What Sets the Royals Apart?
The last week of October is here; the clocks are about to be turned back, autumn is in full swing, and there are two teams left standing in pursuit of the World Series title. This week, we’re taking a look at the defining characteristics that have delivered the New York Mets and Kansas City Royals to the brink of the game’s ultimate goals. Earlier this week, we discussed the Mets. Today, it’s the American League champion Royals.
In 2014, the Royals snuck up on a lot of people, including myself. This year, not so much. They have once again ridden their own unique formula — a combination of contact hitting, speed, defense and a deep, flame-throwing bullpen — to the Fall Classic. While the Mets were a second-half phenomenon, the Royals sat at the front of the AL Central pack all season. The only doubt was whether they would earn home-field advantage throughout the AL playoffs, which they did with a productive final weekend of the regular season.
The postseason has been a little dicier. The Astros appeared to have them pinned in the ALDS, only to watch the Royals escape with a late Game Four rally. The ALCS versus the Blue Jays wasn’t quite as eventful, though the Royals needed to survive a classic Game Six at home to finally put away the Blue Jays. They unleashed a bit more of their blue magic in Game One of the World Series, winning an instant classic that featured everything from leadoff inside-the-park homers to Bartolo Colon–Chris Young relief pitching duels, to you name it. What are some of the distinguishing characteristics that have the delivered the Royals to this moment?
Their Position Players Show Up for Work
About a year ago, in this space, and a couple months back at ESPN Insider, I examined the continuity and dependability of the Royals’ position player corps. In 2014, they became only the sixth AL playoff team in the divisional era to return eight or nine of their position player regulars from the previous season. Last season, 84.9% of the Royals’ total plate appearances were recorded by their nine regulars, fourth highest among that group of six clubs.
This year, I decided to go back and look at what happened to those six clubs the very next season. Was the health of their position player nucleus a one-year deal, or was it a true talent of those clubs?
| Club | Year 1 | % | Year 2 | % |
| Oakland | 1975 | 88.30% | 1976 | 85.90% |
| California | 1982 | 86.80% | 1983 | 65.00% |
| Texas | 1996 | 85.60% | 1997 | 70.30% |
| Kansas City | 2014 | 84.90% | 2015 | 83.50% |
| Boston | 2003 | 84.20% | 2004 | 73.90% |
| Boston | 2008 | 83.80% | 2009 | 71.60% |
Of those six playoff clubs with almost no turnover in Year One, only the 1976 A’s and 2015 Royals again were able to almost completely rely on their front-line position players in Year Two. The bulk of that A’s club was fresh off of three consecutive World Series titles from 1972 to -74, and these Royals have now conclusively proven that they too are more than a one-year wonder, no matter the final outcome of this year’s Series.
Now, the Royals position players weren’t completely healthy this season. Game One hero Alex Gordon missed a chunk of time, and both injury and ineffectiveness cost Omar Infante his job, necessitating the key deadline deal for Ben Zobrist. In contrast to their laissez-faire 2013-14 offseason approach with regard to position players, the club didn’t stand pat after last year’s World Series near miss. Exit Nori Aoki and Billy Butler, enter Alex Rios and Kendrys Morales. While Rios struggled, Morales turned out to be a clear upgrade.
To what can we attribute the durability and dependability of the club’s position players? In general, youth, athleticism, and the ability to hit same-handed pitching, which eliminates the need for platooning, and enables the clubs to stash a specialist or two on their bench at all times. Mike Moustakas looked helpless versus lefties at times in past seasons, but he made major forward strides this season.
Their athleticism is the key to their team defense, which has been the best in baseball by any measure over the past three seasons. Their overall team UZR has paced the majors all three seasons, at 87.6, 61.1 and 50.9. These ratings are largely attributable to superior range, but very quietly, the Royals have also become one of the more sure-handed clubs in the game, with a much better than average error total in 2015. Their up-the-middle defense is stellar, with Salvador Perez, Alcides Escobar and Lorenzo Cain among the upper crust in the game at their respective positions.
I’ve always been a firm believer that defense is just as much a team as an individual proposition. The presence of Escobar and Cain simply makes life easier for their neighbors in the Kansas City infield and outfield. Positioning can be adjusted accordingly, and pitchers can comfortably pitch to contact when appropriate. Game One had innumerable twists and turns, but ultimately, the biggest one just might have been the first, when Escobar circled the bases on a catchable ball hit to a non-center fielder playing center, while Juan Lagares, who might be Cain’s defensive equal, sat on the bench — for all intents and purposes so that Kelly Johnson could get a couple of at-bats.
Uncanny Ability to Make Contact
As clear an advantages as their durability and team defense might be, it can be argued that they aren’t the most in-your-face of the Royals’ traits. How about their ability to make contact? In this day and age, strikeout (K) rates have risen through the roof — well, at least for everyone but these guys. Below is a list of the 10 AL clubs since 2000 with the lowest K totals, as measured by number of standard deviations below league average:
| Team | # STD K | WINS |
| 2015 KC | -2.32 | 95 |
| 2002 ANA | -2.20 | 99 |
| 2001 KC | -2.08 | 65 |
| 2000 KC | -2.05 | 77 |
| 2005 OAK | -1.98 | 95 |
| 2014 KC | -1.92 | 89 |
| 2011 TEX | -1.82 | 96 |
| 2003 ANA | -1.82 | 77 |
| 2010 KC | -1.63 | 67 |
| 2005 LAA | -1.63 | 95 |
Yup, that’s this year’s Royals, the toughest AL club to strike out since 2000. And there are last year’s Royals, just a little farther down the list. In a sport where K totals are spiking, and homers are accounting for a historically high percentage of runs scored, the Royals are doing things a little bit differently. It’s interesting to see some other very accomplished clubs on this list; you’ve got the 2002 World Series champion Angels, as well as a pair of World Series runners-up in the 2014 Royals and 2011 Rangers. You don’t have to rack up piles of strikeouts while going for the fences to have a productive offense. In an article I wrote over at ESPN Insider a little while back, I argued that, relative to the league, this year’s Blue Jays were the best offensive club in the AL since 2000. They had much more power than this year’s Royals, but also had a below league average K rate.
Some of the teams listed above were bad baseball teams; making weak contact isn’t exactly a positive. As a group, however, the ten clubs listed above averaged 86 wins. When you put the ball in play, good things can happen. These Royals don’t pop up, and with the exceptions of Escobar and Infante, don’t make much weak contact, either. This game is about finding edges and exploiting them; everyone else is swinging and missing while going for the fences, while these guys are content to put the ball in play and let their natural athleticism take over. Oh, and there’s another aspect to it…
Using the Entire Field
Infield overshifts have dramatically affected the way the game has been played in recent seasons. Obviously, this has been a direct response to excessive pulling of the baseball, especially on the ground. Hitters like Albert Pujols and David Ortiz, who still absolutely crush the ball on the ground, have been reduced to well under .200 hitters on ground balls as a result. Not only do these Royals make a ton of contact, they by and large keep opponents honest by using the entire field.
Left-handed hitters in particular have been impacted by overshifting. Not Moustakas or Eric Hosmer, however. Hosmer hits the ball to the opposite field over one standard deviation more than the average AL regular. I first witnessed him crushing the ball to the opposite field as a high schooler. On the other hand, Moustakas had devolved into a dead pull hitter as recently as 2014. In a major change this season, he hit the ball the opposite way over one half standard deviation more than the average AL regular. Escobar goes oppo about as often as Hosmer, Cain about as often as Moustakas.
Overall, the Royals ranked 11th among AL clubs in pull percentage, fourth highest in hitting the ball up the middle, and sixth highest in going the other way. They may be free swingers, with well below average walk rates, but this club simply doesn’t give away many free outs by swinging and missing or giving away half of the field.
About that Bullpen
I have never been an advocate of expending massive sums of cash on the building of a bullpen. Sure, you can spend on a truly great reliever, but there just aren’t that many of them out there. Bullpen performers turn over at an alarming rate. Build up a stockpile of homegrown hard throwers and converted starters with an out pitch or a pronounced bat-missing, pop up or grounder tendency. Most of the time, relievers will compile their best seasons while still under team control, prior to their first free-agency eligibility.
The Royals have built their bullpen wonderfully. Homegrown guys? Greg Holland and Kelvin Herrera say hello. Converted starter acquired via trade who lacked the repertoire to start, but became an absolute monster when moved to the pen? Meet Wade Davis. Toss in injury reclamation project Ryan Madson, and the Royals were able to weather the storm when Holland went down late in the season. Game One relief hero Young started 18 games this season, but his extreme pop-up tendency also marked him as a perfect candidate for a well-rounded pen.
Bullpen performance as measured by traditional metrics fluctuates wildly from season to season. In 2014, the two AL pens with the lowest cumulative ERAs belonged to Seattle (2.59) and Oakland (2.91). This year, those two plunged to 12th and 15th (i.e. last) in the AL, respectively, at 4.15 and 4.63. The Royals pen ranked fifth in the AL in ERA in 2014 at 3.30, and then moved to the head of the class this season at 2.72.
Making this feat even more impressive is the fact that Royals’ relievers led the AL in innings pitched this season with 539.1. Let that sink in for a second; the team that went to its pen the most is the one team still standing. This is due both to the club’s pen depth and the relative weakness, especially for a contender, of its starting rotation. Bottom line, the Royals get both quantity and quality from their pen, without devoting extreme dollars or years of commitment to its members. They have struck the right risk/reward balance with this key component of their club.
In many ways, the typical major league baseball game has become much less watchable in recent years. More strikeouts, fewer walks, fewer sequential rallies, heavier reliance on the home run, endless lefty/righty pitching matchup substitutions… the Kansas City Royals have become a friendly oasis to the hardcore baseball fan. Oh, they can hit it out of the park when they need to, but the things they do extremely well are in short supply throughout the game, and have made them an October staple. Their work is not yet done, but this is not a team that will go away easily.
I’ve been saying for years that people reifying the useful analytical assumption of replacement level players have systematically underestimated the value of regular players who show up and play the game the whole season above replacement level.
That makes sense.
So a team that doesn’t have to give a bunch of at-bats to replacement-level players because their everyday starters don’t get hurt is going to be good? You don’t say…
Not what I said. If you simply add WAR together, a team is exactly the same having, say 2 WAR from a player for 3/4s of a season and 0 WAR from a scrub as 2 WAR for a whole season from a single player. And that if the team gets 0.5 WAR from the scrub, it’s actually better off. That’s the nonsense that treating replacement level as reality–instead of an analytically useful assumption–results in.
In that scenario, the first player is clearly the better player, as he put up the same WAR in three quarters of the time. So the notion is not nonsense. But you might still have a point, because ideally you want to distribute these theoretical wins in such a way to maximize actually wins, because you can only get one win per game no matter the score. So when the margins are that close, consistency is probably better.
Which is exactly my point–even while, on a true talent level, the injured player might be “better” because they contribute a higher WAR/game, the team ends up more actual wins having the slightly lesser, but healthy, player.
But you can’t really control how your WAR is distributed on an individual basis, nor can you predict injury. So you still always want the better players, because this maximizes your chances of winning on any given day.
Differential injury likelihood absolutely exists–and given the much greater private information that teams possess it’s perfectly reasonable to suspect that some teams (cough, Royals) might have done just that.
I generally like Tony’s work, but I’m trying to figure out if there is single new thing in this piece.
Maybe they’re not all new, but collectively they provide a great cohesive answer to the question everyone always asks: how does this Royals team win so much?
I don’t think this stuff answers that at all. I actually rolled my eyes when he elided some team skill highlights into the conclusion.
Enjoyed the read. It has been interesting seeing how different the ballclub functions (both the exciting parts and the frustrating ones) compared to the rest of baseball.
On the offense, something that interests me is how much better they have been in the playoffs. It is small sample size of course, so we cannot say why. But I think the reason the offense gets any attention at all is due to a few high profile games. For years, the Royals offense has been extremely frustrating, and even this year, they scored fewer runs than every other AL playoff team.
But then when you look at the pitching and defense, there is something really interesting going on, too. The Royals were third best in the AL in runs allowed, yet their pitching staff was only 9th best in WAR. That’s such a huge difference made by the defense (and/or limitations of team WAR) it is almost unbelievable.
The Astros and Blue Jays specifically both had higher pitcher WAR and their offenses scored more runs than the Royals during the regular season. Yet the Royals put up a remarkable run differential across the 11 games of the ALDS and ALCS.
I think what is missing from team WAR as opposed to individual WAR is the combined effect of multiple good defenders. I suspect that two excellent defenders playing next to each other are greater than the sum of their parts. This is probably true with hitters, too.
Agreed. Playing around with the regular season stats, I think comparing Volquez and McHugh is a good example. Those are two SP who pitched nearly identical innings (200.1 vs. 203.2) and allowed exactly the same number of runs (89). Yet Clearly McHugh had the better individual season.
The Royals team defense effectively turned a 2.6 WAR pitcher season into a 3.9 WAR pitcher season.
Okay, I found my favorite comparison. Ryan Madson was a RP for the Royals who gave up 17 runs in 63.1 innings. The Blue Jays had some journeyman on his third team in two years who allowed 20 runs in 74.1 innings. That’s .27 runs per inning for both pitchers.
The Royals effectively produced the David Price scoreboard results with Madson toeing the rubber.
I would think 2 great defenders next to each other would actually be less than the sum of their parts. There would be more balls that both could field, so their individual impact would be diminished, since only one person gets credit for a play made.
So, the individual ranking for each plus defender would be less playing with another plus defender than if playing next to an average or below average defender. So, the sum of 2 plus defenders is understating the overall defensive contribution.
Yeah, that was a bit confusing on my part. I would call their “true talent” what they would put up with an average defender next to them. If you have two “true” +10 defenders next to each other, you might only expect something like +15 total, since they take away a few plays from each other. I doubt the effect is that big, but that’s what I was trying to convey. Having an outfield of Marte, Kiermaier, and Heyward would likely not result in a +90 DRS, but wouldn’t that be great to see?
That argument makes sense, but it seems to rely on the idea that the area a player covers on a given play significantly overlaps another players area. While this is true on easier play, like a lazy pop-up, I’d argue that on more difficult plays (the ones the Royals distance themselves with) two player’s areas of influence do not overlap. Actually the fact that another player can make a successful play over a larger range should enable a player to spread out even further and cover more ground.
Yes. To model it, assume all 8 fielders are epsilon better than average. The hit prevention then improves by a factor (1+epsilon)^8 = 1 +8*epsilon +28*epsilon^2+O(epsilon^3)
The first term is described by individual WAR. The second term is not. Now, run prevention depends non linearly on hit prevention, hence the large factor.
KC has built their own brand of baseball. Never been prouder!
Not really. It’s the same brand of baseball they played 35 years ago, back when they were one of the best teams in baseball. It’s just easier (and cheaper) to do now, because those types of skills are undervalued in the marketplace. KC’s exploiting market inefficiency.
Nice article. I think people underestimate the Royals starting rotation, though.
It didn’t look great stat-wise, but we all know what Ventura has, how effective and perfect Volquez is for KC (especially given the defense and park that play into his strengths), how Duffy has established himself as a 3rd or 4th starter.
Sometimes it might’ve been the struggles of someone like Guthrie (though he’s avearged over 6IP/GS in his time with the Royals) that forced more bullpen innings.
All the pundits have done is talked about the injured Holland, plus Herrera, Davis, and Madson. That’s all the talk regarding the Royals bullpen. Yet they forget to mention Hochevar, Medlen, Morales, Frasor, Finnegan, Pino and Blanton, all had 10+ IP in relief for the Royals in 2015. In fact, all these are the ONLY pitchers to throw at least 10 IP in relief for the Royals all season.)
Hochevar – 50 Relief IP with Royals, 21 ER (3.73 ERA, coming off Tommy John after being one of the best relief pitchers in baseball in 2013)
Medlen – 14.1 Relief IP with Royals, 4 ER (2.51 ERA — All 4 ER came in his Royals debut, which is also the first time he pitched in the majors in 2 years)
Pino – 14 Relief IP for Royals, 1ER (0.64 era, not to mention a 13/2 KBB rate — this is a guy who had a 5 ERA over 60IP for the twins last year)
Morales – 62.1 Relief IP for Royals, 22ER (3.18 ERA — this is a guy who has had a 4.85 ERA in his last 384 major league innings, dating all the way back to 2008, prior to 2015)
Frasor: 23.1 Relief IP with Royals, 4ER (1.54 ERA)
Finnegan: 24.1 Relief IP with Royals, 8ER (2.96 ERA)
Blanton: 23 Relief IP with Royals, 7ER (2.74 ERA)
ALL of these three went to new teams before the deadline. All began the season with the Royals. They had a 2.73 ERA combined. Three pitchers who would be the heart of another teams good bullpen were afterthoughts.
All this to say, it could be Cy Young himself starting the game, but if he allows a baserunner in the 6th in a somewhat close game, regardless if there’s 0 or 2 outs, he’s getting yanked for the bullpen, and not always the top guys. Which is exactly why they avg’d 5.6IP/start). There’s 9 innings in a baseball game. The starters go 5.6. That leaves 3.4 out of relief. 162 games * 3.4 = 550.8ip, which is pretty much exactly at that mark of 539 you mentioned.
The depth is the most ridiculous part about this team. Not to mention the three pitches with a 2.X ERA they traded, but the players they can still call up that will likely contribute similar numbers.
John Lamb, a former top prospect, came back from injuries to post a 2.67 ERA.
They traded their former All Star reliever Crow for Brian Flynn, who was a AAA all-star in 2014 who tore his lat and missed all of 2015 — should be ready to go by Spring Training)
Scott Alexander, the closer for their AAA team had a 2.56 ERA over 63.1 IP.
Brian Broderick, someone who was playing independent ball last season, came in and posted a 2.90 ERA over 62IP (albeit allowing 60 hits).
Even Troy Patton, a former top prospect for the Astros who was relatively effective as a reliever with the Orioles (3.25 ERA over 169 career innings), was acquired in July, pitched to a 2.37 ERA over 30IP for the same AAA team.
Michael Mariot, one of the most hyped players on the team, had a 2.32 ERA in 62IP while striking out 72.
Louis Coleman, a player who’s already pitched nearly 200 relief IP for the Royals at the major league level (and has posted a 3.20 ERA, 9.4 K/9 in those innings) had a 2.69 ERA over 64IP with 63Ks.
Between the MLB and AAA combined, that is 17 pitchers who posted EXCELLENT numbers THIS YEAR available to pitch for the MLB bullpen at any time, not to mention people like Chris Young, who apart from pitching as a useful starter, also tossed 24.1 innings in relief this year, allowing 7ER (2.59 ERA), so I guess that makes 18. You will be hard pressed to find a team throughout all of history with this much depth.
John Lamb was traded to the Reds in the Johnny Cueto deal.
Might be worth noting Jeremy Guthrie’s 150 IP of atrocious performance (was at the time he lost his job the lowest qualifying P in MLB for WAR) really weighs down their starting rotation ERA. He had no chance in hell of pitching in October so once you strip him out, the rotation isn’t quite so awful. Are Ventura-Cueto-Volquez-Young really that much worse than Price-Estrada-Stroman-Dickey? A bit, perhaps. But adding Guthrie at the end sure makes it worse.
What sets them apart? Heart. http://twtwsports.blogspot.com/2015/10/kansas-city-special-twtws-2015-world.html
About 1 hour ago I was telling someone that this KC team reminded me of that very 2002 Angels team (Second Toughest AL Clubs to Strike Out Since 2000).
They didn’t seem that good, but the hitters were smoking hot in the playoffs, Darin Erstad led a pretty good defense, and Scot Shields/Frankie Rodriguez (both rookies!) lead a shutdown bullpen. (that’s an impression, I ain’t doing research here).
I have to agree with Kevin not necessarily that the Royals’ starters are so great but that their pitching depth is a central part, or maybe THE central part, of their postseason success. I don’t mean depth like have 2 or 3 great starters and a great closer, like the Dodgers or Mets, but being able to put 9 or 10 solid pitchers on the mound. The postseason in different from the regular season in that managers use their pitching staffs like there’s no tomorrow, starters get pulled faster, relievers warm up and come it for 1-2 batters more often, and even if you have a great starter and a great closer, if you don’t have a deep staff you’re going to get knocked along so badly in-between that you’ll lose the gave right there, or you’ll leave the starter in too long even when he’s losing it because you don’t trust the middle relievers, as for example in Game 1 St. Louis-LA 2014 or Game 2 KC-Toronto 2015. This has been the Giants’ secret weapon in all three World Series wins–they always simply had more solid pitchers than the other team, they could pull their starters at the slightest sign of trouble with confidence that the relievers could do the job, and they won a number of games this way (2010 game 6 vs. Philly, 2012 games 3 and 4 vs. Cincinnati, 2014 game 4 vs. St. Louis and games 4 and 7 vs. Kansas City). And they were 4-0 in extra inning games.
Hey I’m from Wichita born & raise been living in Texas for 32yrs now, and became a Texas ranger fan that was a big mistake so just today the rangers are no longer my favorite team I love the kc royals so I got to dance with the one who bring me. I wish the royals good luck win the wc.
Where’s Serb?
Looks like we have a trend here. The last two champions (assuming this ends the way I think it will end) had below average starters and terrific pens, great defenses, and contact happy lineups. Glad to see that
i) My Giants can bunt and field as well or better as these two teams, at least in the postseason
ii) deGrom and Harvey may have trouble missing bats but Bumgarner owned this team a short 12 months ago
And 12 months after owning the Royals, Madbum is getting drunk in some dive bar in San Francisco watching the Mets vaunted pitching staff fail to do what he did last year.
He would not own this version 2.0 of the Royals, they have hit the best pitchers they have faced this year, madbum is a great pitcher but this is the big leagues and players capable of figuring out any pitcher.
And truly if not for that one player on a hot streak the Giants would have lost last year, that’s no secret..
It’s the same team as last year and Bumgarner is the same pitcher. Maybe he wouldn’t have dominated them again, but there’s no reason to think he couldn’t.
As for the other part, the 2014 Giants aren’t the only team who won a championship in large part because of “one player on a hot streak.” The 2013 Red Sox won the World Series because the Cardinals couldn’t get David Ortiz out. The 2012 Giants won because the Tigers couldn’t get Pablo Sandoval out. The 2007 Red Sox won because nobody could hit Josh Beckett in October. It happens, get over it.
In terms of the Royals good health, while it’s hard to quantify, I think the team has done a good job of employing a top-notch training staff in the last 3-4 years. I know it was a criticism of the team during their abysmal stretches in the mid- to late-2000s, but Nick Kenney and his crew have done a pretty nice job of keeping players on the field. They won the award for top training staff in 2013. (For what that’s worth.) Maybe that’s another market inefficiency to be explored. In terms of maximizing player performance, it likely costs a lot less to employ an elite training staff than other more noticeable strategies.