Archive for 2008

Following up on Eric Seidman’s piece today. Beyond my own skepticism on the wisdom of taking a three-year flyer on Juan Rivera, I would like to delve a little further into the defensive impact this has on the Angels.

Garret Anderson is gone, but with Rivera now signed, the Angels have Torii Hunter, Vladimir Guerrero, Rivera and Gary Matthews Jr. hanging around as the likely suspects to man the starting outfield and designated hitter spot. There’s a chance the Angels demote Matthews out of full-time duty, but that’s a tough $33 million pill to swallow.

Assuming they don’t do that, the Angels are left with a defensive problem. Guerrero has been a stiff in the field for awhile now and his knees could really use the rest from tramping about the outfield grass. Hunter isn’t the fielder the Angels thought they were buying, as a three-year weighted UZR rates Hunter as about average for a corner outfielder. Similarly, Sarge Jr moved from an above average fielder in center to now well below average in a corner according to UZR.

Their “ideal” alignment looks like Vlad at DH, Rivera in LF, Hunter at CF and Matthews in RF. Using our above (and Seidman’s) estimates on defensive prowess, that alignment would be roughly 25 runs below average, and that’s assuming none of this post-30-year-old group gets any worse, which is optimistic to say the least. This puts some pressure on the roster flexibility, since DH gets locked up in this situation, but also on the infield to hopefully make up for the deficiencies of the outfield.

Unfortunately, if the Angels fail to re-sign Teixeira, they’re faced with another plus defender leaving and there’s already some questions as to how well they defend up the middle. In short, the Angels were lucky to win as many games as they did in 2008 and if they lose out on Tex, a big chuck of offense and defense goes away and they might be caught resting on their laurels too much.

Earlier today our focus centered around an Angels stalwart on his way out of town, making it only fitting that tonight’s topic involves an Angels outfielder returning to the team. Juan Rivera, the 30-yr old corner outfielder who has missed most of the last two seasons, will be an Angel for the next few years after signing a 3-yr/$12.75 mil deal today. The Angels bought out Garrett Anderson earlier this off-season and have been linked to Manny Ramirez as well, yet seemingly opted to go the safe route with Rivera.

Juan played in just 89 games last season, hitting .246/.282/.438, with 12 home runs. All told, his .306 wOBA in about half of a season made him worth -5.3 runs offensively. The year before, Rivera only appeared in 14 games, and hit .279/.295/.442. In both of these seasons, his O-Swing% looked very atypical of his previous performance. In 2006, Rivera had a career year, putting together a .310/.362/.525 line with 23 home runs, a .373 wOBA, and +17.5 offensive runs.

Defensively, he has not necessarily hurt teams, but he will not light the world on fire with his glove, either. Since corner outfield positions carry the same adjustment, a combination of his UZR totals in leftfield and rightfield peg Rivera as somewhere between a -3 and -5 run fielder. With aging, he looks like a -5 fielder moving forward. Offensively, Marcel projects Juan to hit .272/.323/.450, a .332 wOBA which happens to be the definition of league average. Should this come to fruition, Rivera would be worth 0 runs offensively and cost his team 5 runs defensively. Prorating the adjustments for 130 games and 430 PA docks him 6 runs for playing a corner outfield position and simultaneously adds 12 runs to account for his value above replacement level.

Under this scenario, Rivera would be +1 runs above replacement next year, or +0.1 WAR. At $5 mil/win, his fair market value would be $500,000. Unfortunately, his projections may be a bit skewed as they include two injury-plagued seasons. It is more than likely that the Angels see Rivera as capable of returning to his 2006 form in one way or another. If he can produce a .345 wOBA in 130 games and 500 PA, Rivera would be worth +6 runs on offense and -5 on defense prior to the adjustments. This results in +9 runs, or +0.9 WAR. At fair market value, that is a 1-yr deal worth $4.5 mil. Factoring in a 10% discount rate for signing a longer deal, a 3-yr deal would be valued at $12.15 mil.

Rivera actually signed for $12.75 mil, not too far off-base. Overall, a good deal for the Angels, as long as Rivera can stay healthy. An average annual value of $4.25 mil is well below the asking price of players like Bobby Abreu and Pat Burrell, whose defensive shortcomings almost completely counteract their offensive contributions. Rivera is not a defensive wizard, but if he can combine slightly above average offense with slightly below average defense, this will result in a fine deal for the Angels.

What a difference a year can make.

One year ago, the Toronto Blue Jays organization was coming off a disappointing season in terms of first-base depth in the system. The club’s top first baseman prospect was Chip Cannon, who slugged 32 home runs in 2005 and played at three different levels while topping out at Double-A. He followed that up with 27 home runs the next season, but managed just a .249 batting average during a full year in Double-A. Cannon, at the age of 25, then repeated the level in 2007 and managed just 17 home runs and a .241 average.

Fast-forward through the 2008 season and things are looking much brighter for Toronto. The club picked up former Cubs top prospect Brian Dopirak, who slugged 39 home runs in 2004 at the age of 20, after he was released towards the end of 2008 spring training. Dopirak’s approach and swing path were both reworked by Toronto, according to Dick Scott – the organization’s director of player development.

“His swing was not working for him,” Scott explained recently. “He really got back to what he was doing in the Midwest League (in 2004).”

Dopirak, now 24, responded by hitting .308/.379/.577 with an ISO of 269 in 409 High-A at-bats. He then managed a line of .287/.303/.425 in 87 late-season, Double-A at-bats. Dopirak, a minor league free agent after the 2008 season, was resigned by the Jays and is likely headed back to Double-A, with a not-too-distant promotion to Triple-A possible, if he continues to make adjustments and show improvements.

“You can’t teach the power he has,” Scott said.

The Jays also picked up slugger Adam Amar during the 2007 off-season after he impressed during a tryout camp. The 22-year-old went undrafted out of the University of Memphis during his senior season despite hitting .358/.415/.538 with nine home runs in 240 at-bats. He signed on with Reno of the independent Golden Baseball League and caught scouts’ attentions after he hit .354/.423/.625 with five home runs in 96 at-bats.

The Jays signed Amar and kept him in extended spring training to begin the season so he could work on making some adjustments. Scott referred to the first baseman as a “big, raw, strong guy… with a tremendous work ethic.”

In June, he was assigned to the New York Penn League where he was one of the best hitters in the entire league. In his pro debut, he hit .302/.358/.476 with an ISO of .175 in 252 at-bats. Amar’s numbers slipped a bit after he hit just .186 in his last 15 games. His overall rates were impressive for a slugger and he walked eight percent of the time, along with a strikeout rate of just 11.1 percent.

Scott said Amar could possible jump over A-ball in 2009 and land in High-A ball. “He’s one of those guys we’re just going to keep challenging to see what we have.”

The organization was still not done overhauling its depth at first base. The Jays’ first-round draft pick in the 2008 draft last June was first baseman David Cooper of the University of California. The 21-year-old, selected 17th overall, exploded onto the scene, played at three levels in his debut and finished in High-A ball.

Overall, he hit .333/.399/.502 with 29 doubles in 273 at-bats. In 94 High-A at-bats, the left-handed hitting slugger hit .304/.373/.435 with an ISO of .130. Cooper also posted rates of 9.8 BB% and 17.4 K%. Only one other 2008 first-round draft pick had a better debut – Brett Wallace of the St. Louis Cardinals, who finished the season in Double-A.

Scott was not surprised with Cooper’s early success. “We knew he was coming in as an advanced hitter…. and he held his own at each level. He has a good presence about him and he’s not going to be overwhelmed.”

The knock on Cooper’s scouting report coming out of college was his poor defence. But Scott said it’s not uncommon for defence to be de-emphasized by college programs.

“The thing that surprised us was how well he improved defensively [in his debut],” Scott commented. “I think he’s going to be a pleasant surprise down there in the future.”

Cooper’s 2009 season will either begin in High-A or Double-A. Scott said it will be a spring-time decision. Either way, the Jays will have some intriguing first base depth at both Double-A and A-ball.

Over the last few days, we’ve talked about the positional relationship between second base and third base. In trying to figure out which position actually has the superior defenders at it, we’ve looked at players who spent time at both spots, and their performance at both positions. Despite second base having a reputation as a premium defensive position, guys who play third base and then move to second don’t seem to perform any worse after moving, which suggests that perhaps the crop of second baseman isn’t actually all that much better defensively than the crop of third baseman.

However, there’s an issue of selection bias here. By looking at players who spent a decent amount of time at each position, we’re looking at players that major league managers have already decided have the ability to handle both positions at least well enough to play there on a limited basis. Our sample isn’t randomly selected, but is instead selected based on another person’s predetermined positive view of their defensive skills.

How do we get around the selection bias problem? After all, what we really are wondering is how players who haven’t been moved to 2B would perform if they were to be shifted, and for those players, we clearly don’t have any UZR data for them at second base. However, that doesn’t mean we don’t have any information about them at all. We do have the Fans Scouting Report, which provides us some skill based info about what the fans of each team think about the respective abilities of these players, and allows us to compare skills across positions.

I took all second baseman and third baseman and sorted by speed, since that is the thing that most people agree is more important at second base than at third base. Not surprisingly, the fastest of the fast play second base, and the slowest of the slow play third base. This is what we’d expect. It’s the guys in the middle that are the ones that we’re mainly discussing, though, so I filtered only players who had a speed rating between 60 and 70 (remember, 50 is average). These are players whom, based on just their speed rating, should qualify as potential second baseman. This gave us 17 players. Of these 17, one is an SS playing out of position (Asdrubal Cabrera), seven are full time second baseman, six are full time third baseman, and three are utility players. That worked out pretty nicely.

In terms of their average ratings by skill, the 17 players were as follows:

Instincts: 73
First Step: 71
Speed: 64
Hands: 69
Release: 70
Strength: 60
Accuracy: 65

Now, here are the averages for the six third baseman who should qualify as potential second baseman just based on their speed score. In parentheses, I’ve put the number representing the 3B ratings above or below the average of the eight true middle infielders included (I’m throwing out the utility players).

Instincts: 83 (+7)
First Step: 74 (+0)
Speed: 64 (-1)
Hands: 80 (+7)
Release: 78 (+2)
Strength: 74 (+16)
Accuracy: 67 (-6)

According to the Fans Scouting Report, the fast third baseman have better instincts, the same first step and speed, better hands, the same release, much stronger arms, but the latter comes at a cost of some accuracy.

Overall, though, there’s nothing in the skills analysis of the Fans eyes to suggest that the six “fast” third baseman – Alex Rodriguez, David Wright, Adrian Beltre, Ryan Zimmerman, Evan Longoria, Eric Chavez – are inferior defensive players to the eight middle infielders on the list – Kaz Matsui, Asdrubal Cabrera, Orlando Hudson, Howie Kendrick, Aaron Hill, Chase Utley, Mark Ellis, and Akinori Iwamura.

However, there is one significant difference between the two groups. Yep, you guessed it.

Average 3B height: 6’1
Average 2B height: 5’11

Of players who were rated by their teams fans as having enough speed for second base, the tall guys end up at third and the short guys end up at second. There are no other disqualifying aspects of their ratings that would cause these third baseman to be unable to play second base. They’re just apparently too tall.

Just a week ago the closers market brimmed with names like Francisco Rodriguez, Kerry Wood, and J.J. Putz. As you’re well aware, each of those are now off the market, leaving Brian Fuentes as the cream of the remaining crop, and a ton of rejuvenation projects abound. Then there’s Trevor Hoffman. A pending divorce settlement and encompassing money woes have left Hoffman separated from San Diego, a place where Hoffman is lionized as one of the great closers in modern history. Decorated with scoreboard graphics and an unforgettable entrance, Hoffman painted most of his dominance in San Diego over the last 15 seasons.

Hoffman is now 41 years old and coming off a season that many will characterize as disappointing. A 3.99 FIP is essentially a full run higher than Hoffman’s career FIP, with the culprit being 1.59 homeruns per nine innings and a 13.8 HR/FB%, more than twice his career 6.2%. Few will notice Hoffman’s 9.13 strikeouts per nine or 1.79 walks per nine, when taken together become a 5.11 K/BB ratio, the highest for Hoffman since 2004. It doesn’t appear Hoffman’s velocity or usage was altered either, still sitting around 86 on his fastball, 81 on his slider, and 74 on his change.

It would be easy to draw the comparison to Hoffman’s 2001, which had similar characteristics in homeruns, strikeouts, and FIP, but little stands to be gained. Hoffman’s more recent seasons indicate he’s still quite capable of pitching well, just as the decreased flyballs yet increased homerun percentage should indicate the homerun totals as fluke. The problem, however, is that Hoffman will no longer spend half of his games at Petco Park. It’s also important to note that while Hoffman pitched better on the road than at home last season, it’s in no way indicative of how Hoffman will fare elsewhere.

Marcels has Hoffman pitching 53 innings with a 4 FIP, making him an asset worth acquiring, especially on the cheap. With potential suitors like the Indians and Mets looking elsewhere, it seems conceivable that Hoffman could land in Detroit. At least we know he’s better than Todd Jones.

A wide array of left-fielders hit the free agent market this off-season, and to date, just Raul Ibanez has signed a contract. The others garnering the majority of discussions are Adam Dunn, Bobby Abreu, Pat Burrell, and Manny Ramirez. These four, and Ibanez, are classic examples of all-hitting, no-fielding players, whose values diminish due to their time spent in the field. Ken Griffey, Jr has mentioned a desire to continue his career, and he also falls into the mix. One left-fielder available who does not fit this bill is Garrett Anderson.

In fact, if anything, Anderson is more of the opposite: a solid fielder whose hitting skills are declining. Due to this, rumors of Anderson potentially signing as a designated hitter seem to make little sense. Regardless, Anderson’s name does not appear too often in free agency discussions. Anderson now is different than the same player from a decade or so ago, but even back then certain numbers masked his true level of effectiveness.

From 1997-2003, Anderson ranged from 183-201 hits per season, 36-56 doubles, and 15-35 home runs. Looking solely at these numbers, which many do, Anderson appears to have had an extremely solid 7-year offensive peak. His wOBA tells a different story, however; outside of the .371 in 2003 and .363 in 2002, his wOBA ranged from .325-.342 throughout the peak. His wRAA numbers in the same 7-year span: -3.8, +1.8, +0.7, +1.0, +4.3, +20.6, +24.5. The latter two seasons correspond to the high wOBA seasons of 2002 and 2003, but prior to that, he was virtually a league average hitter.

Last year, he produced a wOBA of .326, resulting in -1.4 batting runs. UZR had him worth +6.2 defensive runs in left-field, though, and with the prorated adjustments for position and replacement level, Garret was worth +18.9 runs last year. This converts to roughly +1.9 wins, deeming him just slightly below average.

Marcel projects Anderson at a .319 wOBA in 2009 and -6.1 batting runs. Weighting his UZR, +4.5 defensive runs seems like a somewhat realistic expectation. Prorating the aforementioned adjustments places the 2009 Garret Anderson at +7.4 runs, or +0.74 wins. His fair market value, therefore, would be somewhere in the vicinity of $3.7 mil for a one-year deal. Something tells me Anderson will sign for much more than that, as he is coming off three straight years earning $10+ mil.

As a left-fielder, though, and not a DH, his projection is very similar to that of Abreu and Burrell’s. While he will command more than his fair market value, Anderson could likely be had for a lesser fee than these two former Phillies. So, if any team is looking for a legitimate left-fielder, perhaps their attentions should be turned to Anderson.

Mark Teixeira looks like he’s down to the wire in terms of finally inking a contract and hoping pushing the remainder of this off-season forward. With the set of bidders narrowed down and the contracts tightening up, it appears that we can hone in on an expected contract for Teixeira, something in the eight-year, $175 million range. That’s not so much an overpay in annual average value, but rather just an overpay in years.

Teixeira is probably a 4-5 win player for 2009, worth between $20 and $25 million. Taking 10% off for a long-term discount and you have a fair value price of $18 to $23 million, which Teixeira seems about to get. That’s what you would be comfortable paying him if you felt he was going to stay a 5-win player throughout the duration of the contract. What’s not being taken into account though is aging curves. While Teixeira is young, when you sign someone for eight years, you better be factoring that in and any reasonable aging projection would have Teixeira losing a considerable amount of value over the life of the contract.

Teixeira’s soon to be inked contract got me thinking again about Todd Helton and since we’ve added some new stats to FanGraphs since I last looked at Helton, I felt like a brief revisit of him was warranted. Helton had a crummy 2008, no doubt, but even in a crummy year he posted a .391 OBP. And with his BABIP under .300 despite a 23.4% LD rate, that screams for some positive regression in 2009, which would help drive his overall line up back toward his 2005-7 numbers, which average him out to be worth around 40 runs over average with the bat if he could play a full season. Park adjusting his final line (only looking at away numbers is the wrong method), moves that number to about 34 runs. How likely are either of those things to happen? Helton’s been durable throughout his career, but you always worry about injuries to aging first baseman so there’s surely a non-trivial likelihood that he will not fully require. How much you want to knock off, I’ll leave up to you the reader.

Helton’s defense according to UZR plays slightly north of neutral with just enough positive trend for me to say that his glove plus his 12.5 run penalty for playing first base would come out to a negative 10 run total. Again, over a full season. Adding those up and throwing in replacement level, we arrive at 44 runs over replacement per season for Helton, roughly mirroring Teixeira. Helton is considered an anchor with either a three-year, $57 million or a four-year, $75 million contract. Yes, there’s a six year difference in age between the two, but if Helton returns to 2005-7 form (a safe-ish bet) he just has to be able to log between 400 and 500 plate appearances to justify his contract for 2009. Seems surprising for a guy many have written off at this point.

Tim Redding, a 5’11” righty starter for the Washington Nationals the last two seasons, was recently non-tendered. Though he will be 31 in February and is coming off of a 4.95 ERA/4.93 FIP season, several teams are inquiring about his services. Redding has been around since 2001, having played for the Astros, Padres and Yankees prior to the Nationals, as well as serving as a member of the White Sox AAA affiliate for the 2006 season.

His career got off to a rocky start, as in 2001 he posted an ERA of 5.50 and an FIP of 5.10. He managed to strike out over 8.5 batters per nine innings, but posted poor peripherals elsewhere. The following season, the ERA lowered to 5.40 and his FIP dropped over a half-run to 4.45. His K/9 also fell, but to 7.7, still quite good. He allowed way too many baserunners, though, and struggled to strand them. BABIPs of .333 and .321, respectively, can be worked around with solid control and a low walk rate, but Redding possessed neither of these.

In 32 starts during the 2003 season, he pitched 176 innings of 4.12 FIP baseball. His 3.68 ERA even outdid the solid FIP mark. His BB/9 decreased from 4.3 to 3.3; his BABIP stabilized at .300; and his LOB% rose to a slightly above league average rate of 73%. Unfortunately, his K/9 also fell, from 7.7 to 5.9. He did not strikeout as many hitters but he allowed a much lower number of them to reach base, and subsequently appeared more apt at keeping them on the basepaths.

2004 saw a 5.72 ERA/5.30 FIP, and in 2005 these numbers ballooned to 10.57/6.61. In fact, his WHIP in 2005 was a gaudy 1.99. Suffice it to say, he was below replacement level and did not deserve a roster spot on any team. He spent the 2006 season in the minor leagues for the White Sox, compiling decent but not earth-shattering numbers. The first half of the 2007 season was spent in the minors for the Nationals, where his 3.90 FIP earned him a callup.

In 15 starts that season, Redding pitched himself to a 3.64 ERA. His controllable skills told a different story, as a 5.0 K/9 combined with a 4.1 BB/9 and below average home run rate to produce a 5.17 FIP. The vast majority of pitchers are not able to have their ERA outdo FIP consistently for several seasons, and Redding was no exception. This past season, he made 33 starts and posted a 4.95 ERA/4.93 FIP. A good sign emerged, though: his K/9 rose to 5.9 while his BB/9 fell to 3.2, giving Redding his highest K/BB ratio since 2001.

Marcel projects him to pitch 159 innings next season with a 4.77 FIP. He would be responsible for 84 runs should this come to fruition. The replacement starter and reliever combination would surrender 97 runs, deeming Redding +13 runs above replacement. This converts to +1.3 wins, which has a fair market value of $6.5 mil. Tim made just $1 mil in 2008 with the Nationals.

The Rockies, Rangers, Mets, and Orioles have all been linked as aggressive suitors. If they can sign Redding to a deal lesser than or equal to the fair market value listed above, then he will serve as a decent fifth starter. Anything higher and we start to move into the Carlos Silva territory of overpaying fifth starter-types. Redding is not going to light the world on fire, but he could be a decent stopgap in a one-year deal, and could very likely be signed for less than his current $6.5 mil fair market value.

Continuing on with the second base/third base discussion, I figured it would be helpful to look at all the players who were given some kind of significant amount of playing time at both positions in 2008. Which guys did teams decide were good enough to be more than emergency fill-ins at both 2nd and 3rd, and what traits did they share that made them eligible to move between both spots?

Here’s the list of guys who got at least 50 innings at both 2B and 3B in 2008:

Willy Aybar
Ryan Raburn
Ronnie Belliard
Ramon Vazquez
Pablo Ozuna
Omar Infante
Nick Punto
Matt Tolbert
Martin Prado
Mark Loretta
Mark DeRosa
Marco Scutaro
Juan Uribe
Jose Castillo
Jeff Baker
Jamey Carroll
Ian Stewart
German Duran
Felipe Lopez
Donnie Murphy
Craig Counsell
Clifton Pennington
Chris Gomez
Chone Figgins
Brendan Harris
Blake Dewitt
Augie Ojeda
Aaron Miles

The list contains the usual assortment of utility players that aren’t all that interesting in terms of the discussion we’ve been having. Guys like Ozuna, Punto, Tolbert, and Vazquez are given roster spots that essentially require them to play multiple positions, so the fact that they did so isn’t a big surprise. The guys on the list that I find interesting, however, are Aybar, Baker, Stewart, Belliard, DeRosa, Carroll, and DeWitt. Let’s take a look at this group.

Aybar – 5’11/200 lbs, short and stubby body type. Played both 2B/3B in the minors, but spend 2/3 of his games at 3B. Played primarily third base in the majors, but has racked up 192 innings at second base over the last couple of years. His UZR at second base is much better than at third base (small sample size caveats apply).

Baker – 6’2/210 lbs, decently athletic. Was a 3B/1B/LF/RF in the minors, and up until this year, had just played those positions in the majors. Not particularly well, either, getting a negative UZR score at all four corner spots in his career. Was given 370 innings at second base this year, and while his defensive numbers suck there too, they’re better than we’d expect considering how little UZR thought of him at 1st/3rd.

Stewart – 6’3/205 lbs, good athete. Exclusively a third baseman as a professional until this year, when the Rockies gave him 93 innings at second base. His UZR was much better at second than at third, but again, the sample is tiny.

Belliard – 5’10/214 lbs, short and fat. Spent almost his entire career at second base, but split time between 2B/3B this year. Was just not good at third and downright awful at second. The epitome of the height bias – if he was 6’3 or 6’4 with the same mass and defensive skills, he’d never play second base, and people would scoff at you for thinking he could.

DeRosa – 6’1/205 lbs, decent athlete. Spent his early career as a utility guy, racked up lots of playing time all over the field. Basically the same defensive ratings at both second and third, and interestingly, not that different at SS either.

Carroll – 5’9/170 lbs, short and skinny. Had the worst arm ranking of any second baseman in the Fans Scouting Report, and has still racked up nearly 1,000 major league innings at third base. Really, if you think teams are sorting 2B/3B based on arm strength, explain Jamey Carroll playing third base.

DeWitt – 5’11/175, pretty good athlete. Like Aybar, a 3B/2B coming up through the system, with a majority of his time spent at third base. Spent most of his time at third this year, but got 193 innings at second base late in the year. UZR liked him at third, deosn’t like him at second, but again, that’s all very small sample stuff, since he was a rookie.

Overall, the list of guys who were allowed to play second base and third base leans towards the shorter end of the spectrum. The Rockies bucked the trend by giving Ian Stewart and Jeff Baker time at second base, and if UZR is to be believed, it worked. Overall, though, very few tall third baseman were allowed to play second base, and among those who spent time at both positions, there wasn’t a huge difference in their ratings at either 3B or 2B. For those who have been selected as worthy of playing both, they seem to be about the same at either one. While the tall guys can’t play 2B bias continues to show up, it seems that teams are okay with short guys (even ones with noodle arms, like Carroll) playing third base in limited roles.

Tomorrow, we’ll look at the selection bias aspect of this group, and ask what we can infer about those who weren’t allowed to spend any time at second base.

Yesterday, we looked at position adjustments and the interesting relationship between second baseman and third baseman. Despite 2B being considered a premium defensive position, there’s little evidence that the players who occupy the second base position are actually better defenders than the guys who play third base. Both groups come from the failed SS pile of players, but there’s one big difference – the guys who end at third base can hit a lot better than the guys who end up at second base. Why?

My theory – body type, especially height. The tallest listed players in MLB who are playing either SS or 2B are Hanley Ramirez and Alexei Ramirez, who both stand at 6’3, but could be described as wiry thin. With Alexei moving to SS for 2009, the tallest listed major league second baseman will be Jose Lopez, who claims to be 6’2, but I call total B.S. on. In reality, the real tallest second baseman is probably one of Mark Grudzielanek or Chase Utley, both of whom stand 6’1. The average second baseman is 5’11.

On the other hand, the average height of third baseman in 2008 was 6’1. Troy Glaus is 6’5. Mike Lowell and Scott Rolen are 6’4. The only 3B who stand less than 6’0 are Adrian Beltre, Melvin Mora, and Chone Figgins, and Mora and Figgins both have moved around the diamond quite a bit.

It seems apparent that when teams are sorting out where players who been deemed not good enough to handle SS should go, the overriding determining factor is body type, and specifically height. Tall players simply don’t go to second base, and short guys don’t go to third base regardless of their actual defensive abilities.

To illustrate this, let’s take a look at the results of a few players based on Tom Tango’s Fans Scouting Report.

Player A: 86 instincts, 72 first step, 61 speed, 87 hands, 90 release, 41 strength, 75 accuracy

Player B: 91 instincts, 82 first step, 61 speed, 90 hands, 96 release, 55 strength, 92 accuracy

I think most people would agree that first step and instincts would be more important at third base (along with arm strength, naturally) while speed and hands would be more important at second base. Based on the above, Player B would seem to be a better fit for 3B, skills wise, if a team was trying to decide which positions these two should play.

Player A is Eric Chavez, and Player B is Mark Ellis. Both are considered terrific defensive players, and helpfully for this discussion, both are teammates, so their ratings came from the same pool of fans, and their organization has already had to make the position assignments with both players on the roster. Chavez, listed at 6’1/217, ended up at third base, while Ellis (5’11/190) was placed at second base.

A’s fans think they have almost identical skills. Why did Chavez end at third and Ellis at second? Body type. Ellis is small, Chavez is big. Chavez fits the profile of a third baseman offensively, while Ellis does not. It seems entirely likely that if Ellis was a few inches taller and could hit better, while Chavez was a few inches shorter and had a bit less power, the two would flip positions, even if they had the exact same defensive skills they do now.

We could go on and look at other examples – does anyone really think Adrian Beltre, Scott Rolen, Evan Longoria, or Ryan Zimmerman couldn’t play a quality shortstop or second base if asked to? Why were they moved to third base, anyway? Do we have a good answer for this besides “they look and hit like third baseman”?

I don’t think so. To me, it appears that players are separated into 3B and 2B based on things that have little to do with their actual skills, and more about a proxy for what kind of package those skills come in. Perhaps there’s a competitive advantage here for a team that’s willing to take a 6’3 or 6’4 plus defender and shift them to second base instead of third base.