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A continuation of the series of retrospectives looking back at the regular season and how teams fared. They will be presented, from first to last, in order of their run differential as given by the BaseRuns formula and adjusted for strength of schedule, which I feel is the best measurement of a team’s actual talent level.
Number Twenty seven: San Francisco Giants
Looking at the respective ranks for San Francisco’s separate units really makes it clear who were the problems for the Giants. The hitters came in 28th in the league, the starters 12th and the relievers 27th.
That the rotation came in above average despite the anchors of Barry Zito and Kevin Correia is a testament to just how awesome and Cy Young-worthy Tim Lincecum was in 2008. Matt Cain and Jonathan Sanchez were both stable members of the rotation, also helping to offset the Zito disaster. It’s notable though that if you regressed home run per fly ball rates among starting pitchers, the group gets a lot worse.
Contrast that to the bullpen where Sergio Romo was truly the only hurler to claim a significant amount of positive contribution. Beside him were a few average-ish relievers surrounded by a hodgepodge of flotsam of the Gino Espineli and Erick Threets ilk.
The real culprits though were among the hitters, who generated about 75 runs below average according to wOBA and also lost about 20 runs on the defensive side as well. Interestingly, with the dismission of Barry Bonds, the offense clearly felt his absence, but possibly left field as well. Certainly Aaron Rowand played a part as well, but San Francisco’s outfield defense improved by 44 plays according to John Dewan. However, letting Pedro Feliz leave contributed to a collapse in their infield defense, falling 54 plays on the corners.
Back to the outfield, the Giants’ outfield of Fred Lewis, Aaron Rowand and Randy Winn were contributors with the bat as well, which coupled with that outstanding defense mentioned above, makes them one of the better and unheralded units in the game during 2008. It’s just everyone else who ruined the nice bed that the outfield made.
Can San Francisco recover? Barry Zito is going to be a big part of that answer as he’s not going to go anywhere with that salary. With Sanchez, Lincecum and Cain in the fold, the Giants have the foundation for a good rotation. Rebuilding bullpens can be done easily and cheaply, so really it comes down to overhauling their infield. With the weakened NL West, there is a chance for the Giants to make strides quickly.
For the last day or two we have begun to delve deep into the baseball economy and how it relates to fair market value, free agency, and context. This morning, our discussion centered around the necessity to add context in order to more accurately represent free agency analyses. This afternoon, Dave brought forth a great evaluative tool, showing average dollars/win figures for all 30 teams. The figures in the spreadsheet were arrived at after concluding that a team of replacement players would cost $12 mil and win 50 games; that the goal of each team would be to win 40 games above replacement; by subtracting the $12 mil from the estimated payroll; and finally by dividing that difference by the 40 wins above replacement.
The logical next step is to actually put this into action, combining an analysis of fair market value with the context of a specific team. With the news that the Brewers have decided to offer arbitration to Ben Sheets, he seems like the perfect person on which to test our new methods. To make the post a bit easier to read, I’ll break it up into different sections.
Brewers Payroll
Over the last three years, the Brewers have increased their payroll from $57 mil to $80 mil. If we factor in about a 5% markup, their 2009 payroll can be estimated at $84 mil. Therefore, they would have $72 mil ($84 mil payroll – $12 mil replacement payroll) to win 40 games (90 wins – 50 replacement wins). The quotient amounts to an average of $1.8 mil/win. Now, this is just an average, and does not imply that every signing the Brewers make has to be for $1.8 mil/win. However, every player of theirs that exceeds $1.8 mil/win will necessitate an adjustment in what they have left to spend.
Ben Sheets & Fair Market Value
Weighting the Bill James and Marcel projections for 2009 puts Sheets at 180 innings with a 3.60 FIP, very solid numbers. He might not be the guy who, in 2004, produced a 2.65 FIP, 2.70 ERA, and > 8.0 K/BB, but he still has the ability to dominate. A replacement level starter would log 150 innings with a 5.50 FIP while a replacement reliever would pitch the remaining 30 innings at a 4.50 FIP.
Ben Sheets: 180 IP, 3.60 FIP, 72 runs Replacement SP: 150 IP, 5.50 FIP, 92 runs Replacement RP: 30 IP, 4.50 FIP, 15 runs
All told, that would put Sheets at 72 runs and the replacement level at 107 runs. This +35 run advantage for Sheets puts him at +3.5 wins above replacement. Normally, we would add a quarter-win or half-win for the fact that the starter in question would pitch the innings and help save the bullpen. Sheets does not get this advantage from me, and given his inability to consistently make more than, say, 22 starts in a season, I’m actually going to dock him a quarter-win, bringing his value to a solid +3.25 wins above replacement.
The going rate right now is $5 mil/win, so if Ben were to sign a 1-yr deal, the appropriate fee would be $16.25 mil. Factor in a 10% discount for a multi-year deal, and his 3-yr deal would be worth $44 mil, an average annual value (AAV) of $14.7 mil. That AAV divided by his 3.25 WAR amounts to a fee of $4.52 mil/win, about two and a half times higher than the Brewers’ average of $1.8 mil/win.
The Contract & The Team
If we knew nothing else about the Brewers, other than that they were striving for 40 wins above replacement and had 73 mil left with which to accomplish the feat, then signing Sheets to this deal would mean they now had 37 wins to add with about $58 mil to spend. We do know about the Brewers, though, and thanks to the guys at BrewCrewBall, calculations about returning players and their salaries can be made.
According to their figures, the Brewers will have 16 players returning to the roster, at an approximate sum of $66,449,000. The link suggests the total is closer to $73 mil, but Salomon Torres retired, and I’m unsure what is going on with Craig Counsell, so they were both removed. Calculating the wins above replacement for all 16 players, the total comes to about 35 wins, at the $66,449,000. This means that the Brewers have $17,551,000 left to spend in order to accrue the five remaining wins necessary to reach 40 WAR.
If they signed Ben Sheets to this 3-yr deal at fair market value, which would be an AAV of $14.7 mil for three seasons, they would have 38 wins above replacement amongst 17-19 players, and about $3 mil left to spend. Because they are getting such great deals on Braun (an astrounding $149,000 per win), Hardy, Weeks, and Hart, they can use the money saved in those areas to afford the inevitable jump in arbitration for the likes of Prince as well as other potential free agent targets.
Based on the projections for those returning, the Brewers appear to be in a solid position for 2009, and with about $14-17 mil remaining, should be able to increase from 35 wins to 40 wins above replacement, bringing their projection to 90 wins. Signing Sheets would be nice, but doing so may necessitate the usage of prospects to fill out the roster, who, could add quality for the league minimum, but might not be very useful.
Moving Forward
The next step in these types of analyses is to evaluate the remaining money in terms of the spots that need to be filled. With their $17 mil remaining outside of those returning, it is quite different in signing starters as opposed to a LOOGY, long reliever, and backup infielder. So, Brewers faithful on the interwebs, what are the positions that are not returning next season? And, on top of that, would you prefer to sign Sheets to his fair market value and fill the remaining spots with farm players, or invest that $14-17 mil elsewhere to fill out the roster, all the while keeping the goal of adding at least 5 WAR to the team?
Yesterday, the Houston Astros announced they have signed Mike Hampton to a contract. This time around, Hampton isn’t setting a record for the largest contract ever signed by a pitcher, but instead settling for a guaranteed $2 million for 2009 with the ability to make another $2 million if he hits certain incentive markers.
Considering Hampton didn’t pitch at all in 2006 or 2007 and only managed 78 innings last year, there’s some understandable skepticism about just how long he’ll last before succumbing to another injury. Reaction in some corners to giving Hampton guaranteed money likens it to setting money ablaze.
Honestly, I had the exact opposite reaction – I think this is a classic no risk move that could pay solid dividends for the Astros.
Hampton has one obvious major league skill – the ability to get ground balls. His sinker has good movement, and he’s always been a groundball pitcher. That didn’t go away while he was rehabbing, either – his 2008 GB% of 52.7% was higher than any mark he posted while healthy from 2002 to 2005. Because Hampton keeps the ball on the ground, his primary way of keeping runs off the board has always been to limit the long ball – his career 0.78 HR/9 rate is one of the best in the league for active pitchers.
Because he’s able to prevent home runs, he’s been able to succeed with below average walk and strikeout rates – his career 1.53 K/BB rate is nothing to write home about, but because he hasn’t given up many home runs, he’s posted a career 4.25 FIP.
Hampton showed the same skillset last year – mediocre command, doesn’t miss many bats, but still gets a bunch of groundballs. However, 15.2% of his flyballs went over the wall, leading to a 4.94 FIP. As we’ve talked about, HR/FB rate fluctuates quite a bit from year to year due to factors outside of a pitcher’s control, so we can’t just assume that this was some flaw in Hampton’s pitching that caused the surge in longballs. If Hampton had allowed HRs on just 10% of his fly balls, he’d have allowed four fewer home home runs, and his FIP would have been 4.34, pretty much right in line with his career norms.
Even factoring in some regression due to age, it’s hard to get much lower than a true talent level 4.60 FIP for Hampton. If we assume that a replacement level starter in the NL would post a 5.50 FIP, and that Hampton’s injury problems limit him to 100 innings, then we still get a 10 run difference between Hampton and a replacement level starter.
Signing a +1 win pitcher for $2-$4 million (it’s impossible to know which incentives he’d hit in our scenario) is a pretty big bargain, even in this depressed free agent economy. Good move for the Astros.
If you haven’t yet, read Eric’s post below about the need to add context to contract analysis, depending on a team’s ability to contend. I don’t know that I agree with the idea that bad teams should never improve themselves through free agency if it doesn’t result in a playoff berth, but I did want to build off of Eric’s point about teams having different marginal win/dollar rates at which a contract makes sense.
Intuitively, everyone knows this is true – a contract that makes sense for the Yankees doesn’t necessarily make sense for the Rays, simply due to the massive differences in payroll. Alex Rodriguez can be an asset for New York while he’d simultaneously be a liability for other teams simply due to the context of the specific organizations.
However, I don’t know that I’ve ever seen anyone break down the marginal win/dollar rates for each franchise, based on projected payroll, so that’s what we’ll do this afternoon. For those unfamiliar with the marginal win/dollar metrics, they were first made famous by the late Doug Pappas, and his work has been continued on by countless others. The concept is built around the belief that a team of replacement level, freely available players would finish with something like 50 wins, and due to their freely available nature, they shouldn’t cost any more than the league minimum.
Basically, we’re saying that a team that isn’t trying to contend could win 50 games on a payroll of about $12 million, which assumes a $400,000 contract for 30 players. That team would be paying about $240,000 per absolute win, and since they’re the baseline we’re building off of, obviously they wouldn’t be spending any marginal money or accumulating any marginal wins.
To apply this to a team from last year, the Seattle Mariners spent $117 million and won just 61 games. In other words, they spent $105 million to win an extra 11 games over what they could have won without even trying to contend, so the Mariners spent $9.55 million per marginal win. That’s bad. Really bad. A team with that marginal win/dollar rate would have needed a payroll of about $382 million in order to be a 90 win team, which would put them in contention while not guaranteeing a playoff spot.
Hopefully, you have a pretty good grasp of marginal win/dollar rates now. Now, using 2008 team payrolls, adding a 5% markup to adjust for modest salary inflation, and assuming that every team’s target should be 40 marginal wins added, here are the team specific dollar per win rates for 2009 – obviously, for some teams like Seattle, these won’t reflect a change in direction from potential contender to rebuilding.
The Yankees can spend $5 million per win across their entire roster. Remember, we’ve been saying that wins on the free agent market cost just over $5 million per win – if there were enough free agents available, the Yankees have a large enough payroll to build a contender from scratch just by signing free agents. Once you add in the presence of cost-controlled players like Joba Chamberlain, Chien-Ming Wang, and Robinson Cano, where they’re paying quite a bit less than $5 million per win for players developed from within, and the Yankees can actually justify free agent contracts up to $7 or $8 million per win. They can spend $15 or $16 million on a league average player in order to fill out the roster and have it not be a real problem. That’s a remarkable financial advantage.
On the other end of the spectrum, you see teams like Tampa, Florida, and Oakland, who have to try to contend while spending less than $1 million per win. The only way to do that is to build from within, which is why these organizations covet major league players in their 1st-3rd years of service time – you can get huge production for no money, which is absolutely vital to trying to build a 90 win team for less than $1 million per marginal win.
These payroll specific dollar per win rates are a good step in the right direction to evaluating whether a contract makes sense for a specific team. However, there’s still a pretty huge missing piece of information here, and that’s the amount of wins currently on a roster. A team needs to understand how many wins they really have to add and how much money they have available in order to evaluate a specific move, and we’ve only calculated the latter half in this post. In a future post, we’ll take the next step and factor in the wins already in place.
During the baseball off-season, few, if any aspects of the game are as interesting as where free agents end up. Each signing catalyzes a frenzy of analytical activity as writers from all walks of baseball life attempt to deduce whether or not certain moves made sense or were executed under poor judgment. On occasion, deals can be deemed poor before money even enters the picture, due primarily to the player being below average outside of some shiny stat like home runs or RBIs. On the other hand, there are always plenty of deals that make sense, statistically, but the money does not add up.
For the last month or so, Dave and I have used statistical analysis as well as economic concepts to determine the fair market value for several players. Essentially, we have been working to determine what a player is worth, relative to a replacement level player, while factoring in the going rate of dollars per win, inflation, and a potential discount rate for multi-year deals. There is no better way to evaluate a contract from a context-neutral standpoint then to combine offense and defense and determine wins above replacement.
Unfortunately, as Rob Neyer pointed out in a post yesterday revolving around my article on Gil Meche’s worth, baseball does not exist inside of a vacuum, and context is very real. Rob’s point, with which I firmly agree, is that even though Meche has statistically been worth over the average annual value of his current contract, the deal is still poor when the context of the Kansas City Royals is taken into account. As in, is that $11 mil/yr really worth increasing the win total from 71 to 73?
This idea of context is extremely important, because the price of increasing from 71 to 73 wins is vastly different than an improvement of two wins from 91 to 93. The difference, realistically, involves the playoffs. That 93-win team may now play into October whereas, with 91 wins, they would have fallen just short. Therefore, it would make more sense for teams in this situation to pay a higher fee per win than the 71-73 win team. Perhaps they value wins at a rate of $7-7.5 mil as opposed to $4.8-5 mil. Along similar lines, the team with the win total in the 70s may be inclined so as to value players at a rate of $3-3.5 mil/win. With regards to Meche, Rob’s point boiled down to the fact that even though Meche is worth about $12.4 mil right now, he is not worth that much to the Royals, with their payroll and attendance struggles, as well as their inability to make the playoffs, or even the .500 mark.
Our analyses here generally tend not to discuss context, as we merely look at the fair market value of a player, regardless of where he signs, perhaps to serve as a benchmark. If Meche were a free agent right now, he would be worth 12.5-13.8 mil, depending on whether or not he signed a one- or multi-year deal. If he were a free agent today, worth a projected 2.75 wins above replacement, it would make sense for a team on the cusp of making the playoffs to “overpay” his worth to increase their chances. It would not make sense, however, for a team like the Royals to do the same, given that they would still struggle to even reach the .500 mark.
In an e-mail conversation with Neyer, we arrived at the same conclusion: the issue of an opportunity cost is what this really boils down to; that is, what would happen if the $55 million given to Gil were instead invested into international talent, the amateur draft, or scouting? In that scenario, how many potential wins could be added to the major league team in the five years of Meche’s tenure, or even the year after? For all we know, those investments could have resulted in five players capable of sniffing the +1.5-2.5 win mark. And would the attendance or TV ratings from the past two years be any worse without Meche?
I like Meche, and statistically, he is worth more than the average annual value in his current contract, but I wanted to make it clear that context needs to be included when evaluating a deal in order to be as accurate as possible. It is different determining if an actual signing makes sense compared to simply determining the fair market value. For instance, if we wanted to see if Ryan Dempster was worth his deal, or how much his worth exceeded the value, a similar analysis would need to be run, and the context of the Chicago Cubs would also need to be taken into account. If the goal involved merely determining his fair market value, prior to signing, context is not necessarily as important.
The problem we run into, though, is that even though all dollars/win are not created equally, it is particularly tough to determine the true rates. Are 85-win teams justified in spending $7 mil/win? Are 90-win teams justified in spending $9 mil/win? Are 65-win teams justified in spending anything over $3 mil/win on a single player, given their likely low payroll and the fact that one player would not turn the team around? What are your thoughts on the matter? At what win threshold does it make sense to exceed the general going rate or fall short? Should teams with little shot at contending for several seasons even attempt big deals?
A continuation of the series of retrospectives looking back at the regular season and how teams fared. They will be presented, from first to last, in order of their run differential as given by the BaseRuns formula and adjusted for strength of schedule, which I feel is the best measurement of a team’s actual talent level.
Number Twenty six: Cincinnati Reds
This wasn’t quite the season Cincinnati had in mind when the seasons began changing for the warmer this year. Saved from the bitter depth of the NL Central only by the lowly Pirates, the Reds featured a below average offense, defense and starting rotation. They managed to assemble a bullpen that resembled league average though.
Starting with the defense, going by John Dewan’s plus/minus system, they checked in at 22nd this year, 34 plays below average. While that it is bad, at least it was an improvement over 2007 when they finished 27th, a whopping 63 plays below average. The big differences appear to come from Joey Votto taking over from Scott Hatteberg, Corey Patterson replacing the departed Josh Hamilton, and a reduced amount of time that Ken Griffey Jr. appeared in right field.
You would like to see a below average defensive unit at least make it up with the bat, but that’s certainly not the case here. Patterson, Jeff Keppinger and Paul Bako were horrible at the plate, a collective 50 runs or so below average. For their horrid fielding, Griffey and Adam Dunn did far too little to make up the difference. Joey Votto was about the only success story with some supporting roles played by Jerry Hairston Jr and Chris Dickerson.
Edinson Volquez, arriving for Josh Hamilton from Texas, was certainly a big splash in the rotation for Cincinnati but he was alone in that role. Aaron Harang was the big surprise, dropping his strikeout rate substantially and seeing a rise in walks and home runs allowed. Johnny Cueto was serviceable in his first taste of the big leagues, an encouraging sign, but Homer Bailey was not, still unable to see his minor league strikeouts translate in the big leagues.
Bullpen wise, nobody aside from Jeremy Affeldt stands out as a success, perhaps Jared Burton, but the Reds did a good job of limiting liabilities with the worst reliever being either Gary Majewski or David Weathers.
The Reds managed to trade Griffey in 2008 and Adam Dunn and are losing some minor others to free agency. Their defense will be much improved with even average gloves in their place, but they also represented a pair of the few above average bats, so the Reds immediate future still looks bleak. Their hope would seem to rest on hoping Volquez is for real, Harang bounces back and Bailey and Cueto take steps forward and give them a force in the rotation to cover their other, numerous, deficiencies.
In 2004, Carlos Beltran had a coming out party, of sorts, on the grandest of stages with the Houston Astros. He joined the Drayton Gang earlier in the season as part of a three-team trade, and while he was always highly valued, mashing eight post-season home runs and setting the record for most consecutive playoff games with a home run cemented his superstardom. Following the season, agent Scott Boras and he signed a 7-yr/119 mil deal with the New York Mets, an average annual value of 17 million dollars.
In 2,609 PAs with the Mets from 2005-08, Beltran is hitting .275/.362/.505 with an average of 36 doubles, 29 home runs, and 21 stolen bases. He also plays fantastic defense and is a menace on the basepaths. Bill James and Marcel disagree on his 2009 projection, with James being more optimistic in the form of more plate appearances and a higher wOBA. The godfather of sabermetrics sees Beltran posting a .383 wOBA in 680 PAs, while Marcel is calling for a .368 wOBA in 617 PAs. Weighting the two projections, Beltran’s true talent level is around a .376 wOBA in 649 PAs.
Over the last three seasons, Beltran has posted + – defensive marks of +11, +24, and +24. Weighted, with another year of aging taken into account, we can be comfortable calling him a +20 fielder for 2009, which amounts to +16 runs, and +2.5 more need to be added as a positional adjustment since he is a centerfielder. Before his offense even comes into play, Beltran is worth +18.5 runs compared to an average player.
To determine his offensive contribution, subtract the league average wOBA from his projected mark, divide by 1.15, and multiply that quotient by the number of plate appearances. ((.376-.332)/1.15)*649= 24.8. Therefore, Beltran is worth +24.8, or +25, runs compared to an average player, or about two and a half wins. Add this to the +18.5 from other facets of his play and Beltran, for 2009, is a +43.5 runs above average player. Converted to wins, he is worth 4.35 wins above what an average player would contribute. Then we must add another two wins to establish his mark above replacement level, making him +6.35 wins.
Next, we want to see if he is worth the AAV of 17 mil, so multiply the 6.35 wins by the 5 mil rate of dollars per win. The product is 31 million dollars, meaning that if Carlos were a free agent right now, and signed a 1-yr deal, a fee of 31 mil would be appropriate. Factor in a 10% discount rate for security with a team, and that he has three years remaining on his deal with the Mets, a 3-yr deal at this juncture would be worth 84 mil, an AAV of 28 mil.
A 17-mil/season deal would pay Beltran to be worth 3.4 wins. As we have just seen, right now, he is worth about three full wins more. The Mets are paying him handsomely, but his market value at this moment much greater in terms of salary. Now, Rob Neyer linked here this morning discussing the idea that certain teams can afford to, or should pay more for certain players, based on the payroll and potential success of the team. As in, the Mets increasing their wins total from 92-95 should be worth more money than Meche increasing the Royals from 70-73 wins.
This makes Beltran’s case even more interesting, because the Mets are currently paying him for much less than he is worth on the market today, and the Mets are a team with a payroll, fanbase, and potential success large enough to pay, with merit, more than the 5 mil/win rate. Essentially, they are paying a 6.5 win player money for a 3.5 win player in the context of their team, which could/should pay closer to 6.5-7 mil per win. His offensive numbers may not be as impressive as a few years ago, but he is a dynamite baserunner and arguably the best defensive centerfielder in the game, which adds immense value normally not taken into account.
The Detroit Tigers organization is not known for its minor league depth. In fact, its system ranks as one of the worst in all of Major League Baseball. Regardless, a number of interesting minor league pitchers were added to the Tigers’ 40-man roster recently, in order to protect those players from the Rule 5 Draft on Dec. 11.
Zach Simons, who was originally drafted by the Rockies in the second round of the 2005 draft and traded to Detroit this past season for veteran reliever Jason Grilli, had an intriguing season. In High-A ball for Detroit, Simons allowed just 29 hits (.166 average) in 53.1 innings of work. Oddly though, he allowed more walks than hits, with 30. Simons also fanned 61 batters. He has a low-90s sinking fastball that tops out around 94 mph, along with a slider and change-up. Coming out of community college, Simons was a starter who was converted to the bullpen after a disastrous 2006 season, when he allowed 134 hits in 111.2 innings and posted an ERA of 6.29. After the 2008 regular season, Simons was assigned to the Arizona Fall League where he allowed 12 hits and seven walks in 13 innings. He struck out just six batters but impressed Detroit enough to earn a spot on the 40-man roster.
Guillermo Moscoso was another name that came out of left field for a lot of Tigers fans, when he was added to the 40-man roster. His name was not even mentioned in the winter of 2007 or spring of 2008 as one of Detroit’s top prospects. Moscoso’s 2008 season changed that, though. The 25-year-old right-hander allowed just 36 hits in 52 High-A innings, as well as rates of 2.25 BB/9 and 12.46 K/9. Upon a promotion to Double-A, Moscoso allowed 24 hits in 34.2 innings, with rates of 2.08 BB/9 and 12.98 K/9. The talent was always obvious, as he pitched a perfect game in Short Season ball in 2007. He throws an 88-92 mph fastball, along with an average curveball and change-up.
The third pitcher added to the 40-man roster was Alfredo Figaro, a right-hander who posted a 12-2 record in A-ball before struggling upon a promotion to High-A. At the lower level, he allowed 99 hits in 123 innings of work. He also posted rates of 2.20 BB/9 and 7.02 K/9. In High-A, Figaro allowed 37 hits in 29.1 innings and his walk rate jumped significantly to 3.68 BB/9. He is still raw but Detroit likes his fastball (which touches 94 mph) and curveball. He also has as developing change-up.
All three pitchers remain raw but they offer some much-needed talent to the weak system.
Following the 2006 season, Gil Meche inked a 5-yr/55 million dollar contract with the Kansas City Royals. The deal underwent immediate scrutiny due to Meche’s below average performance throughout the previous few seasons. His ERA ranged from 4.48 to 5.09, with an FIP entrenched in the 4.60-4.70 area. Simply put, an average annual value of 11 million dollars did not seem appropriate for someone with his credentials. Perhaps Dayton Moore, who apparently goes by the nickname DMGM, knew what he was doing, because Meche has established himself as a solid and consistent pitcher over the past two seasons.
2007: 34 GS, 216.0 IP, 6.50 K/9, 2.58 BB/9, 2.52 K/BB, 4.02 FIP 2008: 34 GS, 210.1 IP, 7.83 K/9, 3.12 BB/9, 2.51 K/BB, 3.61 FIP
His walk rate rose a bit this past season, but his WHIP remained in the same general vicinity as 2007, and his FIP improved by almost a half-run, all the while repeating his durability. So, the 55-million dollar question then becomes is he worth the 11 mil per season? As in, if Meche were a free agent right now, what would an appropriate contract look like? To figure out the answer, we turn to the ever familiar dollar valuation formula that Dave and I have used here recently.
For starters, we need to see what Meche is projected to do in 2009. Bill James and Marcel disagree, both in innings logged and FIP, with James calling for more innings and Marcel projecting a lower FIP. Averaging the projections, Meche in 2009 would pitch 199 innings with a 4.18 FIP. His value would be how this compares to a replacement level pitcher. For a starting pitcher, replacement level FIP is set at 5.50. Unfortunately, a replacement level starter would not be left out there for 200 innings. Instead, he would amass somewhere around 150 innings. The remaining 49 innings would be logged by a reliever. For bullpen hurlers, replacement FIP is 4.50.
Replacement SP: 150 IP 5.50 FIP 92 runs Replacement RP: 49 IP 4.50 FIP 25 runs Replacement Total: 199 IP 117 runs
Meche, with a 4.18 FIP in 199 innings, would be responsible for 92 runs. Conveniently enough, this cancels out with the 92 runs surrendered by the replacement starter, meaning Meche’s value above replacement level is +25 runs. Converted to wins, Meche would be worth 2.5 wins. Then, factor in that Meche is taking innings away from the bullpen, and I’m comfortable adding another quarter-win, bringing the total to 2.75 wins.
Last year, the average dollar figure per win was around 4.5-4.75 million dollars. With inflation, I’ll call this year’s amount a firm 5 million per win. 2.75 wins multiplied by 5 million dollars per win amounts to 13.8 million dollars. That is, if Meche were a free agent right now and signed a 1-yr deal, 13.8 million dollars would be an appropriate fee. For multi-year deals, we usually factor in a 10% discount rate, since players tend to sacrifice a bit of their monetary value for some security. With that in mind, a 3-yr deal for Meche would come out to 37.3 million dollars. A 5-yr deal would be valued at 62.1 million dollars.
Meche may not have seemed worth the money back in 2006, but as of right now, his average annual value would be somewhere around 12.4 million dollars, above the 11 mil in his actual contract.
