On Wednesday afternoon, Liam Hendriks entered a tough situation. There were two outs in the bottom of the ninth, but his margin for error was nonexistent. The bases were loaded, and the White Sox were locked in a tie game. One hiccup in command, four slightly misplaced pitches, and the game would be over.

Do pitchers have less command when they enter? Is it worth worrying about whether a pitcher might not have it that day? I have no earthly idea, so I decided to investigate. First things first, though: I wasn’t actually sure what I was investigating. Time for some experimental design.

What about the walk rate, but only on the first batter faced by a new reliever? That’s certainly a number I could look up. That checks in at 8.1% from 2015 to present (I used the Statcast era even though there’s no Statcast data involved in this query, just for consistency’s sake). Over the same time frame, the overall reliever walk rate is 9.3%. Case closed, let’s go get brunch.

Only, that’s a bad comparison. We’re not comparing apples to apples. If we’re actually going to look into whether pitchers are particularly likely to come in and not have it, we need to compare like to like. Take the immortal Sugar Ray Marimon, who made 16 appearances for the Braves in 2015. He was a one-hit wonder, though “wonder” might be strong: he compiled a 7.36 ERA in 25.2 innings before decamping to Korea. Read the rest of this entry »

There’s no one way to hit well, but there is one constant in hitting: batters swing too often. The intuition behind that fact isn’t hard to get to: if you swing at a pitch outside the zone, you’re taking a ball and turning it into weak contact (it’s hard to hit pitches outside the zone with authority) or a strike — that’s bad! If you swing at a pitch in the zone, you’re turning a strike into either a strike (if you miss) or contact. Swinging is so bad outside of the zone that it overwhelms the advantages of hacking in it.

I don’t mean to imply that this should extend to logical extremes — you can’t literally never swing — but the numbers are clear. In 2020, batters were worth 3,030 runs below average when swinging. They added the same amount when they didn’t swing. This isn’t a fluke: batters have already added 1,350 runs relative to average by taking pitches this year — you guessed it, they’ve cost themselves as much by swinging. In every full season since the advent of pitch tracking in 2008, swings have cost offenses at least 6,000 runs. It’s just a fact — hitters swing too frequently.

José Iglesias has probably never heard this advice. He’s in the midst of one of the swing-happiest seasons of recent memory, and he’s doing it in exactly the way that worries you — a mountain of chases. There’s just one twist — it hasn’t sunk him just yet, despite everything I said up above, and it’s fascinating seeing him survive.

The top of the chase rate leaderboard is filled with powerful hitters. Salvador Perez leads the way so far, with a 49.1% swing rate on pitches outside the zone. Luis Robert is in second. Javier Báez is in the top 10, as is Nick Castellanos. I don’t mean to say that you can’t be a good hitter when you get fooled that often — all of the batters I named are having good years. They’re producing in a particular way, though: plenty of misses, but loud contact when they do connect. Read the rest of this entry »

Let’s not sugarcoat it: Kris Bryant was bad last year. Sure, it was only 147 plate appearances, but the sheer broadness of his struggles made it feel longer. He set career lows in batting average, OBP, slugging percentage, walk rate, barrel rate — you name it, and there’s a good chance he fell short in it. With the Cubs in salary relief mode this offseason, there was talk of a non-tender, and it certainly wasn’t good for Bryant’s free agency hopes.

That feels like less of a worry now. Through the first month of the season, Bryant has been tremendous. April marks don’t compare well to full-season numbers, but far from continuing his swoon, he’s posting the best numbers of his career nearly across the board. He looks like an MVP candidate again, and it’s a good thing for the Cubs, who need all the offensive help they can get given how many of their regulars are struggling.

What changed? As Tom Verducci detailed, Bryant is swinging differently, and it’s paid dividends so far this year. Let’s dig into the numbers and see how that new swing (in fairness, it’s still pretty similar to the old swing) is working so well.

Take a look at this heatmap of the four-seam fastballs Bryant faced in 2015 and ’16:

That’s right: four-seam fastballs low in the zone. Bryant devoured those pitches en route to 14 WAR over the two years. Next, look at the four-seamers he saw in 2019 and ’20:

Read the rest of this entry »

Wednesday night, the Marlins defeated the Brewers by a comfortable 6-2 margin. Though the game wasn’t close, it could have been slightly closer: the Marlins saved a run with a clutch sacrifice fly double play in the bottom of the sixth. That’s a standard play; every level from youth tee ball on up has catch-and-throw double plays. That doesn’t mean it wasn’t impressive. In fact, the moment-to-moment action of the play shows how impressive baseball players are even on plays we think of as de rigueur.

Here, watch it in real time:

Let’s start with the pitch: Sandy Alcantara couldn’t have done much better. He dotted the bottom of the zone with a 99 mph sinker, the perfect location to induce an inning-ending ground ball. Seriously, it’s hard to draw it up any better than this:

That’s a perfect location for a grounder-inducing pitch. When he’s located that pitch on the bottom edge of the zone, good things have happened: he’s saved roughly four runs relative to average per 100 sinkers he’s located there. That’s roughly in line with the best overall pitches in baseball. When he spots it, in other words, the Marlins are right where they want to be.

Travis Shaw begged to differ. Well-spotted pitch, plus velocity: he hit the smithereens out of it. The ball came off his bat at 101.7 mph, a veritable laser beam. Combined with its flat 12 degree launch angle, that ball is a hit the vast majority of the time; it carried a .910 expected batting average per Statcast, though that ignores the horizontal angle (or spray angle), and Shaw happened to hit it right at a defender. Read the rest of this entry »

It feels like only yesterday that the Yankees snatched Mike Tauchman from the Rockies for a pittance and unleashed him on the AL East. In 2019, Tauchman was electric; his .277/.361/.504 slash line buoyed the Yankees in a season where they desperately needed it. Injuries (and 100 PA in the minors) kept him from playing a full year, but even in only 296 plate appearances, he managed 2.6 WAR, sixth among Yankees batters.

That performance didn’t carry over into 2020. Despite the team’s intermittent injury problems, the Yankees used him as a fourth outfielder and defensive replacement. He didn’t hit a single home run, a concise summary of what went wrong: his power disappeared overnight. By the start of this year, he was barely playing and out of minor league options, which makes last night’s development unsurprising: the Yankees traded him to San Francisco in exchange for Wandy Peralta and a player to be named later, as Jack Curry first reported.

Tauchman had lost his spot in the Yankees’ outfield, and it’s not hard to see why. Aaron Judge and Aaron Hicks are playing everyday, which left one outfield spot for three outfielders: Tauchman, Clint Frazier, and Brett Gardner. Tauchman and Gardner fulfill similar roles, and the team was giving Gardner the majority of the playing time while carrying no backup shortstop. Frazier is the only outfielder with options, but he’s playing far more than Tauchman, which meant Tauchman was the odd man out — the team needed to trade him to avoid exposing him to waivers. Read the rest of this entry »

The intentional walk is, in my opinion, the most overused tactic in baseball. If you explained it to someone who had just learned the rules, they’d be confused. “The object of the game is to get runners around all the bases to home plate, right?” they’d ask. “You’re purposefully putting a runner partway around those bases? Does his run somehow not count?”

The run does count, and intentional walks are generally a great way to help your opponent score. Given that “helping your opponent score” is a bad way to win baseball games, intentional walks are mostly bad. Thanks for coming to my TED talk.

For decades, managers have intentionally walked dangerous batters. Sometimes it makes sense. Often, it doesn’t. Inevitably, though, the siren call of doing something, doing anything at all, to affect one’s own destiny leads managers astray. It’s an understandable impulse. Who among us, given the choice between doing literally nothing and taking some action to affect the outcome, would pick doing nothing? Since being a manager is largely about purposefully doing nothing when you could instead be doing something, I totally get why over-managing still persists.

Still, not every intentional walk is bad. Not every run is created equal, and there are certainly situations where the tactical advantage of choosing a different batter to face is worth more than the cost of an extra baserunner. Jayce Tingler called for two consecutive intentional walks on Sunday night in a win over the Dodgers, and they actually made sense. That calls for a celebration, as well as an explanation of why these particular walks were sound. Read the rest of this entry »

More than anything else, I’ll remember Carlos Rodón’s no-hitter for how it ended. Not when he hit Roberto Pérez in the foot — that was no fun, but perfect games end on nonsense all the time — but because he threw harder as the game went on, topping out at 99 mph on his 110th pitch of the game. It’s all the more impressive when you consider that he started the game in the low 90s.

Pitchers losing velocity as the game goes on is a phenomenon as old as baseball itself. That’s just how it works; throwing a pitch requires a ton of physical effort, and doing it 100 times will wear you down. If you’ve ever done repetitions of anything in your life, you can empathize. Rodón laughs at that fact of life, in a way that I think of as Justin Verlander-esque, and I was curious whether other pitchers follow the same pattern, particularly after Jacob deGrom popped a casual 101 mph fastball in the seventh inning of his latest start.

Using deGrom as evidence of anything is an iffy idea at best — the man is a unicorn, a pitching deity descended to earth. But Rodón is mortal, and he does it, so it’s hardly some unobtainable goal. I set out to see whether pitchers are adding velocity in later innings these days, and whether that addition has changed over time. Read the rest of this entry »

Read the rest of this entry »

The NL West is a two-team division these days, but that wasn’t always so certain. In 2019, the Diamondbacks burst onto the scene as a potential playoff team — not the equal of the Dodgers, but a thorn in their side nonetheless. The Snakes didn’t boast the same top end as their Hollywood rivals, unless you had a wildly optimistic opinion of Ketel Marte, but they did have depth, personified by Carson Kelly, the highlight of their return for trading Paul Goldschmidt.

That 2019 season showed Kelly’s promise. In 365 plate appearances of platoon work, he compiled 1.8 WAR, combining competent work behind the plate with a 107 wRC+. That batting line was buoyed by a 13.2% walk rate and a juicy .232 ISO, neither of which seemed particularly convincing, but his central skills — good plate discipline, the ability to draw a walk, enough power to be respectable — all pointed to continued offensive competence.

The 2020 season wasn’t so kind. A .221/.265/.385 line was good for a 70 wRC+, and those flashes of light from the previous year — his walk rate and power on contact — both dipped. It was only 129 plate appearances, and it came with a .250 BABIP, so it was hardly a season he couldn’t recover from, but his swoon mirrored Arizona’s: 25–35, last in the NL West. After the Padres went nuclear this offseason and with the Giants continuing to hit on interesting players, it was easy to move on from the Diamondbacks and their bushelful of interesting but flawed players, Kelly included.

Secretly, though, Kelly’s 2020 was actually encouraging. Not the top-line numbers, mind you; those were terrible, like we talked about above. But consider: Kelly’s ISO (extra bases per at bat, if you’re unused to seeing that; it’s a measure of power) dropped from .232 to .164, and he totally deserved that. His barrel rate halved, his hard-hit rate declined precipitously, and he traded line drives and fly balls for grounders. Bad power central!
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I had a hard time writing the introduction for this article. Actually, strike that — I had one in mind the whole time, but I kept trying to come up with alternatives. Here’s the deal, though. I’m obsessed with Corbin Burnes (in a wholesome, “I love watching this guy pitch” kind of way), and I’ll use any excuse possible to write about him. His seeming transformation into a pitching demigod? Yeah, that certainly qualifies.

If you’re looking for the origins of both my Burnes obsession and his journey from prospect to ace, look no further than his first start of 2019. Burnes threw a gem, from a strikeout perspective at least, notching 12 K’s against a single walk. He also gave up three home runs and lasted only five innings — seems bad! The culprit was a fastball that spun ineffectively, some unholy blend of four-seamer and cutter that hitters had no trouble timing and obliterating.

Think “obliterating” is an extreme word choice? Burnes had an 8.82 ERA in 2019 and a 6.09 FIP. He gave up 17 homers in 49 innings, leading to a two-month trip to the minors. Batters barreled up 13.7% of the fastballs they put in play, which produced 10 of those homers. They whiffed on less than 20% of them, a poor result for such a hard, high-spin pitch. And he simply didn’t get the ride that four-seamers need, a prerequisite for missing bats. Read the rest of this entry »