bat, though I’m not sure how accurate foul ball exit velocity readings are – but merely the location of the pitch that made an intentional walk a good option.
I can’t tell you what the odds of Ramírez getting a hit on a ball in the strike zone were. La Russa can’t either – but from the sound of his comments, it sounds deterministic. In the third inning, when Martin left a pitch over the plate, it “cost him two runs.” Let’s see the pitch in question:
Unquestionably, two runs scored on that play. Unquestionably, Ramírez hit a single. He even hit the ball pretty hard. But is that a process failure by Martin? I’m not so sure. He threw a well-located changeup that Ramírez put on the ground into the shift. Position your second baseman three steps to the right, and that might be an out instead. Ramírez is great – but he’s hardly a guaranteed base hit every time a pitch is in the strike zone.
There’s really not much more to say than that. In La Russa’s mind, a pitch in the strike zone was unacceptable. I don’t for a second think that Martin meant to throw that changeup in the zone. Pitchers miss their targets sometimes, and Reese McGuire was setting up fairly close to the zone anyway.
I’m just an analyst on the internet. I’ve never managed a team. I won’t claim to know any of the exact numbers here, or whether Katz came out to tell Martin that any pitch in the strike zone, regardless of outcome, would lead to an intentional walk. But if I were La Russa, I wouldn’t give that order.
I’m just projecting, but it seems to me that La Russa is substituting absolutes for probabilities. You can pitch Ramírez in the zone and get an out. You can try to miss the zone and hit it. It’s not black and white – sometimes a bad process leads to a good outcome, and vice versa. That’s baseball in a nutshell: the edges are small either way, and both sides can’t win. All you can do is give yourself the best chance to succeed – pitchers have singled against Jacob deGrom, and Mike Trout has struck out against bad relievers. There are no absolutes.
Maybe I’m misunderstanding La Russa’s logic. Maybe there’s a detail left out somewhere, or something lost in translation. I don’t think so, though. Sometimes, you have to take people at their word. La Russa didn’t care about the fact that the foul ball made the count 0-1. It didn’t enter into his decision making. It wasn’t a question of whether Ramírez’s odds of getting on base changed after the combination of a pitch in the zone and a foul ball. It was just: pitch in zone, walk.
If you like La Russa’s decision making this year, this one won’t change your mind. In fact, you probably agree with him that baseball can be reduced to a binary. Pitches in the zone when you want to throw them out of the zone turn into runs, and so on and so forth.
If you haven’t liked La Russa’s decision making, on the other hand, this is just more evidence. When you deal in absolutes, you miss out on the fact that hitters do worse after 0-1 counts than overall, or that getting the other team’s best hitter to ground the ball into the shift is an overall good thing. You might also inadvertently belittle your pitcher after the game; “he’s smart enough to know” is something people say about children or pets.
If you came here to see the math behind another unlikely intentional walk, I’m sorry. There really isn’t any. You either trust that Tony La Russa knows enough that when he makes a wildly counter-intuitive decision, it’s for good reasons, or you don’t. As best as I can tell, there have never been any similar intentional walks, though our pitch-by-pitch database only goes back to 2002 and it’s entirely possible I missed some anyway. Is your faith in La Russa’s genius enough to outstrip that? That’s for you to decide on your own.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
Things my faith in LaRussa’s genius is enough to outstrip:
“Is your faith in La Russa’s genius enough to outstrip that?”
What genius? If he had any, it evaporated long ago.
I think you meant to say he drank it away
LaRussa must be looking at the Apple Stats odds by count
Only the Sith deal in absolutes*
*and Tony La Russa
-implying Tony La Russa isn’t just Senator Palpatine with a dye job.
Hahaha brilliant!
Tony playing chess keeping his managing decision in the PR instead of the alleged locker room chemistry issues.
Thanks for the interpretation as to what LaRussa meant in his press conference. I have watched a number of his press conferences this year and he is incoherent. That is without reference to his manner, which is somnolent.
Sometimes you just get frustrated about something and make a quick decision because of the frustration. I think that is what we see here. ‘F@$* it, you can’t throw him something out of the zone – here I’ll do it for you.’ LaRussa is probably at this stage a lot right now – his team should be much better than it is, but they aren’t doing what he wants, so why not do something you have a little control over when you can, before something worse than a walk happens. His faith (or lack of faith) in a guy like Davis Martin is somewhat understandable right?
I think he did it to teach Martin a lesson. “Idiot can’t throw a ball, so I’ll show him how it works.”
LaRussa is the worst manager in the majors right now. It’s like the Raiders hiring Jon Gruden after years away from the game. Everyone knew it would be a disaster, and, lo and behold, it was.
I guess I’m someone who falls outside of your analytic pigeonholes, because I’ve thought TLR’s decision making has been routinely bad this season — lineup construction, bullpen usage, intentionally walking Trea Turner on a 1-2 count, etc — but I don’t have a problem with this specific decision.
When a young pitcher with limited MLB experience throws a pitch down the middle right after he has been tasked with “unintentionally intentionally” walking the guy, that demonstrates some lack of control which could reasonably lead to some concern that telling him not to think of pink elephants has just made him think about pink elephants and that there is now a decent chance that he is either going to groove more pitches (which will have a higher probability of getting hit) or that he might overcorrect and throw wildly and allow the runner on 2nd base to advance.
Balancing the perceived probability of bad outcomes under the circumstances against the increased probability of Ramirez making an out now once the count had gone to 0-1 could reasonably justify the decision to intentionally walk him at that point. It doesn’t have to be the result of strictly binary thinking.
If you don’t trust your pitcher to execute on strategy, shouldn’t he be replaced?
I made this point the LAST time he intentionally walked a batter (Trea Turner) to face the next guy (a feckless Muncy): it comes down to Larussa’s confidence in the pitcher as to whether he can follow the game plan and put the ball where he wants it. This only confirms it….if you’re supposed to not throw a strike to the batter and the first pitch is in the strike zone, what more proof do you need? Do you let him throw another, just to see if maybe he’ll be better..? In both cases – Trea Turner and Jose Ramirez – you’re talking about some of the premier hitters in the game.
I see nothing bizarre about this decision, and the very fact that Ben suggests people are judging Larussa’s moves based on whether they like him or not seems to imply much of the criticism he’s getting IS because he’s unlikeable.
I lived through the Larussa era in St. Louis, and came away with two distinct impressions. 1) I didn’t like Larussa’s public persona, and 2) I respected the hell out of the way he managed a ballclub.
not unlike LaRussa, you ignored a specific and essential piece of data: the consequence of the new count (in both cases). Ben even agreed with walking Ramirez from the beginning, and it does seem ludicrous put a guy on base because your pitcher missed his spot.
The question is “How do you explain making that decision *after* seeing that pitch?” with respect to better outcomes, and nothing suggests that La Russa can articulate that or even recognizes the negative consequences. If I were a fan (or a player on the team), I’d be concerned about what the basis for his decision-making is.
If he wants to manage by his “gut,” fine, but then just go out there and say, “I had a feeling and that’s the way I roll.” Trying to rationalize nonsense is exhausting, *especially* given TLR’s specific history of rationalizing all sorts of awful nonsense (I’m not sure I’d consider multiple DUIs a “public persona”).
(edited for typo, clarity)
The basis for his decision making was how awful that pitch was.
Ramirez, a lefty, down 0-1, is still a worse matchup for the pitcher than Reyes, a righty. But IBBing a guy puts another runner on, which you generally don’t want to do. I don’t have a problem with giving your guy a shot to pitch around him, although that’s risky in its own right.
There are some pitchers you can trust to pitch around a guy, and others you can’t. (At least I think this is true – I’ve never seen any data, but it seems like common sense.) After that first pitch, LaRussa figured in that spot, he couldn’t trust Martin to throw balls.
I much prefer a manager who can explain his decision making process over one who just goes with his gut. Whether or not I agree with those decisions, at least La Russa always has reasons for them.
Well, for his in-game decisions, anyway, as he’s never provided any reasoning for his terrible choices of #2 hitters in many of his lineups over the years. Even the times he batted the pitcher 8th had decent logic behind them, but he never has explained those 2-hole hitters with both mediocre OBP and power. It never made sense for Earl Weaver either despite how innovative he otherwise was, but at least he managed in an era before it was discovered just how important OBP with some power is in that lineup position.
It boggles my mind that Charlie Montoyo lost his job before this guy.
Montoyo isn’t buds with the owner; he had to produce.
Brought to you by the same owner who thought blowing up the Bulls after 6 championships was a good idea.
Jerry was at that point losing $$$ on the Bulls due to having to pay everybody. You don’t make enough $$$ to buy a basketball team unless you really, really, really care about $$$ in the first place. Every last bit that you can accumulate.
I’m more surprised TLR didn’t pull the pitcher while he was at it. Martin only had one more out in him anyway, so if you’re issuing an IBB to make some sort of point, go all the way and take your pitcher out of the game!
By the time you are talking about the 5th inning PA, if you are asking “should you walk him here?” then you aren’t asking the right question. If TLR is going to walk the best hitter on the team in a four run game with a man on second and two outs in the 5th, why wouldn’t he walk the same guy in a one run game with runners on second and third and two outs?
I guess it was “only the third,” but it isn’t like the 5th is really late in the game either and it was pretty apparent by the third inning that the White Sox had left their bats at home that day and they weren’t going to get a lot of runs. It is far from the first time this year that LaRussa has let the other teams best hitter beat them when there was a base open. Maybe he didn’t realize it at the time, but that was the game in the third and he chose to let Ramirez have a chance to beat him.
Sounds like he was supposed to in the third, making this the second time he wasn’t able to pitch off the plate
Good post and sorry to nitpick but just FYI – on the main page, the subheadline says it was an 0-2 count instead of 0-1
Fascinating discussion. I’m prejudiced against folks who I perceive don’t have self image issues. Tony did a fine job with the Redbirds, even though he probably over-managed.
I have generally been a harsh critic of La Russa, but this is the one weird decision I don’t totally disagree with— once the decision was made to leave Martin in.
Martin has reasonable but by no means crazy stuff; 94-96 fastball with some ride, a pair of averageish breaking balls, and a below-average changeup. He doesn’t walk a lot of guys, but as Longenhagen describes, his issue is command: it’s very much control over command for him, so he’s frequently vulnerable to giving up hard contact (and extra-base damage) by leaving pitches in the middle of the zone.
He was instructed to pitch around J-Ram, and instead he threw a changeup basically right down the middle, a little away, on the first pitch. If J-Ram is looking for offspeed, that pitch lands about 450 feet away. What was desired was basically an intentional-unintentional walk, and Martin threw a meatball instead, and he’s prone to. I don’t think it’s a matter of rookie spot starter Martin *trying* to throw it there out of stubbornness, I think it’s a matter of Martin not having sufficient command of his pitches to follow the instructions.
After the 0-1, knowing the situation, it’s perfectly defensible to me. The better question is: if you don’t want Martin, who you already know is prone to meatballs, to pitch to Cleveland’s lone star hitter with guys on again, why not 1) intentionally walk at the beginning to get the much better matchup w Reyes immediately or 2) just bring in a reliever? The second option was not as attractive as it might be in most situations, since this was the first half of a double header, but still… why pitch to J-Ram at all?
Yeah, he’s acting like the change in count is the only differentiating factor between the two situations to consider. The way Martin failed to command the previous pitch, it could very well be that the odds of Ramirez getting a hit were greater with an 0-1 count with the pitcher showing sloppy command than they were with an 0-0 count and it being assumed that the pitcher had better command than he actually did.
An excellent and smart article. So deftly explained, and the conclusion is perfect. Well done.
In game theoretical situations “tit for tat” is one of the highest-performing strategies, even when defection (ignoring LaRussa) is indistinguishable from a mistake.
Yes retaliation (intentionally walking Ramirez) can be irrational in isolation, but in long-run repeated games it ensures compliance by pre-committing regardless of the perceived intent.
Clearly you’ve never heard of the iterated prisoners dilemma…
Last month LaRussa intentionally walked Trea Turner on a 1-2 count, which was even more outrageous.
This is the first article I’ve seen here at FG where the picture was worth the real estate. “This is an article about walking someone in a favorable count” with a big ol’ picture of you-know-who.
This article convinced me it was the right move. Ramirez has a career 106 wrc+ down 0-1. The next batter, Franmil Reyes, has a 78 wrc+ this season. It would be a righty-righty matchup, unlike vs Ramirez. So you’re still better off with the IBB than facing him.
But an IBB puts another runner on. That’s why some teams rarely issue intentional free passes. So it also makes sense that you would give your pitcher a chance to let Ramirez get himself out. That first pitch was so bad – an 85 mph meatball in the middle of the zone – that I understand why LaRussa lost faith in the pitcher.
Why did he leave a pitcher that he didn’t trust? After the Ramirez BB, the next PA became even more important.
Yes, an 0-1 count does increase the probability of the pitcher recording an out, but the fact that the pitcher in this scenario achieved that probability increase either on accident or in defiance of orders does not inspire confidence in his ability to take advantage of his now favorable situation. On the surface, “manager intentionally walks batter immediately after strike 1” sounds a little crazy, but I find it much less crazy in light of the context of the mound visit explanation.
I don’t want La Russa on that wall, I don’t need La Russa on that wall, and I don’t want or need him to give that order. It wasn’t a Code Red, it was a Code WTF?!?!?
There was a baseball book written in 1990 by George Will, Men at Work. He is a political talking head but is also a baseball fan. He was given access to the Oakland As when they were managed by La Russa. In the book he describes a 9th inning where La Russa pinch ran for a pinch runner he had just put into the game. La Russa came up with some justification for switching pinch runners but it didn’t really make sense when I read it. I think a lot of his genius came from handling the bullpen the way he did but I wonder how much of it was genius and how much of it is just a guy that likes making a lot of moves and is smart enough to justify them to the media, vs the old school go with your gut manager.