Entering last night’s start against the Boston Red Sox, Justin Masterson was 1-5 with a 5.46 ERA. His peripherals suggested he was a better pitcher than those old timey numbers gave him credit for. So how did Masterson respond while facing his old team but by causing his pitched baseballs to eat more grass than a sick dog. Yes, even more than his usual 62% groundball rate. Here’s his line:

9 IP
2 H
0 ER
6 SO
2 BB
110 Pitches
75 Strikes

That doesn’t tell the entire story though. Here’s the real beef:

21 BIP
17 GB
3 FB
1 LD

That’s 21 balls in play and 17 groundballs –- or 81% — unsurprisingly this left the Red Sox without an extra base hit on the night. The most ridiculous aspect of the night is that Masterson allowed two of those fly balls in the ninth inning. That means that through eight innings and 26 batters –- or nearly three times through the lineup — roughly 90% of the Red Sox’s balls in play were of the groundball variety.

The most surreal aspect is how this marks Masterson’s fifth start this season with a groundball rate over 70% and yet it’s not his highest rate this year. In fact, he’s only allowed more fly balls and line drives than grounders in one start all season; and even then his GB% was 46%. In a May 19th start against Kansas City Masterson faced 23 batters and had 14 of 16 balls in play pound the ground. Against the Orioles days earlier he’d allowed 20 balls in play with 15 being grounders. Then there was his outing against the Yankees two starts ago, where 13 of 28 batters faced hit grounders. That’s almost half the batters he faced, and they all smacked the ball into the earth.

Compare that to the Pittsburgh Pirates’ 17 strikeout performance versus Stephen Strasburg and the Washington Nationals on Tuesday night and one wonders which the more frusturating style of defeat is. Sure, fanning 17 times as a lineup is more embarrassing, perhaps humiliating, but at least the guy throwing at you for seven innings was straight out of a nightmare.

To drop some analogies on this thing, Masterson carefully placed the carrot in front of rabbits, but only in locations where they could nibble on it, never allowing for a solid chomp. Strasburg never let the rabbit feel as though he had a real shot at biting that carrot. Or, in more simplistic and gory terms: Masterson’s approach resembles death via a thousand papercuts, whereas Strasburg prefers headshots.

FanGraphs now has a Facebook page where you can easily get a feed of the latest posts on FanGraphs. This will be especially useful for those of you who are Facebook users, but not necessarily Twitter users where we do pretty much the same thing.

We’re kicking off a new series here at FanGraphs, where we’ll profile what each team should do as we head towards the July 31st trading deadline. R.J. starts us off with a look at the Nationals.

Overview

With the arrival of baseball’s Jesus Shuttlesworth and the ability to take on payroll (both in the short- and long-term) Mike Rizzo and the rest of the front office might be tempted to make a splash. After all, despite injury carnage to their pitching ranks, the Nationals were still in the midst of the divisional race through most of May before falling to the cellar in the past few weeks.

Buy or Sell?

Realistically, the Nationals are at least a year away from competing with the Phillies and Braves. Making a big deadline deal would be aimed towards public relation and posterity’s sake. That makes selling more likely.

The Nationals rotation currently features Livan Hernandez, J.D. Martin, John Lannan, Luis Atilano, and yes, Stephen Strasburg. Injuries have decimated a previously potential-packed unit. Jason Marquis won’t return for a few more weeks; Jordan Zimmerman, who underwent Tommy John surgery, might return later in the season; same with Chien-Ming Wang (shoulder surgery), Scott Olsen (shoulder inflammation), Garret Mock (cervical spine surgery), and Ross Detwiler (torn hip cartilage).

With that kind of depth soon returning, it could be ideal for the Nats to attempt and cash in a few of their current starters with limited upside. The problem is, well, they aren’t very good. Livan Hernandez is the most notable thanks to his 2.22 ERA although his peripherals suggest he’s a house of cards. Atilano and Lannan have the same issues of Craig Stammen. None of them can strike batters out and as a result they walk more batters than they should. Stammen had a 1.94 K/BB ratio upon demotion which looks overqualified next to Atilano’s 1.00 and Lannan’s 0.71. The starting pitchers desirable to other teams are equally desirable to the Nationals. Rizzo and company should, however, maneuver a full court press when it comes to moving a reliever or two. It’s not like the Nationals can’t replace the production by sliding a bumped starter into relief anyways.

The Nationals also have an overabundance of utility players too. Cristian Guzman (who had previously only played a non-shortstop position in the 2003 All-Star Game) has taken up second base and right field this year, potentially making him more attractive to suitors if not for an $8 million salary. Willie Harris is cheaper ($1.5 million) and while he’s primarily an outfielder, he has gotten a few starts in at third base and second base in these past two seasons. Adam Kennedy is even less expensive ($1.25 million with a club option worth $2 million or a half million buyout) and has played every position but catcher over his 12 seasons. The Nationals have no shortage of utility men in the minors either, with Eric Bruntlett, Pete Orr, and Luis Ordaz a phone call, meal ticket, and coach seat on the fastest moving missile away.

Even with the odd rumors of a potential extension, Adam Dunn is in the final year of his contract and could prove worthwhile to a team in need of a bat. The problem is that Dunn has never been willing to become a designated hitter, which lowers his value and could limit the potential destinations. Josh Willingham is also intriguing, although the Nats may as well hold onto him.

The Farm

Top catching prospect Derek Norris is still a while away, but his presence along with Ivan Rodriguez’s multiple year contract and Jesus Flores – if he ever returns – mean a catcher isn’t necessary. Double-A Harrisburg features two of the team’s top infield prospects in Danny Espinosa and Chris Marrero. Neither is raking at the moment. Most of the team’s top outfield talent is in the lower minors meaning acquiring an outfielder to plug in alongside Nyjer Morgan and Willingham could be an option. Their aforementioned pitching depth is mostly contained to the upper minors as well. The Nats really need impact talent, just like most teams without contention status. None of their pieces will bring that back, so depth with traces of upside should be the focus.

Budget

It’s impossible to say what the payroll ceiling is, but with more than $20 million in contracts due to expire at season’s end it doesn’t seem impossible to expect the Nationals to be able to take on money now and for the future if necessary.

On April 9th, 2003, Javier Vazquez, with the Montreal Expos at the time, struck out 14 batters in only 96 pitches. He became the first player ever to strike out 14 batters in fewer than 100 pitches; only Greg Maddux, Tom Seaver, and Grant Jackson had ever struck out at least 13 with so few pitches.

On June 8th, 2010, Stephen Strasburg of the Washington Nationals struck out 14 batters in only 94 pitches. That’s the highest number of strikeouts ever recorded with so few pitches. It came in his first career start, besting the greatest marks players like Seaver (105.3 rWAR) and Maddux (98.8 rWAR) ever posted.

Strasburg also became the first player to record at least 14 strikeouts and no walks in his debut. Not only did Strasburg not issue any walks, he only reached three total 3-ball counts.

Stephen Strasburg’s first start was remarkable for a multitude of reasons. The sheer spectacle, the stuff, the velocity, and the strikeouts. Perhaps the most interesting thing to watch, as Strasburg’s career develops, will be his efficiency. His first start already ranks among the most efficient games ever. We already knew he had the stuff and the velocity. If he can combine that natural talent with the kind of efficiency he showcased on Tuesday, watch out MLB.

Well, that was quite a show, eh? Seven innings of just unbelievable, dominating stuff. Even the four hits felt like flukes as the opposing hitters just played self defense and hoped to slap the ball the other way. Pitch F/x doesn’t give out many legit 100 MPH readings, but it did it on multiple occasions, and the fastball averaged over 97 MPH for the night. Contrast that with a nasty change-up around 90 MPH and a knee buckling 82 MPH curveball, and you have major league hitters looking foolish with regularity.

Yes, that May 3rd start by Ubaldo Jimenez, where he just shut down the San Diego Padres, was a thing of beauty. Wait, were you thinking of something more recent?

Hey, look, I was as impressed by Stephen Strasburg as anyone else last night. But, in the rush to hyperbole, I noticed that it’s become common to talk about how Strasburg’s stuff is just so much better than anyone we’ve ever seen. That would be true if Ubaldo wasn’t walking around the planet right now.

Here’s his velocity graph from Brooks Baseball from that game against the Padres.

There’s 120 pitches in there. He hit 99.8 on the 117th pitch of the night. He struck out 13 hitters on the evening, by the way. While he issued three walks, he was also not facing the Pirates Triple-A line-up, so we’ll call that even. All in all, it was a very similar start to the one that went down in D.C. last night.

This isn’t to diminish Strasburg’s debut in any way, shape, or form. He was remarkably good, and will continue to be, I’m sure. But I think that it’s important that we recognize that the stuff isn’t once in a lifetime. It’s not even once in 2010. Strasburg has a great arm, but so does the Rockies ace, even if he comes with just a wee bit less hype.

There has been a lot of discussion over the past year about the logistics of turning the June amateur draft into an international affair, which would include players from around the world and would eliminate international free agency. The idea is valid, but the best route to take is to create two separate drafts; this would leave the June draft as is, and create another draft solely for the world prospects.

This draft would be held during either the otherwise-boring General Managers Meeting in November, or the increasingly boring Winter Meetings. At one point, the amateur draft actually featured three separate drafts in one year and, as recently had 1986, had two drafts (January and June) – so this is not an entirely out-of-left-field idea. By having the draft in November or December, it would allow teams the opportunity to disperse scouting staffs from college and high school stadiums, to parks in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Australia, Europe, etc.

Major League Baseball would have to take a huge lead in this venture, obviously, which could include the creation of an MLB International Scouting Bureau. Each year, players would have to submit applications to be eligible for drafting considerations. It would be done early enough for Major League Baseball to run background checks on players to prove their identities and ages. To help teams scout players, showcases and tournaments would be held in various locations so scouts and executives can see the players perform against similarly skilled talent. Teams could certainly do their own scouting, as well.

As for draft order, the flawed and archaic Elias Rankings (or perhaps something a little more accurate) could continue to be used for the June draft. For the world draft, teams would be awarded a pre-determined value for each of their free agents, such as 4 WAR for a Type-A free agent, 2 WAR for a Type-A and 0.5 WAR for a Type-C. If the St. Louis Cardinals, for example, had four free agents, including one A, two B and one C, then their accumulated value would be 8.5 WAR. The team with the highest total would draft first, and so on.

If two or more teams were to end up with the same total, the order would be decided amongst those teams based on the accumulated service time that each free agent had for their team. So a player obtained at the July trade deadline would have much less value than a player with 10 years of service time with the same club. This system would allow a much different draft order for the world draft. If you wanted to change it up a bit, the draft ranking could instead be based on the previous year’s free agent crop, to take into consideration the players that actually left via free agency, rather than the current year where some players may actually be re-signed by their respective clubs.

Another option to the standard draft order process would be to have it as an auction-style draft, where everyone has a legitimate shot at signing each player, assuming they’re willing to pay the big bucks. This would also, theoretically, help control the bonuses handed out.

To be honest, I can’t really think of any negatives that would be associated with having two separate drafts, aside from the increase in costs for teams (scouting staffs, travel) and Major League Baseball (administration, etc.). From a logistics standpoint, creating a separate draft would be much easier than trying to re-vamp the current amateur draft, which seems to work fairly well (bonus demands aside).

The Orioles do not score many runs. In fact, their 3.33 runs per game in 2010 puts them not only at the bottom of the American League, but also at 28th in the majors. Therein lies the crux of their league-worst 16-42 record. While their young pitchers have struggled at times, the offense has lacked the power to bail them out. Even with the veteran pitchers on the mound, the O’s have struggled to stay in games.

That wasn’t the plan when Andy MacPhail acquired Kevin Millwood at the Winter Meetings last December. The Orioles had scored 4.57 runs per game last season, a bit below league average but serviceable given the circumstances. Their lineup featured a number of young players coming into their primes. Improvement and maturation from Adam Jones, Nolan Reimold, Matt Wieters, and, to a certain extent, Nick Markakis (who had already established himself) figured to help catapult the offense a bit and provide support for the young pitchers.

Adding Millwood gave the Orioles another veteran presence in the rotation. He, along with Jeremy Guthrie, afforded MacPhail and Co. the flexibility to keep some of its less developed arms in the minors. Also, since he was likely to outperform the young arms, he gave the team a better chance to win some ballgames. The scheme was well laid, but it doesn’t take a Robert Burns to understand what can go wrong between plan and execution.

Wieters and Jones have struggled to produce anything so far. Reimold performed so poorly that he’s now at AAA — though could return as a first baseman, which is just another of the Orioles’ problems. Miguel Tejada, brought in to provide an upgrade over the departed Melvin Mora, has hit just as poorly as the latter. Those troubles extend to nearly everyone in the lineup. Of the nine Orioles with 100 or more PA, only three have an OBP above .320. That has made life tough for their pitchers.

To start the season Millwood did exactly what he was supposed to. Through 10 starts he had allowed just 28 earned runs, a 3.71 ERA against a 4.09 FIP. It wasn’t ace-like, but it should have been good enough for a team that scored between 4.5 and 5 runs per game. Yet, as we know, the Orioles fell far short of that. They had managed wins in just four of those 10 games, and in none of them did they have, or hold, a lead when he left the game.

While the Orioles have a poor offense to begin with, they’ve been even worse with Millwood on the mound. They have scored just 3.1 runs per game in his starts, compared to 3.3 per game overall. Over the course of 32 starts that amounts to about 6.5 runs, which doesn’t seem awfully significant, but can certainly make a difference if it’s concentrated in a few starts. What stands out more, however, is the support the Orioles have provided while Millwood is in the game.

To preface, Millwood is currently averaging 6.6 innings per game, which is more than he has averaged in any year since 1999. He’s helping the Orioles by pitching deeper into games and taking the burden off their woefully inadequate bullpen. The Orioles have rewarded his efforts with just 2.2 runs during the innings he pitches. Obviously they’ll score more than that in some games and fewer in others, but on average it means the Orioles are wasting even his quality starts. It means that efforts like his seven-inning, three-run outing against the Twins on May 8 go to waste. It means they don’t have much of a shot when he pitches all eight innings, allowing just four runs, in a game on the road, as he did on April 21 in Seattle.

Things have gotten much worse for Millwood in his last three starts. On May 28 he allowed five runs, four earned, in six innings against the Blue Jays. Then he ran into the Yankees twice, allowing six runs in 5.2 innings both times. In the four starts following his eight-inning, three-run performance against the Royals his ERA has jumped a full run. That should get better once he starts facing offenses not in the league’s top four, but the offensive problems will still persist.

The Orioles offense is just not scoring, and it’s affecting no one quite as greatly as Millwood. He has done exactly what the Orioles expected. He has afforded them flexibility with their young pitchers, and he has, until recently, kept opposing teams at bay. Andy MacPhail had a solid plan, but, as Burns so duly noted, those plans often gang aft agley.

—-

I’d say Millwood is the least-supported pitcher in the league, but that would ignore Zack Greinke. As Joe Poz tweets, the Royals have failed with Greinke in the game during his last four starts. They have scored 2.4 runs while he’s in the game, which is a tick more than Millwood, but have scored only 3.1 for the entire game in which he pitches. The Royals offense as a whole has scored 4.34 runs per game, so the Royals seem to be failing Greinke more than the Orioles are failing Millwood. Also, like Millwood, Greinke has stumbled lately. Not that there’s a causal connection between poor run support and declining performance. But it is an interesting connection, at least.

Going into the 2009 season, one player on top of everyone’s “Must Watch” list was Diamondbacks 1B/LF Conor Jackson. Jackson, a former first round pick out of UC-Berkeley (smart guy), had put up a 3.0 WAR season in 2008, hitting .300/.376/.446 while playing plus defense in left field and okay defense at first base. However, he was turning twenty seven years old going into the ’09 season, and was primed to at least repeat his numbers from the previous year.

But then something sad happened. After getting off to an already rough start to the 2009 campaign, Jackson caught a bad case of Valley Fever, which the Mayo Clinic says, “…is highly variable. It can take from six months to a year to fully recover, and fatigue and joint aches can last even longer. The severity of the disease depends on several factors, including your overall health and the number of fungus spores you inhale.” The Valley Fever eventually turned into pneumonia, and Jackson just couldn’t take it anymore:

Jackson said he had a cough, was sore and achy and had been feeling constantly tired.

“By the third inning, it felt like I had played 20 innings with an 80-pound backpack on,” he said. “It was brutal.”

…He said the first signs of sickness came during the team’s first road trip of the season to San Francisco in mid-April. He said the pneumonia hit him during the most-recent homestand, at which point the club placed him on the disabled list.

…”I haven’t lifted a weight, I haven’t run, in three weeks pretty much,” he said. “We haven’t even talked about timetable. One doctor told me, ‘You’re going to be fatigued for the rest of the year.’ The infectious-disease guy said everybody reacts differently, so I don’t know what to expect.”

Jackson would end his season on May 11th, hitting just .182/.264/.253 in 110 plate appearances, good for -1.0 WAR for the season despite playing just thirty games. The Valley Fever did not go away immediately, and it took months for Jackson to finally get over it. The results were damaging; weight loss, muscle atrophy, and rust all set in, and even though Jackson was able to come back for the start of the 2010 season, the results have not been pretty. He’s hitting .242/.336/.333 with just one homer in 148 plate appearances, good for a wRC+ of just 82. Jackson also missed time on the DL in late April this year after straining his right hamstring.

Most shockingly for Jackson has been his balls in play. He’s hitting line drives at a staggering rate of 27.6% (!), but has a BABIP of just .270 for the season. Those numbers lead me to believe Jackson’s line drives have been more of the Juan Pierre variety than that of Albert Pujols, as the power numbers still remain staggeringly low.

Jackson still has the possibility of reviving his career, but his natural talent has not been able to supersede his temporary physical problems. Until Jackson’s power numbers come back, his value at first base and left field is extremely limited, and the Diamondbacks have to wonder how much rope they’ll give him before they’re forced to go in a different direction.

Our weekly Q&A about the goings on in Major League Baseball. Join us at noon.

Last night, a superstar stepped on to the field for the Washington Nationals. In the very first inning, after yet another feat of strength, the player had 40,000 strong standing, roaring, clamoring for more.

Huh? Oh yeah. That Strasburg guy was pretty good, too. But I was referring to Washington’s other franchise pillar, Ryan Zimmerman.

The fourth overall pick out of the University of Virginia in the 2005 draft, Zimmerman zipped through the minors, reaching the show the very same summer that he was drafted. Over the 2006-2008 seasons, he combined spectacular defense with a quality bat, averaging about +10.3 UZR per 150 defensive games with a 110 wRC+. Zimmerman compiled 3.9 Wins Above Replacement per season over that time frame, though that total was stunted somewhat by a left shoulder injury in ’08 that put him on the shelf for two months.

Since then, Zimmerman has taken his game to another level. He had 6.6 WAR in 2009, tied with Adrian Gonzalez for 9th among position players. This season, Zimmerman’s 3.2 WAR total trails only Justin Morneau, Robinson Cano and Alex Rios.

The 25-year-old third baseman is swift as ever with the glove, posting a +14.1 UZR/150 last season and a +24.7 UZR/150 in 2010. But it’s his bat that has taken a great leap forward — Zimmerman had a 132 wRC+ in 2009 and currently owns a 169 wRC+ this year.

Zimmerman’s power numbers have spiked since the beginning of the ’09 season. He had Isolated Power figures of .184, .191 and .159 over the 2006-2008 campaigns. Last year, his ISO climbed to .233. This season, it’s up to .282. Zimmerman’s home run per fly ball rate, 11.4-11.5 percent from 2006-2008, was 15.9 percent in 2009 and sits at 20.3 percent in 2010.

With the exception of 2009, Zimmerman has always posted excellent totals when pulling the ball to the left side. This season, he has been off-the-charts good..

Also, his power to center and the opposite field has surged:

Zimmerman’s pop up rate to the right side has fallen each year of his career, which certainly helps his opposite field numbers. Take a look at his infield/fly ball rates when hitting to the right side:

A more powerful Zimmerman is getting fewer pitches thrown within the strike zone. His percentage of in-zone offerings was right around the major league average each season prior to 2010. But that mark has fallen this year:

His walk rate has climbed as well — Zimmerman took a free pass in 8.2 percent of his plate appearances from 2006-2008, but walked 10.4 percent last season and 14.3 percent in 2010. He is getting more intentional walks (nine last year, four so far this year). That could affect his zone percentage a bit, too — without the intentionals, Zimmerman’s Zone% is around 46.4, though that’s still below the MLB average. Intentional walks or not, Zimmerman’s unintentional walk rate is up. It was 7.6 percent from 2006-2008, 9.1 percent in 2009 and is 12.4 percent in 2010.

Last year, Dave Cameron showed that there’s an inverse relationship between the percentage of fastballs a hitter sees and his ISO: the more pop a player has, the fewer fastballs he gets. That has been the case for Zimmerman. He got a heater a career-high 61.4 percent in 2007, and saw fastballs 59.9 percent in 2008 and 59.1 percent in 2009. This year, he’s getting challenged 55.3 percent.

Perhaps there’s some game theory going on here: Zimmerman mashed fastballs last season (+1.32 runs per 100 pitches seen), and pitchers have responded by throwing more breaking and off-speed stuff this season. Zimmerman’s performance against fastballs in 2010 is still good but has fallen (+0.51 runs/100), while his performance against more frequently thrown breaking balls and changeups has improved. Maybe Zimmerman is looking for something that bends or tumbles more often.

Will he continue to hit for this type of power? My guess would be that Zimmerman keeps some of the gains that he has made, but not all of them. According to Hit Tracker Online, Zimmerman leads the majors in “Just Enough” home runs, with six. A “Just Enough” home run, per the definition on the site, “means the ball cleared the fence by less than 10 vertical feet, OR that it landed less than one fence height past the fence. These are the ones that barely made it over the fence.”

Zimmerman’s rest-of-season ZiPS projects a .227 ISO, which seems reasonable. He has been beating the snot out of the baseball for too long to consider it a total fluke, though I’d bet that he won’t keep hitting a homer two-thirds of the time that he pulls a fly ball.

Be happy, Nats fans — a superstar debuted on the mound last night, but remember that you guys have one at the hot corner, too.