Zach Britton Watched the Orioles Lose
There is one article to be written about Tuesday’s American League wild card game, and that article will be written in 25,000 different places. I thank you for taking the time to read our own version. I can’t promise that it’s a different version from what’s likely to be already out there, but, see, that’s just the thing. There was a problem with how Tuesday played out for the Orioles, and everybody but perhaps the TBS broadcasters has been able to put their finger on it.
The Orioles lost, sure, and that’s the biggest problem. There’s no problem that affects them more. But the Orioles lost in extra innings. After Chris Tillman was removed, Buck Showalter cycled through six different relievers. Not one of those relievers was named Zach Britton, a closer who spent the year being so dominant he’s constructed a case for the Cy Young. The final pitch of the Orioles’ season was thrown by Ubaldo Jimenez. This is about what it looked like, and then it was time for them all to get packing.
I’m usually averse to being overtly critical, especially when it comes to matters managerial. The way I figure, they’re the ones in there, they’re the ones who tend to know best, and, who am I to say which decisions were wrong? The longer the Orioles played, the more curious it became that Britton didn’t appear, but I tried to give Showalter the benefit of the doubt. Maybe, I thought, Britton had had something happen. Showalter has helped build the Orioles into something successful in large part through his management of the bullpen. Something had to be up, right? Perhaps Britton was at least feeling under the weather?
No, it wasn’t that.
Britton warmed up three different times, but was never used. You could tell there was major frustration there. On his part & teammates’
— Dan Connolly (@danconnolly2016) October 5, 2016
It wasn’t even anything weird. It was something that’s weird precisely because of how unusual it isn’t. Showalter repeatedly made the same decision managers have been making for decades. He didn’t want to use his closer in a tie game on the road. You could say it made some sense when he went to Mychal Givens. You could make some sort of case when he went to Brad Brach. You might even be able to defend, almost, going to Darren O’Day. But then Brian Duensing pitched, and then Ubaldo Jimenez pitched. Oh, I have a table for you.
| Pitcher | OPS |
| Mychal Givens | 0.664 |
| Donnie Hart | 0.519 |
| Brad Brach | 0.578 |
| Darren O’Day | 0.717 |
| Brian Duensing | 0.714 |
| Ubaldo Jimenez | 0.772 |
| Zach Britton | 0.430 |
Point-four-three-zero. Do you know what a .430 OPS is? That’s how well Cardinals pitchers just hit. Mariano Rivera allowed a career OPS of .555. He finished one season below .430 — that would be 2008, when Rivera’s OPS against was .423. The difference between Britton and Rivera is nothing to do with performance level. It’s just about how long Rivera kept it up. Britton is no worse than Rivera at his prime, and, say, I seem to recall Rivera getting used non-traditionally an awful lot in October.
About that. I have to say a couple things. One, this is not without precedent. In the 2013 NLDS, Fredi Gonzalez famously opted for David Carpenter over an available Craig Kimbrel. That was in the bottom of the eighth, and Carpenter turned a 3-2 lead into a 4-3 deficit. Kimbrel didn’t pitch and the Braves lost the series. Even more relevantly, there was Game 4 of the 2003 World Series. The Yankees tied the Marlins at 3-3 in the ninth. Joe Torre subsequently called on Jose Contreras and Jeff Weaver, leaving Rivera in the pen. Weaver lost the game and the Yankees lost the Series. So, even Rivera lived this once. Showalter didn’t make literally the worst decision of all time.
And two, Buck Showalter didn’t lose the game for Baltimore. The players lost the game. The lineup had four hits in 11 innings. There’s no guarantee the Orioles would’ve won even had Britton been used. They made it through 10, after all, and Jimenez could’ve conceivably worked a scoreless frame or two. He’s had a good recent stretch. It’s important not to exaggerate the actual effects of managerial decisions. They can swing win expectancy, no question, but decisions like that don’t win or lose games. It’s almost all about the players, and the managers are peripheral.
But. To say the Orioles could’ve lost anyway doesn’t excuse Buck Showalter, because in a one-game playoff, you can’t afford to sacrifice any win expectancy, and that’s what he did. Even though he didn’t light the house on fire, he’s the one who stuffed every wall with oily rags. During the year, by our numbers, Zach Britton handled 17% of the Orioles’ high-leverage plate appearances. In the single most important game of their season, he handled 0%, as Showalter waited for a lead he never got.
This is a story that’s relevant in 2016, but this is also an article that could’ve been written in 2001. This is old-school sabermetrics, fundamental sabermetrics, Sabermetrics 101. It’s classic complaining about closer usage, but the complaints have never gone out of fashion. Analysts got some stuff wrong back in the day. Like, say, dramatically underrating defense. That was an oversight, but the closer-usage critiques were right on. Articles like this have been written for so long they’re hardly even interesting, the path being so well-trod. For some players, it’s important to have roles. In the playoffs, especially, those roles should go out the window. The best players should play the most. The best pitchers should make the biggest pitches. Rigidity is inefficiency.
Showalter would’ve preferred to use Britton with a lead. Well, of course. It made him uncomfortable to think about some other pitcher trying to potentially slam the door. But, you still have to get to the point where you can achieve a lead, and the Blue Jays needed but one run to finish the Orioles off. Showalter, say, didn’t love the idea of having to use Duensing or Jimenez or Tommy Hunter with a lead, if Britton had already been used. What makes a tie game any better? What makes a tie game any less stressful, when a pitcher has even less of a margin of error?
Zach Britton gave the Orioles the best chance for a scoreless inning or two. In a tied one-game playoff like this, you don’t put those innings off. You seize them when you can and worry about the later innings if you play them, because, possibly, the later innings won’t be played. Britton should’ve been used even earlier, but let’s say he works the 11th. If the Orioles score in the 12th, perhaps Britton can stay out there. No game tomorrow, after all. And even if not, odds are Britton could at least get the Orioles clean to the 13th. Britton could’ve bought the offense time, and even if it stayed quiet, that still manages to delay Duensing and Jimenez. There’s value in that alone. How far do you take it if you’re trying to save Britton for a potential lead? Do you put a position player on the mound when you’re out of other pitchers? Who had to be bad enough for Buck Showalter to give the ball to the single most dominant reliever of this baseball season?
Real quick, in case you’re curious:
| Split | BA | OBP | SLG | OPS |
| Save Situation | 0.194 | 0.254 | 0.260 | 0.515 |
| Non-Save Situation | 0.167 | 0.223 | 0.227 | 0.450 |
That’s Britton over the last three years. Not only has he not been worse in non-save situations — he’s even been better. There was no reason to be concerned about how Britton might deal with a tie game. He’d deal with it the way he deals with any game. He’d go out there and throw Zach Britton-y pitches. Many of those pitches get hitters out.
The Orioles lost for so many reasons. Most visibly, aside from one swing by Mark Trumbo, they just didn’t hit. And maybe they were never going to. Jimenez pitched poorly in relief, after having had a pretty encouraging stretch that earned him some of Showalter’s trust. The Orioles team performed a little worse than the Blue Jays team, and when that happens, one team moves on while the other is eliminated. But baseball is incredibly hard. It’s impossibly hard. Players can’t will themselves to do better. They can’t improve their chances doing anything easily. Given how hard it is to play, then, all a roster should ask for is a manager who doesn’t reduce the chances of moving on by way of his own decisions. Some decisions are not so cut and dry. And Buck Showalter, more than almost anybody else, has shown he can usually get the most out of 25 guys. But Tuesday, Buck Showalter was faced with an easy choice. On more than one occasion, he ignored it, and the best reliever in baseball watched his team lose, like all of the rest of us did. Showalter made no use of his team’s biggest edge, and though that didn’t directly cause the loss, that doesn’t make it any more forgivable.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.
I can’t recall a managerial decision so bad that the word ‘indefensible’ can be used literally. Until tonight. I’m 32 years old.
This thing was the Mona Lisa of bad decisions by a manager.
The Grady Little Debacle was worse.
In Pedro’s final 2/3 of an inning, he allowed 7 hits to 9 batters, including a homer, three doubles, and three singles. Four runs scored. Game went to extras.
Waiting to relieve him were Embree, Timlin, and Williamson. To that point in the playoffs the trio had combined for — are you bracing yourself against something? — 23 innings and ONE run. They’d allowed just 8 hits and 5 walks while fanning 26 men.
But Grady stuck with Pedro, who by the way had allowed hitters to bat .298 after pitch #100 during the regular season. Little left him in for 123 offerings.
And this as you probably remember was Game 7 of the 2003 American League Championship Series. You know, when the Carmines were trying to win their first Series since God spoke to Moses.
The only bigger blunder in playoff history belonged to Don Denkinger.
But Pedro’s still Pedro. That doesn’t make it a good decision, but just in terms of narrative, leaving Pedro in the game is a lot more defensible than having Ubaldo Jimemez pitch before Britton.
I think the problem with Grady Little was that Pedro’s struggles after exceeding 100 pitches were so documented and foreseeable – I mean, I remember watching the game and the broadcast was talking about it even as Little was making the decision to leave him in – that Pedro’s giving up those runs, while not inevitable, felt like it was after the fact.
An upvote for your username.
At least in Grady Little’s case, as with many cases like this, there was possibly something he knew that the public didn’t. There’s an argument for tiring Pedro being better than Embree/Timlin/Williamson (who weren’t all that great during the regular season), even if it’s not a great argument.
There’s no argument for not putting Britton in. Unless you think Britton is a worse pitcher than all the guys the Orioles put out there after the 8th, there is no defense. It was mathematically the wrong move. The badness of Showalter’s decision lay not in the gravity of the mistake, but in how utterly wrong it was.
And one of the most encouraging moments of my 30 years of Red Sox fandom was when Theo fired Grady Freaking Little very soon thereafter. (Heywood Sullivan or Lou Gorman would have let him have another crack at this managing thing.) Orioles fans must have been screaming at their TV’s just as I was that night in’03. My sympathies.
Disagree… Little made a “bad read” on the situation. Pedro had been pitching very well up until that mound visit, and few managers would have had the guts to silence their first ballot caliber pitcher and send him packing, than to trust him to make one more pitch to get out of the jam.
And none of those relievers mentioned were close to the talent or performance level of Britton.
Pedro was getting hammered, batter after batter. He was exhausted, and putting the ball on a tee, over and over. Even foul balls were being crushed. He was at 120+ pitches with 5 outs still to get. There was zero chance he would complete the game — so you go to the untouchable trio while you still have a lead.
I get the impression that some commenters here did not in fact watch the game, or were understandably far, far too traumatized to now recall it accurately. Here’s a link:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=St3WF3_xaWk
or maybe you’re so fixated on the thing that you said that you won’t look at facts?
Jimenez is worse than Pedro (both of them were hit hard, but only one of them is or will ever be in the HoF)
Britton is much better than Embree, Timlin, Williamson (i mean, what?)
Then there’s the whole extra innings, season-ending run on 3rd part? And also the fact that Britton has an 80% GB rate and a DP was available.
At least with the Grady situation, you could argue that emotions got the best of him. He wanted to BELIEVE that the best pitcher he’d ever seen would be able to dig deep and get those last few outs. Time and again in history, managers have made decisions that went against he book because of a gut feeling or simply a desire for a magical moment. Sometimes it has worked, sometimes it has backfired.
But Buck’s decision wasn’t emotional. It was calculated. He truly believed that Ubaldo was a better choice there. And that’s why it’s hard to defend.
See: Collins, Terry, 2015 World Series, deciding whether to leave Matt Harvey in the game.
As a general rule, ‘went with my best pitcher too long’ is a less grievous error than, ‘didn’t use my best pitcher at all.’ I think. Which isn’t to say Grady was good that night, but is to say I think last night was worse.
This was clearly not as indefensible, and using 23 innings (among 3 pitchers) is ridiculous evidence to present on an analytics-focused website. I can’t believe how many plus-ones this has.
People (usually) don’t learn if there aren’t consequences to their actions (besides losing, of course). Showalter should be fire and maybe that gets the attention of the other 29 managers, or maybe not, then you fire the next one; eventually they will get it.
Someone went to Catholic school.
I did nothing of the sort, but nice try. Once managers realize that these kind of strategies will cost them their jobs they will stop implementing them, or better yet, don’t hire managers with that kind of out-dated philosophy in the first place.
Showalter’s decision was one of the dumbest from a manager that I have ever seen, but firing him because of it would rank as one of the dumbest executive decisions. It is widely believed that he is a primary reason why the Orioles have beaten their projections by far more than any other team over the last five years. It’s somewhat akin to a brilliant investor doubling your nest egg, then getting liquored up and blowing 25% of the gain. Apoplexy is perfectly justified, but firing the guy would be idiotic because in sum you’re still a lot better off for having him.
Seems like you’re giving a manager way too much credit for what actually transpires on the field. And others are probably laying it onto him a bit too much.
The argument for firing Buck is that he’s such an egomaniac that he refuses to learn from his mistakes. It’s doubtful he’d even acknowledge this was a mistake. Thus, he’s likely to make the same mistake again.
yeah this is spot on, Buck was so good during the season but this was just brutal….
Buck might be in hot water if his superiors disagree with his decisions, although likely not enough to be fired after all he has done for them. We fans are surprised at what happened, but it is more of an organizational failure if team execs were also sitting there wondering what was going on to anywhere near the same degree that we were.
There likely was a time when a GM hired a manager and then stayed completely out of in-game decisions, but you have to think that that era as mostly passed as we progress into more of an analytical age and teams are run like more of a corporate environment.
As one example, you have to think Theo has significant input on how Chapman is used. In this age, it does not make sense for Theo to pay a huge price to get Chapman with a strategy in mind and then to not make sure that his direct reports were aligned to execute that strategy. I’m sure the Cubs and Orioles would defer to Maddon and Showalter in the face of disagreement, but it is hard to believe that the entire braintrust would not review all possible scenarios and discuss a plan of action for each beforehand.
O’s should fire Buck only because of past history of teams that have fired him in the past and have made it to the World Series soon after his dismissal. OK, so it took the Rangers 4 more years to get there, but the Dbacks and Yanks won it the next year.
By the way, I’m sort of kidding here.
Not-So-Bold Prediction — Of all the postseason teams with a Cy Young contender on their rosters, the Orioles will be the only team that won’t use that contender in a postseason game.
If the Giants lose tonight behind Bumgarner, that will almost certainly not be true. Cueto probably won’t even be on the roster for the NL WCG.
Are you saying Cueto is a Cy Young contender?
Top 5 WAR, ERA, and Winz
Yes, he’s at least nominally a contender.
Not true. Aaron Sanchez and JA Happ are both Cy Young contenders and neither one got into yesterday’s game.
I think Sanchez and Happ will get a few more chances to get into games.
What do you mean by this?
Jays won, so Sanchez and Happ will get to start ALDS games?
What if Rich Hill reaggravates his blister? What then?
What if the earth leaves its orbit and hurtles toward the sun? What then?
At some point in the future, all relief pitchers will regularly practice with the outfielders (Javier Lopez already does this but Bochy doesn’t seem to have gotten the message). With relief pitchers who could be trusted to play the outfield, Showalter could have run through his other relievers for an inning or two each and left Britton in left field, bringing him in for a batter or two when needed and then shuttling him out to left again when the danger passed.
Showalter’s mistake was the result of focusing too much on the concepts of ‘closer’ and ‘save’–his reasoning must have been that (1) Britton is the closer and (2) closers are used in save situations, so if the score is tied with the winning run on 3rd and no outs in a walkoff situation (even walkoff not just the field but the entire season), Britton can’t get a save and therefore he shouldn’t be brought in. Universal recognition that this was a really really stupid decision may get more managers to think more flexibly. The Indians are already doing this with Allen and Miller. This is another wave of the future in thinking about relief pitching and it may spread faster as a result of this.
Btw there are many articles about this already and this one has the best title I’ve seen.
I admire the creativity of the outfielder/pitcher gambit, but practically speaking I’d bet that the vast majority of managers don’t want the injury risk of sending a pitcher to run around in the outfield straining hamstrings.
I actually agreed with not using Britton in the 8th, 9th, or 10th innings. But the 11th was a markedly different situation. Unlike the 8th, a run permitted literally ends the season. And unlike the 9th or 10th, the heart of the Toronto order was coming up AND Baltimore had exhausted it’s best non-Britton relievers.
Bring in Zach for the 11th and 12th, then with a bit of luck you’re at the bottom of the Blue Jay order for the 13th, by which time perhaps the Orioles have scored the go-ahead run — then Ubaldo or whomever (Bundy?) can handle the weakest part of the Toronto lineup, for the save.
I think that once being able to play the outfield becomes part of relief pitchers’ standard training, people won’t freak out over the possibility of injury any more than they do with anyone else playing the outfield. The novelty of would take some getting used to but it shouldn’t be a problem in the long run. Just imagine a LOOGY/ROOGY closer tag team. After the first batter you could even switch after a pinch hitter is announced. The only problem is switch hitters, can’t get around that.
The approach you’re suggesting is like what the Indians are doing with Allen and Miller, use your best reliever in the most dangerous situation. It makes sense but requires non-robotic thinking which can be objectively criticized, whereas a lot of managers feel like if they have a formula which they rigidly follow it means they can’t be criticized. I remember Matt Williams pulling Zimmermann for Storen in Game 2 of the 2014 NLDS with 2 outs in the 9th and a one-run lead when he was completely cruising, he had retired like 20 straight batters because he gave up a walk, I couldn’t believe he could be so stupid, Storen blew the lead and Williams’ comment was ‘he’s our closer, it was a no-brainer’. Clearly that was the goal, not to use your brain because decisions made by the brain can be wrong and therefore can be criticized.
The obvious problem I see with this plan is that you are just taking for granted that a RP will actually have the skill to play a competent OF. Which is far from a certainty. Considering there are everyday OF’ers who are not particularly good at the position. I think its a stretch to assume that you can just basically will a RP into being able to play the OF because it helps you strategically.
This isn’t a video game where you can throw any person in any position. There does have to be some sort of underlying skill there. The first time a team loses an important game because their RP/OF made a mess of a fly ball and we are going to be having a similar discussion to this one.
It seem’s like a much better idea to just use your bullpen smartly and leave your better OF’ers to play the OF.
Well obviously if particular relief pitchers turn out to be bad in the outfield, then this strategy won’t work for them, but that doesn’t mean it can’t work for others. And if RP1 who’s pitching while RP2 is in left field is for example Britton who gives up only 8.8% fly balls on BIPs, then the chances that anything at all will come his way are pretty low.
This basically gives you twice as many relief pitchers to use. It’s much harder to smart when have much fewer relievers.
Honestly though, what % of RP do you think could play even a passable OF? Personally I would be surprised if it was over 5%.
It seems like a very niche strategy that would only work for very specific situations. In the vast majority of situations all that is needed is better bullpen management.
I mean, we don’t need to re-invent the wheel here. You simply need to put the best reliever on planet earth in the freaking game when you are 1 swing away from your season ending instead of hoping you get small lead so he can come in then instead.
Yeah. I’d been wondering about Britton coming in, then realized the Jays 2,3,4 hitters were coming up and thought, “Wow, that was gutsy and smart to hold Britton so he could face Donaldson et al.” I couldn’t believe it when he STILL didn’t come in. I actually do think it might be time to fire Buck. That was unforgivably bad.
I present to you, Travis Wood.
http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/watch-travis-wood-pitcher-also-daredevil-outfielder/amp/
Yes, and probably inspired by that the Giants did the same thing with Gearrin later, although he didn’t get a ball hit to him.
Wtf with the thumbs down? I said the cubs did it first.
I guess it has gotten to the point where you mentioning the cubs is considered untrustworthy. Thr33Rings probably isn’t helping your case. For what it’s worth, I appreciate the idea you brought to the table here.
I think people are just sick of hearing “EVEN YEAR” (not that jftg is necessarily guilty of that).
I’ve never said that except to make fun of giants fans who si
33rings is indeed making giants fans look bad but there are obviouslt a lot of cubs fans like that too. What can you do?
Having relief pitchers play the OF and then get shuttled in and out depending on if a LHB or RHB is coming up is not new at all. I remember the ’86 Mets did this on at least one occasion with Orosco and McDowell.
Seeing as this was an AL game, having Britton “hide” in the outfield for lower-leverage situations while still keeping him available to come back to the mound when needed comes with the drawback that on offense, you lose the DH and have to put up with Zach Britton’s hitting.
Then again, he is sitting on a career .625 BA.
“Britton warmed up three different times, but was never used. You could tell there was major frustration there. On his part & teammates’
— Dan Connolly (@danconnolly2016) October 5, 2016”
Wieters’ body language oozed frustration as walked off the field during Encarnacion’s homer. He must have felt a build up of impending doom from the moment Buck didn’t bring Britton in to pitch the bottom of the 11th.
The reason why this is the worst strategy decision ever is that Showalter didn’t do something common like leave a really good starting pitcher in too long; he specifically chose to put in one of the worst pitchers in all of baseball (who had no business even being on that roster) in a tied playoff game, while the best pitcher in baseball sat idle and ready.
That’s a very special level of incompetence, and should be a fire-able offense.
I am sure 95% of MLB teams would be salivating to hire Buck when you believe he should be on the chopping block over the so called “fireable” offense …. lol
The pitcher who “had no business even being on that roster” had the 2nd lowest second-half ERA in the AL. There are a lot of good points to be made here, but that isn’t one of them.
Driven by a .212 BABIP and average at best K/BB numbers, but a 76% LOB. It was all smoke and mirrors.
Still a sub-4 FIP, though. He may not have been “2nd best pitcher in the AL” good, but he was still effective. It wasn’t *all* smoke and mirrors.
an xFIP of 4.24 kind of does suggest it was largely smoke and mirrors.
But unrosterable? That’s an exaggeration.
The worst managerial decision of all time is Jake Taylor allowing Ricky Vaughn to intentionally walk Beck in order to face Jack Parkman.
Worked out for the Indians, though.
It’s ironic that this happened the day after some articles here about what’s special about the Orioles, how they’ve managed to beat various projections for some time, at the end of one of which Jeff wrote:
‘I don’t have an explanation. I’d like to pretend that I do, but the best I can muster is some of this credit should go to Buck Showalter.’
I have the feeling that somehow the same mindset which motivated Showalter to make the apparently good decisions over the past several years which led to Jeff’s conclusion also led him to make the terrible decision yesterday. He has a way of using his players, and his bullpen in particular, which he’s developed over the course of the years and which has helped his team to consistently do better than would be expected. He knows this and this encourages him to continue to follow this thinking. Although the results of this have generally clearly been good over the years, yesterday a specific situation came up in which this way of thinking led to him having a huge blind spot, so that he simply couldn’t see what was obvious to pretty much everyone else.
Baseball is a weird and wonderful game.
The only way I see Showalter’s decision making sense would be if he thought Britton could only go 1 inning. If that were true, then it doesn’t matter much if that inning comes when the game is tied, or when the Orioles had the lead. In any best-case situation, you are going to have Britton pitch 1 inning and then rely on someone like Jimenez to close out the game.
However, even if we assume Britton could only go 1 inning, it would make more sense for Britton (instead of Jimenez) to pitch to the heart of the Blue Jays lineup.
Finally, I don’t think it is valid to assume Britton could only go 1 inning. If he could indeed go 2 innings, it is senseless to wait for a lead in an elimination game because doing so necessarily limits him to 1 inning in the best-case scenario.
I hate to say it, but I really think it just came down to Showalter intentionally or unintentionally thinking “Britton must get save. Save good.”
I don’t think that was the case and I won’t pretend to be able to read Showalter’s mind. It was an inexplicably bad decision by Buck not to bring in Britton instead of Jimenez. While Ubaldo has pitched extremely well the last five weeks of the season, he almost always had trouble in the first inning before settling down.
As for Britton, the only reason I can think of to explain Showalter’s reluctance to use Zach was that he was called on to get five outs in Sunday’s game. Buck has used Zach several times this year in tie games, so his decision, hard as it was to understand, wasn’t based solely on saving him for when the Orioles got the lead.
Perhaps we’ll learn more about his decision-making process in the next few days; perhaps we won’t. But this Orioles fan was dumbfounded by his decision.
Even if Britton could only go 1 inning. Pitching in the tie ballgame would be higher leverage. If the orioles did take the lead, they could easily score 2 or more runs in the top of an inning. Making Britton’s bottom of the inning pretty low leverage. Might as well use him in a tie game where even giving up 1 run loses you the game.
I would agree. I just think it is worth highlighting that Showalter’s decision isn’t as bad if you assume Britton could only go 1 inning.
I’d like to reiterate that (1) I think that assumption is faulty, and (2) that even if that assumption is made I don’t agree with the decision. But when judging Showalter’s decision, we should try to look at the situation in the most favorable light. Otherwise, it is just a mob-mentality of criticism.
I would like to give Buck some benefit of the doubt, but I don’t think it is possible here. Were it the 8th inning, I could accept this excuse, but this was the 11th-sudden death. There was no inning for Britton to pitch if the run scores.
So there is 1 out with first and third. What is Britton’s great strength? Ground balls-ground balls at an historically unprecedented rate. And he also gets strikeouts. Neither of those are Ubaldo’s obvious strengths, and even what appeared to be a strength at the season’s end was clearly not working today.
It just doesn’t matter whether Britton can only go 1 inning or not. Nor does it matter if you anticipate needing length from your next pitcher. You still have Bundy and other starters available. But you have to get out of this inning without allowing that run. And you have a pitcher uniquely able to do just that-more able than any other pitcher in the game.
It is as if your whole season depended on a pitcher throwing just one strike, and you have Greg Maddux on your staff but decide to use Edwin Jackson instead.
“Pitching in the tie ballgame would be higher leverage.”
Actually this isn’t true. Bottom of the 9th (or later) in a tie game has an LI of 2.3. Bottom of the 9th with the home team trailing by 1 has an LI of 3.6.
I meant more on an average basis. True he could come into the game with a 1 run lead or the Orioles could score 2 or 3 runs. On average, whats the LI that we expect him to pitch at in the bottom of the inning with a lead?
He has used Britton for more than 1 inning before this season. It is simply inexusable.
You’re right, and that’s why I said I didn’t think it was a valid assumption to believe Britton could only go 1 inning. I’m simply trying to portray a possible scenario in which case his decision might make more sense.
Britton went 1.2 innings on Sunday. With a day off, he should have been able to go two innings if needed. Hell, in a must-win game like this, it’s not insane to ask him to go even longer if you’re out of better options.
Yes, you are right. This is why I said I didn’t think it was a valid assumption to believe Britton could only go 1 inning. However, if Showalter had a reason to think differently, then perhaps his decision doesn’t look as bad.
Huh? If Britton could only go for one inning, then he needs to be used for one inning. He wasn’t used for any inning. You can only maximize your best resource if you actually use it.
When you are the away team in extra innings you know that in order to win you need to (1) score during the top of an inning, and (2) get three outs in the bottom of said inning. Thus, if you know you have a reliever that can only go 1 inning, it’s reasonable to wait to use him until your team has given you the lead.
Not if he’s clearly your best reliever. Protecting a tie on the road is the HARDER job compared to protecting a lead. And you don’t lose anything by using your mult-inning reliever for only 1 inning if that is the last inning in a win.
Maybe decisions like this is the reason why Showalter doesn’t have a ring yet. Great manager, just not in the postseason
So one of the reasons in favor of holding your closer back is that you don’t trust someone else to trust a 1-run lead, assuming that’s all you get. What is the likelihood, though, that the team scores more than 1 run in the top of the inning? A 2-run lead is still something you normally want a closer for, but it’s also something where even a mediocre reliever will hold it in spite of good fortune and execution on the part of the home team most of the time. A lead of 3 or more is very comfortable even without your best dudes.
The insanity of this is, Buck don’t trust Jimenez to save a late game lead, but he trusts him to preserve a late game tie?
I can somewhat understand not using your best relief pitcher immediately in a tied extra inning game when on the road. The team will have to get 3 outs in the bottom of the current inning to force another frame, then 3 more in the next frame whether they score or not. If you think the relief ace cannot go more than 1 inning, it does not make a terrible amount of difference how the relievers are sequenced as long as the non-ace is good, especially if you do not expect to score many runs. There may also be other factors like who is up in the line-up; save the relief ace for the toughest batters.
That said, I would still not recommend it unless both relievers are both very good. There is also the possibility that your team scores a bunch of runs in the next inning and the last 3 outs become trivial. Stay alive this inning; worry about the next inning when it arrives, if it arrives.
It still doesn’t make sense. As people mentioned above, the Orioles could have scored more than one run in their half of the inning, and then Britton would have been pitching in lower leverage situation. It’s an obviously suboptimal allocation of resources.
Also, Britton can and has pitched multiple innings before.
It is understood that the Orioles could have scored a bunch of runs in the top of an inning, thus rendering the bottom of the inning a lower leverage situation.
However, the point I was making above, and that Paul G. is making here is that if you operate under the assumption that Britton could have only gone a single inning, then Showalter’s decision goes from “insanely idiotic” to “not entirely unreasonable.”
In either situation, Paul G. and I disagree with Showalter’s decision. But when people are calling for him to be fired over this decision it is worth pointing out the difference between an insanely idiotic decision and merely a sub-optimal decision. This is similar to how there is a difference between driving 100 MPH when you’re hammered drunk versus driving a little too fast on an icy road. In both situations you’d be negligent (i.e., wrong) but in the first situation you are criminally negligent and in the second situation you are simply negligent.
No, I disagree. You’re making the argument that if he can only throw a single inning (rather than two), the optimal allocation of that inning, from a LI perspective, is if your team is ahead by a single run. You concede that the Orioles could have scored two or more, but that it makes (some) sense to be in a position to use your ace reliever in an optimal way, so keep him until your team scores.
There are a few different ways that could play out:
1. The O’s score 1, Britton comes in to save it in an optimal LI situation
2. The O’s score 2 or more, Britton comes in and saves it in a slightly-less than optimal LI situation
3. The J’s score at all, Britton isn’t used.
If we assume that the odds are 50-50 of either team scoring first in extra innings (probably a reasonable guess, here), then the likelihood of scenario 3 equals the likelihood of option 1 PLUS the likelihood of option 2. So the likelihood of the scenario where Britton gets used in that optimal situation is less than 50%…let’s say 35 or 40% (because it’s more likely that the O’s score 1 than it is that they score 2).
Meanwhile, the likelihood of scenario 3 is some 50% or so, and Britton doesn’t get in the game.
It’s essentially calling good the opposite of perfect, which is silly. Showalter didn’t want to use his big gun because he was over-estimating the likelihood that scenario 1 would come to pass.
It’s much worse than that. In any inning, the decision to use or not use Britton would come after the Orioles already had their chance at bat, which always makes the Jays the team most likely to score next.
I do not think a manager should be fired for a single decision, especially one who is probably actually a pretty good manager. It was a truly egregious decision though. Facing several situations in which giving up a single run would end the season, he repeatedly refused to use the best guy in the world at not giving up runs. The idea that he would only use him in a situation in which giving up a run would NOT cost the team the season (and possibly with wiggle room) is mind-boggling.
“You’re making the argument that if he can only throw a single inning (rather than two), the optimal allocation of that inning, from a LI perspective, is if your team is ahead by a single run.”
That is not what I am arguing – I have repeatedly said that I agree with those that say Britton should have been used even if you assume he could only pitch one inning.
What I have actually argued is that if you assume Britton could have only pitched 1 inning, it’s not as dumb of a decision as it would be if you knew he could pitch more than 1 inning.
Fair enough. Thanks for correcting me.
If Britton could pitch multiple innings, Buck should have run him out there. Maybe he didn’t have to be the first guy, but he should have been in the game long before Ubaldo. The long guy is the last person that should enter the game, unless he is a really good long reliever and you expect to keep him out there for 3+ innings because he is that good. Or perhaps if the team has multiple long relievers.
The fact that Buck kept warming him up was dumb. That’s just going to make him tired. In my opinion, once the pitcher warms up the second time, he should come in, especially in this scenario. I remember the K-Rod fiasco with that long game between the Mets and Cardinals where K-Rod essentially threw more pitches in the bullpen than most starters do in a game. K-Rod had nothing once he finally arrived for his save situation.
The situation I was considering is a really deep bullpen, like the 2001 Mariners or the “No Runs DMC” of the Yankees before the sell-off. Sending Betances or Miller out there first as to save Chapman for the special moment, whether that be a save situation (meh) or to exit a jam is defensible. Leaving Chapman in the pen and trotting out Adam Warren is not. This was the latter.
There was a comment I read somewhere (maybe in the Fangraphs chat?) that said something along the lines of “I’d never want to wish an injury on someone, but for sanity’s sake, I hope Britton’s hurt.”
That’s how I felt. Watching this unfold actually *hurt*, and I have no vested interest in this game whatsoever.
Buck’s decisions through the 10th were at least kind of defensible, given the quality of the relievers he used. Givens, O’Day, and Brach are obviously worse than Britton, but still very solid and performed well. The 11th inning defies rational explanation.
I am especially irked by the idea that Jimenez was a better option than Britton simply because he pitched well recently. Two good starts at the end of the year, and Buck suddenly forgets about the ERA near 6.
And if the defense of Ubaldo is the good recent starts, then he has to be compared to Liriano (since at that point, it was clearly Jimenez vs. Liriano for as long as they could go – if Buck’s not bringing Britton in in a tied game in the 11th, he’s not doing it in the 13th). And Liriano’s recent starts (including a dominant one against the Orioles!) were even better.
Maybe Showalter was channeling a little George Carlin with his bullpen. I can’t bang a 10, but instead I’ll band 5 2’s…
First off, I didn’t realize that Hart and Brach had been THAT effective, as I was screaming for him to turn to Britton earlier to put the pressure on the Jays bullpen (knowing the offense couldn’t bail them out until Britton was toast). In a do-or-die with Britton’s arsenal, he was good for at least 2 innings. I even begrudgingly agreed with O’Day, because he has the stuff to do exactly what he did.
But going to Duensing and Jimenez was absolutely the worst. A bazillion TV viewers rooting for karma against the Blue Jays after the Labatt and Showalter didn’t go for the kill… the O’s were so lucky to still be in the game after those 3 rally-killing double plays… why roll the dice again?
Just an absolute train wreck of bad decisions. Seriously, did he have Daniel Cabrera out there to follow Jimenez?
What’s equally amazing and more disheartening to me (because I wanted the Orioles to lose and because I plan to be watching a lot of MLB postseason on TBS in the ensuing weeks) is the complete failure of the broadcast team to talk about this shocking issue. It isn’t as though they vigorously debated it and came to the wrong, old school conclusion. It is that they barely touched it–mentioning Britton around the 9th inning and then saying nothing about it as Duensing and Jimenez came in. Right when they threw it to the studio it was as if someone in the production truck had finally gone on Twitter and said something to Ernie, who simply pointed out as he was saying goodbye that Britton hadn’t pitched. But that’s obviously not good enough. I generally like Ron Darling and was very surprised he didn’t say anything about it.
I know we’re used to broadcasters being behind the curve on a lot of this stuff, but have we really lowered our expectations of MLB broadcasting that we can’t even expect the booth to IDENTIFY a controversy (as opposed to identifying it and getting it wrong?)
I really don’t want to watch MLB postseason games on mute. There isn’t a good alternative. But what the hell am I supposed to do?
I think you have it very wrong. If you want to get your analysis, then read this article or the 25,000 others like it.
Good broadcasting is not about painful analysis (trying to make the people watching feel smart for understanding the simple issue that you are “analyzing”). Do you hear Vin Scully drone on and on about something that everyone already understands? That task is best left to Jon Gruden on MNF.
Good broadcasting *IS* however, pointing out the glaringly awful call being made in real-time, and discussing it a bit.
/fixed
Vin Scully is missed sorely already.
“Not only has he not been worse in non-save situations — he’s even been better.”
You gotta cool it with the triple negatives, Jeff.
I heard Showalter say that one of the reasons he didn’t pitch Britton is because he saw the game turning into a marathon and wanted a long man in. This is utterly confounding logic, as the only way it can possibly turn into a marathon is if the Blue Jays don’t score. He was conditioning on an event that might not happen, and in so doing made that event even less likely to happen.
I was shocked Britton wasn’t warmed and ready to enter once runners got on first and third with the heart of the Jays order due up. Not only is he the Orioles’ best pitcher overall, but he’s a ground-ball pitcher, thus minimizing the chance of a sac fly (or a home run, as it were). It’s a shame too, as I think Showalter is one of the better managers in the game.
The Jays didn’t score for a while…it was a marathon. If Britton got used up in the 9th, then he wouldn’t have been available to put out the fire in the 11th. If he pitched the 9th and 10th, the game likely would have ended the same way.
To be clear, I can’t believe he didn’t pitch either, but the fact that he wasn’t used earlier was not necessarily the reason they lost.
“If Britton got used up in the 9th, then he wouldn’t have been available to put out the fire in the 11th.”
But when Britton goes in in the 9th (in this hypothetical situation), we don’t know there is going to be an 11th. That’s the whole point!
“but the fact that he wasn’t used earlier was not necessarily the reason they lost”
Of course, but there is no *the* reason they lost. There are multiple events that increased/decreased their win probability through the game. Showalter’s job is to make decisions that increase this probability as much as possible. He failed in this regard in a very obvious way.
If Britton pitched the 9th and 10th to the same scoreless result, you’d have O’Day out there to pitch the 11th, not Ubaldo.
Also, there was no need to save Britton to put out the fire when we already know Buck didn’t use him to do so.
The question is not whether or not Britton should have been in the game, but when. If he had come in in say the 9th, I’m pretty sure that by the 11th every Jay’s fan would have been ecstatic, because as long as Britton was available this felt like sudden death. If he is brought in to face EE with runners on, and gets out of it, then he has maybe one inning left and then both he and Ubaldo are gone, and there is no long guy. The key to the game was that Liriano looked really strong, Toronto had to bring him him into the game first, which was great for the O’s except that he was on. Once Liriano looked dominant, it became clear that Ubaldo would have to pitch. It is a lot easier in hindsight to make decisions, but deciding when to burn your best weapon is a tough call.
Hind sight is 20/20… if the Orioles win then Buck is a genius. They lost, so now he’s made the biggest post-season blunder in history? Oh come on!
You cannot prove with any certainty that using Britton changes the outcome of the game.
And you can’t prove with any certainty that using Paul Janish in the middle of the lineup instead of Trumbo doesn’t change the outcome of the game. See, 2 can play at this game.
Nevertheless, I’d put my money on Trumbo and Britton. You’d put your money on Janish and Ubaldo?
Apples and Oranges here.
If Britton is used in the 9th or 10th, and they still lose later in the game, then everyone would be on here complaining about some other “crazy” decision by the manager that cost them the game.
I love this logic. I will heretofore apply it to all situations!
“YOU CAN’T PROVE WITH ANY CERTAINTY that if I drove blindfolded at 120 mph that I would die in a fiery hell! Where are my keys?”
“YOU CAN’T PROVE WITH ANY CERTAINTY that we weren’t put on this earth to eradicate all other species and exert our dominance in a battle royal free-for-all! Where muh rifle?”
“YOU CAN’T PROVE WITH ANY CERTAINTY that this raw chicken I left on the sidewalk in the 80-degree heat for two weeks will sicken me! Where’s my fancy bib at?”
Surely, surely you can see some flaws in your logic there. (Probably not though. When faced with acute, obvious error, we often like to DOUBLE DOWN!!)
It’s not hindsight. Everyone was wondering about Britton while the game was happening.
Nope, you’re wrong. The only way having Britton throw in the 9th/10th could possibly look bad is if the O’s take the lead in the 11th or later, and THEN Ubaldo (or someone else) loses the game for them. “Too bad”, we’d all say, “that Buck wasted Britton in those pointless extra innings earlier in the game, and couldn’t be the one to close it out for them.”
…”Except”, we’d realize, “maybe we wouldn’t have seen the O’s get another chance to score if they hadn’t used Britton in the 9th/10th.”
And then the O’s fans, wanting to defend Showalter’s decision-making, along with all reasonable and logical baseball fans, would cry from the rooftops: “AT LEAST WE GOT HIM IN THE FUCKING GAME, THOUGH, AND DIDN’T HAVE ONE OF THE GREATEST CLOSERS IN HISTORY (for a season, at least) SIT ON THE BULLPEN BENCH WAITING FOR US TO GET THE GODDAMN LEAD”
#1 – It’s not hindsight. I couldn’t remotely keep up with the tweets about it as it was happening.
#2 – He wouldn’t be a genius, he would be lucky. He was lucky in the 9th and 10th; that didn’t make not having Britton in then the right decision.
No, no, no, no. Of course nothing is certain. Ubaldo might have struck out the next two batters or gotten a DP grounder or gotten a DP fly ball/throw to home or any number of things. Britton might have thrown a wild pitch or given up a hit or been stung by a swinging bunt that scored the run. None of that is the point.
The point is that if that run scores, the Oriole season is over. And the pitcher best equipped to stop that run from scoring is on your team. We love it when the unexpected happens and the scrub pitcher wins a big game or a Joey Gathright type hitter smacks a game winning home run. But we don’t manage with that expectation. We use the player proven most likely to succeed in a particular situation, and this was uniquely just such a situation.
I had to work late last night. Didn’t get home to watch the game until the ninth inning. I thought it was weird at first that Britton wasn’t pitching but accepted it. Brach is a stud, -$: while he made it interesting, it worked. Then O’Day came on in extras, again, Britton would have been my choice but O’Day is still a stud, so fine.
Then Duensing comes in, and I immediately check the box score because I was 50000% sure that Britton must have come on in an intense situation in the 7th/8th. Nope. I don’t understand.
Breaking: Showalter invited to vacation in Maui with Dusty Baker and talk shop.
I knew right as Ubaldo came in that the Jays were going to win. I don’t care if he hasn’t given up a hit all month long he is the absolute last guy I would put in. Hell I’d rather throw Chris Davis out there before Ubaldo, because simply put I don’t ever want my season in the hands of him because you knew as soon as he came in he was either going to walk in the winning run or give up a walk off dinger because that is what he does.
This had more to do with the fact that I was tired and had to wake up early to go to work than it did anything else, but I turned the television off as Ubaldo Jimenez was coming into the game. I didn’t have to ask “who won?” in the morning.
I feel bad for Ubaldo Jimenez. Ballplayers have confidence, but do you think he walked out there wondering why him, just a little bit? Nothing he could do, though.
I know it’s a bit off topic, but I’m looking for logical comfort from the Jeff and the Fangraphs community. Can’t the same basic logic be applied to taking a basketball player out of the game (when you wouldn’t normally) because he’s in “foul trouble” during a tied game in the third quarter? You’re choosing to save him for later when later might mean an insurmountable 15-point deficit in the fourth. I realize the analogy doesn’t line up perfectly, but it’s always driven me nuts how a coach’s rigidity, to steal a word from Jeff, seems to hurt his team.
Am I the crazy one?
I don’t know…I don’t know basketball but that kind of sounds like a reason not to bring your closer in in the 7th inning of a tied game. It may be the right decision, but waiting for the 9th is still defensible.
You know you’re playing the full 4 quarters, just like you know you’re playing 9 innings.
Or put another way, not putting Britton in the 11th (or 10th or 9th) would be like not putting the basketball player in for the final (regulation) minute of the game or something.
Oh my lord Red Sox fans, please, please, PLEASE stop complaining about ’03. You’ve won 3 titles since then and Grady not pulling Pedro was nowhere near as egregious as Buck not using Britton. Ugh.