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I’m not sure if you know this about me, but there are two things that I’ve always loved to do. First, I like to make things about me, even if the connection is tenuous. Second, I like to go over my own past decisions and see if there’s anything I can learn from them, hopefully without being too self-serving. I have great news – well, for me at least. Two free agent signings last week – Robert Suarez to the Padres and Rafael Montero to the Astros – have given me an opportunity to do both.

Of course, I don’t want to give either player short shrift. Both are excellent in their own right, late-inning relievers coming off of effective 2022 seasons and high-leverage postseason work. Egotistical as I am, I can’t completely ignore them and only talk about myself. As a compromise, I’ll start by profiling each player and their new contract. From there, we’ll move on to discussing why neither was on my Top 50 Free Agents ranking, and what I think I did wrong in making the list. Read the rest of this entry »

Rob Thomson is a folk hero in Philadelphia now. He brought the Phillies back from an early-season funk and eked into the playoffs, then charged to a World Series berth behind a barrage of home runs and an underrated bullpen. If the team had won two more games against the Astros, I might be talking about Thomson’s unexpected ascent to King of Philadelphia. Instead, I’m grading his managerial decisions.

As usual, I’m focusing on in-game decisions only. That covers lineup and pinch-hitting decisions on the offensive side, as well as defensive replacements in the rare case where that comes up. It covers pitching usage, both starter length and bullpen deployment. It doesn’t cover keeping your bench players involved in the game, or getting your relievers ready to enter in any given inning, or keeping team morale up when all seems lost. Those are all monumentally important, and also impossible to observe from my position. Let’s get to those in-game decisions, shall we? Read the rest of this entry »

Welcome to another installment of postseason managerial report cards. In this one, we’ll look at the Yankees, whose strong start to the season ended in playoff disappointment. From a purely results-oriented standpoint, you’d be hard-pressed to find a Yankees fan giving this year’s team a passing grade.

In these report cards, I’m focusing on process instead of results as much as possible. I considered every pitching move that the team either made or chose not to make, as well as starting lineups and pinch hitting decisions. I suppose I considered batting order as well, but there’s so little value in batting order optimization that I pretty much gave every manager a perfect grade there.

Managers do far more than simply choosing who to put in the game and when to do so. Their role in helping players get prepared and keeping everyone on the same page with regards to team strategy is more important, particularly over the course of a full season, than anything I’m getting into here. I can’t see those decisions, though, and I can see these. What’s more, the postseason amplifies single-game decisions; with so few contests compared to the long haul of a full season, each squandered point of win expectancy feels like a catastrophe. With that lens in mind, let’s take a look at New York’s finest. Read the rest of this entry »

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Welcome to the offseason. As is customary, the end of the playoffs means the release of FanGraphs’ annual top 50 free agent rankings. In recent years, we’ve rotated through the writers principally responsible for the list – first Dave Cameron, then Kiley McDaniel, Craig Edwards, and, more recently, me. I’m back this year and I’ve brought help: the FanGraphs staff contributed mightily to this piece.

Below, I’ve provided contract estimates and rankings of the winter’s top free agents, along with market-focused breakdowns for the top 25 players. That could be a quick discussion of where a player might sign, what a team might look for, or even just statistical analysis masquerading as market analysis – I’m an analyst at heart and never stray far from my roots. Meanwhile, a combination of Michael Baumann, Justin Choi, Jay Jaffe, David Laurila, Eric Longenhagen, Dan Szymborski, and Jon Tayler supplied player-focused breakdowns, which are designed to provide some context for each player at this moment in his career. Special thanks to David Appelman, Sean Dolinar, Jason Martinez, and Meg Rowley for their help behind the scenes.

The players are ranked in the order in which I prefer them. That’s often the same as ranking them in contract order, but not always. In some cases, I prefer a player I expect will get less money over one who stands to make more. I’ll generally make note of that in the accompanying comment, but just to reiterate, this list isn’t exclusively sorted by descending average annual value or anything like that. All of the dollar amounts are estimated guarantees. Plenty of contracts will include team options or player incentives, but those aren’t included in these estimates. Player opt outs are similarly not included. All of the projections are Steamer 2023 projections, but use our Depth Chart playing time allocations. The lone exception is Kodai Senga, whose projection comes courtesy of ZiPS. The listed ages indicate the age-season the player is about to play. Read the rest of this entry »

Aaron Nola had a rotten first start of the World Series. He gave up five runs before he finished three innings, and while the Phillies bailed him out en route to a 6–5 win, that game surely left him with a bad taste in his mouth. When he took the ball again for Game 4, he was likely hoping to change the story once and for all.

He had a plan, too. In Game 1, Nola had gotten beaten in a silly way. He came out pumping fastballs, and the Astros were only too happy to feast. They collected six hits; five, including a three-run home run by Kyle Tucker, came on fastballs. Time after time, he threw a perfectly serviceable fastball up there, and the Astros pounced on it. Some were blooped. Some were smashed. Nearly none were missed; the Astros swung at 16 fastballs and came up empty exactly once.

That’s hardly surprising. The Astros were one of the best teams at hitting fastballs this year. They were the best, period, on fastballs below 95 mph. Even with playoff adrenaline, that’s where Nola lives. It’s a bad recipe against such a fearsome offensive team; if you can’t make the Astros swing and miss, you’re going to have a long night — or a short night, measured in innings.

In Game 4, Houston came out swinging yet again. Nola threw nine fastballs in the first inning, and the Astros swung at six. They missed exactly one: the first pitch of the game to Jose Altuve. Nola started Tucker with two straight fastballs in the second inning, and he was on them both times. Something had to change. Read the rest of this entry »

Blame Mike Petriello. I don’t think that anyone is actually wondering whether you should, as a fan of the batting team, root for a double play. You shouldn’t! Don’t do it. Don’t even think about doing it. But after it came up on last night’s Game 4 broadcast, I thought I’d at least quickly go over why this is a bad idea that you shouldn’t consider.

Let’s set the stage. In the top of the fifth inning, Alex Bregman stood at the plate with the bases loaded and nobody out. The Astros already led 1-0 and were looking for more. Bregman was in an 0-2 hole against José Alvarado. Naturally (well, maybe), it’s time to talk about whether you should be rooting for a double play if you’re pulling for the Astros.

Q: Should you prefer a double play here if you’re Houston?
No.

Q: Are you sure? It would put the Astros up 2-0, which is a lot of runs.
Yes, I’m sure.

Q: How likely are the Astros to win if Bregman strikes out?
I used our WPA Inquirer to look up an estimated winning percentage for the Astros with the bases juiced, a one run lead, and one out in the top of the fifth. They stood to win 73.9% of the time.

Q: How about if he hits into a double play?
If it’s a 6-4-3 double play that scores a run and leaves a runner on third, they’re 74.7% likely to win. If the double play erases the runner on third instead, it’s 74.3%. Given where the infield was playing, I don’t think a home-to-first double play was very likely. In fact, I think the 6-4-3 type was the only real consideration.

Q: Hey! They’re gaining win probability by hitting into a double play, aren’t they?
That wasn’t really a question. In any case, sure, if Bregman had only two options – double play or strikeout – he’d prefer to hit into a double play. Baseball has all kinds of outcomes, though! Some of them even let you reach base. Those are a lot better than hitting into a double play.

In his career, Bregman hits .215/.268/.375 after 0-2 counts. He strikes out 32.5% of the time, which is notably not 100%. He’s also a fly ball hitter after 0-2, because he’s a fly ball hitter all the dang time. He has a 34.7% groundball rate when he puts the ball into play after 0-2 counts, right in line with his overall mark.

Alvarado is quite good when he gets ahead 0-2, which does matter. Let’s give him a ton of the benefit of the doubt and say that Bregman will strike out 50% of the time, while only reaching base 10% of the time. That’s a goofy assumption, to be clear – that’s a lower OBP than Alvarado has allowed on 0-2 in his career and far lower than the major league average. Bregman is an elite contact hitter, and he had the platoon advantage. The real number is probably at least double that, but I’m trying to be charitable here.

Let’s break it down like this: 50% strikeouts, 10% one-base singles, 15% groundouts, and 25% outs in the air. With Jose Altuve on third base, let’s say 60% of those fly balls score runs. We’ll even make all the groundouts double plays.

Using those same WPA Inquirer numbers, the Astros were 87.1% likely to win if Bregman reached safely while scoring only one runner, whether by walk, hit by pitch, or single. They were 78.3% likely to win if he hit a sacrifice fly without advancing the runner on second. Sum it all up, and account for the fact that a fly ball that doesn’t score anyone is the same as a strikeout, and that gets Houston’s win percentage to 76%. That’s meaningfully better than the chances of winning after they hit into a double play.

If we make some more reasonable assumptions, this falls apart even further. Let’s say Bregman reaches base 15% of the time, still far lower than a reasonable estimate but at least less punitive towards him. Let’s also say that he hits a double or two-base single once in a while, and that only 85% of his groundouts are double plays instead of 100%. That’s another goofy assumption – when Bregman has grounded out in a double play situation (runner on first, less than two outs), the defense has turned a double play 40.2% of the time in his career.

With these still-goofy numbers, we’re up to 76.9%. That’s a lot better than hitting into a double play. If I used my actual baseline assumptions instead of stacking the deck in favor of the strange assertion that Houston fans should be rooting for a double play, I get a 78% chance of Houston winning with Bregman down in the count 0-2.

Q: That’s a lot of numbers. Give it to me in one word. Should Houston fans have been rooting for a run-scoring double play?
No.

Before we begin, a quick apology from me: I haven’t gotten to these managerial report cards as quickly as I’d like. They take a lot of work, believe it or not. I comb through every game log multiple times to capture the particulars of each situation, keeping an eye on pitcher and batter availability while doing so. I like to watch key moments, too, just in case something pops up that way. I still miss things — it’s hard to get every last detail right, though I try to be thorough — but without poring over the details to get everything straight, I couldn’t write these.

Between the general rigors of writing and compiling the annual top-50 free agent list, I just haven’t had time to get these done. That’s not a great excuse, and I’m sure these are less interesting to read than they would have been if they had come out directly after the relevant eliminations. But hey, they’re here now! Well, this one is. More will follow in the coming week.

Bob Melvin, San Diego Padres

Batting/Lineups: B-
Melvin faced one central decision throughout the playoffs: who to play at first base. The lineup didn’t offer much in the way of flexibility anywhere else; every slot had a clear starter. That left Josh Bell, Wil Myers, and Brandon Drury to share DH and first base between the two of them. Drury theoretically has positional versatility, but there was nowhere else to put him. Melvin used two general rules: play Bell against righties and sit Bell against lefties. Read the rest of this entry »

If you’re a fan of balls in play and general athleticism, I’ve got bad news for you: the 2022 playoffs have featured the highest strikeout rate in playoff history, a whopping 26.6% excluding intentional walks heading into last night’s game. More than a quarter of plate appearances have ended without the fielders moving, the runners tearing around the bases, or indeed anyone having reached at all. For what it’s worth, the unintentional walk rate is only 7%; the strikeouts are what’s out of hand, not the non-contact plays.

Why is this the case? I can think of many reasons. Maybe the teams that made the playoffs are jam-packed with the best strikeout pitchers they can find. Perhaps the parade of relievers Jay Jaffe noted last week are just too effective. Maybe that extra velocity from starters is to blame. Hitters shouldn’t escape scrutiny, either; maybe they’re swinging for the fences more with the bright lights of October on them and accepting more strikeouts as a result. It could be matchup-based, or pitchers could be using their best pitches more often. It could be better scouting of hitters’ weaknesses, or just an accident of a few pitchers getting hot, or any number of things. Read the rest of this entry »