What’s Up With Nolan Arenado’s Defense?
Heading into 2021, the question that loomed over Nolan Arenado concerned his bat. Could he remain productive outside of Coors Field? Roughly 40% into the season, the answer seems to be yes. Although his on-base and slugging percentage are down, handy wRC+ tells us that Arenado’s offensive output relative to the environment he’s in has remained consistent. On this front, he has been the star the Cardinals had hoped for.
On the other hand, I’m willing to bet good money that nobody was worried about Arenado’s glove. Altitude doesn’t affect one’s footwork or agility. We expected him to continue his life as one of the league’s best third basemen. And all things considered, he still is one of the league’s best third basemen. What follows isn’t the sound of panic, but rather a fact to keep in mind. Consider Arenado’s defensive numbers this season:
| Year | Innings | DRS | UZR | OAA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 1377.1 | 13 | 3.3 | 14 |
| 2017 | 1343.1 | 17 | 6.7 | 9 |
| 2018 | 1328.1 | 12 | 5.8 | 11 |
| 2019 | 1319.2 | 24 | 10.3 | 21 |
| 2020 | 417.1 | 11 | 8.5 | 7 |
| 2021 | 600.0 | 3 | 1.0 | 0 |
They’re… okay. Huh. That being average elicits this sort of reaction is a paean to Areando’s talent. When the three big defensive metrics all agree that his defense has taken a step back, though, you have to wonder – what’s going on? He’s no pumpkin at the hot corner, but he’s also not the superstar we’ve become accustomed to. Prorate his 2021 DRS to his 2019 workload in terms of innings fielded, and you’d wind up with 7 DRS after rounding up. That would represent the lowest mark of his career. Defensive metrics are imperfect and noisy, sure, but confronted with these changes, there’s probably some signal worth analyzing.
For this article, I’ll be focusing on Baseball Savant’s Outs Above Average. Our in-house metric is UZR, but it unfortunately doesn’t account for infield shifts, which will become relevant later on.
So, what does OAA say about Arenado’s glove-work this season? His total can be broken down in terms of the direction he traversed during a play – in, lateral towards third base, lateral towards first base, or back – which might give us a better sense of where he is falling behind compared to previous seasons:
| Year | In | Towards 3B | Towards 1B | Back |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 0 |
| 2017 | 4 | -3 | 7 | 1 |
| 2018 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 2 |
| 2019 | 3 | 4 | 13 | 1 |
| 2020 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 1 |
| 2021 | 0 | -4 | 3 | 1 |
A good chunk of these numbers aren’t out of line with Arenado’s career tendencies. He mainly earns his keep through diving stops followed by strong, accurate throws to first; as if to reassure us, he’s already amassed +3 OAA on plays to his left. Plays where he moves in or back constitute a small portion of his value. It appears as if Arenado has been merely mortal this season, worse overall but not lagging in any particular direction.
What does stand out, however, is the -4 OAA he’s accrued on plays towards third base. That’s on par with his 2017 season, but the major caveat here is the number of attempts: 117 back then, as opposed to 43 this season. This is one area where Arenado has been undeniably worse. But there’s another area that’s even clearer. Baseball Savant allows us to look at a fielder’s OAA by batter handedness. Here’s Arenado’s OAA per season since 2016, split between left- and right-handed batters:
| Year | RHB | LHB |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 16 | -1 |
| 2017 | 9 | 0 |
| 2018 | 12 | 0 |
| 2019 | 15 | 6 |
| 2020 | 6 | 0 |
| 2021 | 4 | -4 |
As a third baseman, Arenado records most of his outs off batted balls from righties. But we can’t just ignore lefties, because he’s at a whopping -4 OAA against them when his full-season low is three higher. It’s not that lefties themselves are a hassle, though. It’s that facing a lefty forces him to position himself in a way he’s perhaps not comfortable with. What do teams love to do when a lefty is at the plate? They apply the shift, of course. Dissecting Arenado’s fielding versus lefties, -3 of his -4 OAA are from plays he made in shortstop territory, where third basemen are often placed to cover the hole a shift produces.
Getting even more specific, all -3 OAA are from plays when Arenado assumed the role of shortstop “straight up” – that is, he was closer to second base than he was to third, in the sense of a traditional shortstop:

What’s intriguing, though, is that Arenado isn’t spending more time at short. The Cardinals this season have shifted almost as often (418 times) as the Rockies have (406 times) against lefties, representing two of the lowest rates in the league. Plus, both teams were conservative even before the infamous trade. And when Arenado handled shortstop straight up last season, he at least broke even with a 0 OAA and a 52% success rate on plays with an estimated success rate of 51%. The burden on his shoulders is the same as before, yet 2021 is the odd year out.
I suppose it’s time to look at a couple plays Arenado has made as a traditional shortstop. His shakiness in that role has ranged from understandable to “Nolan, is that really you?” To start, here’s an example of the latter:
A slow roller with not much distance to cover, not to mention Josh Bell as the runner – yeah, that cost Arenado a lot in the eyes of Outs Above Average. There’s not much I can add onto this. Once in a while, even the best fall victim to lapses. Funnily enough, that isn’t the first time Arenado committed an error against a Josh Bell grounder this season:
Also not a good look! Shown these two clips, someone oblivious to the existence of Nolan Arenado would assume he’s a terrible fielder. I don’t have access to data on individual plays, but after fumbling around with the sliders on Baseball Savant, it seems like they both had an estimated success rate of at least 90%. With the way OAA is calculated, that means the two boners alone cost Arenado -1.80 or more on his seasonal total. It’s surprising, but at least provides us an explanation.
That doesn’t mean silly gaffs are solely to blame for Arenado’s deflated numbers, however. Outs Above Average penalizes fielders less for failing to convert difficult plays by design, but over time, they do add up. Fully embracing the ridiculousness, here’s yet another play featuring Josh Bell. I’m not totally ruling out Nationals’ devil magic as a contributing factor:
Even though Arenado is situated at shortstop, the heroic dive towards his left is reminiscent of one he’d make near third. It’s the sort of impressive play he’s executed before. But while the speed and alertness is present, Arenado’s throw sinks before it can reach the glove of Paul Goldschmidt. There’s little reason to blame him; a lesser third baseman might not have snared the ball in the first place. In analyzing his defense, though, there’s a inclination to wonder whether this is indicative of a larger issue. Is Arenado having trouble throwing to first? Maybe, but there are examples of smooth throws that just weren’t in time:
Is there anything else we can take away from the four GIFs? Honestly, not much. There are a bunch of other videos I viewed in preparation for this article, but none of them hinted at a fundamental issue within Arenado’s glove-work. Unlike Fernando Tatis Jr., whose errant throws accounted for much of his poor defensive ratings in 2019, we can only shrug at this situation. Arenado has made some glaring mistakes, and he’s also been less efficient at converting batted balls into outs.
He’s a bit worse in each category, which does or doesn’t bode well for his future depending on one’s perspective. That there’s no crucial flaw could be a sign that Arenado is fine. But based on his downturn, there’s also a worthy argument that this is an inflection point. According to research from the Sports Info Solutions blog, defensive performance “takes an even sharper decline following their age 30 season,” and well, Arenado is right on the cusp of that moment. It’s the question of Schrödinger’s Baseball Player all over again – in this case, when does a (relatively) struggling fielder cease to exist as a superposition of states?
One final note. There’s seemingly a dearth of jaw-dropping Arenado gems this season. He’s had a few opportunities. But as in this GIF, they haven’t translated into outs:
Considering (a) how much distance he needed to cover and (b) Yelich’s elite sprint speed, Arenado would have been awarded tons of credit had he succeeded. But alas, he was a few paces too late. Maybe a previous version of Arenado pulls this off. Maybe his inability so far to execute the toughest of plays is representative of a lesser defensive ceiling. Or maybe, it’s nothing at all, since his success rate so far is calculated from a small sample.
The bottom line is that, unfortunately, Nolan Arenado’s uncharacteristic defensive ratings are largely an enigma. Metrics like DRS, UZR, and OAA are still imperfect, and there’s a lot we don’t know with respect to his condition and overall health. He’s at least been healthy enough for it to not appear in headlines, but who knows, he might have stubbed his toe in the morning of that game against the Nationals.
In sum, I’m not too worried about Arenado. Select 10 plays from his career at random, and there’s a much greater chance you’ll end up with a bunch of successful, even phenomenal ones. It’s not like he’s gone from having a positive defensive number to an overwhelmingly negative one, à la Bryce Harper in 2018. His work in shortstop territory has been sloppy at times, but Arenado has always been competent, not great, there. Only time can tell whether this is a turning point or a blip.
Justin is an undergraduate student at Washington University in St. Louis studying statistics and writing.
Very interesting stuff. I like the premise of it all. You show that he clearly still has the fielding ability since he his getting to these balls, but for some reason, the outcomes have been different. Call me crazy but it’s possible his previous left shoulder injury has thrown off his feel/proprioception in his hands during his transfer while gliding towards 3b
Since the first season with DRS in 2003, Rockies 2B are +120 (3rd), SS are +163 (2nd) and 3B are +96 (4th). By contrast their OF have come in dead last by a mile at -373, with the White Sox second worst at -168.
Obviously player skill is a contributing factor, but intuitively it makes sense that Rockies IF metrics will be somewhat inflated just by all the additional opportunities while their OF metrics will be overstated by the pure amount of ground there is to cover.
There is plenty of evidence that there should be park factors for fielding as well. Another thing to consider is that the Rockies have always had ground ball pitchers – since 2003 they rank 2nd in GB/FB and there’s a pretty sizeable gap between them and 3rd. (of course #1 is St Louis. . . .)
I have long thought this, specifically for the Rockies. It is entirely possible that they have never had outfielders who can play defense but every single outfielder there has had terrible UZR metrics.
Well, this is the same team that figured Ian Desmond was their solution in CF so “they dont know what a good OF looks like” is a pretty sound theory.
On a more serious not though, briefly looking at guys who have played in COL and elsewhere they dont seem to really be any different outside of Coors. It does appear that they historically just haven’t really have great OF’s.
Dexter Fowler was a dreadful OF with the Rockies but became nearly elite for a season or two after he left them. Coors does hurt OFs. Remember Ian Desmond was a gold glove quality SS in Washington. He has elite speed. It was a fair bet he would be solid in CF. I think Coors made his adjustment far more difficult. It’s a rough place to play OF.
Very good points, thanks.
Do you have access to his home/road defensive splits (career)?
The outfield thing makes plenty of sense I totally see why OF DRS is hurt by Coors but I don’t understand why IFers would be helped
Balls hit are going faster and are far more common. Common raises your defensive scores simply through accumulation. Faster means you turn double plays easier. It also means high BABIP, but that is counted against the pitcher, and more difficult defensive plays which when missed hurt a defender less.
Nolan Arenado: Not a shortstop! You could leave it at that and be fine. But there’s more here.
But take a look sometimes at the 3B-1B side numbers for shortstops. Virtually all of them are better going to first than toward third. Since 2016, here are the going to left vs going to right splits in OAA since 2016:
Nick Ahmed: Right 7, Left 49
Andrelton Simmons: Right -4, Left 42
Francisco Lindor: Right 11, Left 34
(As a side note, I first noticed this because Marcus Semien is comically, impossibly bad going to his right as a shortstop. This was true before Chapman showed up, as well as after, but it seems pretty likely that they just decided Matt Chapman would get all of those, letting him compensate for all of Semien’s deficiencies, and have him focused on going left).
In general, it is really hard to find shortstops who are as good going to their right as to their left. Addison Russell was good going to both sides. Adeiny Hechevarria is about average going both ways. I think that’s about it.
This is also true for third basemen as well. Arenado’s splits up there show a pretty clear trend. Matt Chapman, Jose Ramirez, Kyle Seager, Evan Longoria…they’re all better going to the left than the right. The only exception here is Anthony Rendon, who is weirdly bad going to his left given his overall defensive abilities and Nick Castellanos, who is no longer a third baseman.
You would think that this would mean that Arenado is having trouble going to his right as a shortstop, but no, that’s not what is going on. He’s having trouble going in! Arenado’s not really a shortstop, so there’s no reason to think he’s figured out how to play going in from the shortstop position. But he’s either fine going to his right or hasn’t had any opportunities to do it from the shortstop position. He appears to be having trouble judging it going in, and you can see that on the clips up above.
He actually was a shortstop in high school (because Matt Chapman was next door at third).
That is definitely one of the more ridiculous facts I have heard lately. That’s a public school. It’s not like Giolito and Fried being in the same rotation one of the most elite private schools in the country, or the IMG superteams.
How are you going to say that and forget about their 2, Flaherty. Iirc fried was their 4. Some other guy was better at the time.
I thought Flaherty was a few years behind Giolito and Fried? For some reason I thought those two were the top and Flaherty became the ace after they graduated but was behind those two.
How about Eddie Murray and Ozzie Smith on the same high school team?
Also you have Ryan Zimmerman, David Wright, BJ Upton and Mark Reynolds on the same traveling team as kids with Justin Upton as their bat boy. Michael CUddyer was just a year or two ahead of them on the same team
Until the 3rd Nats clip I was entertaining the notion that it was something related to the way Flaherty pitches.
Yesterday, on the Cardinals subreddit, I made a comment pointing out this exact thing, noting that all three main defensive ratings were down on Arenado, especially OAA. Are you following me around, Justin? 😉
Just kidding. I also pointed out that on the offensive side, Arenado has been struggling, too. The basic numbers are there, but a deeper dive shows a weak profile. This season, he has an xwOBA of .310, an xBA of .255, and an xSLG of .423. He isn’t getting as much value as he used to when he makes contact; his .336 xwOBACON is 35 points lower than his career average.
I know this article is focused on his defense, but this is the second straight year of somewhat alarming Statcast data for Arenado. There’s still a lot of season to go, but if Arenado doesn’t improve his underlying numbers on either side of the ball, it will become worrisome for a Cardinals team that is on the hook for nearly $200 million.
The Cardinals subreddit scares me… someone posted my article about Matt Carpenter there and it got torn into pieces.
Ha. Don’t read the comments! Except here, of course. We’re at least funny when we’re bad.
Don’t go there. It’s not worth it, most of the time.
It’s pretty rough, isn’t it? Upon first glance, it looks liek Arenado is hitting a lot of weak fly balls (AVG EV of 90.2 MPH — 100th/113 hitters with a min. of 250 PA). It kind of goes against the thinking– he has a high FB rate and a low GB rate, which should be good things, but not when you’re hitting them so weak. The obvious thing would be that, well, it’s not Colorado, so those weaker FB aren’t going to carry as much. Combine that with a deader ball, and it’s not going to be pretty. It’s probably not as simple as that, but it does seem to be a big factor.
There was an article at Baseball Savant a few weeks ago pointing out that Arenado relies heavily on pulled fly balls to be productive. Check out his spray chart – he has a couple HR to left center but all the rest of his HR are more or less down the LF line. And it’s not just HR: he has a few doubles right down the RF line, 1 triple to straightaway RF and literally zero XBH from RF to left-center meaning 1 XBH between the RF line and left-center. It’s not just this year either. His numbers for prior years are pretty similar.
HE has to lean heavily pull because he has never hit the ball hard. His EV has always been average at best and certainly nowhere near as high as the other top HR hitters. To continue to be productive he’s going to need to continue to not strike out and squeeze 20-25 balls just inside the foul pole every year and that’s a tight rope to walk.
Yea I’d be a bit worried if I’m the Cardinals. You’re talking about a low-OBP profile and defense that wasn’t flint to stay elite forever.
I’m not worried about Arenado suddenly falling off a cliff and becoming an albatross, but I’m not seeing the profile of a superstar going forward
He has not been good in June. Hard hit % has gone from about 32% to about 20%. That’s in Billy Hamilton / Jarrod Dyson territory.
One potential contributing factor, and I say this as a Cardinals fan, is that based on roster decisions, trade decisions, and even player development; the Cardinals analytics department/front office does not seem to be up to snuff with the rest of baseball and is arguably in the bottom half of the league. I point this out because in all likelihood the majority of Nolan’s defensive issues can likely be attributed to being positioned a step and a half to two steps too close to 2nd base on shifts.
Edit: I can back it up too. Look up 3rd base fielder positioning for 2021 Cardinals with left handed batters with the shift on an no base runners vs 2020 and 2019 Rockies with the same filters
It seems like they’ve missed on a lot of their big signings too. The legacy extensions to Carpenter, Molina (fine, extend your “legends”, but they always did them before they had to). The Fowler FA signing. The pre-emptive extension to Goldschmidt is likely to age badly (if it hasn’t already), the extension for Martinez. The FA signing of Mikolas worked well, but then they extended him for too many years/dollars. Traded some players they probably shouldn’t have (Arozarena, Voit, Gallen — I always forget he was originally a Cards prospect).
They still seem to develop talent well, which is important, but when it comes to their “blockbuster” moves with big dollars involved, they don’t seem to get it right.
I can think of one BIG exception to this. Their decision not to resign Pujols at the price he wanted and let him leave for the Angels turned out to be one of the best bang for your buck moves in recent memory. I imagine that for a team that cares as much about its legacy and history as the Cards do, that must have been a tough pill to swallow, but time has showed them to have been exactly right.
Good point. That showed great restraint. I do think if the Angels hadn’t made such a high offer to outbid them massively, they would have re-signed him.
To be fair, they really wanted him. They offered a deal that would have been enough had the Angels not went way over the top. There was a bit of luck there.
I spoke to insiders in the Cards organization before Pujols left and according to them the Cardinals were absolutely not willing to go all-in on Pujols. I can’t say for certain whether my intel was trustworthy, but the team’s final offer was reportedly exceeded not only by the Angels but by the Marlins (!). Add in that the Cards were almost certainly aware of Pujols’ true age, and their general reticence not to hand out contracts in the hundreds of millions, and I don’t think it was mere luck that they let him walk.
Stop it with this true age nonsense! There has *never* been any credible evidence that Pujols is anything other than the 41 years of age he currently claims to be!
Then again, had the Angels not jumped in and Pujols taken the Cardinals’ lesser deal, then it wouldn’t have hurt them as badly on the back half of the deal as it did the Angels, especially since the Cardinalds weren’t stupid enough to backload their offer.
I have always felt they, the Cards, knew something about Pujols that we the public do not know. Maybe it was the age rumor, the steroid use rumor, both or something else. But my gut always felt they would have signed him long term unless their was something they knew that no one else knew. But my gut can be wrong.
The Molina extension was fine (and giving extensions 1 year before free agency is NOT too early), the Voit trade worked out fine (not that Voit has cooled off and Gallegos has ascended), while the jury is still out on the Mikolas and Goldschmidt extensions (as well as DeJong).
Meanwhile, there are a number of good moves the Cardinals have made in recent years as well, such as trading for O’Neill, the Ozuna trade (which still worked out despite somewhat disappointing production), the initial Mikolas signing, the Kim signing, the 3 1-year extentions for Wainwright to date, the Wong extension, probably the Arenado trade, etc.
Is there anything else we can take away from the four GIFs? Honestly, not much.
Is there anything we can take away from eight weeks of defensive metrics?
Yes. See above for reference.
“Prorate his 2021 DRS to his 2019 workload in terms of innings fielded” is what we in the biz call a “load-bearing clause”
It’s also what we call a somewhat small sample size.
Arenado always made the odd brain-fart drop-kick play, even when he was at his best. His defensive genius was the impossible play, not ultra-consistency on easy ones.
Hmm, so like Kolten Wong before 2019?
fWAR update: Nolan Arenado, 2.0; Austin Gomber, 1.5. And the main prospect the Rockies got back has about a 750 OBP in an offensive challenged Eastern League (AA), a couple years younger than league average, and Gomber is three years younger than Arenado. Oh, and one of them is owed almost $200m going forward, and both teams are in 4th place.
Yeah, I think the initial returns are pretty obvious on that trade.
By bWAR Arenado has been worth double what Gomber’s been worth.
Since the Rockies are paying the salaries of both players this year, I’d say the Cards are fine with the trade so far.
Seamholic, which prospect has a monster OBP in the Eastern League? Elehuris Montero was the main prospect in the deal, and he is indeed in AA, but he’s got a meh .216/.319/.426 slash line at age 22. I assume I’m missing something, or I have the wrong guy, but none of the other prospects dealt fit the bill either. Let me know when you can, thanks.
He is as overrated as cargo. Look at the home/road splits. Trevor story will be the next overpaid contract
We really gotta fight this battle every time, huh? Damn bro I’m getting old
Maybe a bit off-topic, but what happened to Inside Edge Fielding on the stats pages?
I haven’t seen it mentioned yet, but isn’t OAA basically just guys getting to more balls when there is more foul territory like Rockies and athletics?
Arenado is 30. He isn’t a young guy anymore. How many fielders remain elite defenders at age 30?
Quite a few. It isn’t until their mid-30’s that the best fielders generally stop winning Gold Gloves.
in the above examples i’d bet a dollar if the infield was not shifted all the plays would have been successful outs, made by the position player affected. nerds are ruining baseball.
Apart from the obvious fact that “nerds” produced the numbers that showed, overall, that shifts improve defense and suppress OBP on ground balls.
You’re a bit of a lost cause on this one, aren’t you?
A whole dollar?
I don’t know what he was like in this regard in COL, but I’ve been surprised by Arenado’s decision-making since he came to STL. Three times that I can recall he’s passed up an easy out at first to try for a force at second and he’s been late – a couple times way late. Purely anecdotal of course, and probably doesn’t mean much, but still striking to me, since I’ve always considered his baseball IQ to be off the charts.
I probably need some context, on history on other players. Is it uncommon for defensive metrics to fluctuate from one year to the next, then bounce back? Regarding another 3B’man, when Gio Urshela arrived on the Yankees, he looked phenomenal in the field, which matched his reputation, but his defensive metrics indicated a below-averge fielder. Since then, his defensive metrics are more in line with his strong “visual” metrics. Is this something that needs at least two, if not three years of data?