Blame Mike Petriello. I don’t think that anyone is actually wondering whether you should, as a fan of the batting team, root for a double play. You shouldn’t! Don’t do it. Don’t even think about doing it. But after it came up on last night’s Game 4 broadcast, I thought I’d at least quickly go over why this is a bad idea that you shouldn’t consider.

Let’s set the stage. In the top of the fifth inning, Alex Bregman stood at the plate with the bases loaded and nobody out. The Astros already led 1-0 and were looking for more. Bregman was in an 0-2 hole against José Alvarado. Naturally (well, maybe), it’s time to talk about whether you should be rooting for a double play if you’re pulling for the Astros.

Q: Should you prefer a double play here if you’re Houston?
No.

Q: Are you sure? It would put the Astros up 2-0, which is a lot of runs.
Yes, I’m sure.

Q: How likely are the Astros to win if Bregman strikes out?
I used our WPA Inquirer to look up an estimated winning percentage for the Astros with the bases juiced, a one run lead, and one out in the top of the fifth. They stood to win 73.9% of the time.

Q: How about if he hits into a double play?
If it’s a 6-4-3 double play that scores a run and leaves a runner on third, they’re 74.7% likely to win. If the double play erases the runner on third instead, it’s 74.3%. Given where the infield was playing, I don’t think a home-to-first double play was very likely. In fact, I think the 6-4-3 type was the only real consideration.

Q: Hey! They’re gaining win probability by hitting into a double play, aren’t they?
That wasn’t really a question. In any case, sure, if Bregman had only two options – double play or strikeout – he’d prefer to hit into a double play. Baseball has all kinds of outcomes, though! Some of them even let you reach base. Those are a lot better than hitting into a double play.

In his career, Bregman hits .215/.268/.375 after 0-2 counts. He strikes out 32.5% of the time, which is notably not 100%. He’s also a fly ball hitter after 0-2, because he’s a fly ball hitter all the dang time. He has a 34.7% groundball rate when he puts the ball into play after 0-2 counts, right in line with his overall mark.

Alvarado is quite good when he gets ahead 0-2, which does matter. Let’s give him a ton of the benefit of the doubt and say that Bregman will strike out 50% of the time, while only reaching base 10% of the time. That’s a goofy assumption, to be clear – that’s a lower OBP than Alvarado has allowed on 0-2 in his career and far lower than the major league average. Bregman is an elite contact hitter, and he had the platoon advantage. The real number is probably at least double that, but I’m trying to be charitable here.

Let’s break it down like this: 50% strikeouts, 10% one-base singles, 15% groundouts, and 25% outs in the air. With Jose Altuve on third base, let’s say 60% of those fly balls score runs. We’ll even make all the groundouts double plays.

Using those same WPA Inquirer numbers, the Astros were 87.1% likely to win if Bregman reached safely while scoring only one runner, whether by walk, hit by pitch, or single. They were 78.3% likely to win if he hit a sacrifice fly without advancing the runner on second. Sum it all up, and account for the fact that a fly ball that doesn’t score anyone is the same as a strikeout, and that gets Houston’s win percentage to 76%. That’s meaningfully better than the chances of winning after they hit into a double play.

If we make some more reasonable assumptions, this falls apart even further. Let’s say Bregman reaches base 15% of the time, still far lower than a reasonable estimate but at least less punitive towards him. Let’s also say that he hits a double or two-base single once in a while, and that only 85% of his groundouts are double plays instead of 100%. That’s another goofy assumption – when Bregman has grounded out in a double play situation (runner on first, less than two outs), the defense has turned a double play 40.2% of the time in his career.

With these still-goofy numbers, we’re up to 76.9%. That’s a lot better than hitting into a double play. If I used my actual baseline assumptions instead of stacking the deck in favor of the strange assertion that Houston fans should be rooting for a double play, I get a 78% chance of Houston winning with Bregman down in the count 0-2.

Q: That’s a lot of numbers. Give it to me in one word. Should Houston fans have been rooting for a run-scoring double play?
No.

Before we begin, a quick apology from me: I haven’t gotten to these managerial report cards as quickly as I’d like. They take a lot of work, believe it or not. I comb through every game log multiple times to capture the particulars of each situation, keeping an eye on pitcher and batter availability while doing so. I like to watch key moments, too, just in case something pops up that way. I still miss things — it’s hard to get every last detail right, though I try to be thorough — but without poring over the details to get everything straight, I couldn’t write these.

Between the general rigors of writing and compiling the annual top-50 free agent list, I just haven’t had time to get these done. That’s not a great excuse, and I’m sure these are less interesting to read than they would have been if they had come out directly after the relevant eliminations. But hey, they’re here now! Well, this one is. More will follow in the coming week.

Bob Melvin, San Diego Padres

Batting/Lineups: B-
Melvin faced one central decision throughout the playoffs: who to play at first base. The lineup didn’t offer much in the way of flexibility anywhere else; every slot had a clear starter. That left Josh Bell, Wil Myers, and Brandon Drury to share DH and first base between the two of them. Drury theoretically has positional versatility, but there was nowhere else to put him. Melvin used two general rules: play Bell against righties and sit Bell against lefties. Read the rest of this entry »

If you’re a fan of balls in play and general athleticism, I’ve got bad news for you: the 2022 playoffs have featured the highest strikeout rate in playoff history, a whopping 26.6% excluding intentional walks heading into last night’s game. More than a quarter of plate appearances have ended without the fielders moving, the runners tearing around the bases, or indeed anyone having reached at all. For what it’s worth, the unintentional walk rate is only 7%; the strikeouts are what’s out of hand, not the non-contact plays.

Why is this the case? I can think of many reasons. Maybe the teams that made the playoffs are jam-packed with the best strikeout pitchers they can find. Perhaps the parade of relievers Jay Jaffe noted last week are just too effective. Maybe that extra velocity from starters is to blame. Hitters shouldn’t escape scrutiny, either; maybe they’re swinging for the fences more with the bright lights of October on them and accepting more strikeouts as a result. It could be matchup-based, or pitchers could be using their best pitches more often. It could be better scouting of hitters’ weaknesses, or just an accident of a few pitchers getting hot, or any number of things. Read the rest of this entry »

Framber Valdez isn’t the marquee pitcher in this World Series. He’s a solid fourth by reputation, with the top trio some of the brightest pitching lights of the last five years: Justin Verlander, Aaron Nola, and Zack Wheeler. Two games into the series, that top trio have been uniformly bad. Each has given up five runs, hardly the dominant performances they’re known for. Valdez? He stands untouched and mostly unchallenged, allowing a solitary run over 6 1/3 innings to pace the Astros to a 5-2 victory in Game 2.

When Valdez is on his game – and he’s always on his game, setting the major league record for most consecutive quality starts this year – he mixes a snapdragon curveball with a sinker that warps gravity, drawing the ball inexorably downward. He was in fine form Saturday night against a tough Philadelphia lineup. He got awkward swings seemingly at will, weak grounders whenever he needed them, and had a beautiful curveball in his back pocket whenever the opportunity for a strikeout presented itself.

The Phillies have been swinging early and often this postseason. That’s a horrid plan against Valdez; his biggest weakness is an occasional lapse in command. Even tonight, in one of the best performances of his career, he walked three Phillies. If you can lay off his curveball – easier said than done – he’ll sometimes spray a few sinkers and put you on base. Read the rest of this entry »

Every October, I eagerly await the latest installment of Jay Jaffe’s series about the state of starting pitching in the playoffs (his look at relievers is also a highlight). Last year, that waiting was almost rubbernecking; I wanted to see how absurdly short the postseason starts had gotten, and I wasn’t disappointed – thanks, opener Corey Knebel. This year, I was excited to see a rebound because I’m a sucker for playoff pitching duels. Again, I wasn’t disappointed; as Jay noted, start length has exploded this year, to the highest mark since 2019 and second-highest since ’16.

That tracks perfectly with my experience of this year’s slate of games. Sure, there were some games like the deciding Padres/Phillies clash where neither starter escaped the first inning, but for the first time in ages, aces pitching into the seventh has felt more like the rule than the exception this year. Yu Darvish totaled 25 innings across four starts. Zack Wheeler has amassed 25.1 innings in four starts, and he’s coming back for more. Framber Valdez and Joe Musgrove have each averaged more than six innings per start. Six is the new seven; in modern baseball, these qualify as workhorse performances.

You should read Jay’s article if you haven’t already. It’s one of my favorite recurring features — it’s that and my postseason managerial report cards, except with Jay’s series, I get the great pleasure of reading instead of having to pore over every game log countless times myself. When you’re done reading Jay, though, I have a treat: I got my hands on a database of postseason game logs, which means I can do some fun permutations and take a closer look at this season’s postseason starters. Read the rest of this entry »

You can almost hear the hum emanating from the Astros’ player acquisition and development machine. It’s proven and precise, a system honed over 10 years that finds talent all over the place and then helps those players succeed while signing them to win-win extensions. It’s hard to say who the Astros’ core players are because they have too many, and from too many generations. They might be the best team in baseball when it comes to working with pitchers; they also have Yordan Alvarez, Kyle Tucker, and Jeremy Peña bolstering old hands like Alex Bregman and Jose Altuve.

The Phillies, meanwhile, should come with a sign for opposing GMs looking to emulate them: “Don’t try this at home.” The team is a high-wire act. After the previous regime mostly whiffed on developing an Astros-style new core, Dave Dombrowski arrived and worked out which pieces to keep, which to discard, and where to augment. He’s been wildly effective at it, but his options were limited by timeline. Need a new outfielder? Well, there are none in the system, so you’ll need to sign free agents and make trades. Bullpen? Hah! Better start working the phones.

The bones of a nice house were there all along – Bryce Harper, J.T. Realmuto, Rhys Hoskins, Zack Wheeler, and Aaron Nola make for a heck of a foundation – but Dombrowski found the rug that really pulls the living room together. You’d never try to build your team this way, but if you absolutely have to, Dombrowski is the man for the job. Read the rest of this entry »

Sorry for the Shakespearean title; the playoffs make me feel overly dramatic every year. This time, I was inspired by the markedly different approaches of the San Diego Padres and Philadelphia Phillies, who traded blows for five exciting games. The Padres (avatar: Juan Soto) work the count and take walks. The Phillies (avatars: Nick Castellanos and Bryce Harper) sit dead red and swing from the heels. Styles make fights, to borrow a saying from a dying sport, and this one was dramatic.

It got me to wondering: how different were these two approaches, really? It certainly felt like the Padres were watching plenty of hittable first pitches fly by while the Phillies swung at breaking balls in the dirt, but that’s based on my sentiment while watching the game, sentiment that was surely informed by both my pre-existing biases and the broadcasters repeatedly mentioning the disparity throughout the series. Read the rest of this entry »

Baseball isn’t scripted or preordained. There’s no knowing who will win any given game; Jacob deGrom lost to the A’s this year and the Pirates swept the Dodgers. It’s a game of thin margins, and with huge volatility; some games a smashed line drive leaves the park, while others it finds a fielder’s glove. It’s a game defined by its uncertainty – but be honest, you knew the Astros were going to win on Sunday, right?

It sure didn’t feel that way at first. The Yankees shuffled their lineup yet again, and the new configuration paid early dividends. Leadoff hitter Harrison Bader looped a soft liner for a single. Two batters later, Anthony Rizzo flatly refused to get out of the way of a baseball headed in his general direction, as is his custom. He was rewarded with first base, and shortly with a run when Giancarlo Stanton and Gleyber Torres followed with singles. Rizzo added to the tally more conventionally in the second, doubling home a run to put the Yankees up 3-0.

Unfortunately for New York, the game moved inexorably forward, and so too did the Astros. Houston’s lineup is beatable, but it’ll take your best. Nestor Cortes didn’t have his in Game 4. He came out with his customary guile, changing speeds and mixing pitches through two scoreless innings. When he took the mound for the third, something changed.

His fastball, never blazing, lost another three ticks on average. He lost command over the pitch, too, throwing five straight outside the rulebook strike zone to Martín Maldonado to start the inning (one was called a strike). By the time he finished walking Jose Altuve, he’d given up on it altogether, looking to land sliders and cutters instead. Jeremy Peña made him pay; he didn’t respect the fastball at all, sitting on the cutter, and when Cortes hung one in an attempt to battle back into the count, Peña unloaded on it for a three-run homer. Read the rest of this entry »

Framber Valdez threw a spectacular game last night. For seven innings, he bewitched, hoodwinked, and otherwise bamboozled the Yankee offense. As Alex Eisert noted, he notched a career high in swinging strikes en route to a whopping nine strikeouts.

How did he manage it? As best as I can tell, he made one key adjustment: he used his wipeout curveball to start at-bats and ended up with 16 first-pitch strikes out of 27 batters faced, plus a weak grounder that turned into slapstick comedy:

It’s particularly impressive when you consider the beginning of his outing: he started six of his first eight batters faced with a ball and looked like he might struggle to find the zone. But he stuck to his plan, and the Yankees, who had taken the first eight pitches they saw, started swinging aggressively the rest of the night. Read the rest of this entry »

With the ALDS finally finished, I’m continuing my annual series grading each manager’s playoff decision-making. As always, I’m focusing on the lineup and pitching decisions that each manager made in the course of their series. I’m honing in on process rather than results, and taking into account the limitations of each roster.

That might mean not docking Dusty Baker, in a future edition of these report cards, for failing to bring in a lefty specialist; he doesn’t have any. It might mean taking it easy on teams with limited platoon or pinch hitting options. It doesn’t mean that you get a pass for not doing anything, though; just because a manager’s resources are limited doesn’t mean they should automatically sit on their hands. Of course, sometimes doing nothing is good, too. Leaving your excellent starter in or skipping pinch hitting when it only confers a marginal advantage can both be smart moves.

What qualifies me to issue these grades? Well, nothing really. They’re just the opinions of someone who spends a lot of time thinking about baseball. I’m sure teams are doing their own evaluations, and they probably have a better handle on the exact individual matchups, but the point is this: these decisions matter, and while the team- and consensus-building aspects of a manager’s job are far more important over a 162-game season, little edges can be decisive in a short series. A run could send you home or catapult you to glory, as these two managers will demonstrate. A note: both ALDS losers played in the three-game Wild Card round, and I’ll cover all of their decisions, starting with the most recent series. Read the rest of this entry »