The Rays have been one of the hottest teams in the majors the past few months and have surged to the top of the American League East standings mostly on the back on the club’s offense. Since May 15, the team has posted a combined 132 wRC+, a figure that would easily lead baseball over this span if it weren’t for the Blue Jays (who boast a 145 wRC+). Given their propensity to not invest in their club’s payroll at levels even close to league average, the Rays often have the feeling of a faceless club. But they do have a few notable position players who you would expect to be leading the charge as they have been blitzing the league.

Without looking, which player is leading the team in WAR? Is it postseason folk-hero Randy Arozarena? What about Austin Meadows or Brandon Lowe who have both led the team in position player WAR in recent seasons? The answer, to my surprise, is utility infielder Joey Wendle with 1.7 WAR.

Wendle was traded to the Rays from the Athletics for a Player To Be Named Later following the 2017 season. In parts of four seasons with the Rays including 2021, Wendle has compiled 7.3 WAR in 1,163 plate appearances, which prorates to about 4.1 WAR per 650 plate appearances (a proxy for a normal season with regular playing time). He is a player who is likely anonymous to the casual fan mostly due to his deployment. As part of the Rays infielder mob, he has only stepped up to the plate on 545, 263, and 184 occasions the past three seasons (note that the 184 PAs came during the pandemic-shortened season). And you never know where to look for him; in his Rays tenure, he has appeared mostly at second and third base but also at shortstop and in left field. One might call him the quintessential Rays player. Wendle is versatile and quietly productive. Read the rest of this entry »

Adbert Alzolay has been one of the few pleasant surprises for the Cubs this season. Through his first two major league stints across 2019 and ’20, he walked 15% of the batters he faced in 33.2 innings of work, most of which was in the starting rotation. Even when striking out 28.6% of opposing hitters, handing out free passes at such a high rate is not a sustainable way of working through a lineup and keeping runs off the scoreboard and without the aid of a .263 BABIP in those 33.2 innings, Alzolay’s results would have been even more concerning. Meanwhile the Cubs, after years of contending and struggling to develop pitchers internally, were bereft of exciting arms on the right side of the aging curve. This past offseason, ownership refused to spend in any meaningful way and the club was forced to ship out Cy Young candidate Yu Darvish for Zach Davies and a few prospects in the low minors. They did sign Jake Arrieta to a $6.5 million deal coming off a disappointing stint with the Phillies, but that signing represented Chicago’s most significant investment in pitching this offseason. These moves and circumstances meant that Alzolay would need to take a big step forward in 2021 if the Cubs wanted to remain competitive with the Cardinals and Brewers in what seemed to be a winnable AL Central.

But expecting Alzolay to make a substantial leap in terms of his control took some wishful thinking if you were scouting the statline. At his last stop in Triple-A in 2019, Alzolay walked 11% of batters in 65.1 innings. That figure is obviously better than the 15% he posted in his first innings in the majors, but it would still be a below average rate and that was while facing worse competition. For Alzolay to even have an average walk rate, he would have to cut his 2019 Triple-A rate by at least 20%, all while facing better competition. The odds were certainly not in his favor.

Miraculously, he has made the necessary adjustment. In 49.2 innings in 2021, Alzolay is now walking only 5.2% of batters in an environment where the league average is about 9%. Not only has he shaved his previous major-league rate by two thirds, but his 2021 mark now represents an elite figure, one that’s in the 88th percentile of all pitchers per Baseball Savant. Better yet, he has barely sacrificed any strikeouts. As I said in the introduction, Alzolay had a career 28.6% strikeout rate coming into 2021. This season, that rate is still a well-above average at 26.3%, especially relative to other starting pitchers. He has also increased the rate at which he induces groundballs (38.3% prior to this season, 45.7% in 2021), which should offset some of the strikeouts he has lost as he tries to hone his command. All of this has culminated in a 3.81 ERA through nine starts despite a bloated 20% HR/FB rate, the latter figure driving the massive difference between his FIP (4.21) and xFIP (a sterling 3.41). Read the rest of this entry »

Take a gander at the list of the most effective relievers in the majors thus far and you get a mix of known quantities and pop-up guys. That’s the nature of the beast. When evaluating relievers, we deal with small samples and given the talent of any major league pitcher, many have the ability to place atop a leaderboard over a short span of time.

Readers of this website are almost certainly aware of strikeout artists Aroldis Chapman, Josh Hader, James Karinchak, Craig Kimbrel, and Edwin Díaz. We also see familiar faces Ryan Pressly, Blake Treinen, Taylor Rogers, Mark Melancon, and Will Smith. César Valdez shows up here and is especially notable given his velocity, changeup usage and journey, which has included stops across MLB organizations, Taiwan, and Mexico. Matt Barnes is having a resurgent season. Giovanny Gallegos has been incredibly effective since he arrived in New York after he was part of the trade that sent Luke Voit to the Yankees. But today I want to focus on Emmanuel Clase. Read the rest of this entry »

If you are a regular FanGraphs reader, chances are that you’re aware of the rise in strikeouts across the majors. At this point, bemoaning the rise in strikeouts is an essential component of the baseball media apparatus. Every season is accompanied by pieces on the subject. I found this type of article going as far back as 2013, and they have been especially prevalent in recent seasons. It seems to be a rite of passage to put out a piece on the increasing strikeout rate, so as a newly minted member of the baseball writing community, here is my entry in the genre.

For context, the league-wide strikeout rate has increased every season since 2005, when it sat at 16.4%. In 2021, that figure has risen to 24.1%. That is a 47% increase in 16 seasons. Not only has the strikeout percentage monotonically increased, but the rate at which it is increasing is growing. From 2005-09, the rate increased by 9.7%; from 2010-14, 10.3%. In the most recent five seasons, the strikeout rate increased by 11.6%.

The question is always who and what is driving this phenomenon, and the answer is almost always “well, there are a few factors at play.” One angle that I thought has been under-researched is hitter behavior with two strikes. You may have heard your favorite local newspaper columnist bemoan the idea that hitters do not have a two-strike approach anymore, that all they try to do is hit home runs, which has led to all the strikeouts. Of course, this type of thinking is reductive, mostly because it does not even consider the role of the pitcher. Nevertheless, many have discussed two-strike results, though more anecdotally than quantitatively. So let’s investigate this aspect of the strikeout rate problem first. The following is the strikeout rate and wOBA in plate appearances that reach two-strike counts in the Statcast era:

Like the overall strikeout rate, the strikeout rate in these plate appearances is monotonically increasing but much more slowly. Year-over-year, the increase never exceeds 2% besides this season and 2020 (about 3%). I will note we are only about a month and a half into the season and given the weather, league offense is at its nadir, so I would expect this to regress some. wOBA with two strikes has jumped in the Statcast era and this season so far has stuck out like a sore thumb. The weather caveat applies here also, as does the caveat that we are dealing with only a fraction of the plate appearances in 2021 versus all other seasons besides 2020 (for obvious reasons). This information seemingly debunks the awful two strike approach theory, at least within the defined time frame. Hitters are barely striking out more when they get to two strikes and their overall performance has not changed much season-over-season, 2021 notwithstanding. If we dig further into two strike behavior, the idea that hitters have drastically changed when they are confronted with two strikes does not track:

I will note that the chase rate calculation is based on my own filtering of the Statcast data from Baseball Savant. The swinging strike rate has increased every season and the rate at which balls are put in play with two strikes has decreased every year, which gives some credence to the complaint about hitter behavior. I would argue the changes are so small, however, that drastic claims about today’s players are not warranted. We are talking about 1.3 percentage points in terms of swinging strike rate, and 2.2 percentage points in balls in play rate from 2015-21. I do not think anyone without access to this kind of statistical information can really tell the difference between those figures when watching the game. The swing rate with two strikes has been very stable in this era. In terms of chase rate, batters have become more discerning, which can only be construed as a positive development, assuming we believe it’s better to have fewer strikeouts.

Interestingly, the rate of called strikes as a percentage of total two-strike pitches has seen a noticeable jump in 2021. Devan Fink wrote about how pitchers have become more aggressive throwing the ball in the zone this season with the advent of the new ball. I would imagine this is the impetus for the growth in the percentage of strikeouts via the called strike.

Overall, the differences in two-strike performances between seasons do not seem substantial enough to explain the acceleration of the strikeout rate growth. Maybe it is not batter performance in two strike counts, but instead a notably higher percentage of total pitches being thrown with two strikes?

There is basically no difference between 2021 and the preceding five seasons combined. The count-based run values are more of a mixed bag with no discernible trend.

Two strike performance changes does not seem notable in recent vintage. In fact, the swinging strike rates in all counts have effectively increased at the same rate across all counts.

The last thing I investigated was looking at pitch types and seeing if any groups of pitches are more responsible for the rate of whiffs than the others. Here there are more interesting trends.

Neither breaking pitches nor offspeed pitches have seen much of an influx in swinging strikes. Hitters have struggled more with fastballs, on the other hand, in all situations. (Another hat tip to Devan Fink, who wrote about the unusually large increase in fastball velocity in the month of April this season.) Pitchers’ fastballs are becoming tougher to time-up and now that they are becoming more aggressive throwing the ball in the zone, they are inducing more swinging strikes with those pitches.

The league’s two-strike approach does not seem to be having an outsized effect on the rise in strikeouts, at least in this most recent era of baseball. There are small upticks in a few relevant metrics, but more of the increase has to do with swings and misses in all counts, especially on fastballs. This count-based analysis yielded similar results to an excellent piece from Chet Gutwein here at FanGraphs. He found that not only has the league’s swinging strike rate on fastballs increased more relative to other pitch types, but fastballs high in the zone were mostly to blame due to the continuing growth of velocity and, as a consequence, spin rate.

As the league tries to address the issue of fewer balls in play now and in the future, finding a way to combat the rise in pitcher velocity should be one of the first items on the docket. The fact that pitches are moving more than ever does not appear to be as large a factor, given the changes in whiff rates on breaking and offspeed pitches. Moving the mound back, which will be implemented in the Atlantic League this season, and giving hitters more time to react seems like a good start. After parsing through the two strike data, it seems like rectifying the lack of formidable two strike approaches across the majors is not the silver bullet many believe. Digging further into the data by pitch type in all counts, the main issue is rising whiff rates on fastballs, which Chet Gutwein opined on in his own piece I referenced above. So maybe combating velocity is the elusive silver bullet? Without a relatively controlled experiment we cannot say for certain. But we can say that hitters being criticized for forgoing any semblance of a two strike approach and placing the blame on them for the rise in strikeouts is most likely a futile exercise.

Jack Flaherty has a 2.83 ERA through seven starts, which comes out to a 73 ERA-. His park adjusted FIP- of 75 is right in line with that figure; his FIP is 3.03. It would be easy to stop there and say Flaherty has been great; his excellent ERA matches up with his FIP, so he must be doing something right. Dig a little deeper, however, and there are some reasons to be skeptical. His overall line has been buoyed by a 7.5% HR/FB. His strikeout rate is down almost four percentage points compared to his last three seasons combined (25.8% versus 29.7%). Worse, his swinging strike rate is down to a below league-average 11.6%, indicating he has been somewhat fortunate to punch out a little over a quarter of the batters he has faced. On contact, things are not much better. His groundball rate is five percentage points lower than it was over those same three seasons and after allowing a below average rate of hard-hit balls from 2018-20, he is now right at league average.

This is all to say that Flaherty hasn’t quite been his excellent, arguably ace-level self (no, I will not be debating the definition of an ace). Poking around, I found an interesting trend. Flaherty has always leaned on his four-seamer and slider, but in 2021, that reliance has accelerated. He is throwing his fastball and slider as a higher percentage of his total pitches than in any other season up until this point. He is increasingly becoming a two-pitch pitcher:

There are two ways you can look at this. First, you could say that he is using his best offerings more often than ever, which can be construed as a positive development. Or you can say that this is making him more predictable, allowing batters to sit on those two pitches, making him less effective. Given that his peripherals are a bit worse this year, one might say that the latter explanation rings true. But his results are as good as ever, so maybe the former point is viable. Read the rest of this entry »

Pitchers are always looking to chip away at the platoon advantage. Two of the most common weapons in doing so are the changeup and curveball. The former fades away from opposite-side batters and from the barrel as the bat whips through the zone. Most of a curveball’s movement, meanwhile, is vertical; no matter the handedness of the batter and corresponding bat path, the pitch can duck under the bat as the batter makes contact. Sliders, though, generally have a large platoon split, to the detriment of the pitcher, as they move more horizontally relative to vertically and toward the pitcher’s glove side. This leads the ball towards the barrel of an opposite-handed hitter, giving him more of an opportunity to make contact.

Cutters are interesting in this regard. Given the movement of the pitch, you would expect it to have significant platoon splits like a slider. The ball moves toward a pitcher’s glove side, albeit generally not as far as a slider; an opposite-handed hitter would have a better chance putting the barrel on it. But this is not the case, according to research from Max Marchi done back in 2010, as he found that cutters were in the middle of the pack with respect to pitch-type platoon splits. It still had more favorable splits when the batter had the platoon advantage, but that is the case for all pitches in general.

So why does the cutter not have much of an effect on the platoon advantage despite its break? As MLB.com explains it, the magnitude of the horizontal break is subtle enough to catch a hitter expecting a four-seamer off guard. Thus, when he swings, the movement of the pitch forces the batter to fight it off his hands and either induces weak contact or breaks the bat altogether. My thesis was that players are turning to the cutter because of these neutral platoon splits, as heavily using a pitch that works well to hitters from both sides makes you harder to predict. Read the rest of this entry »

Despite playing for the Yankees and having the largest contract ever handed out to a pitcher, I think Gerrit Cole’s start to the 2021 season is going under the radar. Now, I have no empirical evidence that this is the case, but go with me here. I think two things are at play. First, Jacob deGrom is striking out every batter he faces (do not fact check me on that) and plays in the same city. Second, the Yankees’ struggles have been the talk of baseball in the early going, with much of the focus centered on the lineup and rightfully so. The team’s performance thus far has been extremely underwhelming, though they are 9-4 since their 5-10 start.

None of the blame for the Yankees tepid beginning can be put on Cole, however. He is off to a fantastic start. Through his first six starts, he has struck out 44.3% of the batters he has faced and walked only 2.1%. That strikeout rate is third in the majors behind deGrom and Corbin Burnes; the walk rate sits fourth in the league behind Burnes, Zach Eflin, and Walker Buehler. Put those two figures together and Cole has a K-BB% of 42.1%, only a few percentage points behind Burnes and deGrom and a shade under 10 percentage points above Joe Musgrove. The difference between Cole and Musgrove is about the same as the difference between Musgrove and Clayton Kershaw who is 19th on the leaderboard. Cole’s 2.4 WAR is tops in the league, though he has made one more start than both deGrom and Burnes, though I will note that he has only thrown two and two thirds more innings than deGrom so on a rate basis he has actually been more effective in accumulating WAR. Most of the difference has to do with a .315 BABIP allowed compared to deGrom’s .241 and a strand rate that is 8.3 percentage points lower.

So, Cole has been great. But this is not a breakout. Cole has been one of the best handful of pitchers in the sport since he first donned an Astros uniform in 2018. In the three preceding seasons, he posted a 36.6% strikeout rate and 6.8% walk rate over 485.2 innings, good for 6.05 WAR per 200 innings pitched. What is notable is that early on, he is pitching as well as ever. Better even. Since 2018, Cole only has one six start stretch where he struck out at least 44.3% of opposing hitters (44.6% from the end of July to end of August in 2018) and he has never posted a six start stretch walking so few batters (on a rate basis). At this point baseball fans are accustomed to Cole’s dominance over the opposition, but the degree to which he is doing so is unprecedented. Read the rest of this entry »

Eduardo Rodriguez has been one of the vital cogs for the resurgent Red Sox. Sure, Boston’s league-leading wRC+ is the main impetus for the club’s success. But both the starting rotation and the bullpen have been in the top third of the league and Rodriguez has been one of the larger actors of the former’s placement among the league-leaders. Rodriguez has accumulated 0.4 WAR in just four starts and 23 innings of work. He sports a 3.52 ERA and 3.34 FIP despite allowing a gaudy 17.4% HR/FB. The main driver of his results? Not only is he striking out a shade more than 29% of opposing hitters (after posting marks of 24.8% and 26.4% the previous two seasons), his walk rate sits at a sparkling 2.2%. This start is already extremely impressive. But in the context of what he endured in the very recent past, I would say it’s extraordinary.

For those unfamiliar, Rodriguez missed the entire 2020 campaign. It wasn’t due to an elbow injury or shoulder soreness or forearm tightness. Rodriguez suffered myocarditis; a heart condition connected to contracting COVID-19. Speaking to Joon Lee of ESPN, Rodriguez said he could not throw pitches without feeling significant fatigue brought on by the effects of his condition. He was unable to train for three months. This meant that not only did he miss last season but he was behind the proverbial eight ball when it came to preparing for the 2021 season.

Getting back on the mound was an amazing accomplishment alone. Having one of the most dominant starts to the season among all starting pitchers is one of the most surprising developments of the young season. Rodriguez has not just picked up where he left off. He has adjusted his pitch mix and fundamentally changed the method by which he attacks hitters.

His fastball velocity is down a half a tick, despite the league average increasing by half a tick.

But that hasn’t proven to be a problem. As I alluded to, he has made major tweaks to his arsenal in 2021. In his first three major league seasons, Rodriguez leveraged his plus fastball velocity by throwing the pitch about 60% of the time. As the velocity diminished, he began to rely on the pitch less in 2018-19. Now the four-seamer is his second-most used pitch:

Pitchers are relying on their best pitches more and more. And why should they not? It makes all the sense in the world. Throwing a fastball 60% of the time just so that you can “establish it” is an outdated moniker that players and teams alike are reticent to follow. Take a look at the our season stat grid tool if you want proof that the most dominant pitchers in the league are increasingly relying on their breaking pitches. Select curveballs and you will see Julio Urías, Zack Greinke, Brandon Woodruff, Anthony DeSclafani, Dylan Bundy, Walker Buehler, Corbin Burnes, and John Means toward the top of the list. For sliders, that list features Tyler Glasnow, Lance McCullers Jr. (who is also throwing a new slider), Shane Bieber, a new and improved Jeff Hoffman, Freddy Peralta, and even Clayton Kershaw, whose slider is almost 45% of his pitch diet.

These are cherrypicked examples; not every pitcher on this leaderboard has been as productive as those starters thus far. But it does point to the idea that the best pitchers MLB has to offer are increasingly leaning into their best secondary offerings and have either continued to be successful or found another level in their production.

The idea of simply throwing your best pitch has become more in vogue in recent years. Back in 2017, Eno Sarris wrote that pitchers should try making breaking balls 80% of their total pitch mix. Part of the reason is that non-fastball pitches, specifically breaking balls, have gotten increasingly harder to hit; Ben Clemens wrote about this trend a couple of years ago. Even though fastballs have become harder to hit by virtue of increased velocity, pitchers are turning away from them in favor of other offerings.

This decision raises the question: Are pitchers successful with their non-fastball pitches because they use them less? The idea is that the main driver of offspeed or breaking ball success would be that hitters see them less, making them tougher to adjust to in a plate appearance. Theoretically, then, if a pitcher goes primarily to his secondary pitches, those pitches will become less effective on a per pitch basis. Is this true?

To investigate, I took every pitch type that was thrown at least 100 times in a season from 2018 through ’20. I took the year-over-year changes in pitch usage, swinging-strike rate, and run value per 100 pitches thrown for each season pair (where in both seasons the pitch was thrown on 100-plus occasions).

The first thing I wanted to look at was effectiveness based on changes in usage for each individual pitch type. The short answer to this is that there is little relationship between marginal usage change and marginal success in either of the two measures for any pitch type.

If anything, changeups and curveballs actually induce swinging strikes as a higher percentage of all pitches with more usage. That is the strongest relationship in this dataset, and it still consists mostly of noise. Based on the data, there is no evidence that pitchers should be dissuaded from throwing their best pitches more often, and that holds true for breaking balls, offspeed pitches, and fastballs.

Sure, you may argue, throwing any pitch a little more won’t have adverse effects on its effectiveness, but aren’t there diminishing returns? At a certain point, don’t you throw the pitch too often to fool the batter? To answer that, I placed each pitcher and pitch type pair into a bucket based on usage, then separated the bucket into increments of 10% (so the first consisted of pitches thrown between 0 and 10% of the time, the second 10% and 20%, etc.). I then grouped the pitch usages across the three seasons and looked for any potential deviations in effectiveness.

Again, these relationships are mostly noise. Even for pitches thrown upwards of 70% to 80% of the time (beyond which the the data is scarce), they should not lose any per-pitch potency by virtue of increased predictability.

For those of you skeptical that fastballs make up the majority of pitches and that this lack of a relationship may not be evident with breaking balls or offspeed pitches specifically, I have bad news for you:

As with run values, there’s no strong relationship between swinging-strike rate and usage.

As noted above, fastball usage is on the decline throughout the league. But using the data I collected from ’18 through ’20, it’s clear that pitchers aren’t all now throwing breaking pitches all the time.

The vertical lines represent the 50th percentile in that specific distribution. On average, pitchers using a certain breaking ball less than 30% of the time shied away from using the pitch more. On the other hand, breaking ball usage mostly increased for players who used it more than a cursory amount. That all makes sense: If you have a breaking ball you like to use (or are comfortable using), you’re going to throw it more; if you don’t have a strong breaking pitch, then you’re not going to be tossing it all the time even if it could theoretically be more effective.

Throwing a pitch just for the sake of throwing it is not going to fly in MLB in 2021. Pitches are thrown with a purpose: generating whiffs, or at least groundballs. This is one of the fundamental factors in the ever-increasing strikeout rate: Not only are pitchers throwing harder than ever, but they are also leaning on their best stuff even more. That’s while every one of those pitches is being optimized with the help of technology to generate maximum movement and deception. And that trend will not stop until there is evidence that a pitch will perform worse upon increased usage. Barring that, pitchers across the league will rely on the pitches they deem most dominant.

This recent tweet from Daren Willman caught my eye:

#Rangers Kohei Arihara threw 7! different pitches in the first inning. pic.twitter.com/X86J6NpvFH

— Daren Willman (@darenw) April 20, 2021

Partially it was because I was already intrigued by Kohei Arihara, but the pure absurdity of this fact stands out, too. He threw seven different kinds of pitches in his most recent start against the Angels. Seven! In one inning! The only other player to accomplish this feat in 2020 was Arihara’s countryman Yu Darvish, who coincidently did so in seven different innings last season. Since 2008 (the first season with public PITCHf/x data), there have been 909 instances of a pitcher throwing at least seven different pitch types in a single inning. When you think about how many innings of regular season baseball have been played since 2008, you can appreciate how rare this type of occurrence is.

If you are not familiar with Arihara yet, let me fill you in. The right-hander came over from NPB after playing six years for the Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters. He was posted going into his age-28 season and signed a two-year deal with the Rangers for a total of $7.44 million, $1.24 million of which was the posting fee awarded to his now-former club. At the time of signing, this seemed to be a very good deal for Texas. Arihara lacks the explosive fastball and mind-bending breaking pitches frontline starters in MLB today; his strikeout rate his final season in Japan was 19.4%. But his repertoire was deep. Eric Longenhagen wrote up a scouting report back in December outlining his pitch mix and fastball velocity, comparing him to other high-profile players from NPB. Eric concluded that Arihara profiled as a back-of-the-rotation type, placing a 40 FV on him. Getting a guy who can fill the back of a rotation for about $3.7 million per year (when accounting for the posting fee) seems like a solid deal to me. Read the rest of this entry »