What Are the Phillies Waiting For?
The Phillies don’t look like a very good team this season. They haven’t looked like a very good team in some time, really. That said, they aren’t all that far from contention in a muddled NL Wild Card race. After enduring 96 losses in 2017, the club enters the upcoming campaign with an improved roster, having replaced Freddy Galvis with J.P. Crawford and Tommy Joseph with Carlos Santana. They’re poised to receive a full season from Rhys Hoskins. They’ve also added Tommy Hunter to the bullpen.
The result of those additions to last year’s returnees is a projection for 74 wins. Improving by eight games in a single offseason is pretty impressive. The Phillies aren’t really expected to do that, though. By BaseRuns, which removes sequencing from a team’s run-scoring and -prevention, Philadelphia was actually a 70-win team last year. So the gain this offseason is more like four wins. Still, it’s something.
It’s also something that has come at little expense. Yes, the team added free-agent Carlos Santana this winter for an average of $20 million per season. Given the team’s financial wherewithal and the potential to compete now, however, it’s fair to wonder why the Phillies haven’t done more.
In recent weeks, Philadelphia has been connected both with Jake Arrieta and Lance Lynn but appear reluctant to continue moving forward this offseason. While a 74-win team will get nowhere near the playoffs, the current state of the club’s rotation means that the Phillies could easily spend their way to something closer to contention this season without greatly impacting their ability to contend in future years. In November, Travis Sawchik wondered when the Phillies would spend. With pitching still available in the free-agent market and a relatively mediocre set of Wild Card candidates, the time for the Phillies to spend at least a little bit of their reserves should be now.
Before getting to the Phillies’ present finances, let’s take a brief step back and remember where the club has been. Here are Opening Day payrolls for Philadelphia since they moved into Citizens Bank Park in 2004.
From 2010 to 2014, the Phillies’ payroll placed among the top four in the majors. It went down a bit in 2015, followed by a huge dip in 2016, and then another big drop this year. For some perspective, consider the Houston Astros’ tank-job, for which that club has been criticized. From 2009 to 2011, Astros payrolls averaged $91 million. Then, while tanking between 2012 and -14, the average payroll dropped 57% to $39 million. By comparison, the Phillies’ average payroll from 2013 to 2015 was $161 million, a figure which dropped 48% to $84 million in 2016-18. Philadelphia’s drop in payroll has been nearly as severe as the Astros’ own decline earlier this decade.
The Phillies have also seen a precipitous drop in attendance over the last few years, as the team has failed to perform on the field. From 2007 to 2013, the team averaged 3.5 million fans per year. That number decreased to just over 3 million in 2013, fell to 2.4 million in 2014, and has come in right around 1.9 million the last three years. While we don’t have precise figures for how payroll and attendance figures have affected the bottom line, we can take a look at the estimates from Forbes. Here are the estimates for operating income through the 2016 season.
From 2004 to 2010, the Phillies made a bunch of money; from 2011 to 2015, they gave most of those profits back. From 2015 to 2016, the Philly’s attendance was flat, yet they improved from roughly a $9 million loss to nearly $90 million in profits.
Two things happened to change the Phillies’ fortunes. First, they lowered payroll by about $40 million. Then, their $2.5 billion television deal kicked in. That deal, which includes a 25% ownership stake in the channel, meant a huge increase in revenue for the organization. Forbes hasn’t released their estimates for last season yet, but that television money isn’t going to decline. Meanwhile, attendance was roughly the same while the team paid about $15 million more in payroll. If we wanted to guess, $60 million in profits seems like a reasonable number. This year, with payroll down about $40 million from last year, it wouldn’t be too far-fetched to think the Phillies were going to take in $100 million in profits this season. The kicker here is that, in the period from 2004 to 2017, the value of the franchise has increased at a rate of 15% per year according to Forbes, going from $392 million in 2005 to $1.65 billion last year.
We don’t know the exact asking price on Jake Arrieta and Lance Lynn, but let’s say the cost for the two combined is something like $150 million ($100 million for Arrieta, $50 million for Lynn) over the next four years. Even if Philadelphia signed both of them, the result would be a 2018 payroll roughly equivalent to last year’s — and, at the moment, current payroll commitments over the next three years (2019-21) are just $42 million, $29 million, and $11 million, respectively. The team can easily afford to bring in two pitchers without hurting its long-term plans.
If money isn’t what’s preventing Philadelphia from acting, there are two other possible arguments against making such a pair of moves. First is that improving from 74 to 79 wins doesn’t exactly render a club instant contenders. With regard to that comment, however, consider the current projected win totals in the National League.
| Club | Projected Wins |
|---|---|
| Cubs | 94 |
| Dodgers | 93 |
| Nationals | 90 |
| Cardinals | 87 |
| Giants | 82 |
| D-backs | 82 |
| Mets | 81 |
| Rockies | 79 |
| Brewers | 78 |
| Pirates | 76 |
| Phillies | 74 |
| Padres | 73 |
| Braves | 72 |
| Reds | 72 |
| Marlins | 65 |
Move the Phillies up to 79 wins and they are absolutely Wild Card contenders. The Cardinals look to have the inside track at one Wild Card spot, but there are currently five teams in the 78- to 82-win range potentially contending for the second one. It’s also possible that the Phillies are better than a 74-win team on paper: Baseball Prospectus, for example, currently situates them at 78 wins right now.
Of course, spending a ton of money just to make a team a Wild Card contender might not appear to be a good use of funds. For a club that’s averaged 69 wins over the past five seasons, however, entering the competitive fray while doing nothing to close a future window of contention — as opposed to otherwise letting massive sums of money just sit around — makes a lot of sense.
The other argument against bringing in Arrieta and Lynn (or Alex Cobb) is that they might block potentially better pitchers at some point. The Phillies, in fact, do have some very good pitching prospects in Franklyn Kilome, Adonis Medina, and Sixto Sanchez, but all three are multiple years away, and there will always be five rotation spots to fill.
Right now, the Phillies have Aaron Nola at the top of the rotation with some combination of Jerad Eickhoff, Mark Leiter, Nick Pivetta, and Vince Velasquez after the Phillies ace. Slotting Arrieta and Lynn after Nola and letting the other four battle for two spots would vastly improve the rotation, and the increased depth would also help as the season wears on.
The Phillies signed Carlos Santana this winter, but they aren’t trying to win this season. Given their financial power, the free agents available, and their proximity to contention, there really isn’t a good reason for the franchise to be so quiet. They will lose a few more draft picks, but they’ve been picking at the top of the draft for years, and they will still have the No. 3 pick overall in June. The Phillies aren’t that far away, and nothing they do this offseason would prevent them from going big next winter. The team has an opportunity to win, and they should take advantage.
Craig Edwards can be found on twitter @craigjedwards.
Go ahead and judge the Astros. Then explain why it makes sense to spend $10-15 MM/year on a free agent that takes a team from 65 wins to 70 wins. Maybe the Phillies have figured that out and will spend more when it’s one or two pieces required to get to the postseason.
Hope you don’t mind, but I edited your comment to make a little more sense:
Go ahead and judge the Author. Then explain why it doesn’t make sense to spend $10-15 MM/year on a free agent that takes a team from 74 wins to 80 wins (when that realistically puts them in the running for the playoffs). You’d think that maybe the Phillies would figure it out that like when the Cubs signed Lester in 2015 it may that just one or two pieces are required to get to the postseason.
Who is this hypothetical player the Phillies would sign for $10-15M/yr that would add 6 wins to their projection?? A guy like that would cost $30M/year for 7+ years, if he existed right now, which he doesn’t.
“What Are the Phillies Waiting For?”
BRYCE HARPER and MANNY MACHADO
The Phillies are signing both.
Why did the Phillies sign Carlos Santana instead of Yu Darvish? I guess their owner can’t get past his prejudices against Japanese players. Signing Darvish was the Phillies move. Santana represents $20 million per year flushed down the toilet.
I guess Craig Edwards and Travis Sawchik saw the Santana signing and said to themselves: Ïf the Phillies are this dumb then why don’t they continue down that path and sign Mike Moustakas and Lance Lynn?”
As for the Phillies empty payroll, Harper and Machado will change that in a big way and the Phillies have a lot of guys hitting arbitration. The Phillies may have to pay a little in payroll taxes in 2020 due to that stupid Santana signing.
That argument rather depends upon the Phillies signing both. And they’d still have a rotten rotation, so they’d still need to sign the moral equivalent of an Arrieta. (Or find one in the farm.)
Given the number of big market teams staying under the CBT limit this year (plus a couple of others, like, say, the Braves), I don’t see this as a viable strategy, unless you want to go all weird and do a Stanton on both of them.
I genuinely don’t see a good reason why the Phillies aren’t moving towards their 2009 salary level … which would hardly be exorbitant. And adding a couple of reasons (anywhere in the 25) to come to the park? 1.9 million is shameful. Add another 500,000 at $50 per, and you gain $25 million in revenues, plus a fan base that actually has a reason to get up in the morning.
Oh, and profits of $80 million in 2016, a year when they spent the unconscionably high amount of $90 million on payroll, plus a new cable deal?
Where can I buy a share of this? Forget baseball ethics, I want a part of this gold-mine!
Disagree with “they’d still have a rotten rotation.”
ZIPS/Steamer average
1. Nola, 4.6
2. Pivetta, 2.1
3. Velazquez, 2.0
4. Eickhoff, 1.6
5. Eshelman, 1.5
Compared to
Jake Arrieta 2.8 (Would be #2)
Alex Cobb, 2.1 (Would be #3)
Lance Lynn, 1.7 (Would be #4)
Never going to happen. No team is laying out $600 million in contracts to 2 players in one winter. Nevermind the obvious problems it would create in roster construction down the road.
Can you elaborate on the roster construction problems down the road? Having a superstar OF and a superstar SS/3B makes it difficult to construct a roster?
With additions like those mentioned, I could see this team pulling a ‘2015 Cubs’ and getting a 2nd Wildcard after a losing season with the help of Free Agents. And also, if they don’t make it this year, well, Arrieta could still lead the staff for 2019 and beyond when they would be ready for it. In a big market like Philly, there’s far less downside to making these sorts of deals. Try and win games………..
Arrieta projects for 2.2 WAR in 2019, which would have him competing for a spot somewhere in the middle of the Phillies rotation, barely a full WAR better than their 7th choice SP.
His name is big but his projection is not, tons of red flags. Names don’t win games, smart decisions and talent do.
Even with those conservative projections he’d be 2nd on the team only after Nola. More importantly, he and his 30 starts would lessen the burden on his younger parts and allow the bullpen not be overtaxed throughout the season. This worked with Lester for the Cubs, AJ Burnett with the Priates, Greinke for the Diamondbacks, Santana for the Twins to push them all into playoff contention. Arrieta’s Cy Young days are over but he can still provide a very valuable service to a young team, especially one that can more than off set the risk due to large market incomes.
Sorry to belabor the point, but he’d be third by a hair as Pivetta is projected to improve a tad more than 0.1 WAR over the next year by standard age curve. And Arrieta’s projection for 2019 isn’t conservative, it’s standard 50th percentile projection. In 2019 he’d only project a hair better than 5th as well though, so the number doesn’t matter as much as the point that he only projects to be a substantial improvement over Philly’s current 2nd, 3rd, and 4th best pitchers for this season.
Undoubtedly, a 2.2 WAR SP is very valuable at the right price, but the whole point is that Philly projects to have about 3 of them already- plus a near-5 WAR ace in Nola, by 2019. Arrieta as a legit near-3 WAR SP is very valuable this year, but only adds maybe a 1-2% increase to Philly’s playoff odds this season. If you look at Philly’s projected 2019 squad, there is no basis to conclude ‘man, they really need a $20m+ 32 year old declining 2 WAR pitcher.’ They’d have cost controlled SPs less than 0.6 WAR worse as 6th choice.
Lester, Greinke, Burnett, Santana & Arrieta are fairly different. Notably, none of those FAs were the difference for their clubs making the playoffs even once.
Lester, of course, worked out- but the 2015 Cubs team he was added to was projected to be a competitor with or without him- they won 97 games. They would have still made the playoffs easily (by 8 games) if Lester and his 5 WAR would have instead been a replacement player. His contract was 160m and he’s provided nearly 13 WAR already, so with 4 years left and a WAR projection today of 3.4, his deal is likely to provide substantial surplus value. Lester pushing the Cubs to contention is pure narrative- the Cubs first became a great club projected to compete, then started to add FA prizes. Lester helped the Cubs win a WS because he was added to a great team, and his best remaining years were applied to a team ready to win and win big.
Greinke is closer to the Arrieta situation- he joined a club that didn’t project to be great. It’s early to call that deal a success, however, as the Diamondbacks have not yet built a great club nor have they won anything but 1 WC. They currently project to go 82-80, and are paying Greinke 30m+ for seasons 34, 35, 36 & 37. Greinke also projected far better (4.3 WAR cp 2.7 WAR), while they both posted around 18 WAR in the 4 years prior to FA, Greinke was coming off of a 5.8 WAR season with no serious decline, Arrieta is coming off of a 2.4 WAR season with a 1.6mph drop in velocity, a big loss of control, a slider that is no longer elite, and FB rate at 34%, despite never having had success with a FB rate higher than 28%. Even so, Arrieta won’t make Grienke money, or sign for 6 years, so they are similar- it’s just less certain that the move will or has provided surplus value for Arizona. Grienke did not push Arizona into the playoffs- they secured a WC spot by 7 games, and had the top WC spot by 6 games, so replacing Greinke with a 0 WAR SP sees Arizona grab the same WC spot. WC banners don’t fly for ever, neither do 82-80 banners.
Santana and Burnett weren’t big price FA acquisitions- they were low price partial-reclamation projects. Santana had posted 9.9 WAR in the 6 seasons prior to FA, and had spent the 3 seasons prior to his FA on 3 different teams. The Twins did well at 4/55m, with 8 WAR already posted- but just like Lester, Santana did not push the Twins into the playoffs. Their 2nd WC spot was secured by 5 games, a replacement player rather than Santana would result in the same WC.
Similarly the Pirates paid only about 3/33 for Burnett, taking a chance on him after he posted 1.0 and 1.4 WAR seasons. He is closest to Arrieta in career trajectory, having been a star 3/4 years before his move, but having fallen off dramatically. The Pirates secured the #1 WC in his 2nd year, by 4 games over the #2 WC and by 8 games over the next closest team. He posted 3 WAR, so again, if Burnett had been instead a replacement player, the Pirates grab the same WC spot.
The idea that any of these pitchers were ‘the difference’ for their team reaching a playoff goal is simply narrative based on their names being commonly known: save only for Lester helping win the WS. Of the high price moves, only the Lester deal really made sense and hugely benefited the club. If Phily can get Arrieta at Burnett/Santana prices, then he could be surplus value for them- but that’s a ridiculous thought, as there is no way he is taking 3/50 or anything close. And even if he did join at that price, and Phily grabbed a WC in 2019- it’s unlikely Arrieta would be ‘the difference’ unless they won it by a single game, since he projects (2.2 WAR) to be a marginal upgrade on a staff that will likely have 4/5 2 WAR SPs.
I sort of see the point of surveying the pitchers in house for another season to see who takes a step forward. Though it seems like a risky move at this stage. I’d like to see them add Arrieta and/or Lynn for the reasons stated. It’s not slowing down the process as much as we trust it here in Philly.
To answer the question in the title: They’re waiting for the price to come down.
What would you rather have them do?
Arrieta’s a 3rd starter in decline who is asking for David Price money. Lance Lynn can’t strike anyone out anymore and we don’t know if he’ll get that back. Alex Cobb’s changeup never came back last year and we don’t know if we get it back. All three require giving up a draft pick (although it is a later round one). Any one of those guys might make sense as a flyer on a cheaper deal, but the Phillies are sitting, waiting for the price to come down.
Don’t mistake lack of news for inactivity. It doesn’t make sense to sign a depreciating, risky asset when you’re not ready to compete now. It only makes sense if you get them on a really, really good deal.
I was just writing up the same response; instead I’ll just ‘like’ yours!
Also, I’m sure part of it is that Philly wants to keep the future salary commitments very light so they have plenty of cash to make runs at Machado and Harper next offseason.
Lynn still got a decent amount of strikeouts, and he is very likely to get it back as the good majority of pitchers do in their second year back from Tommy John Surgery. If he does rebound somewhere close to his pre-surgery numbers as is likely, he’s a very good #2-#3 starter.
I don’t think you can compare 2014 Lester (or the 2015 Cubs) to 2018 Arrieta (and 2018 Phils) and make an argument that supports the Phillies signing Arrieta now.
Tanking isn’t something you do half-assed. Tanking IS the best way to build a team, like it or not. But by signing Santana they are not close at all to the worst team in baseball, and signaling that they are at least passively interested in competing this year (unless they think they can flip Santana at the deadline, which I have suggested as probable, as Hoskins does not fit in LF long term).
By NOT signing any major pieces beyond Santana, I think the best guess is that are creatively tanking, betting that they can move Santana for better prospects than the money they’ve paid for him. Something something calculated risk. For what it’s worth, lots of competitors will likely want to add a bat.
“Tanking IS the best way to build a team”
Then why have the Dodgers, Nationals & Yankees, among many others, done fine without any of these $10 million payroll hack jobs the Astros and Cubs did? Yes, you could argue payroll (which helps at the FA level), but payroll doesn’t draft your homegrown contributors…
The Nationals did tank for many years = Harper, Strasburg, plus others.
NYY and LAD did fine by spending as money as only the top two clubs in the countries’ top two markets can.
To be fair, you just picked the two richest teams in MLB and a team who picked #1 two years in a row to get Harper and Strasburg.
I agree that you can build a winner without Astros-level tanking. But you either have to trade your good major-league players to get minor league prospects, draft really high, or just spend way more than anyone else. It’s pretty hard to build a winner without at least one of those.
Agree that he/she used poor examples, but the Giants and Cardinals won four of the five* WS prior to the three straight tanks turned WS victories. Neither the Cards nor Giants tanked Astros/Cubs/Royals style, nor did they spend too crazy.
*I’m not sure what to do with the 2013 Red Sox, but they were a mix of everything.
True, but the Giants were bad for 4 years post Bonds, and they hit on 3 top 10 picks gain from that losing with Lincecum, Posey & Bumgarner.
The functional difference between 61-101 and 74-88 is, IMO, way overstated in the Craig/Travis/Rian et al series. The romanticized arguments about fan experience and a good time with the family at the ballpark are way overblown considering that the typical ‘Astros-style rebuild’ featured maybe 13 fewer wins than the typical ‘Giants-style rebuild. That’s 13 wins over 162 games- so roughly 10% more competitive, but still having negligible playoff chances. That difference between a 38 and 44% win rate is not hugely effecting enjoyment of the game.
The Cardinals were legitimately different. From 1988 through 1999, they averaged about 3 games under .500, never winning 89 games even once and only making 1 playoff appearance. That’s a pretty awful stretch, even with the ‘roiding McGwire breaking records. Then Pujols arrived – one of the greatest out of nowhere players in modern history, and a fairly like Dominican PED factory product (as the Caribbean academies are awash in PED programs). With two more years of McGwire, the Cardinals were immediately great, and then Luhnow joined with his wave of talent. So even St Louis was bad for a decade during their rebuild, and needed to push the limit on PED usage as well as landing a generational front office talent to return to competition. A lower nadir from 88-99 could have brought about a quicker or less cheating return to contention.
For as great as he was, Lincecum wasn’t a key player for either the 2012 or 2014 teams. Lincecum’s performance had slipped by the ’12 season and was all but washed in 2014. Posey and Bumgarner were/are great, but those were the only top 10 picks who one would consider a key performer for the last two titles. (I’m using fangraphs/memory here, so if BP/DRA says something different, I apologize).
It’s probably be better to expand this beyond only teams that have won the World Series. The Ranger teams, iirc, were more along the lines of the Cardinals and Giants, while the Rays probably fall more into the tank category than anything else.
So you agree that both the Cardinals and Giants went from mediocre to consistent winners without ever needing to tank. Sure, they had some lean years, but they were rarely terrible, and they did have several years with winning records and late season contention (including that 1996 playoff appearance by the Cardinals) along the way to keep the fan bases happy.
Also, McGwire contributed only a half season when the Cardinals made the playoffs in 2000 and struggled through an injury-plagued final year when they did the same in 2001. Meanwhile, as great as Pujols used to be, one homegrown superstar alone does not allow a team to win consistently (see: Joey Votto, Paul Goldschmidt, and Mike Trout).
A little off topic, but it’s also a bit interesting to note some of the players on that 55 win Astros ’13 team.
Jose Altuve struggled through a .638 OPS season; Marwin Gonzalez struggled through a .571 OPS season; JD Martinez struggled through a .650 OPS season; Dallas Keuchel struggled through a 5.15 ERA season, 5.18 for Brad Peacock. None of those guys could have gotten those chances for decent teams- tanking meant playing these future MVP and CY and all star players.
It wasn’t clear that these future stars were worth investing in- Peacock was likely the highest regarded of the bunch, with guys like Chris Carter, Matt Dominguez, Brett Wallace and Jordan Lyles being the guys most likely to get development chances if a club could only pick a handful of youth to try out.
The ‘Lester/Carlos Santana’ (i.e. a FA signing indicating the tank over) acquisition for Houston was Dexter Fowler, helping the club win 70 games in 2014. His presence ensured upcoming rookie George Springer would play RF rather than CF- which helped push JD Martinez out the door.
The Cardinals are actually the best example of a team that never had a “rebuild”…they got some stars out of nowhere and were good enough for long enough that they got lucky. The Cardinals spent a ton of money on Holliday and Rolen but otherwise had a somewhat reasonable payroll and their big stars sort of came out nowhere (Berkman, Carpenter, Pujols) in 2011. Pretty much every team would like to be those Cardinals today but since teams are much more even in player evaluation it’s a lot harder to be that team (something that I think the Cardinals have found out lately).
The Giants had some similar things, where they just randomly had monster years from Andres Torres and Aubrey Huff in the same year (Torres put up more WAR in that year than the rest of his career combined, and Huff was below replacement the year before and after 2010). But the real key was an amazing ability to hit with the draft in the years were they weren’t that good. They weren’t even near the very top of the draft, but Posey (#5) and Bumgarner (#10) and Lincecum (#10) were their first round draft choices those years and they hit big on them. There was a lot of luck and a lot of good talent evaluation but they did have some tough years in there where they stockpiled blue chip talent.
(I just saw ThomServo posted something similar below. Whoops)
The Cardinals are also notable for continually churning out quality Major League performers from late first round draft picks and later round picks. They haven’t had a Top 10 pick since (I believe) the 1996 draft, yet they always manage to get their fair share of quality drafted prospects. For example, Albert Pujols was a 13th round pick, as was Matt Carpenter, while Yadier Molina was a 4th rounder.
There’s no reason other teams couldn’t do the same with the right people in the scouting and front offices, so it’s really not necessary to tank in order to get somewhat more highly placed draft picks.
The Cardinals’ draft selection (high-floor, bat-on-ball types) and player development have been considered elite for the last two decades. (The Yankees and Indians may have surpassed them recently.) If every team could pull 3-win players repeatedly out of their farm systems, why would anyone need free agents?
Teams crater when their veterans jump the shark and their prospects don’t meet expectations or they’ve traded them to add veterans for a playoff chase. Thus, when you’re team is over the hill and your farm system is depleted, you tank to rebuild the farm. Tanking works because any remaining stars on bad teams are best used to acquire prospects who add wins when the team becomes good again and the higher draft picks, of course. It’s difficult for teams to collect 15+ 2+-win players simultaneously, so when you’re sure you can’t you want to push your resources into the future.
“Why did the Phillies add Carlos Santana now?” might have been a more interesting article.
The Phillies have tanked but with Santana I think the buy mode has started. Rumor says the owners actually want to spend more but klentak stepped on the break and asked him to wait one more year because the free agent class sucked.
I’m very sure the Phillies will spend big time next season and make a big bid for one of Harper/Machado plus an ace pitcher.
Keuchel would make a lot of sense in that park and with a slick-fielding up the middle defense (Crawford, Kingery, Hernandez)
What this author is advocating is the “eh, why not?” approach, and I just don’t agree.
I’ve wondered this aloud in the comments section of other articles: is the new wild card structure actually improving competition or hurting it? What I mean by this is, are teams really willing to pay to get themselves from, say, 79 wins to 84, when the payoff for that gamble is most likely a do or die road game where, if you win, you’ve mostly likely burned your best starting pitcher, putting yourself at a disadvantage for winning the next round?
I honestly don’t know. The new system clearly incentivized teams to win the division, and some have positioned themselves extraordinarily well to do so. For those on the outside looking in, it may be more prudent to hold their chips until the front runner falls. For the Phillies, they may see the Nationals window starting to close in the next year or two, and may be making a strategic decision to conserve resources for then. Perhaps not, but I do think there is merit to this argument.
The Phillies are quite clearly trying to not block their prospects who are potential MLB contributors this year from having a chance to prove they will be assets long term. They have a bevy of unproven starters who will be given long leashes this year – you mention some, but they also have Tom Eshelman, Ben Lively, Jake Thompson. Not only can any of these guys show they are capable of being long term core pieces, but they are CHEAP (i.e., won’t cost picks or big $$ that can be thrown around next year). I’m sure the front office’s response to questions like title above are “Why WOULDN’T we see what we have in-house first?” They are doing the same thing in the field with Altherr, Franco and Williams. All of the starting arms can be moved to the bullpen (likely several would thrive there, namely Velasquez and Pivetta), should they continue to struggle as starters in 2018. The prices on the remaining FAs would have to drop enough that the cost in $$ and picks are enough to force them to make the move.
This is a very good comment.
In addition, all of the starter options they are trying out this year are on the 40 man roster. Who is getting DFA’d if they sign one of the FAs?
Yup, and even the guys that they don’t want to keep long term, but who improve their value this year, can be used as trade assets.
For instance, the Cubs during their tank years took a middling MR with big control problems, gave him a chance to work through some struggles when a competing team would only give such chances to a better prospect or performer, and then eventually turned him into SP (Jeff Samardzija) whom they were able to trade as the anchor piece for SS Addison Russell.
The Cubs did roughly the same with Luis Valbuena. He was a post-hype prospect from Cleveland who no contending team was going to roster, and who wasn’t even among the best flier candidates on a terrible Cubs team. Thought of at the time as a bad bat that didn’t add anything defensively or on the bases- he started hitting for power, and established himself instead as an above average bat that didn’t really hurt a team defensively or on the bases. He was then flipped to Houston for Dexter Fowler.
As the poster above mentions, the Phillies will look to give the Nick Williams and Ben Lively types a chance. Williams himself is already a decent example of how this process can create trade value/squad assets, as Williams was given a chance last year and did enough to drum up some interest from other clubs despite hardly having established himself as ‘the answer’ for Philly going forward.
The author would pretty much have Philly go out and get their version of Nick Markakis – where even if the player meets moderate projections, the lost opportunity cost hurts. A club only has about 13 or 14 core spots to feed innings and plate appearances (i.e. 1-9, plus 5 SP), so each Markakis (low upside, paid, declining vet) reduces that slot number by about 7%.
So let’s say a Cubs/Astros rebuild frees up 14 core spots, and let’s say that the average ‘total tank’ club has low-cost access to dozens of Ben Lively and Nick Williams types as well as post hype minor league FAs, waiver wire claims, or AAAA types, etc. Assume also that grabbing 14 of these types has an expected 1-year value around 14 WAR, with a distribution that sees an average of 3 players post 2 WAR.
If those numbers were remotely accurate, each Markakis type would decrease that ‘cost-controlled, core player WAR’ value by 7%. If you assume that the development PA/IP for 5 spots produces about one 2 WAR player (a 20% success rate), then having Colon, Dickey, Markakis, Kemp and Aybar/Francoeur all in core spots would have cost the Braves a 2 WAR performance from a cost-controlled ‘scrap heap’ player. Could Reid Brignac have posted a 2 WAR season for Atlanta if given some of the PAs that went to washed up pair of Erick Aybar and Kelly Johnson? Pretty likely he could, and then he’d have been a 1-2 WAR cost controlled MI, coming off of a 2 WAR season, likely valued in the trade market in 8 figures. He could then be flipped regardless of 2B being kept free for a better prospect.
Clubs have more to gain by giving core spots to cost-controlled players with upside.
Are most of those guys legitimately ready to be thrown into the fire, though? While you don’t want to block your best prospects for too long, at the same time you also don’t want to rush them before they’re truly ready, which is another major issue with the tanking strategy.
I actually like what the owners have done. They have tried to run cheap while tanking but when competing they were also willing to lose money for 2-3 years. I think that is how it should be. No owner can afford losing money every year but there are owners who are reluctant to ever lose any money in any given year.
I like when an owner saves some money in a tank and then actually is willing to go into the red for a couple years to extend a window (basically reinvest the saved money).
What I really hate is owners who save money in a tank and then not reinvest it when they are good.
The Phillies owner doesn’t want to lose money long term but he is willing to spend big for some years too.
I think the criticism should focus less on tanking and more on owners not willing to spend to extend a Window when you are good and the team gets expensive in the third or 4th year.
I mean who cares if a tanking spends 20 or 80m? What is much worse is owners of contending or almost contending not willing to spend. I much rather have teams strip all the way down to almost zero payroll and then go over the limit for a couple years when it gets expensive then teams having a steady eddy lowish mediocre payroll.
Except this doesn’t happen, unless you are the Tigers.
Tanking alone is still a problem, particularly when it contributes to significantly devaluing the free agent market like with this off-season, but yes I definitely agree that this kind of behavior is even worse.
Why were teams like the Pirates and Royals (and currently the Indians) still reluctant to spend while their contention windows were open? Even if they weren’t willing to lose money, what happened to all that money they saved while they were rebuilding?
The Royals won the World Series and then gave Ian Kennedy $80M. The Indians went to the World Series and then gave Encarnacion $60M. The Pirates went to the playoffs three straight years winning 94+ games. Three small market teams succeeding on home-grown talent. What problem are you trying to solve?
One thing that I think needs to be considered is that the Phils aren’t approaching this exactly like the Astros are. All indications point to them making a play for a superstar in free agency next year. Free agents may be look more favorably on a team that won 80 games vs 74, and employs Arietta, vs one that does not
Smart players will rather join clubs without underwater declining players.
Is Pujols a big sell to FAs for LAA? Of course not, he’s a heavy negative as players don’t want his -2 WAR hurting the club, nor could they be thrilled about the payroll he is taking up.
Huge money, lost pick, lost int’l money for an old, declining, #3 SP isn’t going to bring in Machado or Harper. It is far more likely that having one of their young, cost controlled SPs develop from a 1 WAR to 2 WAR SP will provide much more help.
There’s a world of difference between Pujols and Arrieta at this point of their careers. Arrieta certainly isn’t going to get a huge mega-deal, and he’s very unlikely to completely collapse this very season.
i’ll join the chorus in saying, mostly, “..why?”
signing arrieta would add some wins. however, their rotation will still be poor, and still lack any depth whatsoever. honestly, IMO, even signing arrieta AND lynn wouldn’t make their rotation good. lynn wasn’t good last season, and it’s not like he’s young. they’d have to sign about every FA pitcher left to make their rotation good enough, and they want to leave tons of $$ to pursue machado next offseason. taking themselves from 70-74 wins to 75-79 won’t do much but lose them draft position/bonus pool money. i think they’re smart to wait this one out.
Agreed, though the rotation won’t be poor.
A rotation that has a 4 WAR SP (Nola), 3 other 2 WAR SPs (Velazquez, Eickhoff and Pivetta), and 3+ 1 WAR SPs is solid. For years the Philly narrative has been the strength of their young pitching, none of whom have flamed out and proven under average. Sure every staff could use another 4 or 5 WAR SP, but none are available.
As every commentator is saying, adding expensive 1 or 2 WAR SPs, or an extremely expensive 2.7 WAR SP, hurts. Is this author trolling or really just that far behind – no front office is incompetent enough to be making moves like the ones he is suggesting.
eh, i still think their rotation would be poor. there’s only one real “guy,” who isn’t even a horse yet, and the rest are average at best. will a single one of those guys go 200+ innings? Also not sold on Velasquez being a 2-WAR guy. but even if he is.
If you look closely at Arrietta, Cobb and Lynn (including their peripherals), you gotta conclude that their prime years are in the rear view mirror. Give any one of them a one-year contract to rebuild value but multiple years is a real risk — even if there were not young guys a year or two away.
Even if signing any of these guys for one year was an option no-one would do it because it would mean throwing away a draft pick (and draft budget money) for an asset you only get for one year.
The MLBPA has really screwed over free agents in the name of “competitive balance”, which, oh by the way, was higher before they implemented all these nonsense rules.
It’s still a lot better than it used to be. Teams are much more likely to sacrifice a 2nd or 3rd round pick than they are a 1st round pick. Don’t blame this on the current CBA when the previous one was even worse in that regard.
Also, a one year deal means they won’t lose the draft pick in the first place, since that would mean these guys would fail to land the necessary $50M contract.
Or you could conclude that Lynn had somewhat of a down year in his first year back from Tommy John Surgery as is natural, Cobb bounced back to close to his career numbers after two lost seasons, and a declining Arrieta is still a well above-average starter.
“Right now, the Phillies have Aaron Nola at the top of the rotation with some combination of Jerad Eickhoff, Mark Leiter, Nick Pivetta, and Vince Velasquez after the Phillies ace. ”
Eickhoff is pretty clearly the best of that lot, so he’d be #4. That leaves only one slot for Velasquez and Pivetta, both of which have flashed enough that the Phils are wise to want to see more before consigning them to the bullpen.
And while Sanchez and Medina are likely >2 years away, Kilome will be starting this season in AA, and other legit SP prospects at the top 2 levels are Eshelman, De Los Santos, Taveras, Suarez and Romero (and a veritable cavalcade of lesser types). There is an excellent chance that 2019 Jake Arrieta would be blocking someone.
Eickhoff, Velazquez and Pivetta all project better than Lynn- so Lynn would be #6.
People have been very up and down with snap judgments about Velazquez. In ’16, the common chatter was that the Astros messed up big to trade him. Then he had an injured ’17 and the common chatter is that he, as a 25 year old SP who projects for 2 WAR, should be converted to relief. Way too much recency bias with him IMO. Agreed with you take that the Phillies would be wise to give them rotation spots this year.
Pfft, if Lynn bounces back to near his pre-surgery numbers as is likely in his second year back from Tommy John, then he’s easily better than everyone other than Nola.
Oy, back to these terrible ‘team ____ should spend more in FA’ articles.
The article is poor because it doesn’t even attempt to make a compelling case for why the Phillies should make a given move.
If the author wants to encourage the Phillies to sign Arrieta, then lay out the numbers. Project what Arrieta will make, how he will perform, and how that performance will increase the Phillies odds of making the playoffs. Every savvy person here knows that adding Arrieta will cost $100m plus draft pick and int’l slot considerations, will be under water, and will only bump the Phillies up to about 76 projected wins – maybe 78 after schedules are factored in – which would increase the odds of playoffs by about 1-2%.
Lynn doesn’t warrant mentioning since he will not improve the Phillies even by 1 projected WAR.
The article skips over Phillies pitching depth without a serious look. Lynn would not upgrade the rotation by slotting ahead of anyone- and even Arrieta would be less than a full WAR better than the Phillies #4. Philadelphia has Eickhoff, Pivetta and Eshelman for the 3, 4, 5 spots, with Eflin and Lively as the 6 and 7th SPs, and prospects potentially debuting by fall.
Adding Lynn would add about 0.4 WAR to the team- at the cost of likely ~2/25+ as well as pick and int’l pool money considerations. Cobb adds likely a full 1.0 WAR, but probably ~3/40+ as well as pick and pool offsets. It makes worlds more sense to use the 1-2 WAR SPs they already have competing to make the back end of their rotation.
As other commentators have mentioned below- the most successful rebuilds have avoiding needless overspends on FAs. The authors capricious FA spent mantra would have had the Cubs fail to develop Hendriks in favor of Scott Kazmir, or the Astros fail to develop Kuechel, Peacock, McHugh, Morton, et al, in favor of Ian Kennedy or similar FA dross. It is far too predictable that all these poor ‘FA spend’ articles lack, as a rule, any serious cost-benefit analysis, performance analysis, or squad analysis.
In short, the answer to these endless ‘why doesn’t club ____ act like an incompetent club and overspend on a player they don’t need who provides poor value’ is that they don’t want to lose or get fired, etc. Poor article.
The point of the article seems to be “The Phillies should sign Arrietta/Lynn because their profits are excessive” and not “The Phillies should sign Arrietta/Lynn because it would help them win games and contend for the playoffs”.
The article reads like it was written by Boras.
The comment is poor because it doesn’t even address the points made in the article itself.
Let’s start by asking: what article did you read? The article I read argued/stated that the Phillies have a lot of revenue, and thus money to spend in free agency. While they’re not in the playoff race at the moment, because the NL is extremely top heavy, a few moves and some luck/better than expected performances could get them the second wild card.
You’re making a number of arguments that don’t address the article. I don’t necessarily disagree with some of them, but you’ve created a strawman.
Also, the Cubs are the proud employers of Jason Heyward and his contract, one of the ten worst contracts in the game right now. And they’ve had a very successful rebuild.
Poor comment.
The article was about suggesting that the Phillies signing Arrieta and Lynn as part of their rebuild. My comment assessed that advice and noted the lack of performance, cost, win curve, and other typical data-driven and relevant information that the article failed to provide.
We are all agreed the author focused on the Phillies revenue.
Can anyone think of a series so poorly written and so commonly objected to on fangraphs? I cannot.
FanGraphs seems to have turned a bit dogmatic Left since it was acquired. Since many of us are analytics types who eschew dogma, we aren’t comfortable with that kind of bias.
The answer to “should Team X do Y?” is always going to depend on what the data says…and in this case it appears to say that standing pat is the best move the Phils can make.
Plus, what’s so wrong with a team making a nice profit? Since Scott Boras and the MLBPA have been insisting for years and years that baseball is not a sport but a business, it seems perfectly logical that baseball teams should then act like competent business entities and do their best to turn a tidy profit. Except when they do, Boras shrieks and demands that aging players be signed to undeserved contracts, the MLBPA files grievances, and the press screams “collusion!” without a single shred of evidence.
Let’s get back to BASEBALL.
Confining oneself to “points made in the article itself” is exactly the problem.
Edwards points out that spending money would help the team immediately, which is true as far as it goes, but doesn’t go far. He either ignores or handwaves away long-term implications, opportunity costs, and/or any serious quantification. The most essential considerations to the question are largely absent from the article.
Worse response.
Fair.
Why not sign them ? Because they are no good. Laugh all you want. 2 years ago I said Jason Heyward’s numbers showed he was big time overrated. Guys laughed. Who is laughing now. Regarding Arrieta, he is almost 32, lost serious zip on his velocity, gave up way more home runs than previously last year, and is predicted to be headed for a roughly 4 ERA. He will only get worse…..starting now. Red flags all over the place. He is a bad contract waiting to sign. Lynn is also over 30, Steamer has him projected for a gosh awful ERA, he strikes out less and also gives up many more home runs. Seriously….why would the Phillies “build” on those pitchers. And to top it all off, they (especially Arrieta), want a huge long term contract. # not even close to worth it
The Phillies don’t need to sign anyone.
I can forgive a computer projection system like Steamer for being ignorant of the common performance curve experienced by a pitcher in the first and second years removed from Tommy John Surgery, but it’s astounding just how many human baseball fans even here on Fangraphs are just as ignorant.
It’s a near zero percent chance all their SP in house options work out. Look at the SP FA list next year, it isn’t awesome either. IF you sign Lynn or Cobb or Arrieta, it is for 2019 and 2020, not just 2018. Signing one good FA (if the team likes either) is not going to block anyone this year. There will be injuries, and failures, and plenty of innings.
So, instead of looking at just this year, look at the next two years. Signing one of these guys leaves plenty of money to add Harper or Machado, and whatever pitcher they want next year. But, if they don’t add anyone next year, won’t the argument be not to add next year, because “signing free agents to a 74 win team doesn’t make sense”? If they add 2-3 wins this year, and get lucky, they are nearly an 80 win team. Adding to that team, especially if Washington loses Harper and isn’t great, makes sense.
“It’s a near zero percent chance all their SP in house options work out. ”
When you start out by criticizing a ridiculous strawman that nobody has advanced, that’s not a good sign for your argument.
Feel free to ignore that line, if you want. In retrospect, pointing out the obvious was a mistake.
Neither Arrieta, Cobb, nor Lynn project to be above average in both 19 and 20 (Lynn doesn’t project so now, and Cobb is right on the edge- Arrieta projecting to approach that edge next year).
“Look at the SP FA list next year, it isn’t awesome either.”
Kershaw could very well be a free agent next offseason. Keuchel and Pomeranz will be free agents for sure. All three of those pitchers had significantly lower ERAs than any of Darvish, Arrieta, or Lynn did last season.
Manfred and Torre have made a mockery of the game. Profit first, win if you can mentality. Race to the bottom and pocket huge profits. No one is trying to win anymore. sad
I can’t blame them or the Astros of taking the best opportunity for longer -term success. Why muddle around with average (around $100 million now) salary and average results?
Maybe because it usually doesn’t work out as well as it did for the Astros. They’re the exception with just how well they did with all the extremely high draft picks they got. Most teams can hit almost as well on mid first round picks as they do Top 10 or even Top 5 draft picks. Meanwhile, they keep their fan bases decently happy with decent attendance and avoid awkward accusations of greedy owners who don’t reinvest their profits when they do get good again. They also don’t rush their prospects to the Big Leagues and risk stunting their development. Furthermore, it helps prevent stale free agent markets as we currently have.
You really like giving 31-year olds $125M+ contracts no matter how much evidence exists that that’s stupid.
The #1 draft pick is so much more valuable than the #15. Anecdotally, you rarely get Bryants, Correas, Springers, etc past the top 5.
Get educated, man!
So here’s another reason. Apologies if it’s already in the comments thread…
PHI is projected for 74 wins. That’s undeniably close to the 82 win WC2 projection. But for all the reasons given as to why they should pay to try and compete now, I’ll say WRONG. They should pay to try and compete in JULY.
Should PHI play out half the season and, be a few games on the happy side of projections, and in the running for a WC berth they can always trade for reinforcements. And easily. A farm system chock full of prospects, a payroll running far under capacity, and plenty of spots on the roster to be improved will mean they can pick and choose from the available assets out there. Not just rentals. PHI has the ability to take on a multi-year contract or three if an expected contender falls on their face and wants to jump start their own rebuild.
Oh. And it won’t cost them $100M+ to hope that Arrieta is still useful a few years from now, and it won’t cost them QO penalties.
And if the youngsters do fail to perform in the 1st half, or if the injury bug strikes, PHI can walk away having spent nothing.
Being 8 games off the WC2 projecting is not ‘undeniably close,’ it’s 1.3 SD away. Besides the Marlins, only the Padres (73), Braves (72) and Reds (72) project worse than the Phillies (74) in the NL.
Adding schedule adjustments to those projections will change those numbers, likely bumping Philly up ~2 wins- but also bumping the Mets up ~2 wins and pushing the WC2 projection to 83 or 84 wins.
82 wins is unlikely to be sufficient for the WC2 so team projected within a game or two with the Reds and Padres isn’t undeniably close.
Not actually the thrust of my point. Namely, that they’re better off playing half a season and seeing where they are. If they’re contenders they can add at the deadline
The Phillies went 23-19 in their last 42 games, corresponding closely to the arrival of Rhys Hoskins, and look like the team most likely to make a serious jump into contention similar to last year’s Twins. Even one of the remaining major league caliber starters could easily be enough to put them in the wild card picture.
No, Hoskins isn’t projected to repeat his performance. 42 games at the tail end of a season isn’t predictive.
Only one of the remaining SP FAs (Arrieta) projects to improve upon Philly’s internal options by a full WAR, and even he doesn’t add 2 full wins.
“What Are the Phillies Waiting For?”
The awesome free agent class of 2018. Duh.
The Phillies are being smart. Here’s hoping the Phillies stay smart and don’t waste money before the end of the season.
Why does it seem like so many articles here and on other baseball sites these days were written by Scott Boras?
It is pretty bad news that the Cardinals have one wild card locked up, because the Diamondbacks look pretty strong also, and the Rockies, Giants Brewers and Mets all made some big investments.
So sure, if you look at the mean outcome (the projection) for each of those teams, the Phillies could make some moves to have a chance to get above that number. But what they need to do is pass several teams. This means their luck plus talent gap must do better than the luckiest of the 3 teams at ~82 wins. This is a much taller order, especially since the Rockies and Brewers should not be ignored, either.
Just to keep the math simple, lets pretend there are just the 3 teams at 82 wins (I will give the Mets a free projected win to keep it simple). Let’s also pretend that they will each finish within 8 games of their projection (I made this number up), and that the win total is uniformly distributed from +8 to -8 (another invention for simplicity). On average, the best of these teams will win 86 games, and the variance will be smaller than it is for one team. Under these obviously wrong but not worthless assumptions, the Phillies need to get to about an 80 win projection to say they have a reasonable shot, and it is pretty clear that an 82 win projection would bump them up from a “reasonable shot” to a 25% chance. If this does not inspire you to spend an 8 figure sum, the Phillies and Brewers are also apparently underwhelmed.
I have to believe that what the Sixers have done in the NBA has had some sort of influence on the Phillies’ management rebuilding process. “Trust the Process” is Philadelphia’s slogan and not “What are the Phillies waiting for?”
Having read the article and the comments, I can very much see the argument that the Phillies should splurge on a free agent. However, what I don’t see is why that free agent should be a starting pitcher, especially given the options presented. Arrieta is the sort of pitcher that you hope returns to form and becomes that playoff ace that you want, while Lynn and Cobb are the sort of pitchers that get signed when the team has a major hole in the rotation and the established veteran is better than the nothing they have. None of this appears to apply to the Phillies.
All of this amazes me, frankly. Virtually every MLB team operates in a taxpayer-funded facility. They have revenue streams that dwarf those of even a few years ago. The Phillies in particular have plenty of money and minimal long term contract committments. So how can the FO justify not putting the best possible product on the field? They have a hole at 3B as well as in the rotation. This winter in particular they could have pursued real needs, instead of filling the non-existent 1B hole-they have Hoskins. “We’ll try to win-someday” isn’t very satisfying.