Mark Ellis, Oakland
Option: $6M Buyout: $0.5M

After a disappointing 2009, Ellis bounced back in a big way; increasing his WAR by two while only racking up an additional 82 plate appearances. When Ellis originally signed the extension, he became the point o dissension amongst the community for not testing the market. The deal appeared to be of the sweetheart variety. It still is, as even Ellis’ down season racked up a value of $5.4 million. If Ellis were to replicate that value (in dollars) in 2011, he would essentially pay for himself, as the buyout guarantees he’ll receive half a million whether he’s in Oakland (likely) or elsewhere.

Jose Lopez, Seattle
Option: $4.5M Buyout: $0.25M

One could categorize Lopez as a third baseman, since that is where he played last season, but for now let’s call him a second baseman. Lopez will be a quarter of a million richer as he hits the free agent market unless Jack Zduriencik somehow creates a sucker rally. The 2010 season may represent a disaster in Lopez’s career, but he’s probably headed for a utility role given his history of relative success. Lopez will only be 27 and getting away from Safeco should help his raw numbers immediately. He’s never going to take a lot of walks but his ability to hit for pop and adequately play two premium defensive positions shouldn’t be overlooked.

Omar Infante, Atlanta
Option: $2.5M Buyout: $0.25M

Infante was more than worth the money over the last two seasons alone, but this season cemented his return. Presumably Infante will return to his super sub role, although some of that is dependent on what occurs with Chipper Jones and what steps – if necessary – the Braves take to replace the legend.

The final series of the first round also had some of the most up-and-down games.

Best Games

5. Kyle Farnsworth, Game 2
1.2 IP, 1 H, 0 R, +.377 WPA

Farnsworth’s inning-plus in game two came in about as high leverage of a situation as it gets (although some of it was self-created). He entered with a runner on second and one out in a 4-4 game in the tenth inning, proceeded to hit and walk the two subsequent hitters, and then induced one of the most ridiculous double plays in baseball history, with Troy Glaus eschewing the out at home and going 5-4-3 to end the inning. Farnsworth then stayed in to record the “save” up by one in the eleventh. Overall, his outing had a pLI of 3.86, nearly double the typical situation for a closer, making his scoreless effort all the more impressive.

4. Buster Posey, Game 3
2-4, RBOE, +.422 WPA

In game three, otherwise known as the “Brooks Conrad game,” Posey was having a good but uneventful night at the dish until he hit a shot up the middle which Conrad couldn’t handle. The Giants took the lead on that play, Conrad’s third error of the night. Of Posey’s +.422 WPA on the night, +.371 came from that play.

3. Johnathan Sanchez, Game 3
7.1 IP, 2 H, 1 ER (allowed by Romo), 11 K, 1 BB, +.466 WPA

The craziness of the final two innings of game three make it easy to forget just how masterful Johnathan Sanchez was. In a low scoring game on both sides, Sanchez was murder on Braves hitters, staying in complete control until he was pulled by manager Bruce Bochy in the eighth. His only earned run of the game didn’t score until after he was lifted – perhaps his line could have looked even better.

2. Eric Hinske, Game 3
1-1, HR, 2 RBI, +.578 WPA

Eric Hinske isn’t exactly a great all around player, but he can hit right handed pitching. That’s exactly what he did against Sergio Romo, as he just barely took one over the right field fence to give the Braves a 2-1 lead heading into the ninth inning.

1. Tim Lincecum, Game 1
9 IP, 2 H, 0 R, 14 K, 1 BB, +.711 WPA

The fact that this performance was even compared to the Roy Halladay no-hitter finished mere hours before game one started is a testament to Lincecum’s tremendous performance. For all the domination Johnathan Sanchez showed in game 3, it was nothing compared to Lincecum, who drew 31 swings and misses along the way to his fourteen strikeouts. To put the cherry on top, he did it all on in a 1-0 game. Perhaps it wasn’t quite as magical as the no-hitter, but there’s no doubt in my mind that Lincecum’s game one deserves a lofty spot in the all-time best postseason pitching performances.

Worst Games

5. Tommy Hanson, Game 2
4.0 IP, 5 H, 1 HR, 4 R, 5 K, 1 BB, -.260 WPA

The Braves would eventually come back and win this game, but the four early runs given up by Tommy Hanson put them in a deep hole. Much of the damage was done early on a three-run Pat Burrell home run (-.259 WPA), and Hanson did settle down after that and pitched pretty well in his final three innings, allowing the Braves to later tie the game and then win it in extra innings.

4. Buster Posey, Game 2
1-4, BB, R, K, GIDP, -.344 WPA

Both of Posey’s positive events – his walk and single – came with two outs and weren’t run scoring events, and, until the tenth inning, none of Posey’s outs had came in high leverage situations either. When Posey came to bat in the bottom of the 10th with bases loaded and one out, he could have won the game. Instead, he grounded into a double play in easily his most important at bat of the game, moving the Giants win expectancy back from 83% to 50%. The Braves would go on to score the winning run in the next inning on Rick Ankiel’s home run.

3. Michael Dunn, Game 3
0 IP, 1 H, -.349 WPA

It doesn’t get much simpler than this. Dunn entered in the bottom of the ninth with one sole purpose: retire Aubrey Huff. He couldn’t, as Huff singled in the tying run and put runners on first and second for Buster Posey. Bobby Cox immediately pulled the left-handed specialist, ending his night right there.

2*. Peter Moylan, Game 3
0 IP, 0 H, 1 RBOE, -.371 WPA

The final Brooks Conrad error came with Moylan on the mound, and due to the lack of defense in our implementation of WAR, Moylan receives the full -.371 debit for this play. Posey did hit that ball hard, but Moylan should have been out of the inning. Instead, the go-ahead run scored and the Giants went on to win.

1. Sergio Romo, Game 3
0.2 IP, 1 H, 1 HR, 1 ER, -.563 WPA

Romo was called upon to protect a 1-0 lead as well as Johnathan Sanchez’s shutout. He couldn’t do either, as Eric Hinske, the first batter Romo faced, hit the home run mentioned above to give the Braves a 2-1 lead. Romo did manage to retire the side after the home run, but at that point, with the Giants only having one more chance to score, things were looking bleak for San Francisco. Luckily for Romo, he was bailed out by Aubrey Huff, Buster Posey, and Brooks Conrad.

**. Brooks Conrad, Game 3
0-3, 3 errors, -.751 unofficial WPA

Conrad’s game three will go down as one of the worst postseason performances in history. I wrote about it in detail here.

Best Series

Hitter: Eric Hinske
1-3, HR, R, 2 RBI, BB +.664 WPA

Hinske didn’t play much in this series, but in his two biggest PAs (leverage indexes of 3.3 and 4.5), Hinske came up big, with the go-ahead home run in game three and a one-out, one-on walk in the bottom of the ninth in game four.

Pitcher: Tim Lincecum
9 IP, 0 R, 2 H, 14 K, 1 BB, +.711 WPA

See above.

Worst Series

Hitter: Jason Heyward
2-16, 1 BB, 8 K, GIDP, -.493 WPA

Heyward’s rookie season was incredible, but his debut in the postseason was anything but. Heyward struggled the whole way and failed to record a hit until game four. The Braves didn’t hit much at all this series, and Heyward’s struggles were a big reason why.

Pitcher: Sergio Romo
0.2 IP, 3 H, HR, 3 R, -.705 WPA

Romo appeared in two games and was awful in both, allowing the aforementioned Hinske home run in game three and failing to record an out in the eighth inning of game two.

Notables:

Buster Posey: +.205 WPA
Cody Ross: +.276 WPA
Brian McCann: +.353 WPA
Omar Infante: -.324 WPA

Dear Wide Readership,

This is Carson Cistulli. You may know me from such films as “How Stella Got Her Groove Taken Away in the First Place” and “Haters Gonna Hate: The Life and Times of Jimmy Stewart.” Also, I contribute with some frequency to this site.

Tonight, as you probably know, we, the Baseballing Enthusiasts of America, have the opportunity to watch Colby Lewis pitch a potentially ALCS-clinching baseball game against the New York Americans.

Alot of people have asked, and attempted to answer, the question “Who is Colby Lewis?”

The answer to the question is obvious: there is no answer. Or, rather, there is no one answer. Allow me to explain.

It is not uncommon for theologians — and this extends across multiple faith traditions — for theologians to describe God by describing, instead, what God is not. The practice, called apophasis, is predicated on the belief that God is ineffable*, and therefore cannot be apprehended directly.

*I once had a girlfriend who was ineffable, but in a totally different way.

The Mystery known as Colby Lewis is also ineffable. Yes, we can point to him and say, “There is Colby Lewis on the baseball mound” and, yes, we can look at his player page and say, “His slider has been considerably above average (+1.56 runs per 100 thrown) while his curve has been below average (-1.54 per 100).” But that is to ignore the entirety of Colby Lewis.

Jorge Luis Borges comes closest to representing this dichotomy in his very short story “Borges and I.” In said text, Borges struggles to see the similarities between Borges the Man and Borges the Famous Argentine Author. “I do not know which of us has written this page,” he ends by saying.

Similar is the case with Colby Lewis. Sitting here, in Madison, Wisconsin, I imagine Colby Lewis. Later, in front of a television, I will see someone named Colby Lewis, pitching against the Yankees. But that man, throwing from that mound, is only part of the Colby Lewis I imagine.

My colleague Joe Pawlikowski has suggested, via Twitter, that Lewis will fail tonight versus the Yankees and that I, among his (i.e. Lewis’s) biggest supporters, will be crushed.

But I have the leg up on Joe Pawl here, on anyone who’d adjudge Lewis’s success by mere wins and losses, by swinging strikes and groundballs-induced. For the Mystery of Colby Lewis is unassailable. As Walt Whitman has stated, it is large and contains multitudes. One game will have no effect on it. Colby Lewis has won already.

Humbly Yours,
Carson Cistulli

Game Five obviously did not go the way the Giants wanted, as the 4-2 loss cut their series lead to 3-2. There are small signs that the Phillies’ hitters are coming around, and the pitching matchups aren’t going to get any more favorable for San Francisco. I won’t review every key play of Game Five, but rather a few bad and good points that the Giants can take away from it.

Errors in last night’s game highlighted problems some see with the Giants infield defense. Aubrey Huff‘s error in the third inning was the biggest WPA shift in the game (.155), scoring two runs to put the Phillies up for good. Pablo Sandoval’s error in the ninth didn’t cost the Giants any runs, but did serve as a reminder that he has been benched for reasons other than his bad season at the plate. Despite Huff’s good UZR and DRS scores this season, for his career he’s still a negative defender at both at first, and was slightly below average in 2010’s Fans Scouting Report. The metrics don’t see Sandoval as horrible at third base, but the Giants are clearly concerned about his abilities there.

The middle of the Giants’ batting order got shut down. There’s no shame in getting reigned in by Roy Halladay, even when he’s working with a pulled groin, but the Giants needed more from their 3-4-5 hitters Aubrey Huff, Buster Posey, and Pat Burrell, who were held to a double (by Burrell) and a walk (by Posey) in twelve plate appearances. It was obvious before the series started that runs would be hard to come by for both teams, especially the Giants, but the team can’t count on Cody Ross to keep bailing them out (insert baserunning joke here).

There were some hopeful signs for the Giants, however. They still aren’t being dominated by the Phillies’ offense. Tim Lincecum gave up three runs (not horrible in itself over seven innings), but two of those scored on Huff’s error. The Phillies did look better at the plate in this game (at least to me), but they are still struggling to score runs. Lincecum won’t be starting the other games of the series, but Jonathan Sanchez and Matt Cain have more than held their own so far against the Phillies. One long home run by Jayson Werth doesn’t change that.

Despite the last night’s defensive foibles, Giants fans should be happy that Pablo Sandoval started last night and got a hit. He grounds into an incredible number of double plays, and 1-4 with no walks isn’t great, but he’s still a better bet than running either Mike Fontenot or Edgar Renteria out there. Bruce Bochy resisted the temptation to leave Andres Torres on the bench, and he responded by going 2-3 with a walk. Another poor plate performance shouldn’t change our evaluation of his true talent, but it might have put pressure on Bochy to sit him for the remainder of the series, and he’s clearly better both offensively and defensively than Aaron Rowand. It is amazing how much I’ve read about Torres’ “returning to reality” during his playoff struggles from people who should know better. He’s probably not as good offensively as his 2009 and 2010 regular season performances, but as I’ve discussed before, this hasn’t been a 300 PA, BABIP-fueled hot streak, either. For more than 700 PA in 2009 and 2010 Torres has had an above-average walk rate and good power. He needs to be starting every game for the Giants.

Some will want to talk about the Phillies “seizing the momentum” as the series shifts back the Philadelphia. The Phillies still have the more talented group of players, but they certainly haven’t outplayed the Giants so far in this series. Even in last night’s loss, the Giants showed that if they do win the series it won’t be a miraculous feat.

Facing elimination tonight, the Yankees are pulling out all the stops by announcing that CC Sabathia will be available out of the bullpen tonight, even though he started Game 5 on Wednesday and threw 112 pitches. For his part, CC says that he “could throw 45 to 50 pitches” on one day’s rest. My question – should he throw any?

Yes, the Yankees have to win tonight or their season ends. But they also have to win tomorrow or their season ends. As often as the “take it one game at a time” cliche is run out there, the Yankees actually have to take it two games at a time, because winning just one doesn’t really do them any good. Winning tonight is critical, of course, but so is winning tomorrow – they are of equal importance. And I’m not sure that using Sabathia in relief tonight is the best use of resources in effort win both games.

The working assumption is that a pitcher’s quality of performance goes up with each off day they get between starts (to a point, anyway). If we accept that premise, then Sabathia should be more effective tomorrow than he would be tonight. We don’t have nearly enough data to quantify the difference between a starter throwing a few relief innings on one or two days rest, but we should be able to safely assume that there is some difference, even if we don’t know how much.

If they use Sabathia tonight, they would essentially be borrowing win probability from tomorrow night’s game in order to increase their chances of winning Game 6, but the potential quality difference could make that a bad trade-off. Using made-up numbers to illustrate the point, let’s say these were the respective probabilities of winning each game if Sabathia was used in relief tonight versus tomorrow.

Sabathia relieves tonight.

Game 6 – 55 percent
Game 7 – 40 percent

Chance of winning both: 22 percent

Sabathia relieves tomorrow night.

Game 6 – 50 percent
Game 7 – 50 percent

Chance of winning both: 25 percent

Under this scenario, the Yankees would increase their odds of winning tonight but decrease their odds of winning the series. Now, these numbers are not real, and in reality using Sabathia in relief for an inning or two is not going to make a difference of this magnitude in either game, so this isn’t some kind of colossal screwup if he pitches tonight. But I do think the win-Game-6-at-all-costs mindset misses the bigger picture.

You have to win Game 6 to force Game 7, absolutely. But you have to keep the overall goal in mind, and that is to win both games. My guess is that the Yankees best chance to win both would be to save Sabathia for tomorrow, when he may be more effective. I understand the temptation to use him tonight, but I think the Yankees may be better off if they resist that urge and try to win tonight’s game with the rest of their bullpen.

I’m nothing if not predictable. Why change a horse in midstream, the saying goes.

Roy Halladay, October 6, 2010

Roy Halladay, October 21, 2010

Yup, more strike zone plots from Brooks Baseball. And Carson’s out here pushing the limits in his previews. But these two game plots are pretty different, eh? Then let me blow you away with yet another strike zone plot, eh?

Looks like Halladay was having a little trouble locating low-and-away to left-handers, no? Or, at least low-and-away in general. In any case, it’s a nice way to show, in pictures, what it looks like to win “without your best stuff,” as the game stories most likely went today. Halladay grit and grissioned his way through the start while Tim Lincecum was the valiant loser, mostly because of some poor defense behind him.

Lincecum is not left-handed, and that probably helped lefties Chase Utley, Ryan Howard and the recently unbenched Raul Ibanez to a stunning 3-for-12 in game five. That group, along with Domonic Brown, is now a combined 10-for-51 with 7 walks and 3 extra-base hits, which sounds bad except the whole team is now batting .208. Perhaps the struggles of the left-handed batter from Philadelphia were overstated.

Raul Ibanez, though, that guy shook off his benching in a strong way. One of his two hits led to the first run of the game and started that third inning that featured all the little league defense a big-league audience could handle. Placido Polanco was the WPA champ on the offensive side for singling in the third run in the third inning (+8.5%), but somehow Ibanez sticks out.

It was a nice respite. Now, because of the Roy Oswalt Decision, the Phillies still face an uphill climb in game six.

Part two in an ongoing series on players with 2011 options.

David Ortiz, Boston Red Sox
Option: $12.5M Buyout: None

Reports of David Ortiz’s demise have been greatly exaggerated. After a poor 2009 – largely a product of a .238 BABIP – Ortiz responded in a big way in 2010. Big Papi slugged 32 home runs, breaking the 30 homer barrier for the first time since 2007, and posted a 137 wRC+ in 606 plate appearances. Even at the DH position, that’s worth a solid 3.3 WAR. After his dismal 2009, in which he only posted 0.8 WAR, it may have looked like the Red Sox would do all they could to make sure Ortiz wasn’t around by 2011. At this point, though, with Ortiz coming off the strong 2010 and projected as a 2.5 WAR player by CHONE, the Red Sox will likely look to bring the slugger back. If we see any sort of salary inflation, Ortiz’s deal will settle right around market value and possibly a touch below, which a team like the Red Sox can certainly handle.

Nick Johnson, New York Yankees
Option: $5.5M Buyout: $0.25M

Nick Johnson was supposed to shore up the Yankees DH position this year, assuming he could avoid injuries. Unfortunately for New York, a Nick Johnson injury is as certain as death and taxes. In 98 plate appearances this year, Johnson had mixed results; he reached base at a .388 clip but his contact rates and BABIP were way down. Of course, we can’t glean a whole lot from those plate appearances, and when Johnson plays we can probably still expect the high-OBP, medium power type player that we’ve seen this whole millennium. But if that player can’t stay on the field, he’s not worth much to anybody, and for that reason, we can probably expect the Yankees to decline their half of the mutual option. Five and a half million isn’t much for the Yankees, but it’s not nothing, and even the Yankees do operate on a budget and will look to use that money on upgrades either at the DH position or elsewhere.

Gregg Zaun, Milwaukee
Option: $2.25M Buyout: $0.25M

The most stylish catcher in the game, Zaun’s flair may as well come custom from Louis Vuitton. A torn labrum bagged his season, leaving it best known for an embarrassing case of the yips. The closest thing to game action Zaun has seen since is doing postseason television work in Canada. Still, he’s established his desire to play, and assuming Milwaukee chooses to decline his option, Zaun could latch onto a team in need of a good hitting reserve catcher (wRC+ over 90 in each of the past seven seasons) with the groove gene.

Miguel Olivo, Colorado
Option: $2.5M Buyout: $0.5M

Olivo’s contract stipulated that his option would convert into one of mutual standing based on his games played tally. He saw action in 112, which seemed unlikely at the date of inking, what with Chris Iannetta in tow, but there is a decent chance the option is now mutual. Olivo played well enough to have Colorado exercise their part of the deal (regardless of Iannetta) and could find himself as a free agent through his own merit.

Yorvit Torrealba, San Diego
Option: $3.5M (mutual) Buyout: $0.5M

To catch is to don the tools of ignorance. Part of Torrealba’s job description in 2010 included enlightening Nick Hundley until he got his C legs under him. Torrealba defied the odds by having one of his finest offensive seasons (107 wRC+, matching a career high) in perhaps the most arctic of offensive conditions. Padres’ bench coach, the legendary Ted Simmons, holds the philosophy that it takes 500 games (or 1,500 at-bats) to know what you have in a catcher. Assuming Simmons: 1) has some say, and 2) knows what he’s talking about, it wouldn’t be a shock if Torrealba returns.

According to John Fay of the Cincinnati Enquirer, the Reds will pick up Bronson Arroyo’s option after the season. Arroyo’s option calls for $11 million, and by picking it up, the Reds will forgo a $2 million buyout.

In the same article, Fay also notes that the Reds will not be picking up Aaron Harang’s option. That leaves the following pitchers as potential options for the Cincinnati opening day starting rotation: Arroyo, Johnny Cueto, Edinson Volquez, Travis Wood, Homer Bailey, Mike Leake, Matt Maloney, Sam LeCure, and, potentially, Aroldis Chapman.

Therefore, when evaluating this contract, we need to not only compare Arroyo to replacement level but also to the level of these other starters that the Reds have available. Arroyo put up 1.7 WAR in 2009, with a mediocre 4.61 FIP but a solid, .246 BABIP supported 3.88 ERA. Overall, Arroyo was a 1.7 WAR pitcher, but thanks to his good ERA, his performance was worth much more than that to the Reds last season.

Arroyo definitely could be the kind of guy who can outperform his FIP, but I would hesitate to project another season in which his results better his peripherals by three quarters of a run or more. Arroyo has a slightly low career BABIP of .290 and his LOB rates are very close to league average. As such, we should expect the difference between Arroyo’s FIP and ERA to be somewhere between zero and his career average of 0.27 instead of the 0.72 we saw in 2010.

According to CHONE’s most recent projections, Arroyo is a 4.48 ERA pitcher. Of the other starters listed above, none of them have a projected ERA above 4.78 (Chapman doesn’t have a projection). CHONE projects five starters (aside from Arroyo) to put up at least 17 RAR and three others to put up 11 RAR. It appears that the young depth that the Reds have would be able to cover the loss of Arroyo quite well. Arroyo probably provides half a win to one win above the rest of the Reds rotation, making $11 million a high price to pay.

However, with the Reds coming off their first playoff season in 15 seasons, Walt Jocketty probably isn’t terribly willing to risk success on five extremely young starters. To him, the relatively marginal upgrade of Arroyo over those young pitchers appears to be worth the premium. As the commitment is only for one season and the Reds have already expressed an intention to increase payroll, this kind of contract certainly isn’t going to kill the Reds, either in 2011 or in the future.

Despite that, the Reds aren’t a team without weaknesses, and they may be able to do better than Arroyo with that $11 million. The free agent crop at SP is relatively thin this year, and that makes holding on to Arroyo a safe use of their money. If players like Scott Rolen and Drew Stubbs and Johnny Cueto perform as well as they did last year, that may be enough for a repeat NL Central championship. If not, the Reds may find themselves wishing they made a bigger play with their money than the relatively stable but unimpressive Arroyo.

The Atlanta Braves released Melky Cabrera two days ago, after he had finished the season as the worst player in baseball, with -1.2 WAR. Among players who played enough to qualify, he was one of six with negative WAR this year, along with Carlos Lee (-0.8), Adam Lind (-0.3), Cesar Izturis (-0.3), Skip Schumaker (-0.2), and Johnny Gomes (-0.1). That’s about standard: there were five players with a negative WAR in 2009, seven in 2008, seven in 2007, and seven in 2006. Only one player had a negative WAR in more than one year, Jermaine Dye, whose lead glove produced -0.4 WAR in 2009 and -0.8 WAR in 2007.

Otherwise, though, appearances on the negative WAR list tend to be brief rather than protracted — though you still don’t hear the phrase “replacement player” escape Jon Miller’s lips very often, very few players can hang on in the majors when they’re performing below replacement level. Most of the players at the bottom of the barrel are fringy guys who tend to be around zero, give or take a win, like Mark Teahen, Jeff Francoeur and pre-2010 Delmon Young, but some of the players on the list are surprising: baseball’s second-worst position player in 2009 was its 17th-best position player in 2010, Aubrey Huff. Baseball’s second-worst position player in 2007 (above only Dye) was 23rd-best in 2009, Jason Bay.

Though there are usually a handful of position players with a negative WAR in any given year, that isn’t always the case with pitchers. This year, there wasn’t a single one, and from 2006-2009, there were only six total. (There weren’t any Jason Bays in the bunch, either. The “best” pitcher in the bunch is Jason Marquis, who posted a -0.7 WAR in 2006, then received a $21 million contract two months after the season ended, but that may have been more a reflection of Jim Hendry’s spending priorities than Marquis’s star power.)

Having a negative WAR, of course, can be a leading indicator of the end to come. Of the fourteen position players with a negative WAR in 2006 and 2007, six were out of the majors in 2010: Jermaine Dye, Ray Durham, Craig Biggio, Angel Berroa, Preston Wilson, and Shawn Green. And Jason Kendall’s career surely isn’t long for the world. We can do a similar analysis of the 18 players with a negative WAR from 2008-2010, and predict that within the next four years we’ll see the disappearances of Garret Anderson, Jose Guillen, and Carlos Lee, and very possibly Yuniesky Betancourt, Emilio Bonifacio, and Melky Cabrera himself.

Replacement level is an awfully low bar to clear, and being the worst player in baseball is not something that is easy to recover from. Whether or not WAR is a mainstream stat, the underlying truth that it measures is plainly reflected by the careers of the players who post a negative WAR. If Melky can’t clean up his act in a hurry, he’ll soon be out of baseball.