Archive for 2008

In 2008, the Atlanta Braves had a very disappointing season. I know, thanks Captain Obvious, but still, many analysts pegged them to at least be competitive and they essentially fell short in that regard. Granted, they lost John Smoltz after five starts, saw 13 replacement level starts from Tom Glavine before losing him for the rest of the season, made up that difference with slightly above replacement level performance from Mike Hampton, and saw Tim Hudson fall prey to Tommy John Surgery. Whew. By the end of the season, the rotation was headlined by Jair Jurrjens and accompanied by Jorge Campillo, Jo-Jo Reyes, and Hampton.

Here are the values of the primary Braves starters from 2008. Keep in mind that this only includes their numbers as starters, not bullpen appearances:

NAME               IP       FIP      WAR
Jair Jurrjens     188.1     3.59     +3.6
Tim Hudson        141.0     3.83     +2.6
Jorge Campillo    137.0     4.27     +1.9
John Smoltz        27.0     2.32     +1.0
Jo-Jo Reyes       110.1     5.04     +0.5
Mike Hampton       78.0     4.94     +0.5
Tom Glavine        63.1     6.02     -0.3

Put together, these seven pitchers combined for +9.8 wins above replacement. Glavine is not very likely to return in 2009. Hudson will miss most, if not all, of the season recovering from his surgery. Hampton just signed with the Astros. Jo-Jo Reyes was initially rumored as part of the Javier Vazquez-deal, and though his moving did not come to fruition, I think it’s safe to say he is not necessarily part of the Braves 2009 rotation hopes.

That leaves Jurrjens and Campillo. Smoltz will likely return as long as he can physically throw a baseball, leaving two rotation spots open. One of them was filled the other day, as Frank Wren traded a package of prospects for Javier Vazquez. And, if the reports I have been reading are true, and the Braves are offering that guaranteed fifth year, it seems A.J. Burnett will soon round out that rotation. What would this rotation look like compared to last year?

NAME              IP     FIP      WAR
A.J. Burnett     190     3.90     +3.3
Javier Vazquez   200     3.92     +3.3
Jair Jurrjens    160     3.84     +2.9
Jorge Campillo   160     4.12     +2.4
John Smoltz       94     3.57     +2.0

Campillo’s projection was a tad skewed due to Jorge pitching out of the pen and lacking much major league tenure entering this year, as well as the fact that it does not slot him as a full-time starter in 2009. I adjusted it to something in between what the systems are calling for, taking his rotation spot into account. For Smoltz, this assumes he only pitches 2/5 of the season or so. Still, even with 40% of Smoltz, this rotation would be worth 13.9 wins above replacement, a four-win improvement from last season.

What happens if Smoltz comes back and pitches more than these 94 innings though? What if he logs 165 innings at a 3.45 FIP, which would actually be his highest such mark since 1994? In that scenario, Smoltz would be worth +36 runs, or +3.6 wins as opposed to two wins. In that scenario, the Braves would be getting a steal with Smoltz, because there is no way he will sign a 1-yr deal for his fair market value of $18 mil. It would also add another 1.6 wins to the projected 13.9, bringing the Braves potential rotation to +15.5 WAR, an improvement of almost six wins.

We don’t know if Campillo can build on his 2008 performance; if Jurrjens can avoid the sophomore slump; if Smoltz will return and/or stay healthy; or even if Burnett will end up as a Brave. If all of this comes to fruition, however, the Braves could realistically put out an extremely potent rotation.

A Definition of Inferential Statistics:

With inferential statistics, you are trying to reach conclusions that extend beyond the immediate data alone.

This afternoon, I talked about why defensive statistics are not like offensive statistics, and closed with a statement about why I believe that defensive metrics should be viewed as inferential statistics, rather than the results of something that actually occurred. The definition above states it as well as anything I could write – what we want to do with metrics like the advanced defensive statistics we currently have is to make conclusions based on probability that go beyond the data that we have.

Let’s use a baseball example. The +/- system spit out a +47 rating for Chase Utley for 2008, calling him 47 plays better than an average defensive second baseman last year. It’s such an amazingly high number that, on it’s own, it’s basically unbelievable. Did Utley really display such amazing defense that he got to 47 more balls than an average fielder? And if so, how did such a remarkable performance go basically unnoticed by baseball observers?

Perhaps your initial reaction to such an unbelievable number would be to throw it out and discredit the system. After all, if I invented a metric that said that Chase Utley hit .434 last season, you’d just point to the facts and tell me I was wrong. But with defensive metrics, one of the basic tenets we have to accept is that we just can’t know for certain whether an average fielder would have actually fielded a particular ball, because this mythical average fielder didn’t have a chance to field that ball – only the fielder that we’re watching got a chance to field that ball. Whether anyone else could have fielded that ball has to be inferred, since it cannot be known.

This is the fundamental point to accepting defensive statistics – they know very little and infer an awful lot.

This doesn’t make them wrong or invalid. There are all kinds of statistics in life that are inferential and, when constructed correctly, give us meaningful information to make our life better. Political polling data is one of the best examples, and the match between polling data and baseball statistics got quite a bit of play with Nate Silver’s rise to fame this summer. When the data is handled correctly, inferential statistics help us answer questions we can’t figure out through descriptive statistics, and right now, defensive value is one of those things that must be inferred.

So, how do we view these numbers differently than if they were descriptive in nature? The key is to see them as data points as part of a larger sample and not take any one single data point too seriously. +/- thinks Utley was +47 last year. Okay. That’s nice. We’ll toss it into the stew, along with as many other valid data points as we can gather and determine how confident we can be within certain boundaries based on the sample that we have.

If you’ve taken a college course on statistics, you’ve probably learned about t tests and how to calculate necessary sample sizes based on given data. We won’t go through the math here, but research from guys like Chris Dial, TangoTiger, and MGL suggest that we need at least two years worth of data before we can start drawing reasonable conclusions from the defensive data we have now. Two years is a minimum. Three is a lot better, and gets us close to the point where we can be comfortable with the results.

With several years worth of data, we can be confidant that the sample is large enough that the noise in the data can be reduced to the point where our inferences can be at least generally accurate. Viewed by itself, Utley’s +47 is highly questionable. When viewed in concert with his +20 ratings in both 2006 and 2007, we can infer that Utley is probably something like a +25 defender compared to an average second baseman.

The human factor is still there, and we can’t pretend like a larger sample eliminates noise entirely, but we can begin to be confident that we can describe a player’s defensive value within a given range and be fairly accurate. Maybe we can’t prove that Utley’s a +25 fielder, but we could say that the probability of his real defensive value being between +20 and +30 is very high.

When someone tells you that defensive statistics simply aren’t as reliable as their offensive brethren, they’re right – there’s no doubt that the tools we have to measure offense are more precise than the ones to measure defense. But as statistics like UZR and +/- have come along, our ability to infer reasonably accurate conclusions about defensive value has grown immensely. They aren’t perfect, but when viewed as a data point, and analyzed as an inferential statistic, we can gather all kinds of information that we’ve never had before. And that’s exciting.

The Arizona Diamondbacks organization was busy late last month when it added four interesting relief pitching names to the 40-man roster. Those prospects added included left-handers Leyson Septimo, Clay Zavada, and right-handers Kyler Newby and Jose Marte.

Septimo was originally signed as an outfielder out of the Dominican Republic but hit just .254/.305/.349 in three seasons. He was converted to the mound to take advantage of an arm that could dial a fastball up into the high 90s. Septimo also has a power slider at his disposal. His first taste of pro pitching action occurred this past season at High-A ball with ‘meh’ results. Septimo allowed 42 hits in 41 innings and posted rates of 7.24 BB/9 and 9.66 K/9. He also posted a 4.96 FIP. He’ll likely need a little more seasoning in High-A ball before being promoted to Double-A.

Zavada was originally drafted by the Diamondbacks out of university in 2006. He made 22 relief appearances that same season in Rookie Ball and then left baseball in 2007. Zavada had a change of heart and worked his way back into shape in an independent baseball league before returning to the organization. In 24 A-ball games, the lefty allowed just six hits in 35.1 innings (a .057 batting average allowed). He also posted rates of 1.27 BB/9 and 13.75 K/9, while allowing just one home run ball. His FIP was 1.02. Zavada could skip over High-A ball and begin 2009 in Double-A. His fastball reaches the upper 80s, and his repertoire also includes a curveball and change-up.

Newby is determined. How else can you explain how the team’s final draft pick from 2004 (50th round by Arizona, 1,485th overall player chosen – only 13 other players were taken after him in the entire draft). Now, he didn’t sign right away as a junior college player, but he did sign with the club as a draft-and-follow player after spending another season playing for the Mesa Community College. In four years, Newby has posted a 2.30 ERA and allowed 103 hits in 164.1 innings. This past season in High-A ball, he allowed 49 hits in 67 innings. Newby also posted rates of 4.03 BB/9 and 11.55 K/9 thanks to a repertoire that includes an 88-92 mph fastball, a curveball and change-up.

Marte was acquired from the Texas Rangers organization prior to the 2008 season and made some strides thanks to the change of scenery. He appeared in nine High-A ball games and was then promoted to Double-A where he allowed 50 hits in 49.1 innings. Marte posted rates of 4.38 BB/9 and 6.75 K/9. He is a fastball-slider pitcher who can reach the mid-90s with the heater.

It’s rare for a team to devote so many roster spots to young relievers but with the value of pitching at an all-time high, the Diamondbacks could very well have lost any one of them in the upcoming Rule 5 Draft.

If there’s been an underlying theme to my writing here over the last year, it’s been that defense is significantly undervalued in MLB. Well, it seems like people are catching on. From the latest Peter Gammons’ article:

“The other thing is that teams are moving away from the base offensive statistics,” says another GM. “They are pouring through defensive studies and seeing that below-average defenders like Ramirez and Burrell in the field depreciate their offensive numbers because of what they give up.”

This isn’t just talk – last week, the Yankees, D’Backs, and Phillies decided that they had no interest in risking a one year arbitration offer to Bobby Abreu, Adam Dunn, or Pat Burrell, all good hitters who are miserable defensive outfielders. These guys made between $13 and $16 million in 2008, but their employers figured out that their overall production (with defense included in the calculations) just weren’t worth those kinds of paydays again.

So, with this shift in thinking apparently creeping into MLB, I figure it’s time that we spend a bit of time talking about defensive statistics and how they should be viewed. Over the next couple of days, we’ll talk about the theory behind them, and how they should be interpreted.

There are, essentially, two kinds of two defensive statistics available right now. The first would best be described as estimators – these include things like Zone Rating (and it’s THT derivative, Revised Zone Rating) and BP’s FRAA/FRAR. These measures have been around for a while, and because they don’t require a huge amount of precise data to calculate, offer very rough ideas of a player’s defensive value. More recently, several advanced defensive metrics have been created based on more precise play-by-play data – these include Ultimate Zone Rating, Plus/Minus, and Probablistic Model of Range.

The latter are the types that have pushed the new wave of defensive valuation forward, and these are the kinds of “defensive studies” that Gammons refers to. The extra data required helps make them more precise, giving us a better view of how much defense actually matters and how good each player is relative to his peers. For understanding defense, they’re a huge step forward from where we were 5 to 10 years ago.

However, there’s a pretty significant difference between the modern defensive statistics and the numbers that we use to value offense, and that lies in the variability of human error. When we talk about something like on base percentage, it is a statistic based on indisputable factual results – Player X reached base Y times in Z plate appearances. There’s no gray area – it happened, it was recorded, and no one disagrees. You could call OBP, and other things like that, a descriptive statistic – it describes a series of irrefutable events that definitely occurred.

Things like UZR, +/-, and PMR, however, are not simply recording incontrovertible facts. In order to get increased data precision, a human judgment is required to determine where on the field the ball landed and how hard the ball was hit, which both go into the calculation of how likely it was that an average fielder would have caught that ball. Humans, of course, aren’t perfect, so their required inclusion makes the data less reliable. We have to factor in human error when we’re looking at the results of these statistics, because we cannot assume 100% accuracy when there’s a subjective call in the equation.

Because of the variability of human error, these defensive metrics are simply not descriptive statistics. Instead, they are what I would consider an inferential statistic, which is still every bit as valid, but requires a different viewpoint for understanding the data. In the 5 pm post, we’ll look at what I mean by an inferential statistic and how they should be analyzed.

The San Francisco Giants have been quite active so far in the off-season. They made a very early splash when signing Jeremy Affeldt to pitch out of their bullpen and added some reinforcement today, inking Bobby Howry to a deal. Brian Sabean has also been reportedly pursuing Edgar Renteria, a deal that could come to fruition very soon. Additionally, Sabes has been linked to Jorge Cantu, he of the 29 home runs for the Marlins in 2008. With the potential for a very new-looking Giants offense in 2009, I decided to compare their starting lineup from 2008 to what it may look like for the season opener.

First, if any Giants fans out there read this and would like me to factor in partial seasons for some players who received playing time due to an injury to a starter, let me know. Also, if you have reason to believe that they will feature a different starting first baseman in 2009, I will make the correction. For the 2008 lineup, I took those with the most starts; therefore, certain players with a small sample of playing time were not included.

2008 Giants        RAR     WAR
Bengie Molina     +35.0   +3.50
Rich Aurilia       +3.0   +0.30
Emmanuel Burriss  +22.4   +2.24
Jose Castillo      +4.0   +0.40
Omar Vizquel      +23.2   +2.32
Fred Lewis        +25.3   +2.53
Aaron Rowand      +10.0   +1.00
Randy Winn        +38.5   +3.85
John Bowker        -4.4   -0.44

Put together, these ten players combined for +157 runs above replacement, or +15.7 wins. Now, how does this stack up with the potential lineup in 2009 if they ink Renteria and Cantu?

2009 Giants         RAR     WAR
Bengie Molina      +31.2   +3.12
John Bowker         +5.0   +0.50
Emmanuel Burriss   +15.5   +1.55
Jorge Cantu        +15.0   +1.50
Edgar Renteria     +23.5   +2.35
Fred Lewis         +21.8   +2.18
Aaron Rowand       +19.5   +1.95
Randy Winn         +31.0   +3.10
Pablo Sandoval (3B)+33.0   +3.30
Pablo Sandoval (1B)+16.0   +1.60

Now, the above projections are based upon Bengie Molina sustaining about a half-win above average defense and slightly improving his offense to league average for a catcher; on Aaron Rowand improving offensively; and on Renteria bouncing back on both offense and defense. These projected wins amount to 16.3 above replacement, a half-win greater than a year ago. Therefore, adding Renteria and Cantu, and giving a full year’s worth of playing time to Burriss and Bowker will add just a half-win above what they accomplished last year.

Pablo Sandoval needs to be added to the mix. His weighted projection calls for a .362 wOBA in 419 PA in 2009. Assuming he is -5 runs defensively, since we don’t know much about his defensive prowess other than it is about average or below average at 1B, we’re looking at +11 runs on offense, -5 on defense, we’ll say -10 as a positional adjustment since he could split between 1B/3B, and +20 for replacement. The total of +16 runs, or +1.6 wins. This would bring the potential 2009 Giants offense to 17.9 wins above replacement, close to three wins better than this past season.

However, if we substitute Cantu for Sandoval at 3B, and remove Bowker for Ishikawa/Phelps in a platoon, things look much better. Sandoval would improve to +3.3 wins, and the Phelps/Ishikawa platoon would be worth +1.2 wins. This would result in +18.8 wins above replacement for the 2009 Giants offense, higher than if they get Cantu, and go with Sandoval/Bowker at 1B. Therefore, it would seem like the best bet for SF would involve signing Renteria, going with the Ishikawa/Phelps platoon at first base, and letting Pablo be the everyday third baseman.

Dustin Pedroia signed a six-year, $40.5 million contract today with an option for a seventh year at a rumored, but not yet confirmed figure of $11 million. These six years buy out one club-controlled year, all three arbitration years and two free-agent seasons. Thanks to the research of many, we have a nifty general rule for average arbitration rewards that states that arbitration typically comes in at 40% the first year, 60% the second, and 80% in the final year. Because of this, we can easily figure out what the Red Sox are valuing Pedroia at.

First, let us lop off the half-million for his club-controlled year and we’re left with the three arbitration years and two market years for a price of $40 million. Since this covers Pedroia’s age 26-30 seasons, we can be pretty safe at assuming a static performance level for all five seasons. That is, lets ignore aging for now. Calling that performance level X, we have .4*X + .6*X + .8*X + 1.0*X + 1.0*X = $40M as our formula with X representing the market value that Pedroia has commanded. This simplifies to 3.8*X = 40M or just over $10.5M per season. Add back in the 10% discount that players take for long term security, divide by $4.5M per market win and the Red Sox are paying Pedroia as if he’s worth about 2.6 wins a year.

I’m not fully confident on how good Pedroia is at defense, but I think it’s safe to call him about average since I’m pretty sure that he’s not out of this world bad or insanely good (Gold Glove aside, that’s meaningless). Frankly, Pedroia’s defense would have to be butcher-level bad to make this anything less than a total steal for the Red Sox.

Pedroia was worth somewhere around four or five wins wins last year, depending on his defense. Even with the regression that should come on his bat next year, he’ll be just 25 and he seems like a sure bet to exceed three wins at minimum. In fact, the $40.5 million is quite similar to the same amount that Robinson Cano is going to get paid for the same relative time frame. Remarkable since Pedroia just came off an MVP award. Chalk another one up for Boston, who really don’t need any more help.

After reading a wide array of comments either on recent threads here, regarding evaluating free agent signings, or on the forums that chose to link to the same articles, I felt compelled to briefly discuss a certain point of contention. A difference exists between signing a good player and signing a player to a good deal. As simple as that sounds, it is an aspect of analysis all too often forgotten amongst many types of fans and writers. What this means is that it is very possible to sign a bad player to a good deal or a good player to a bad deal.

Likewise, when discussing trades and returns on these trades, it is possible to obtain a good player even though the trade is deemed poor on your part. I don’t want to discuss Gil Meche any more than we have recently, but he seems like the perfect guinea pig on which to illustrate the point. When people discuss Meche and his contract, there are two camps: those who feel it was a great deal and those who still think it was a poor decision on the part of the Royals. Though both camps differ on the signing from the standpoint of a GM or franchise insider, each side is in agreement that he has performed quite well.

It is not as if those who feel the signing was poor derive their opinions from thinking Meche has been a bad pitcher in 2007 and 2008. Rather, their opinions are based on a plethora of off-the-field issues, such as the opportunity cost of his salary, or how his performance has done nothing to increase attendance or television ratings. Now, I do not want to start up another Gil-debate, but it is important to understand that when we evaluate free agent signings, we are looking at much more than simply the quality of the player being signed.

With trades, not only do salaries come into play, but also the return. I was not a big fan of the Joe Blanton deal earlier this year, even though they acquired a pitcher pretty superior to Adam Eaton or Kyle Kendrick. Add in that Blanton does not cost much, is durable, and is under control for another few years, and it seems like a solid move. What they gave up, however, I estimated to be worth more. Who knows exactly how that one will turn out, but the point is that I never felt that Blanton was a bad pitcher.

Nobody is going to debate that Alex Rodriguez is a phenomenal player, one of the best ever, and a clear first ballot hall of famer. However, his deal with the Rangers was largely considered a bad deal, because it hamstrung the team and vastly limited the number of teams to whom they could deal Madonna’s new beau. Along similar lines, Dave took a look at the Mike Hampton signing yesterday, and astutely showed that even though Mike has injury problems, is not durable, and is not worth much over replacement level, the small fee and commitment of $2 mil for just 1-yr is a pretty solid deal. This would be an example of a “bad” player signed to a good deal.

Again, I don’t want to start debates about certain players, but I see this mistake too often in comment threads and felt it needed a bit of clearing up.

Continuing their quest to upgrade their bullpen, the Giants signed Bob Howry to a one year, $2.75 million contract today. That Howry had to settle for such a modest deal shows how much power ERA still has in determining pitcher value in the marketplace.

From 2004 to 2007, Howry was one of the game’s better setup men, posting a FIP between 3.07 and 3.73 in each year, and doing even better than that in ERA – 2.47 to 3.32. He doesn’t walk anyone and strikes out a fair number of hitters, which is a good combination for an 8th inning reliever. Nothing about that changed last year, and his 4.54 K/BB rate in 2008 was actually the highest of his career.

However, Howry posted a 5.35 ERA last year for two reasons – his home run skyrocketed to 1.66 HR/9 and his BABIP was .354. Both of these are more about bad luck than any drop in Howry’s skills – his FB% was the same as always, but more of those flyballs just went over the wall. In 70 innings, that kind of variance is going to happen. That doesn’t mean we should expect it to continue, though.

Marcel projects Howry to post a 4.17 FIP in 2009, and that’s factoring in a pretty significant age related regression – it has him adding nearly a walk per nine innings to his total and retaining a pretty decent chunk of the HR issues that plagued him in 2008. It’d be fair to call Marcel’s projection conservative, and I’d suggest that he’s more likely to post a FIP in the 4.00 range.

If a replacement level NL reliever would post a 4.75 FIP, that makes Howry about 6 runs better than replacement, assuming he pitches 65 innings next year. Adding in a leverage factor to account for the extra value of the runs he’ll be saving as a late inning reliever, and Howry’s basically a +1 win reliever.

The Giants just bought a win for around $3 million. Even in this economy, that’s a bargain. Affeldt and Howry are significant upgrades to the Giants bullpen, and for a total 2009 cost of $7 million, the Giants have gotten quite a bit better already this winter.

Like kids on Christmas morning tearing open their presents while bleary-eyed parents are still walking downstairs from their bedroom, general managers Frank Wren and Kenny Williams could not wait for the 2008 MLB Winter Meetings, which begin on Monday. The Atlanta Braves organization, pending physicals, has acquired Major League starting pitcher Javier Vazquez and southpaw reliever Boone Logan for a collection of prospects headed to the Chicago White Sox. Dave Cameron tackled the Vazquez breakdown, while this article will highlight those four prospects obtained by the White Sox.

Catcher Tyler Flowers is the headliner in the deal from the White Sox’ perspective. The 22-year-old just finished up his third professional season after being selected by the Braves out of Chipola Junior College with a 33rd round pick in 2005 (He had also been drafted by the club the previous year in the 27th round but declined to sign).

Flowers finally put his name to a contract as a draft-and-follow and began his pro career in 2006 in Rookie Ball. He hit immediately and managed a line of .279/.373/.465 with an ISO of .186 in 34 games. The next season at A-ball, his stats line increased to .298/.377/.488 with an ISO of 190 in 389 at-bats. Flowers also posted rates of 11.2 BB% and 19.0 K%, along with a wOBA of .367. This past season, the power-hitting catcher played in High-A ball and posted a line of .288/.425/.494 with an ISO of .206 and a wOBA of .393. His rates included a 19.2 walk percentage (98 walks in 2008) and a 24.7 strikeout percentage.

Although he had a great regular season in 2008, Flowers’ value took a huge jump when he was assigned to the Arizona Fall League and exploded. He hit .387/.460/.973 with a league-leading 12 home runs in just 75 at-bats (one home runs every 6.25 at-bats). If the Braves organization did not have Brian McCann behind the plate already – along with defence expert Clint Sammons to serve as the back-up – Flowers would not have been going anywhere.

The downside to Flowers, though, is his defence. Scouts are split on whether he’ll be able to stick behind the dish. He made 12 errors in 84 games this past season and threw out 43 of 155 base stealers (28%). Flowers is considered an excellent receiver, but he is still working on his game calling. Even if he doesn’t stick behind the plate, it appears as though Flowers will have more than enough bat to play first base. If he does remain behind the plate, though, the right-handed hitter could become one of the best offensive catchers in the game.

The most advanced player in the deal, Brent Lillibridge had a poor offensive season in 2008, which decreased his overall value. The middle infielder, who has played mostly shortstop in his career, spent last season splitting time between Atlanta and Triple-A. Despite having a career batting average of .270, the 25-year-old hit just .220/.286/.344 with an ISO of .124 and a wOBA of .280 in 355 Triple-A at-bats in his second season at that level. He also posted rates of 8.5 BB% and 25.4%. In 29 Major League games, Lillibridge hit .200/.238/.338 with an ISO of .138. The former fourth round draft pick (by the Pirates), does have quite a bit of speed and in the past three seasons he has stolen 120 bases, including 25 in 2008. He has the range and arm strength to play shortstop at the Major League level, although he could compete for the second base job in spring training depending on how the middle infielder story plays out this winter.

Jon Gilmore was a 2007 supplemental first round selection out of an Iowa high school. He has spent the past two seasons playing in Rookie Ball, although he received a late-season promotion to A-ball in 2008. At the lower level, the third baseman hit .337/.369/.473 with an ISO of .136 and a wOBA of .357. His walk rate was just 4.8% but his strikeout rate was a respectable 15.9%. Upon his promotion to A-ball, Gilmore hit just .186/.202/.196 in 102 at-bats. Although he did not display above-average, in-game power in 2008, the 20-year-old has excellent raw power. A former football player, Gilmore is a good athlete and is an average defensive third base, with an outside shot of becoming a plus defender.

Santos Rodriguez is the least-known name of the quartet. The 20-year-old southpaw is in his second season in North America and has spent both years in Rookie Ball. After posting a 6.67 ERA in 2007 (but a FIP of 4.75), Rodriguez allowed just 16 hits in 29 relief innings this past season. He posted rates of 4.07 BB/9 and 13.97 K/9 with no home runs allowed. More than just a LOOGY-in-the-making, the Dominican held right-handed batters to a .138 batting average. He has that power arm that Chicago covets in relievers, but he is extremely raw and needs to develop reliable secondary pitches.

Overall, the White Sox organization is receiving an outstanding offensive catcher, a middle infielder with average offensive potential and two very raw players who are still in Rookie Ball – for a number three starter who has pitched more than 200 innings each of the last four seasons and has struck out more than 200 batters in each of the past two seasons.

Last night, the Braves decided to end all the Jake Peavy speculation and go in another direction – that direction was Javier Vazquez, as they sent a group of prospects to the White Sox for the talented but enigmatic Puerto Rican. With only 2 years and $23 million left on his deal, he’s significantly cheaper than Peavy, and they didn’t have to touch their major league roster or their top prospects in order to add him to their rotation. However, lower cost doesn’t always mean better value – so, let’s look at what the Braves should expect to get from Vazquez.

If there’s one word to describe Vazquez, it’s durable. He’s thrown 200 innings every single year this decade except for 2004, when he threw 198 innings. He’s made 32-34 starts in every one of those years. The man takes the ball every five days without fail. If it’s innings the Braves were looking for, they found the right guy.

The quality of those innings, though, that’s another story. As Eric noted a month ago, there’s not a pitcher in baseball who has underachieved as much in his career as Vazquez. His career FIP is an outstanding 3.93, but his ERA is 4.32 – four tenths of a run higher over 2,270 innings. Based on his BB/K/HR rates, Vazquez should have performed significantly better than he has in his career.

However, for whatever reason, he just can’t seem to strand runners to save his life. His career LOB% is 70.4%, which is pretty much dead on league average – but Vazquez isn’t a league average pitcher, and with his ability to miss bats while not walking batters, he should be better than average at runner stranding as well. Peavy, for instance, has a career 77.6% LOB% on a 3.51 FIP. The difference in strand rate is significantly larger than the difference in their core skills, and it’s why Peavy has won a Cy Young award and Vazquez has been traded numerous times.

Even with his inconsistency, Vazquez should be good for 200 innings with a 4.00 ERA or so in the NL, making him worth about +3 wins compared to a replacement level pitcher. That’s a solid addition to any rotation, but is he worth $11.5 million a year plus four young prospects?

Maybe. If he lives up to his talent, the Braves will be happy with the trade. If he continues to underachieve, though, we may be analyzing next year’s Vazquez trade at this time.