Winning the Pitching Offseason
The 2015-16 offseason has been heralded as a historic one in terms of the volume of starting pitching projected to be available on the free market. There’s star-level talent (some of it already signed), in the persons of Zack Greinke, David Price and Johnny Cueto, as well as a bevy of mid-range targets certain to pull down three or more guaranteed years at a minimum of $10-12 million per season. The first big deals are in the books, and the prices in terms of dollars and years have been higher than the already elevated expectations.
What is the track record of both huge and mid-sized investments in starting pitching, and what does it portend for the clubs who have already made a splash in this year’s market? Does landing the big fish really mean you’ve “won” the offseason? Or might the clubs that either didn’t buy a lottery ticket — or held on to their own, suddenly more valuable tickets — come out ahead?
It’s difficult to fathom that just a few short years ago, the industry shunned the pitching mega-contract. After Kevin Brown cleared the $100 million guarantee mark in 1999, the bar was nudged upward by Mike Hampton’s eight year, $121 million agreement with the Rockies in 2001. That conflagration seemed to teach front offices a thing or two about massive investments in pitchers.
Free agency has generally been an inefficient proposition both for position players and pitchers. Teams often pay players based on what they have done, rather than what they are going to do. Most players don’t hit the free market until after their 30th birthday, quite often with their best seasons behind them. The game is rigged even more for free-agent pitchers, who get hurt at a significantly higher rate than their position-player brethren.
Every free-agent contract that’s signed, however, is seemingly greeted by a barrage of analysis justifying it as a wise investment on the club’s part. It’s a pet peeve of mine, the tendency to assume a deal is a good one based merely on the fact that a club is paying $7.5 to $8.0 per win in 2015 dollars.
Accumulating surplus value above that level should be the goal, and the very real possibility that the free-agent pitcher receiving such lavish guarantees might disappear completely from the scene due to injury or ineffectiveness is totally discounted when these pitching deals are analyzed. The limitations of a pitcher’s ceiling, and the unlimited nature of his floor, are both often ignored.
Today, let’s allow our recent past to inform our present. First, let’s look at what I would consider mid-range free-agent pitching contracts from 2012 to 2015. In this case, I’ve defined them as such: at least three guaranteed seasons at $10 million per year, with a total guarantee below $80 million.
| SIGN YR | YRS/$ | AGES | WAR 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | TOT | $/WAR | |
| Wilson | 2012 | 5-77.5 | 31-35 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 0.6 | 1.4 | 7.4 | 10.5 |
| Buehrle | 2012 | 4-58 | 33-36 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 2.1 | 9.0 | 6.4 |
| Lohse | 2013 | 3-33 | 34-36 | 2.3 | 2.3 | -0.1 | 4.5 | 7.3 | |
| Garza | 2014 | 4-50 | 30-33 | 2.7 | 0.6 | 3.3 | 7.6 | ||
| Nolasco | 2014 | 4-49 | 31-34 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 1.6 | 15.3 | ||
| Vargas | 2014 | 4-32 | 31-34 | 2.2 | 0.4 | 2.6 | 6.2 | ||
| Feldman | 2014 | 3-30 | 31-33 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 2.6 | 7.7 | ||
| Jimenez | 2014 | 4-50 | 30-33 | 0.4 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 8.1 | ||
| Shields | 2015 | 4-75 | 33-36 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 17.0 | |||
| Santana | 2015 | 4-55 | 32-35 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 10.6 | |||
| McCarthy | 2015 | 4-48 | 31-34 | -0.3 | -0.3 | < 0 | |||
| Liriano | 2015 | 3-39 | 31-33 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 | |||
| TOTAL | 39.8 | 8.5 |
That’s pretty grim: $8.5M per WAR on average, even for contracts moving forward from 2015 is a subpar return. Remember, the break-even $/WAR rate back in 2012-13 was well below today’s level. There is not a single clear winning deal among this group, though Francisco Liriano’s contract well positioned to be one after his first guaranteed season.
Each and every one of these pitchers was in his 30s when the contract period began. Liriano’s 2015 was the best of the 25 seasons above, at 3.6 WAR. Only three of these 25 seasons resulted in 3.0 WAR, and less than half of the seasons resulted in 2.0 WAR.
You’d hope, at a bare minimum, that a pitcher in whom you’re investing three or more years at $10 million or more per season would at least qualify for the ERA title over the life of the contract. In only 15 of the 25 seasons above — that is, just 60% of them — did the 2012-15 free-agent pitcher qualify for his league’s ERA title.
Looking back at this list, I recall liking only the Liriano and Ubaldo Jimenez deals when they were signed. While they retained the risks carried by all starting pitchers, they also possessed upside. Reasonably high K rates, reasonably strong contact management potential. In Liriano’s case, specifically, Pittsburgh was a perfect landing spot: they know how to get ground-ball pitchers to get more ground balls than ever, as evidenced by their work with A.J. Burnett, J.A. Happ, Charlie Morton, Vance Worley, and others in recent years.
So recent history suggests that if you’re going to wade into the mid-range free-agent marketplace, your rate of return is likely to be below average, thanks to an almost universal lack of upside, and a 40% chance of not even getting a full season out of your signee.
Let’s move up the pitching food chain, and perform a similar analysis with the largest pitching contracts of all time, a list which includes a handful of extensions to pitchers before they reached the free market, as well as a couple of huge deals that were reopened thanks to opt-out clauses.
| SIGN YR | YRS/$ | AGES | YR 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | TOT | $/WAR | |
| Price | 2016 | 7-217 | 30-36 | N/A | N/A | ||||||||
| Kershaw | 2014 | 7-215 | 26-32 | 7.7 | 8.6 | 16.3 | 3.8 | ||||||
| Scherzer | 2015 | 7-210 | 30-36 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 4.7 | |||||||
| Greinke | 2016 | 6-206.5 | 32-37 | N/A | N/A | ||||||||
| Verlander | 2013 | 7-180 | 30-36 | 4.9 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 10.6 | 7.3 | |||||
| Hernandez | 2013 | 7-175 | 27-33 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 2.8 | 14.4 | 5.2 | |||||
| Sabathia | 2009 | 7-161 | 28-34 | 5.9 | 5.1 | 6.4 | 17.4 | 4.0 | |||||
| Tanaka | 2014 | 7-155 | 25-31 | 3.1 | 2.2 | 5.3 | 8.3 | ||||||
| Lester | 2015 | 6-155 | 31-36 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.2 | |||||||
| Greinke | 2013 | 6-147 | 29-34 | 3.4 | 4.4 | 5.9 | 13.7 | 5.4 | |||||
| Hamels | 2013 | 6-144 | 29-34 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 12.9 | 5.6 | |||||
| J.Santana | 2008 | 6-137.5 | 29-34 | 5.3 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 13.7 | 10.0 | ||
| Cain | 2012 | 6-127.5 | 27-32 | 3.8 | 1.5 | -0.1 | -0.5 | 4.7 | 18.1 | ||||
| Zito | 2007 | 7-126 | 29-35 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 1.8 | -0.5 | 0.9 | -0.5 | 6.7 | 18.8 | |
| Sabathia | 2012 | 5-122 | 31-35 | 4.7 | 2.6 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 8.6 | 11.3 | ||||
| Hampton | 2001 | 8-121 | 28-35 | 1.9 | 0.4 | 2.6 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.8 | 15.5 |
| C.Lee | 2011 | 5-120 | 32-36 | 6.8 | 5.0 | 5.5 | 1.9 | 0.0 | 19.2 | 6.3 | |||
| Zimmermann | 2016 | 5-110 | 30-34 | N/A | N/A | ||||||||
| K.Brown | 1999 | 7-105 | 34-40 | 7.3 | 6.8 | 3.0 | 0.5 | 6.1 | 2.3 | 1.4 | 27.4 | 3.8 | |
| Wainwright | 2014 | 5-97.5 | 32-36 | 4.8 | 0.9 | 5.7 | 6.8 | ||||||
| C.Zambrano | 2008 | 5-97.5 | 27-31 | 2.8 | 3.7 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 9.7 | 10.1 | |||
| Samardzija | 2016 | 5-90 | 31-35 | N/A | N/A | ||||||||
| An.Sanchez | 2013 | 5-80 | 29-33 | 6.0 | 3.2 | 0.9 | 10.1 | 4.8 | |||||
| TOTAL | 215.6 | 7.0 |
We get a $7.0M-per-WAR average, but the break-even point was way below that back in the pre-2010 era when many of these deals were consummated. That said, there do appear to be at least a couple clear winners on this list.
Clayton Kershaw, for one. His rate of $3.8 million per WAR works for me. Of course, the Dodgers jumped in early here and locked him up. Those are his age-26 and -27 seasons, peak prime, an anomaly on this list. The version of CC Sabathia that preceded his opt-out with the Yankees is also a clear winner. Max Scherzer’s first year was very strong, and Felix Hernandez, three years in, looks good, though these are his age-27 to -29 years being measured, and he did experience a steep dropoff in 2015.
Kevin Brown’s contract looks good in today’s dollars, but when you get down to it, it’s a lot like Cliff Lee‘s just-completed pact: a couple huge years early, a fair deal without much excess value in its totality. And then there’s the disasters: Hampton, the second Sabathia contract, Barry Zito, Carlos Zambrano and Matt Cain’s ongoing deal.
In 44 of the 69 seasons listed above, the pitcher qualified for the ERA title. That’s 64% of the time, just a touch higher than the mid-range pitcher group. Interestingly, the pitchers with the ten richest contracts listed above (through Cole Hamels) qualified 86% (18 of 21) of the time, while the others qualified at only a 54% (26 for 48) clip. Bottom line, once you get past the no-brainers, the cream of the crop — and, perhaps most importantly, if you’re able to buy out pre-free agency peak years (see Kershaw, Felix, Masahiro Tanaka, Sabathia Part I) — you are playing with fire.
So what does this mean for this year’s group? To kick off this discussion, I’m going to once again use a table included in my Mike Leake article earlier this week:
| MLB | K > 2 | > 1 | > 0.5 | AVG | < (0.5) | < (1.0) | < (2.0) |
| BB > 2 | 68.9 | 77.2 | 81.8 | 88.5 | 95.8 | 102.8 | — |
| > 1 | 72.3 | 81.2 | 89.1 | 94.6 | 101.6 | 106.2 | 112.2 |
| > 0.5 | 77.5 | 85.6 | 89.0 | 96.9 | 103.1 | 111.8 | 118.4 |
| AVG | 82.1 | 87.5 | 92.1 | 100.4 | 106.9 | 113.2 | 117.6 |
| < (0.5) | 80.3 | 90.7 | 95.3 | 103.0 | 113.0 | 115.6 | — |
| < (1.0) | — | 93.4 | 99.0 | 106.1 | 114.8 | 123.1 | — |
| < (2.0) | — | 97.3 | 99.4 | 109.1 | 120.7 | — | — |
| ALL | 74.8 | 85.5 | 91.6 | 98.4 | 105.7 | 110.0 | 115.8 |
The K/BB Contact Score Multiplier is the average number by which a pitcher’s Contact Score (production allowed on all BIP scaled to league average of 100) is multiplied to derive his calculated component ERA. K rates increase from right to left in the above table, walk rates decline from top to bottom. Each cell is valued by the number of standard deviations better or worse than league average.
Below, some selected 2015-16 free-agent starting pitchers are listed, along with their three-year average Adjusted (for BIP mix and authority) Contact Scores and K/BB Multipliers. Those two factors are then multiplied together to obtain each pitcher’s estimated current true-talent ERA-.
| ADJ C SCORE | K/BB MULT | EST ERA- | |
| Greinke | 83.9 | 89.1 | 74.8 |
| Price | 96.7 | 81.2 | 78.5 |
| Cueto | 90.5 | 94.6 | 85.6 |
| Lackey | 96.5 | 94.6 | 91.3 |
| Samardzija | 97.6 | 94.6 | 92.3 |
| Zimmermann | 98.2 | 94.6 | 92.9 |
| Fister | 92.4 | 106.2 | 98.1 |
| Iwakuma | 104.5 | 94.6 | 98.9 |
| Kazmir | 102.0 | 100.4 | 102.4 |
| W-Y. Chen | 110.6 | 94.6 | 104.6 |
| Kennedy | 117.1 | 92.1 | 107.8 |
| Gallardo | 97.7 | 115.6 | 112.9 |
| Leake | 102.4 | 111.8 | 114.5 |
As you might expect, we’ve got a couple of stars at the top in Greinke and Price, followed by a near star in Johnny Cueto. The measurably above-average group, populated by John Lackey, Jeff Samardzija and Jordan Zimmermann, follows.
As good, or even great, as Greinke and Price are right now, their windows for greatness are quite limited. Both have begun to move in the wrong direction on the K/BB Multiplier grid, a trend which almost never reverses. In addition, Greinke’s three-year average Adjusted Contact Score is a bit misleading, as it is grounded more in limitation of BIP authority than it is in optimization of batted-ball mix. The latter is much more predictive moving forward. The first half of both contracts will likely need to pay for the back half. If they stay healthy, of course.
As for the rest of the group, the only players I thought were particularly interesting heading into the free agency period were Lackey and Samardzija. The former was a short-term reliability play, the latter was much better than his 2015 numbers thanks to the horrendous White Sox team defense. Lackey has been fairly priced by the marketplace, while the final numbers on Samardzija are just a little rich for my blood.
The chief minefields are Leake and Yovani Gallardo. Leake’s young, but lacks any sort of upside scenario. Gallardo can’t strike out anyone anymore, and his contact management skills are nothing special, with no foundational long-term trait.
So, who then wins the pitching offseason? As in your state lottery, the first tier of winners includes those who don’t bother to play. History is likely to again declare the majority of 2015-16 free-agent pitching contracts to be losers.
You want bigger winners? How about teams like the Indians and Rays, who have watched the value of their young, established, affordable starting pitchers dramatically soar from already high levels. Corey Kluber, Danny Salazar, Carlos Carrasco, Trevor Bauer, Chris Archer, Jake Odorizzi, Drew Smyly, Matt Moore and friends are worth their weight in titanium right now. Hold them, they provide scads of surplus value; trade them, you get a mother lode of talent.
You want the biggest winners of all? How about the Atlanta Braves, who took advantage of the shifting sands of the market to move Shelby Miller, a good starting pitcher, for the equivalent of the GDP of Lesotho.
Quality starting pitching — if you want to win, you’ve got to have it. There are some hits in the free-agent pitching market, but you’ve got be rich, smart and lucky to find them. The best practice is to grow your own via the draft, international talent procurement, and development, and quickly lock up the best of them through their peak period. You’ll whiff every now and then, but those whiffs will be a lot less costly.
Pitchers are weak these days. I pitched until my arm fell off, I just snapped it back on and was good to go.
Ever have 59 wins in a season? Didn’t think so.
Come on Old Hoss, you only had to throw 50 feet, that doesn’t count.
I was worth about $258/WAR back in 83-84.
Only won 92 games over that stretch though.
Come on Pud, I threw 1300 more innings than you, and they named the best pitcher award after me.
I think everyone would agree that the ‘Cy Young Award’ would be much more interesting if it were called ‘The Steam Engine Award.’
Guy #1: “Hey did you here Arrieta won the Steam Engine?”
Guy #2: “Is that a baseball thing?”
#BringbacknotGraphs
how did you feel about the Scherzer deal last year? seems fine now but nobody loved it then. Are we going to feel that way about Price/GReinke next year?
Nice article. I like the using the true ERA data to infer future results for these 30+ pitchers. IMO, projecting older pitchers involves two questions. Can they stay healthy and can they make the shift from power to command?
I don’t think fWAR is the best way to measure past contract performance. I’d also look at RA9-WAR, since actual results matter. More importantly, fWAR doesn’t consider command and control as a talent.
Using RA9-WAR doesn’t change Tony’s conclusions. It does better reflect the value of pitchers like Buehrle (who always relied on command) and the strategic adjustments made by King Felix and Greinke in the past two years.
I’m relatively optimistic about Felix, Price, Lackey and Greinke moving forward. It will be interesting to see if Scherzer can make similar adjustments as he ages.
That $7.5M is just a straw man. I think a more rigorous financial approach would be to incorporate a $/WAR inflator. This article pegs historic free agent WAR inflation at 12%:
http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2013/10/15/4818740/how-much-does-a-win-really-cost
Interesting read.
I think Seattle, with Walker and Paxton, are among the teams that have benefitted from soaring pitcher salaries. Both are relatively young, cheap and flash true TOR potential.
Fact check: 2.335 billion USD ?(2013) is the GDP of Lesotho. The Braves got a much better return than that 😉
Interesting article, especially for an old timer like myself who is still trying to grasp the sabermetrics revolution.
I was wondering how you can measure the relative worth of free agent arms in the modern era and here’s a nice table that gives you one reference tool. (Though, as evidenced by the comments above, there are other tools that might be more accurate.)
One hypothetical question for the author (all remarks that can help me are welcome): are there special circumstances where ignoring these sabermetric tools isn’t crazy? E.g., the Orioles are not in the market for a RHP, but if they were what would be a reasonable price for Mike Leake? With their exceptional infield defense and Leake’s high GB rate, would 5/75 be an overpay for a durable arm in a market where so many arms are over-priced?
Regardless of outcome that contract would not look better for the Orioles than any other franchise based on the analysis above. Fangraphs WAR is FIP based, which doesn’t include GB rate. So theoretically his WAR would be the exact same regardless of which team he played for. In practical terms however, his WAR may increase slightly due to him throwing more innings for a team that was better defensively as he should allow less runs and managers would be less likely to give him the quick hook. I don’t know that the difference would allow him to throw enough innings for the O’s compared to a bad defensive team to make a significant impact on his WAR.
Thanks for the answer. I had looked at his xFIP rather than his FIP and it seemed to me that paying him that amount wouldn’t be exorbitant.
But if xFIP isn’t part of how FG calculates WAR then it’s a different story. Thanks for setting me straight on that.
Another thing has occurred to me since I first posted the comment: the DH effect and what it does to pitchers when they move from the NL to the AL. It adds almost half a run, on average, to a pitcher’s ERA, doesn’t it? So, if Leake may turn out to be a decent investment for some teams in the NL, it’s unlikely he will be for most teams in the AL.
FWIW, he also provides extra value (albeit small) to a team in the NL because he’s actually a very good hitter for a pitcher. That would be wasted in the AL.
Really good stuff – one more in the mid-range contracts is Edwin Jackson at 4/$50M, all of which has already been paid out by the Cubs. He gave them 2.5 WAR for a nifty $20M/WAR, by far the worst south of Brandon McCarthy’s null value.
Of course “draft great players and don’t pay them much” is better than signing FAs……but if that was easy, or worked a lot, no one would pay for the FAs.
By this logic, no team should ever sign a FA, or am I reading it wrong? So, the Twins should just have continued to roll out Hendriks, Milone, Gibson, and two random guys the last couple years?
Are you sure that not playing actually adds wins to teams? The goal of a team is to win, not to be the most efficient at wins/dollar.
I was going to say the same thing about the Orioles. With their last two GMs they have pursued a strategy of “grow the arms, buy the bats.”
But because of injuries (Bundy, Harvey) and under performing young arms (Matusz, Tillman, Arrieta before he left for the Cubs and found his slutter) they haven’t achieved much yet. Even Gausman is still a big question mark.
Sometimes the smart course doesn’t work out. And there are talented position players with whom you only have a short window of opportunity before they depart. Most teams want to be efficient with their dollars, but the chance to win a pennant or a World Series (and thus energize your fan base) IMO changes how you calculate the worth of a free agent arm.
Sam Hinkie and the Philadelphia 76ers would like a word on this whole “The goal of a team is to win, not to be the most efficient” phrase. I know it’s a cross sports reference, but that’s probably the most extreme example of a team that does what the sabermetric/analytics book says at all costs.
The jury’s still very much out on whether or not Hinkie’s approach will work, but yes, that’s probably the most extreme example.
IMHO, that’s the right approach for baseball, but perhaps not for the NBA. The big advantage of baseball is that young talent can be acquired and held in the minors to be deployed at a single point in time at the major league level when you’re ready to shift from accumulating talent to winning. You can draft three overall number 1 picks and keep each one on a path to get to AAA at about the same time so that when all three are major league ready, you can start the arbitration clock ticking on all of them at the same time so that you have a young core of cheap talent locked in for 6 years. That’s what the Astros did.
The NBA isn’t the same. The clock on their club control starts ticking the moment you draft them. Hinkie can’t acquire Nerlens Noel, Joel Embiid, and Jahlil Okafor in three successive years and hold them in the D-league until he can put all three on the court together and have their service clocks start then. As soon as they acquired each one of them, their club control clock started. Even if you get three superstars, their club control is only going to overlap for a few years. There’s also very little opportunity to sign emerging stars to club-friendly contracts. If you get Mike Trout in MLB, you can get him at a huge discount if you lock him up early. In the NBA, there’s a fairly proscribed contract system that leads to a max deal for anyone close to superstar level. And there’s less point in accumulating a large number of draft picks. In MLB, a volume approach works because you have so many spots to fill at every level (A to MLB). In the NBA, you could really get by with one or two picks a year as long as you pick wisely. The Spurs have never needed to accumulate a large number of draft picks to stay competitive because they use their low and limited number of draft picks wisely, and those provide enough cheap talent to keep them competitive.
I’m skeptical of Hinkie’s approach working in the NBA. If they happen to accumulate a top pick or two when there’s a no-doubt franchise player available, sure, that’ll work, but those players are so rare, and the draft lottery prevents you from having any certainty you’ll be able to get that player even if you’re the worst team by far, that’s a huge gamble. In truth, there’s little you can do other than scout and develop extremely well (to make sure that you always get a player or two in each draft who can significantly contribute to your team) and cross your fingers that a LeBron or Durant is available and you have a top 1-3 pick at that time.
I agree wholeheartedly with your post. Not to get too far off the baseball topic here, but I think Hinkie’s approach does work much better in baseball where it is constantly stated that teams should never draft for needs but rather take the best player available.
Back on the original topic of being the most efficient in terms of $/WAR as a franchise, I think whether you want to be the most efficient or not has to do with what your goals are for the team. If you as the owner of a MLB franchise see it as an investment and don’t care about the product on the field (Hmm wonder if the folks in Miami know anyone like that), it is absolutely the correct move for you to be as efficient as possible with your spending. If you can win 70 games with a $50M payroll or 75 with a $70M payroll, as the owner, you would probably rather have the first than the second. On your Twins example, given their recent history it’s unlikely that any free agent signings would have really impacted their chances of making the postseason. Given that assumption, there is absolutely no reason not to run Hendricks, Milone, Gibson, and two other guys out there. Paying free agents to be mediocre is just not smart.
Basketball also differs from baseball in that you need to develop your “assets” within the context of a true team sport where players rely on each other to help execute a defensive scheme or put them in a position to score. As the 76ers are perhaps finding out, it seems possible that sort of development might be retarded where all your players are 24 and under, many are of sub-NBA quality, and your best prospects play the same position and need to share the same court. Baseball is quite a bit different in that, say, Manny Machado can learn everything he needs to be a great third basemen even if Yasmany Tomas and Avisail Garcia are manning the corner outfield.
I don’t at all agree that Sam Hinkie is doing what the SABR/analytics book says at all costs. I don’t think it would argue you should deliberately tank for seasons on end (and alienate your fan base and demoralize your players in the process) for a marginal chance to improve your lottery position and collect a bunch of potential young, cheap talent (each with a considerable bust potential, particularly when thrown all together without any sort of veteran presence or leadership).
A team should sign free agents when it needs that little bump over the top. If you’re projected as, say, an 88 win team, adding free agent talent now makes sense. You’re most likely going to get what you pay for, but that’s OK. You have a team that’s already good enough to have a realistic shot at the playoffs and every extra win you add only increases those chances.
The problem is when a team signs free agents to be merely good. Take this year’s Phillies. They could clearly improve dramatically by adding free agents, but not significantly, because they just don’t have enough payroll space to buy enough free agent talent to move the needle in terms of playoff/world series chances. They have no reason to significantly invest in the free agent market. Their money would be far better invested in longer term but higher return options – the draft, international players, etc.
The point Tony’s making with “the winners are the ones that don’t play” is that accruing enough talent via other means that you don’t even have to engage the free agent market is the best of all worlds. It might be better stated that “the winners are the ones who don’t need to play”. If your team needs free agency to be competitive, you’re doing it wrong. It’s only useful as a way to add to an existing winner. It’s not a way to build a team.
Yep. Well said, especially the last paragraph.
If your team needs free agency to be competitive, you’re doing it wrong. It’s only useful as a way to add to an existing winner. It’s not a way to build a team.
This is 100% correct. But its also not really a new concept. This is the largely strategy the Jays employed to win back to back titles all the way back in the late 80’s/Early 90’s.
The interesting part is how so many teams seem to ignore it.
Nice piece, Tony, thanks!
Doing any sort of evaluation on to be completed contracts is pretty fruitless. Of course, Kershaw looks great now. Nobody believed that Kershaw in his first few years was going to prove to be a bad investment. However, there are real concerns as to whether he will be worth $30M+ as a 33 YO. As you pointed out, we can see that with the Sabathia deals. He was a downright bargain in his prime years. He now looks like an absolute train wreck for contract #2.
Focusing on just elite pitchers who have completed their contract (or have only 1 year left) you see:
— Sabathia #2 – $11.3/WAR and will likely go up after 2016
— J Santana – $10/WAR
— Zito – $18.8/WAR
— Hampton – $15.5/WAR
— Lee – $6.3/WAR
— K Brown – $3.8/WAR
— Zambrano – $10.1/WAR
Basically, Cliff Lee and Kevin Brown are probably break evens. Sabathia #2, Santana, Zito, Hampton, and Zambrano were all unmitigated disasters.
None of this information bodes well, in the long term, for the teams that control Price, Greinke, Scherzer, Cueto, and Lester. If recent history is our guide, one or two may turn out OK and the rest will end up being disasters.
Great article. Sifting through to find the mindfields is especially insightful.
Samardzija had his worse K/BB, HR/9, & xFIP as a starter, you can’t blame any of that on terrible defense. He flat out sucked in 2015.
Sorry should be K/9.
>We get a $7.0M-per-WAR average, but the break-even point was way below that back in the pre-2010 era when many of these deals were consummated.
I count 6 pre-2010 deals out of 23, and even fewer are from an era when the break-even point was presumed to be “way below” $7m.