Archive for 2008

Last night was the night of the big inning, as several teams pounded out runs in bunches. In particular, two games saw huge offensive outbursts.

The Dodgers jumped on the Rockies early, putting up an eight spot in the first inning. Kip Wells managed to retire just one batter – Andruw Jones, naturally – before Matt Kemp drove him from the game with his second double of the inning. The eight runs Wells allowed in the first inning was one more than he had allowed in his first 19 2/3 innings of the year.

Up in Kansas City, the Tigers outdid the Dodgers by having a 10 run 8th inning, but their offensive outburst redefined diminishing returns – they were already ahead 9-0 at the time they pummeled Jimmy Gobble, so their ten run inning increased their win probability by a whopping 0.1%. Detroit’s explosion was the baseball equivalent of kicking Barbaro while he’s down.

Interestingly, big innings are usually associated with bases clearing home runs, but the Dodgers and Tigers only needed one long ball between them to total the 18 runs they put up in two innings of offense. On the night, they combined for 35 runs of offense and only hit two home runs. You don’t have to hit the ball over the wall in order to round the bases – especially when you’re facing Kip Wells and Jimmy Gobble.

In a game like baseball, where a team like the 2006 Cardinals can sneak into the playoffs and win the world series, where the 2007 Phillies were able to come back from a seven game deficit in seventeen games to win the division, or where hits in play allowed by pitchers are largely contingent on factors out of their control, there are very few certainties anymore. Heck, we don’t even know if the Yankees will make the playoffs this year! One thing has been more than certain over the last few years, however, and it involves the name Mike Hampton and the word injury.

After pitching a full 2004 season he made just 12 starts in 2005 and has not pitched on a major league mound since. He has tried, however, making several attempts at coming back to justify the gaudy contract titling this post given to him in 2001, but to no alas. For all we know, that third of a season in 2005 may have been the last of Hampton’s career. Now, I’m not out to romanticize his career in any way, nor do I have any real sympathy for a guy making that much money for not really doing anything in recent years, but part of me does think it’s a shame that his body just does not seem fit for the game anymore, no matter what he does.

This year, his arm was finally major-league ready following two elbow surgeries, but the rest of his body fell apart. He was all set to make his major league return in early April but hurt his left pectoral muscle, getting scratched from the start in the process. He later aggravated his chest, and in a recent minor league start in which his pitch count rose to 90, he strained his groin muscle.

Hampton’s not an all-star or even the #2 option on most teams going back to his 2004 and 2005 performances, but a healthy form of him would be a suitable #4 or #5 starter… albeit the most wealthy one. I’ve seen reports that he should sign for the major league minimum with the Braves next year so he can “give back” to the team, which made little sense since he would still be getting paid and, honestly, who’s going to give him a nice-sized contract given his history? If he hurt himself like Kevin Brown punching a wall, or something along those lines I could understand that standpoint, but the fact is that Hampton has consistently hurt himself while trying to get back to the major leagues. I don’t know if the guy is “cursed” or if he has some sort of illness like Rocco Baldelli that is preventing him from staying healthy, but he just seems unable to do so.

“I can honestly look myself in the mirror and know that I’ve done everything I possibly can to get back,” he said. “Whether that happens or doesn’t, it’s not going to define who I am. I know I’ve done what it takes to get here and be successful.”

Unfortunately for Mike, unless he can get back to the big leagues and put together 4-5 solid years, his career IS going to be defined by his numerous injuries and setbacks, as well as for performance and lack thereof relative to a very steep contract.

The National League is seeing some terrific performances from a few center fielders this season. Nate McLouth got to his first all-star game with a great first half, while Rick Ankiel has continued to write the script for a Hollywood movie with his successful comeback. And, of course, there’s Carlos Beltran, flying under the radar as a star who no one ever talks about.

But unless you live in Milwaukee, you might not realize that Mike Cameron is quietly putting together another pretty terrific season himself. Yes, he’s hitting .235, so if you’re stuck on batting average, he’s not the player for you. However, he does so many other things well that the batting average simply doesn’t tell the story.

Cameron’s .825 OPS is built upon a lot of power – he’s hit 15 home runs in just 226 at-bats, obviously quite happy to be liberated from Petco Park, where he spent the last two years. The low average is somewhat offset by a solid walk rate, giving him a .330 on base percentage that’s more than respectable considering his power and the position he plays.

In fact, if you didn’t know Cameron was 35 years old, there would be no reason to think he’s supposed to be declining in skills. Take a look at his production since 1999, when he first established himself as a major league hitter.

A few dips along the way, but basically, he has sustained a similar level of performance for the past ten years. Even an increasing strikeout rate hasn’t been able to lower his offensive output, as he’s simply just doing more with the ball when he does make contact to offset the swings and misses.

Mike Cameron has spent most of his career being under appreciated, so it’s not a big surprise that baseball still doesn’t realize just valuable he is. The Brewers signed him to a 1 year deal for $7 million this year and a team option for $10 million next year – they’re a smart organization, so they’ll probably pick that option up, and continue to have one of the game’s more productive CFs under contract at a bargain rate.

The Oakland Athletics organization has one of the most talent-laden minor league systems in the game. The majority of those prospects, though, have been collected from other organizations through various transactions including trades.

Even so, the Athletics organization has been successful, to a degree, at drafting promising arms. In 2005, despite its reputation for favoring advanced college products, the club focused its efforts on selecting some talented prep arms early in the draft. In the first seven rounds, the organization selected five high school pitchers in nine selections.

Kevin Bunch, a right-hander drafted out of a California high school, was the last of those players selected. He managed just two pro seasons and ended his career in 2006 by allowing 31 hits and nine walks in 16.1 Short Season innings.

Scott Deal was selected in the fifth round out of a Washington high school. The right-hander spent two OK seasons in Short Season ball and has been in the Midwest League for the past two seasons. Still only 21, Deal has served a variety of roles for Kane County this season and has made 10 starts in 21 appearances. He has a 3.73 ERA and has allowed 79 hits in 82 innings.

Vince Mazzaro was drafted in the third round out of a New Jersey high school. He signed late and did not make his pro debut until 2006 when he was assigned to the Midwest League. Mazzaro, a right-hander, had two unspectacular seasons in A-ball before being challenged with a promotion to Double-A to begin 2008. He has thrived at the level and currently has a 2.11 ERA and has allowed 103 hits in 119.1 innings. Mazzaro has struck out just 89 batters with 32 walks. He has become less hittable the last three seasons as he ascended through the minors: 11.01 H/9, 9.31 H/9, 8.00 H/9.

Right-handers Jared Lansford and Craig Italiano were both selected in the second round of the 2005 draft. Jared, 21, is the son of former A’s third baseman Carney Lansford. Jared has had an up-and-down career and followed up a solid 2006 season (2.86 ERA, 87 hits in 104 innings) by missing all of 2007 due to an injury. This season in High-A ball, he has been pitching out of the bullpen and has allowed 57 hits in 60.1 innings. He has walked 20 and struck out 73. Left-handers are hitting .330 against him, while right-handers are batting just .188.

Italiano is the most promising of the five early round prep pitchers. His success is a testament to his dedication and commitment, as he managed to throw less than 54 innings in his first three pro seasons due to injuries, which included shoulder surgery and a fractured skull after he was hit by a line drive. He began 2008 in the Midwest League and posted a 1.16 ERA with 43 hits allowed in 70 innings. Italiano also walked 35 and struck out 79. He then took his mid- to high-90s fastball to High-A ball where he has posted an ERA of 13.81 in 14.1 innings. Italiano has allowed 23 hits and 13 walks during that span of time.

The A’s organization has had varying degrees of success with its selections from the 2005 prep pool. Given that the club is still seeing progress from four of its five top selections, the club should be pleased with the results.

The Minnesota Twins have been one of the more surprising stories in baseball this year, given that relatively few people gave them any sort of significant shot at contending at all. Yet, as we approach the 100-game mark of the season, the Twinkies are 55-43 and sit just a half-game behind the White Sox for first place in the AL Central; additionally, they are only one game behind the Red Sox for the Wild Card. For a team performing well to be considered a surprising story, the implication exists that either the franchise floundered in the recent past, like the Rays, or that its components are largely unknown commodities to the more general public.

Since the Twins have made the playoffs quite a bit this decade the surprise factor stems from their players not receiving massive amounts of publicity. Ipso facto, while most people could recite the 25-man roster for numerous teams in the league I would be willing to wager one of the toughest would be the Gardenhire Gang. Think about it. Their top slugger won the home run derby and the commentators present couldn’t even pronounce his name… let alone remember he won an MVP not too long ago. Their starting centerfielder is more commonly known outside of Minnesota as “that Johan trade guy.” And the only members of their starting pitching staff most people know about are Livan Hernandez, who doesn’t deserve to be one of the only members recognized, and Boof Bonser, whose name is, well, Boof. Point blank, you don’t forget a guy named Boof.

This last notion is really a shame because their success in the starting rotation has largely been reliant upon the performance of the other three: Scott Baker, Nick Blackburn, and Kevin Slowey (Glen Perkins you get honorable mention). This trio does not possess lights out “stuff” nor do they fire the ball past hitters with plus-fastballs. Instead, they limit their baserunners and have been quite adept at stranding those that do happen to reach base. Baker has been better at this than his two colleagues, stranding 82.4% of runners, a number behind only John Lackey at the top of the AL leaderboard. A number like this certainly isn’t expected to be sustained, so his performance from here on out will likely hinge upon just how far that rate drops.

None of the three had extremely significant service time so the reliability of their pre-season projections was not as high as, say, Livan’s, but they have essentially either matched these projections or have outdone them in the first 59% of the season. Going forward, Baker is projected at an FIP of 3.90, with Blackburn at 3.93 and Slowey at 4.12, all very respectable numbers. Their strikeout to walk ratios are not expected to be as high as we have seen thus far but are not likely to plummet all the way down towards J.C. Romero-ville. Lastly, their BABIPs are all either on the average or right around the corner so they haven’t necessarily been of extreme benefit in that department.

Here are their numbers this year, followed by what can be expected from here on out:

Scott Baker (now): 3.99 FIP, 1.16 WHIP, 4.86 K/BB, 1.52 BB/9
Scott Baker (2nd): 3.90 FIP, 1.26 WHIP, 3.08 K/BB, 2.13 BB/9

Nick Blackburn (now): 3.86 FIP, 1.27 WHIP, 3.56 K/BB, 1.37 BB/9
Nick Blackburn (2nd): 3.93 FIP, 1.29 WHIP, 2.58 K/BB, 2.16 BB/9

Kevin Slowey (now): 3.98 FIP, 1.13 WHIP, 4.69 K/BB, 1.42 BB/9
Kevin Slowey (2nd): 4.12 FIP, 1.19 WHIP, 3.00 K/BB, 2.13 BB/9

Their projections from here on out are calling for higher walk rates which in turn raises the WHIP and lowers the K/BB. This means more baserunners will reach and their barometric success (such as ERA) will be determined by an ability to strand them. There are plenty of “if’s” that must be met for the Twins to sustain their success and have a legitimate shot at winning the division, but I don’t consider it to be out of reach. Baker, Blackburn, and Slowey might not be the most well-known, or most exciting pitchers in all of baseball, but they have definitely been solid performers expected to continue producing at a quality level, most likely under the radar.

Yesterday, Francisco Rodriguez became the faster pitcher ever to get to 40 saves, doing it on July 20th, in the Angels 98th game of the season. Last year, he didn’t get his 40th save until the Angels’ 162nd and final game of the season. He’s on pace for 66 saves, which would shatter the record of 57 that Bobby Thigpen set in 1990.

Some may guess that K-Rod has just padded his total, racking up cheap saves by coming in with two or three run leads, but it just isn’t true. Rodriguez has a pLI of 2.63, giving him the highest leverage index of any reliever in 2008. A 2.63 pLI is extraordinarily high – the second highest season total in the last 10 years belongs to Troy Percival in 2000, when he had a 2.57 pLI that year. Thigpen had a 2.05 pLI, by the way.

However, despite successfully converting 40 saves with the highest leverage index in the league, K-Rod is still just 3rd among major league relievers in WPA, behind both Joe Nathan and Brad Lidge. Why? Two reasons:

In those two games, Rodriguez racked up a nifty -1.55 WPA. Ouch. That’s rough.

However, two bad games don’t spoil a season, and K-Rod is having one of the best relief seasons in history. At this point, it will be a minor upset if he doesn’t break the all time single season save record, and he’s done it while leading the league in leverage – that’s impressive.

Every winter, major league teams spend a lot of money on free agent pitchers. It doesn’t even matter if those pitchers are good or not – because they’ve survived at least six years in the majors to achieve free agency, they receive the proven veteran label, and teams fight for the right to lean on that kind of experience. One of the main reasons we’re told that veteran starters are so important is because young pitching is too inconsistent and unpredictable, and having proven veterans on your staff prevents the kind of disaster performances that scared minor league kids can give.

Now, with that in mind, here’s a list of the worst pitchers in baseball this season, sorted by WPA.

Miguel Batista, -2.86 WPA
Brett Myers, -2.62 WPA
Ian Snell, -2.54 WPA
Barry Zito, -2.20 WPA
Andrew Miller, -2.04 WPA

Zito, of course, signed the largest contract in history for a free agent pitcher. Batista signed a 3 year, $24 million deal before the 2007 season. Myers signed a 3 year, $25 million contract that bought out his final arbitration years and his first year of free agency. Snell signed a 3 year, $9 million deal to buy out his first few arbitration years and gave Pittsburgh team options that could eliminate his initial free agent season.

Andrew Miller is the only unproven youngster of the bunch.

Last winter was a perfect example of this phenomenon. Carlos Silva, Kenny Rogers, and Livan Hernandez were paid a combined $25 million for the 2008 season (and Silva was given a lot more beyond that). Those three are being outpitched by every inexperienced minor leaguer their team has brought up this season.

Need more evidence? The Twins traded away Johan Santana and let Silva leave via free agency, replacing them with unproven youngsters Nick Blackburn and Glen Perkins. The Twins team ERA has gone down after losing their two veteran horses, and they’re contending on the strength of a pitching staff of inexperienced youngsters. The Mets and Mariners, the two recipients of these proven veterans, have had disappointing first halves.

The idea that championship clubs are built on the backs of proven veteran starters is a massive myth, perpetuated by out of touch old men and the equally outdated writers to talk to them. “Proven veteran” has become a synonym for “old and crappy”, and as better front offices take hold in MLB, we’ll see teams that cling to these cliches continue to finish in last place, shocked that the experience they built their team around failed to bring them success.

As Dave noted early yesterday morning, the Joe Blanton-to-the-Phillies trade is one that fans of the Phightins—like me—are not going to be in favor of for years to come. It’s not that Blanton is a bad pitcher, or that a guy like Adrian Cardenas is a lock to become a superstar middle-infielder, but rather that the Phillies gave up two of their top prospects for a back-end of the rotation pitcher. From living in Philadelphia and watching the local broadcasts and such it seems to me that those in favor of this trade feel the way they do because Blanton is “new.” If these same fans watched Blanton intently over the last year and a half or so I have a funny feeling their dispositions would not be as sunny.

Add in the facts that Kentucky Joe dominated the Phillies lineup a couple of weeks ago, that he “won” 30 games in 2006-07, and that Adam Eaton stinks and it becomes very easy to see how fans could be manipulated into thinking this was the right trade to make.

One form of this manipulation really irked my family yesterday, however, in that some writers and reporters tried to justify the trade with the clause “if you remove Blanton’s X worst starts, his ERA is …” I’ve seen differing quotes, involving Blanton’s 3.87 ERA sans-three bad starts, or even his 3.58 ERA sans-four bad starts. Well, you just cannot do that. My brother, who covers the Phillies at MVN.com, offered this take, which is essentially the entire point of this post:

“Todd Zolecki wrote on Philly.com that Blanton actually has a 3.58 ERA if you take away his worst four starts. That’s great, but you don’t merely take away four starts to try to justify a trade. Heck, if you take away Adam Eaton’s worst four starts, his ERA would be 4.06! Has Eaton been a pitcher who deserves an ERA nearly in the 3’s this season? No. Has he been effective at all? No. So let’s not cherry-pick stats.”

You can’t simply remove numbers to justify anything. As has been discussed at length this season, the last three years or so should be quoted when discussing a player’s true talent level. If these same writers wish to justify the trade, perhaps it would serve them wise to note that Blanton’s current ERA is worse than his pre-season projection, and that he is expected to be in the 3.77 range over the remainder of the season… not that his numbers would be better if we take away the worst starts, or that he has performed well against NL East teams in a total of four or five starts in his career.

Overall, we don’t know if the Phillies are done dealing. Maybe they turn around and send the perhaps-overrated Carlos Carrasco and fellow top-tier prospect Antonio Bastardo for Erik Bedard, which would give them a rotation of: Cole Hamels, Erik Bedard, Jamie Moyer, Joe Blanton, and Kyle Kendrick, with Brett Myers also in the fold. From what I’ve come to learn, however, regarding Pat Gillick and his “approach” on his way out the door, it really does seem Blanton is supposed to be the prized acquisition to keep the Mets at bay.

But then again, maybe he IS what the Phillies need to keep the Mets at bay, because as many other Philadelphia columnists have noted, Blanton has pitched 15 scoreless innings against the Mets in his career… (sighs and hopes readers pick up on the sarcasm of small sample sizes and cherry-picked stats).

In 1995, I was a 10-year old sprout who loved the game but failed to truly grasp the rammifications of baseball’s labor strike. It constituted the major news story leading into the season, but not the only one. The other big news that year involved a Japanese pitcher named Hideo Nomo, who was in the process of becoming the first such player to permanently relocate to the major leagues. He would not be the first Japanese-born player in the major leagues, but rather the first to permanently leave Japan for streets paved in gold.

Nomo utilized a contractual loophole after his 1994 season in Japan that stipulated players who retired were free to play wherever. This loophole paved the way for Nomo playing in America, which is largely considered to have further paved the way for future Japanese-born major league players.

That 1995 season would be an incredible one for Nomo, as he baffled hitters en route to a Rookie of the Year win. Adding to the circus surrounding each of his starts was his funky windup. Not only had many fans never seen a foreign player of this magnitude, his pitching motion looked borderline insane when stacked up next to the vanilla “hands over head” delivery thought of as the industry standard. Nomo finished 4th in WPA/LI that year, behind just Greg Maddux, Randy Johnson, and Mike Mussina, and kept hitters at bay to the tune of a 2.54 ERA/2.88 FIP and 1.06 WHIP.

In 1996 and 1997 he still posted quality numbers, including a no-hitter in ’96 at Coors Field, but as hitters began to figure him out, his windup became less puzzling and he lost some effectiveness. His ERA and FIP had increased in each of those first three seasons; his WHIP shot up from 1.06 to 1.37; he gave up more home runs on average each year; and his ability to strand baserunners lessened in each subsequent season.

It then came as little surprise that 1998 turned out to be his worst season to date, stranding just 69.5% of baserunners and getting off to such a poor start that the Dodgers shipped him to the Mets for the not necessarily exciting package of Greg McMichael and Dave Mlicki. Following below average production from June 4 until season’s end, the Mets released Nomo in spring training of the 1999 season. The Cubs picked him up, but following a few minor league starts they had a clash of opinion: Hideo wanted to pitch in the majors and the Cubs felt he wasn’t ready. After refusing to make another minor league start the Cubs released him towards the end of April. The Brewers signed him for the remainder of the season, which incidentally involved his lowest K/9 and highest HR/9. His WHIP stayed stagnant at 1.42, but luckily he was able to strand 73.1% of runners, a significant increase from the year prior.

He and the Brewers clashed in contract negotiations following the season and the Phillies soon claimed him off waivers. The Nomo in Philadelphia experiment lasted 24 hours, when they could do no better in negotiations than the Brewers. All told, Nomo eventually signed with the Tigers for the 2000 season. His 4.74 ERA, 4.79 FIP, 4.22 BB/9, and career highs 1.47 WHIP and 1.47 HR/9 did very little to make the move look worthwhile and, at season’s close, Nomo again found himself without a job. He had played in the major leagues for six seasons now and had been a member of six different franchises.

He tossed another no-hitter as a member of the Red Sox in 2001 and posted his best numbers in the last couple of seasons—including a 10.0 K/9—but nowhere near his 1995-1996 seasons. Following his tenure in Beantown he returned “home” to Los Angeles, where his 2002 and 2003 seasons seemed very reminiscent of those initial years. In 67 starts over those two seasons, Nomo posted a 3.24 ERA, 4.17 FIP, 1.29 WHIP, and 79% strand rate. His ability to strike hitters out had diminished (7.59 K/9) but he proved to be effective enough to limit any threats pointed in his direction. In 2004, however, Nomo was officially done, regardless of whether or not he realized it.

His strand rate dropped from 79% to 59%, which looks even worse given that he accrued a 1.75 WHIP. Allowing over two home runs per nine innings with a K/BB ratio below 1.30, Nomo had lost all semblances of effectiveness at the major league level. The Rays, Yankees, White Sox, and Royals all took flyers on the former Rookie of the Year from 2005-2008, but an inability to get hitters out is not one that should be on the resume of any pitcher.

Nomo’s story is exactly the kind that will leave a sour taste in the mouths of some fans due to his poor performance in recent years. However, in my eyes, his is a success story, even if from a relative standpoint. No matter how old I get, when looking back upon a childhood built largely on baseball, I will always remember attempting to emulate his funky windup on the playground and the excitement that hinged upon every pitch thrown in those first few seasons.

Coming to the ballpark on April 27th, Carlos Delgado was the scorn of New York. He was hitting .186/.276/.256 with just four extra base hits in his first 98 plate appearances of 2008. Coming on the heels of his .258/.333/.448 mark last year, and in his age 36 season, the “Delgado is finished” bandwagon got full in a hurry. I even jumped on, noting that his disappearing power was a classic sign of an aging player who just didn’t have anything left to contribute.

Most people suggested that the Mets begin looking for Delgado’s replacement, because the team needed a real power hitter to keep pace in the NL East, and he just wasn’t going to be able to get the job done. We were all wrong.

Since April 27th, Delgado’s hit .276/.353/.536 with 34 extra base hits (nearly half of his 73 total hits since then), including his July surge that has him posting a 1.212 OPS since the beginning of the month. He’s absolutely torching the ball right now, and looks anything but finished.

Delgado’s resurgence is yet another data point in favor of the belief that we simply have a long way to go before we can identify a player who really has “fallen off a cliff” ahead of time. Both visual evidence and trend analysis suggested that the grim reaper may have come for his power during the off season, but it just wasn’t true. Delgado was slumping, and slumps happen regardless of how young or old a player is. However, we have pre-written narratives about what slumps mean when they happen to young players (he’s not ready for the majors, he’s getting exposed the second time around the league, etc…) and when they happen to old players (he’s done), but we need to remember that those narratives aren’t based in as much reality as we would like to believe.

I’m speaking to myself as much as I am to any of you. While the tools we have are useful in predicting the future, we have to remember their limitations and not jump to conclusions that can’t be supported by evidence.