Ketel Marte was one of the best 10 hitters in baseball in 2024. That’s just an objective fact – or at least as objective as facts can get in baseball. Our calculation of WAR? He was 10th among hitters. Baseball Reference has him 10th as well. Baseball Prospectus put him in seventh place. That’s not surprising; he set career highs in home runs, league-adjusted OBP and slugging, and wRC+. He played solid defense and even added a little value on the basepaths.

He was one of the best 10 hitters in baseball in 2019, too. In fact, he’s the only player to crack the top 10 in both 2019 and 2024. That’s wild. Aaron Judge, Mookie Betts, Shohei Ohtani, Corey Seager, Juan Soto, Bryce Harper, José Ramírez – they all played in both years. None of them – none! – managed the double that Marte did. This isn’t some weird defensive value issue, either: He’s the only hitter with a top-10 wRC+ in both years.

Those in between years? Don’t look too closely. Marte totaled 9.1 WAR across the 2020-2023 campaigns. He posted 6.3 WAR in each of 2019 and 2024. In that 2020-2023 span, he was 64th among hitters in total WAR. He had two seasons of roughly average offensive production in that span, and produced at a 3 WAR/600 pace instead of the 6.3 WAR/600 pace from 2019 and 2024. So it’s safe to say he’s streaky – one hitter some years, and a different guy other years. Read the rest of this entry »

It’s been a quiet winter in the AL Central. After Michael Wacha signed an extension at the beginning of the offseason, the division’s five teams combined to add only one deal worth more than $20 million in guaranteed money; that was Shane Bieber’s surgery-affected pillow contract with the Guardians. Now, finally, we can add another to the ledger, courtesy of the Royals. On Wednesday, they signed Carlos Estévez to a two-year, $22.2 million deal with a club option tacked on the end, as ESPN’s Jeff Passan first reported.

The Royals came into the winter looking for relief help. It’s not the only place their roster needed a glow-up – even after trading for Jonathan India, they could still use another bat or two, especially in the corner outfield – but the bullpen was also a particular area of need. Last year’s Royals made the playoffs on the back of pitching, but their starters were the ones doing the heavy lifting, not their relievers. Deadline acquisition Lucas Erceg was the best of the group by a large margin, and John Schreiber was the only other reliever with impressive full-season numbers.

It’s not so much that a team can’t make the playoffs with such a thin bullpen – obviously, the Royals did. But they did it by the skin of their teeth at 86-76, and that despite spectacular seasons from Cole Ragans, Seth Lugo, and Wacha. Counting on those three to combine for 94 starts, 12.9 WAR, and ERAs in the low 3.00s across the board again would be wishful thinking. Additionally, they no longer have last year’s fourth starter Brady Singer, who was Cincinnati’s return in the India trade.

The 2024 bullpen finished last in baseball in shutdowns – appearances that increased win probability by six percentage points or more – and fifth worst in win probability added. Those are outcome statistics, not process ones, but the process statistics weren’t exactly pretty either. Kansas City was middle of the pack in WAR (3.6), 20th in ERA (4.13), 26th in K-BB% (12.0%). It’s not just that this team didn’t have a “true closer” – its bullpen was light on contributors from top to bottom. Read the rest of this entry »

Here’s a sentence that you probably didn’t expect to see a few years ago: The Pittsburgh Pirates were one of the most exciting teams of 2024. They had the Rookie of the Year and an instant contender for best pitcher in baseball in Paul Skenes. Jared Jones was electric. They’re chock full of young hitting prospects. And let’s reiterate: Paul Skenes!

As you might expect, the Pirates hit this offseason with some momentum. It’s hard to find superstars, but Skenes is one of the best five pitchers on the planet, and honestly, I think he might be the best, period. This is the type of winter that lends itself to going for it. The hype will likely never be greater. Add a star or two around Skenes, fill out the bottom of the lineup, and this team could win a weak NL Central. Come playoff time, no one in the world would want to face the Pirates. So it’s with some remorse that I announce their latest signings. On Monday, lefty reliever Tim Mayza agreed to a one-year, $1.15 million contract; on Tuesday, utilityman Adam Frazier followed suit with a one-year, $1.525 million pact.

Frazier was a fun story the last time he was on the Pirates. In the depths of their despair, he was a rare burst of energy, Luis Arraez before Arraez hit the big time. He rarely struck out, rarely hit homers, and caused chaos by putting the ball in play even without blazing speed. Heck, he even drew a nice trade return when the Pirates sent him to the Padres ahead of the 2021 deadline, headlined by Jack Suwinski and Tucupita Marcano, both of whom have made contributions to the big league club. Read the rest of this entry »

Last week, Mets owner Steve Cohen addressed his team’s ongoing contract negotiations with Pete Alonso. During a panel discussion in front of fans, he expounded on the process at length:

“We made a significant offer to Pete. He’s entitled to explore his market. That’s what he is doing. Personally, this has been an exhausting conversation and negotiation. I mean, Soto was tough — this is worse. A lot of it is, we made a significant offer … I don’t like the structures that are being presented back to us. It’s highly asymmetric against us. And I feel strongly about it. I will never say no. There’s always the possibility. But the reality is we’re moving forward. And as we continue to bring in players, the reality is it becomes harder to fit Pete into what is a very expensive group of players that we already have. That’s where we are. And I am being brutally honest. I don’t like the negotiations. I don’t like what’s been presented to us. Listen, maybe that changes. Certainly, I’ll always stay flexible. If it stays this way, I think we are going to have to get used to the fact that we may have to go forward with the existing players that we have.”

That quote caught my eye for a few reasons. First, the length! That’s not a no comment or even close to one. He noted a few specific points where the negotiations had gotten stuck, mentioned that the deal gets less likely as the offseason goes on, and at least nodded in the direction of how an Alonso offer affects team construction. That’s not exactly par for the course when owners give quotes; I’m looking at you, Bill DeWitt Jr., who early this winter said, “The best way to build a championship club is to have good young players.”

Second, I kept coming back to “highly asymmetric against us.” I can’t help it. I’m a contract nerd. I immediately started thinking about what that could mean. The possibilities are nearly endless. Accumulators? Collars? Conditional ownership share? Alonso gets to choose the roster every Tuesday?

Well, probably not. Agent Scott Boras threw some cold water on my ideas in a response. “Pete’s free-agent contract structure request[s] are identical to the standards and practices of other clubs who have signed similarly situated qualifying-offer/all-star level players,” he told The Athletic’s Will Sammon. “Nothing different. Just established fairness standards.”
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Earlier this week, I published my findings about the relationship between when free agents sign and the size of their contracts. As a quick refresher, in recent years, the last 20% or so of free agents to sign have been settling for contracts meaningfully lower than pre-offseason expectations. But that finding raises more questions, some of which I hope to answer today.

First, there’s an obvious question: Did the free agents who got those late, discounted deals perform worse than expected during the following season? In other words, did their low-dollar-value deals foreshadow lower-than-projected production? To examine this, I took the upcoming season’s projections for the players ranked on my Top 50 Free Agents list in each of the past three years, 150 players in all, to come up with a projected WAR for each segment of players. I then compared it to how they actually did in the ensuing year. There is indeed a drop-off for those who signed late:

First things first: Every group underperformed its projections. That comes down to playing time. Our projections use Depth Charts playing time, which approximates the most likely distribution of playing time across a given roster without accounting for the likelihood of injuries. Just as an example, non-catcher batters were projected for an average of more than 600 plate appearances in this dataset, and they came in closer to the mid-500s in practice. So don’t pay too much attention to the absolute numbers; the relative differences are what to look at here.

The last 10 free agents to sign saw huge shortfalls in production relative to expectations. One reason: They played less. The average hitter in this group of 150 free agents batted 70 times less than projected. Hitters signed among the last 10 free agents in their class batted 100 times less than projected. Likewise, the average pitcher in the group came up 25 innings shy of projections, but pitchers among the last 10 players signed came up 40 innings short.
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Look, I get it. You’re up in arms about the Roki Sasaki deal. The rich got richer and we’re all tired of the Dodgers signing every free agent (even you, Dodgers fans) — can they at least make it seem like it’s a level playing field? If that’s how you’ve been feeling this week, though, I’ve got some bad news for you, because I think the two moves the Dodgers have made since signing Sasaki might be bigger deals for 2025. Over the weekend, they signed the top reliever on the market, Tanner Scott. Now, they’re reportedly working on an agreement with Kirby Yates. As Yates’ signing is still pending a physical and has yet to be finalized, let’s cover Scott first, then ruminate on Yates at the end.

Scott’s deal, for four years and $72 million, befits an elite reliever, and that’s exactly what he is. He’s compiled a 2.04 ERA (2.53 FIP) across 150 innings over the last two years, using a lights-out slider and excellent fastball in roughly equal measure. We’re not talking about smoke and mirrors here; both of our pitch models think his fastball is one of the best handful in the game. His gaudy swinging strike rates provide supporting evidence. He sits 96-98 mph and touches 100. Sure, he walks his fair share of batters, but he’s a reliever – that’s just part of the bargain you accept sometimes.

If you’ll recall, the Dodgers leaned heavily on their bullpen in the 2024 postseason. Some of that was because of injuries to the starting rotation, but plenty of it was by choice. The Dodgers assembled a unit with four late-game options, and they used those options aggressively and opportunistically. Best opposing hitter up in the sixth inning? Send in a closer. Starter in a jam and the game on the line earlier than you expected? Send in a closer. Save situation? Fine, sure, we have a few left over anyway, send in a closer. Read the rest of this entry »

Last week, Michael Rosen wrote about Jack Flaherty’s delayed free agency market. Michael advanced a number of theories about why Flaherty hadn’t yet signed a deal, and what that might mean about his fastball, teams’ perceptions of his fastball, and the trajectory of his career broadly speaking. I found that piece really interesting – and I also started thinking about what Flaherty not having signed yet means in a larger sense.

You don’t have to look any further than last year to get an idea of what could happen to Flaherty. Blake Snell and Jordan Montgomery both waited a long time before settling for short-term deals. The year before that, Carlos Correa’s multiple failed physicals kept him on the market until the very end. In 2022, Correa, Kenley Jansen, and Trevor Story all found themselves looking for employment well into March.

All of those players came into the offseason expecting a major contract, and all of them ended up getting less than anticipated, bringing to mind some classic FanGraphs articles from Travis Sawchik, back in the halcyon days of 2018. Those articles drew on a study by Max Rieper that separated free agents into pre- and post-New Year’s signings and found a large discount for the latter group. Read the rest of this entry »

Earlier this week, I threw some numbers together on the value of productive outs. I focused on Corbin Carroll, and rightly so: His electric skill set is a perfect entry point for explaining how hitters can add (or subtract) value relative to average even when making an out. Putting the ball in play? We love it. Avoiding double plays? We love that too. The Diamondbacks are a team full of speedsters, and Carroll’s productive outs gave their baserunners a chance to show off their wheels.

A quick refresher: I calculated the difference in run scoring expectation between the average out and a specific type of out (strikeout, air out, non-GIDP groundout, double play) for each base/out state. Then I had a computer program tag each out made in 2024 with that difference. For example, the average out made with a runner on second and no outs cost teams 0.35 runs of scoring expectation in 2024. Groundouts in that situation only cost 0.25 runs, a difference of 0.1 runs.

Thus, on every groundout that occurred with a runner on second and no out, I had the computer note ‘plus 0.1’ for the “productive out” value. A strikeout in that situation, on the other hand, lowered scoring expectancy by 0.43 runs, a difference from average of -.09 runs. So the computer noted ‘minus 0.09’ for every strikeout with a runner on second and no out. Do this for every combination of base/out state and out type, add it all up, and you can work out the total value of a player’s productive outs. Read the rest of this entry »

Not every out is created equal. Take this fly out from Corbin Carroll, for example:

A lot of things can happen when you make an out with the bases loaded. You could strike out, leaving every runner in place. You could hit into a double play, an inning-ending one in this case. You could ground out some other way, or hit an infield fly. But Carroll’s here was the most valuable imaginable; with one out, he advanced every single runner, including the runner who scored from third.

Mathematically speaking, you can think of it this way. The average out that took place with the bases loaded and one out lowered the team’s run expectancy by a massive 0.61 runs in 2024. That’s because tons of these outs were either strikeouts (bad, runner on third doesn’t score) or double plays (bad, inning ends). But Carroll’s fly out was far better than that. It actually increased the run expectancy by a hair; driving the lead runner home and moving the trail runners up a base is exquisitely valuable.

That’s not the only way this could have gone. Consider a similar situation, a groundout from Aaron Judge:

Like Carroll, Judge batted with a runner on third and fewer than two outs. In this situation, the average out is bad, lowering run expectancy by 0.514 runs. But Judge’s was obviously worse. It cost the Yankees all the expected runs they had left in the inning, naturally, which added up to just a bit more than 1.15. Read the rest of this entry »