A Golden Age of Shortstops?
You probably are already aware last season was a good one for shortstops but here are a few refreshers …
Not bad …
That’s a shortstop?
Now you’re just showing off …
It was a good year for shortstops. Actually, it was a great year. In fact, according to FanGraphs WAR leaderboards, it was the best year ever for major-league shortstops. Shortstops combined for 81.7 WAR, the first time the group has crossed the 80-win threshold.
Nor is it a group that’s superior to its predecessors merely because of expanded schedules or an expanded league. Shortstops in 2016 produced the second-most wins per 150 games since integration.
| Rank | Season | G | PA | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | Off | Def | WAR | WAR150 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1964 | 4398 | 15923 | .253 | .317 | .360 | 90 | -171.4 | 220.1 | 58.0 | 2.0 |
| 2 | 2016 | 6303 | 22977 | .262 | .319 | .407 | 92 | -187.0 | 228.5 | 81.7 | 1.9 |
| 3 | 1947 | 3114 | 11588 | .260 | .338 | .358 | 90 | -145.9 | 157.5 | 40.0 | 1.9 |
| 4 | 1949 | 3076 | 11839 | .260 | .343 | .363 | 89 | -171.1 | 164.2 | 38.6 | 1.9 |
| 5 | 1952 | 3269 | 11685 | .254 | .332 | .344 | 88 | -167.5 | 176.1 | 40.8 | 1.9 |
| 6 | 2007 | 6467 | 23852 | .273 | .329 | .402 | 90 | -253.1 | 224.6 | 75.7 | 1.8 |
| 7 | 2005 | 6515 | 24458 | .269 | .323 | .394 | 88 | -283.4 | 216.9 | 74.5 | 1.7 |
| 8 | 1948 | 3409 | 12514 | .264 | .339 | .358 | 88 | -190.4 | 159.8 | 38.6 | 1.7 |
| 9 | 2002 | 6347 | 23032 | .264 | .321 | .394 | 88 | -298.0 | 235.2 | 70.3 | 1.7 |
| 10 | 2011 | 6739 | 24629 | .258 | .314 | .370 | 88 | -299.7 | 213.2 | 73.2 | 1.6 |
| 11 | 1960 | 3436 | 11390 | .252 | .319 | .365 | 86 | -183.8 | 189.9 | 36.9 | 1.6 |
| 12 | 2012 | 6429 | 23548 | .256 | .310 | .375 | 86 | -348.9 | 252.4 | 69.0 | 1.6 |
| 13 | 2014 | 6410 | 22740 | .251 | .306 | .363 | 87 | -269.5 | 192.5 | 68.7 | 1.6 |
| 14 | 2004 | 6180 | 22892 | .268 | .321 | .403 | 86 | -331.9 | 233.5 | 66.0 | 1.6 |
| 15 | 1966 | 4527 | 16281 | .250 | .304 | .345 | 83 | -302.6 | 254.6 | 48.3 | 1.6 |
| 16 | 1950 | 2912 | 11192 | .263 | .339 | .373 | 84 | -224.9 | 159.8 | 30.7 | 1.6 |
| 17 | 1988 | 5529 | 18892 | .250 | .308 | .347 | 85 | -299.7 | 234.3 | 57.3 | 1.6 |
| 18 | 1951 | 2989 | 11041 | .256 | .331 | .349 | 84 | -223.3 | 166.9 | 30.9 | 1.6 |
| 19 | 1957 | 3814 | 13030 | .258 | .319 | .368 | 86 | -205.7 | 190.2 | 39.2 | 1.5 |
| 20 | 1955 | 3276 | 11239 | .258 | .323 | .359 | 83 | -224.6 | 201.6 | 33.5 | 1.5 |
WAR150 denotes WAR per 150 games played.
The leaderboards do not perfectly capture performance by position, as they include total performance from all players who have played at least 25% of their games at a position. (For example, even though Manny Machado spent most of 2016 at third base his total production counted toward the shortstop leaderboard.)
But 2016 was the second-best, post-integration year on record for the position in terms of total WAR, the best hitting year for the group since 1917, and the best season overall of the last 50 years. I think reasonable people can agree it was a great year for the position.
And while the Alex Rodriguez–Derek Jeter–Nomar Garciaparra troika was often credited with leading a Golden Era of shortstops late in the last century, this new group of Francisco Lindor, Carlos Correa, Corey Seager, Manny Machado (when he’s not playing third base), Brandon Crawford, Addison Russell and Xander Bogaerts (and there’s more yet!) has already set a new standard and could set a multi-year, generational standard.
The group is young and incredibly talented and productive.
The average age of the top-15 WAR producers among shortstops last season was 23.8. 23.8! And it should only become infused with more youth and talent in the next handful of seasons: nine shortstops ranked in the top 20, 12 in the top 34, and 16 of the top 56 of Baseball America’s midseason top-100 prospects last summer.
FanGraphs’ own Corrine Landrey wrote about the unique slugging capability of the 2016 class of shortstops.
The 2016 class of shortstops produced a record slugging percentage (.407) and home runs (565) for the position. The second-, third-, fifth-, and sixth-best home-run total from shortstops occurred between 2000 and 2003, before PED testing was implemented. And the 2016 shortstops slugged 81 more home runs than the next closest group.
Michael Baumann of The Ringer wrote in the midst of last season that perhaps we are entering a new golden era for shortstop play.
Perhaps it’s official.
What’s interesting to me is this question: was 2016 a historical outlier? Is this group an outlier? The kind of collection of talent that comes around once a century? Or is there something else going on that suggests we’re going to more often see elite shortstop production? Will sports specialization combined with technology and training advances create – particularly at a premium position like shortstop, which generally attracts the sport’s best athletes – more advanced players? The type of athletes that can become more productive earlier in major-league careers? Athletes who more often reach elite skill levels?
Consider this passage from a Tom Verducci profile on then phenom outfielder Jason Heyward written in 2010:
Heyward is what Joe DiMaggio would be if Joltin’ Joe grew up playing nothing but baseball, as many as 200 games a year all over the country from the time he was eight, on exquisitely groomed fields, with a private hitting coach, a fitness trainer and a father dedicated to ferrying him around greater Atlanta, which has become one of the world’s greatest amateur baseball hotbeds. Heyward’s story is increasingly how 21st-century stars are made: bigger, faster, stronger, specialized and, having played so much baseball growing up, far ahead of what used to be the sport’s long learning curve.
This is a generation of player – particularly the elite amateur player – raised in the year-round training and competition, playing in hundreds of games per year. This is a generation with access to private instruction, and better technology and tools to help in developing anything from swing tracking to strength training. This is a generation that is not learning the game in sandlots, but through thousands upon thousands of reps. This is 10,000-hour rule generation.
Of the seven U.S.-raised shortstops to rank in the top 10 of shortstops by WAR last season, six were first-round picks selected in 2010 or later. The other, Crawford, was a fourth rounder from a high-profile Division I program at UCLA.
Earlier this month I wrote about Jose Bautista and defying aging curves. As Pirates athletic trainer Todd Tomczyk told me, we simply don’t know much about the 21st century athlete. Perhaps we should toss out the age curves: not just the decline phase, but the development arc.
But in speaking with several major-league evaluators and player-development officials, they cautioned against the idea that sports specialization is creating better, more precocious MLB players.
Said one AL scout: “I can’t say specialization is helping us at all. Football and basketball are grabbing the elite athletes. Playing [virtually] year round may be giving us more skill [hitting] or velocity but it’s robbing us through injuries and overall athleticism….The young [shortstop] class is outstanding but look around the diamond: slower, thicker, more limited players.”
I spoke with Cleveland Indians assistant general manager Carter Hawkins, who was involved in player development as Lindor accelerated through the system and immediately became a star at the major-league level.
Hawkins described Lindor’s development as “a perfect storm,” a combination of rare “maturity” and athletic talent but also the “purpose” in which Lindor applied those gifts.
Hawkins said today’s young major-league players have benefited from increased resources devoted to player development at the professional level. Hawkins said it’s difficult to know if today’s amateur athlete was receiving more reps than previous generations. Prior to reaching a college program, Hawkins said, athletes benefit from playing multiple sports at the young level. He cited benefits related to agility and athletic movement, learning to deal with failure, and working within a team.
So perhaps it’s unclear what benefits youth sports specialization is providing major-league teams, whether in regard to a specific position or the player pool in total.
And, of course, all the amateur-level practice time, travel and equipment is expensive and can be exclusive and is playing a role in reducing the overall amateur playing population. But maybe the top 1% of the amateur playing population is much more advanced than we realized.
Maybe 2016 class of shortstops – maybe this group – is a historical outlier, a once-in-a-100-year flood of talent, or maybe it is a hint of the beginning of a new age of athlete.
A Cleveland native, FanGraphs writer Travis Sawchik is the author of the New York Times bestselling book, Big Data Baseball. He also contributes to The Athletic Cleveland, and has written for the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, among other outlets. Follow him on Twitter @Travis_Sawchik.
Pretty amazing considering that 12-13 years, we had great hitting shortstops like A-Rod Rollins, Garciaparra, Tejada, Renteria, Jeter, Young, Reyes, Furcal…
A note on sports specialization and injuries:
http://wapo.st/2jvguOf
Confused as to why there would be 1,500 less games for shortstops in 1964 – seems liek that is skewing the WAR150 for that year more than the performance numbers – why would that year have so fewer SS games?
Fewer teams pre-expansion
There were fewer teams then. And given this is taking all production from players that spent at least 25% of their games at SS, you could have two guys count as a “SS game” for a single team in a single game (ex. Manny Machado playing 3B and JJ Hardy playing SS would each count as a “SS game”). Having more teams now exacerbates this.
As for skewing the WAR150, it’s a rate stat. The number of games players played literally can’t affect it outside of the sample of games being too small. But this is dealing with thousands of games. It’s probably safe to assume it’s pretty well leveled out.
This is the Golden ERA.I was around in 1964,saw almost every ss that year.Seager,Lindor,Correa,Russell,Crawford,Tulo,Simmons etc.Smoke the 64 bunch.
We may very well have 3 to 4 future HOFers in the present group.
“The average age of the top-15 WAR producers among shortstops last season was 23.8. 23.8! ” — I accept that this seems very low, however there’s no data in the article comparing this with other years. Is it typically one year higher? Five years? That info would be helpful to our understanding.
http://www.fangraphs.com/leaders.aspx?pos=ss&stats=bat&lg=all&qual=400&type=c,4,6,11,12,13,21,-1,34,35,40,41,-1,23,37,38,50,61,-1,111,-1,203,199,58,3&season=1964&month=0&season1=1964&ind=0&team=0&rost=0&age=0&filter=&players=0
I get 26.9 for 1964…
[edit]
FWIW– if they fully explored every offshoot in every article they’d probably never get completed and if they did be like 100k word novels rather than relatively short articles that you can get through in 5-10 minutes.
Another great article by the great Travis Sawchik!
This is a golden age of FanGraphs writers!
Love the Malcolm Gladwell reference. It’s definitely an interesting take that all of these young shortstops are clustered together in the same age group. As a baseball fan, I couldn’t be more excited to watch this generation continue to develop. Scary to think that they’re only getting better. Not to mention that there are some more on the way (J.P. Crawford, Amed Rosario, Dansby Swanson, etc.)
Also the best year ever for 2b ( https://goo.gl/ca6O3I ) and 3b ( https://goo.gl/T32HDd ). Maybe it was just a good year.
It’s a zero sum game when comparing stats that are regressed to league average like WAR and wRC+. First basemen and non-Trout outfielders don’t compare to their equivalents in years past.
2016’s positions ranked by WAR/150 since 1946 (71 seasons)
1B: 66th
2B: 1st
3B: 6th
SS: 2nd
C: 45th
LF: 71st
RF: 64th
CF: 41st
All OF: 71st
Talent has definitely shifted to the infield.
In youth baseball did coaches always put the best players in the infield? If thats a newer trend it could be the cause of this
Yes they did. Everyone who can play and throws right-handed plays SS growing up.
Yes, they did, at least in the late 50’s. Best players went to P, C, 1B, SS, 3B, 2B, CF, LF, RF. RF was worst player because hardly any balls were hit out there and good players at 1B handled the relays.
I ALWAYS played RF.
WAR is not an appropriate historic measure. It is a fine tool to compare players in a given year if the data exists. Is it really surprising that modern players float to the top using an equation with modern data (approximations) and subjective weights applied to that data?
Defensive data is an approximation at best up to pretty recently. How accurate do you think the base-running value is for 1947? The scary (to me) thing to me about base-running data is that it is probably pretty accurate, which is a statement about how limited and crude the analysis is.
You are delusional.
And this does not include top prospects like JP Crawford, Gleybor Torres, Amed Rosario, and Dansby Swanson. All of those are in Keith Law’s top 5 for this year.
Don’t Shortstop’s get compared to the average MLB Shortstop when looking at defensive WAR? So defensive WAR shouldn’t ever be much different, and this sort of metric depends on the offense only. And it’s offense only compared to the rest of MLB, so if, for instance, catcher offense stunk because teams wanted framing to be better (but that isn’t captured in WAR yet), everyone’s WAR goes up a bit at every position.
Also, you can’t use WAR or WRC+ stats to check if the athletes and play in MLB are far better and entering a general golden age. League-wide WAR is pretty much determined in advance (as are the valuation of pitching/defense/offense in WAR too? Or maybe not in fWAR), so a rising tide raises no boats, as it were. If Shortstops are suddenly much better by WAR, who went down? Did any position have a worst year ever, or was the WAR loss spread around?
I don’t think every year’s defensive number’s are normalized to the individual year. It is normalized to a longer-term baseline I believe. The same *might* go for replacement level too.
You raise a valid point, but if the stats behaved as you said, year-to-year comparison would be impossible by definition. I think they try to strike a balance. They don’t want to adjust them every year, so that WAR and UZR and wRC+ are not totally transient, but also they need to adjust sometimes, or else league-wide offensive and pitching trends would skew all the stats.
Ultimately, it would be cool to have stats that are calibrated to a global baseline. For example, I don’t think batters now are that much worse than they were in the 2000’s, but I think pitchers are noticeably better. That means that the wRC+ for batter should be about 95 now, if 2000 was 100, but pitchers should have like a ERA- of 110, compared to 100 in 200. It would be hard, because those stats could deviate very far from an average of 100 in any given era, but it would be make cross-year and cross-era comparisons possible.
You think pitchers are better now than they were when Pedro Martinez, Randy Johnson, Greg Maddux, Roy Halladay, Johan Santana and Roger Clemens were around? I don’t think this is a strong era for SP…
Those guys were not at their peaks at the same time, for one. For two, given that there are a few hundred starting pitchers active at a given time, and that over 1/3 of innings go to relievers now, I basically do not look at the top of the starting pitcher class to gauge how good pitchers are now. Much more indicative is, for example, the fact that average velocity has increased by over 1 MPH MLB-wide in just the last few years.
Are hitters better now than they were when Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, Roger Hornsby and Ty Cobb were around?
I realized I totally screwed that up. Pitchers would have a ERA- of 90 now, or an ERA+ of 110. Basically, the idea is that since 2000, pitchers have gotten better by a greater degree than batters have gotten worse, if they have gotten worse at all.
Tom Verducci’s comments on Joe DiMaggio would be more credible if it wasn’t for the fact that DiMaggio played 187 regular-season games in 1933 (with a 61-game hitting streak) and 172 more in 1935 (hitting .398) with the San Francisco Seals of the Pacific Coast League, which was considered by many to be a third major league at the time. And that’s not even mentioning the hundreds of semi-pro and sandlot games he, Dom and Vince participated in as teenagers.
I’m guessing Orlando Arcia profiles as more of a classic SS prospect — flashy glove, not much pop.
One observation is that this new elite class comes, with a couple exceptions, from domestic development, which I suppose this article suggests but doesn’t state outright.
It seems that when the raw power is untapped earlier in an athlete’s development (with sophisticated training and diet) the game power might have a better chance of materializing. Would a Dominican Corey Seager still weigh 180 at this point or am I underestimating the sophistication of development resources on the island?
This is interesting. But I don’t think these SS WAR figures can tell us anything about players generally. Total WAR has a fixed sum each year, so more WAR for shortstops means less for some other position(s). Why would modern training methods help shortstops, specifically, to the detriment of some other group?
A very good point. I wonder if modern training is helping players to stick at SS who might otherwise have grown out of it in the past. Shortstops seem atypically large right now compared to the shortstops of 20 years ago, with 6 of the top 10 in WAR in 2016 standing 6′-2″ or greater according to FG measurements.
Athletes spend more time honing their skills with more advanced training at a younger age, so the best athletes will rise to the top in every facet of the game. They’re not sacrificing (as much) speed and defense to add power or vice versa, and thus not moving down the defensive spectrum before reaching MLB.
It’s also worth noting that 2016’s 1.9 WAR/150 is *tied* for 2nd with 1947, ’49 and ’52, with 1948 ranked 8th. That post-War period looks more like a true golden AGE of shortstops, with multiple outstanding years by Lou Boudreau, Pee Wee Reese, Vern Stephens, Phil Rizzuto, Eddie Joost, Alvin Dark….
Yes, but this group of young SS is right at the beginning of their careers and none has yet hit their prime. Revisiting those numbers in 5 years could very easily tell a very different tale. If these guys progress as expected, we could easily see 5 years straight of “best SS year ever” records.
Right, but they could also go the way of Starlin Castro or (god forbid) Dickie Thon. Those are extreme cases, but any group of young stars is likely to regress a bit. Each individual may project well, but those who fall sharply really hurt the average.
And while the “Golden Era” table above contains several recent years, the years not listed are just as important in reading a trend. You don’t see 2015, 2013, or 2008-10 on that list.
Here’s my own list of bWAR totals for all who played 50+ games at SS since 2006. You tell me what the trend is:
2006 … 78.0
2007 … 78.9
2008 … 68.2
2009 … 69.1
2010 … 71.4
2011 … 72.2
2012 … 63.5
2013 … 68.3
2014 … 70.8
2015 … 66.8
2016 … 76.3
Those who thought 2006-07 was the dawn of a SS golden era were soon to be disillusioned.
Given there are only, in theory, 30 starting shortstops at a given time, and given it only takes a small subset of them to perform better than usual in order to give lift to the whole position, I think there is a very good chance that this “golden age” is just the result of chance. Basically, Lindor, Correa, and Seager are all just special players, and they could have shown up at any time, but they happen to be showing up together.
Now, what I don’t think is a coincidence is the general trend of the win value distribution shifting younger and younger. So, I think we are more primed now than in the past to have waves of young superstars. However, the Indians, Astros, and Dodgers, and other teams mentioned, should be mostly just grateful that they had the opportunity to get these players.
I think the Heyward snippet while making a good point, also cautions us a bit. While he has had a good career due to his defense, he has slowed considerably from the lofty standards set for him in 2010. While I fully believe he will have another great season or two, I also do not see him as a hall of famer, even if he plays 10 more seasons. But when he first came on the scene he seemed like he was going to be a perennial contender for the best player in the game. So if anything, this sort of puts a wet blanket on it. A lot can happen between the early 20s and the mid to late 20s.
I don’t say this to refute or belittle your piece, which I think makes a strong point about the class of the shortstop position in the current era, but I will point out that last season, Jean Segura (playing mostly 2B) had a higher combined WAR than Correa, and will be featuring solely at SS this season for Seattle. This is not to say that I think Segura is Correa’s equal, but underscores your larger point that the position indeed very deep when 5.0 WAR players can be overlooked.
I am a Mariners fan and hope Segura is as great as he was last year. However it is because Correa is, according to their systems supposed to be the best player in the game (overtaking Trout) in the next 5 years. Whereas Segura might very well have had a career year and go back to being an average to slightly below average regular this year.
League average major leaguer is 2 WAR, no? So the data is telling us is that shortstops on average are now providing league-average value, and historically they didn’t.
You MUST include Trea Turner in this list. Must.
God stuff Travis. thank you
I will say that a shout out to Aledmys Diaz (.300, .369, .510, 2.7 fWAR in 460 PA in 2016) would’ve been appropriate 🙂
That he wasn’t even mentioned speaks to the depth of this new crop.