In 2023, Jurickson Profar was quite possibly the worst full-time player in Major League Baseball. In 2024, he was one of the best. Slashing .280/.380/.459 while playing half his games at the pitcher-friendly Petco Park, Profar finished with a 139 wRC+, sixth best among qualified NL batters. Despite his mediocre baserunning (-0.8 BsR) and poor defense (-8 DRS, -6 FRV), his bat carried him to a 4.3-WAR season. Still, he entered free agency in a tricky position. He’d be looking for a suitor who’d put much more stock in his recent phenomenal performance than the long, uneven period that came before it. On Thursday, the Braves emerged as one such team. Deciding that Profar’s pros far outweighed his cons, Atlanta inked the veteran outfielder to a three-year, $42 million contract.

In hindsight, this contract and pairing feel so predictable that I could have pre-written this article weeks ago. When it comes to projecting Profar’s future performance, the error bars are wide. We’re talking about a player who was released by, of all teams, the Colorado Rockies in 2023 and found himself starting for the NL All-Stars less than a year later. Yet, projecting his contract turned out to be surprisingly easy. Ben Clemens predicted Profar would sign for three years and $45 million. MLB Trade Rumors predicted Profar would sign for three years and $45 million. Kiley McDaniel of ESPN predicted Profar would sign for three years and $45 million. The median projection from our contract crowdsourcing exercise? Yep, three years and $45 million. As divided as this country might be, we could all agree on one thing: Profar would sign a three-year deal with an AAV close to $15 million. Lo and behold, the Braves will pay him $14 million per annum through 2027.

Three years and $42 million is the same contract both Lourdes Gurriel Jr. and Jorge Soler signed last offseason, and very close to the three-year, $43.5 million deal Mitch Haniger signed the winter before. In other words, it’s the going rate for a corner outfielder in his early 30s with something like a two-win projection but All-Star upside. Profar might have a wider range of outcomes, but his median projection is right in that window. If he reverts to the version of himself that we saw in 2023, the Braves will soon regret his contract. If he keeps up his 2024 performance, his salary will look like a bargain. Ultimately, however, Profar only has to be the player he was in 2018 (107 wRC+, 2.2 WAR), 2020 (113 wRC+, 0.9 WAR), or 2022 (110 wRC+, 2.4 WAR) for this deal to pay dividends. That’s exactly the kind of player Steamer thinks he’ll be in 2025: Read the rest of this entry »

When the Mets signed Juan Soto in December, he was, technically speaking, filling the hole that Jesse Winker left behind. Of course, that’s a bit like buying the Batmobile to replace an expired bus pass. Winker’s greatest strength is drawing walks, and Soto’s career walk rate makes Winker’s career walk rate look like Jeff McNeil’s career walk rate. Still, the point stands. The Mets lost one lefty-batting corner outfielder to free agency and replaced him with another. Yet, on Thursday afternoon, they re-signed Winker anyway. His one-year, $7.5 million contract is fairly straightforward, but the ramifications for New York’s roster could be much more complex.

Poor baserunning, miserable defense, and frequent injuries have limited Winker throughout his career. All the same, his bat was a major asset for the Reds from 2017-21. In just over 1,500 plate appearances with Cincinnati, he slashed .288/.385/.504 with a 132 wRC+. While he thrived at Great American Ball Park, he made his mark outside of that hitter’s haven, too, producing an .845 OPS and 126 wRC+ on the road. He made the All-Star team in his final season with the Reds, batting .305 with 24 home runs in 110 games, good for a career-best 3.2 WAR.

The next two seasons, however, marked a period of steep decline for Winker. Playing for the Mariners and Brewers, he managed just 0.7 WAR in 2022 and -0.8 in 2023. His agent might point out that back, neck, and knee injuries hampered his performance in that time, as did some bad luck on balls in play; his xwOBA was nearly 30 points better than his wOBA, while his BABIP was more than 50 ticks below his average from the previous five years. Even so, it would have been more than fair to worry about his future as a major leaguer after his dismal 2023 campaign. Entering 2024, his ZiPS projection was a mere 0.4 WAR in 415 plate appearances, and he was forced to sign a minor league contract with the Nationals less than two weeks before spring training began.

Back to full health, Winker rebounded in Washington. While he wasn’t a power threat like he’d been in his Reds heyday, he knocked 18 doubles and 11 home runs, giving him a middle-of-the-pack .162 ISO. His BABIP was back up above .300, and his 14.0% walk rate ranked fifth among qualified batters (as of his final day with the Nats). All in all, he put up a 125 wRC+ and 1.2 WAR in 101 games.

This was enough to pique the Mets’ interest ahead of the trade deadline. However, after Washington sent him to New York, Winker wasn’t the productive hitter that the Mets thought they were getting when they acquired him. Well, at least not during the regular season, when Winker was little more than replacement level with his new team. All the more disappointing, he was set up to thrive with the Mets: He had the platoon advantage almost every time he came to the plate. While Washington used him as an everyday player, New York shielded him from southpaws; he faced just four left-handed pitchers over the final two months of the season. Nonetheless, his 97 wRC+ with the Mets was much closer to his career mark against lefties (88) than righties (129).

The problem was rooted in Winker’s approach at the plate. With the Nationals, he ran that aforementioned 14.0% walk rate and struck out just 22.2% of the time. After the trade, he lowered his strikeout rate to 17.1%, which might’ve been a good thing, except that his walk rate also dropped way down, to 7.8%. With the Mets, Winker swung more often and made more contact, especially on pitches in the strike zone. His Z-Swing% (per Statcast) jumped from 60.5% to 70.4%, while his Z-Contact% jumped from 85.5% to 91.2%. This wouldn’t have been a problem if he crushed many of those extra balls he put in play, but, naturally, he did not.

So, why did Winker suddenly change his approach at a time when things were going well? I’d posit the Mets noticed that he was holding back on too many hittable pitches over the first four months of the season and let him know that was the case after the trade. According to Robert Orr’s calculations from his Damage leaderboard, Winker was better than the average hitter at identifying hittable pitches every year from 2020-23. Yet, with the Nationals this past season, his Hittable Pitch Take rate put him in the bottom third of the league. After he started swinging at more strikes with the Mets, he rose back up to the 66th percentile. The problem, however, was that he sacrificed another critical skill in the process. Winker’s selectivity rate — Orr’s metric that shows how often a player avoids swinging at bad pitches — fell from the 73rd percentile as a National to the 35th percentile as a Met. All that is to say, Winker swung at more good pitches, but he also swung at more bad ones, and he didn’t do enough damage against good pitches to compensate for his lack of production against the bad ones. Ultimately, his hard-hit and barrel rates were lower with the Mets than they were with the Nationals, as were his wOBA and xwOBA on contact.

This raises another question: Why would the Mets want Winker back if their efforts to improve his approach went so poorly? Perhaps they think he just needs a little more time to reap the rewards. After all, 129 plate appearances is nothing. Aaron Judge was still hitting below the Mendoza Line with an OPS in the mid-.700s by his 129th plate appearances last season. Thankfully for our purposes, we have an easy way to increase the sample size of Winker’s 2024 season with the Mets: Include the playoffs, as Winker took an additional 32 plate appearances in October. He continued to swing at strikes at a similar rate, but he used those swings to record several big hits, including two triples and a home run. He also drew seven walks, compared to just four strikeouts. If you combine those numbers with Winker’s regular season stats as a Met, you get a 10.6% walk rate, a 16.1% strikeout rate, and a .341 wOBA. Even more promising is his .353 xwOBA, notably higher than his .335 xwOBA with the Nationals. All of a sudden, it makes a lot more sense why the Mets decided to keep this guy around.

It’s far too soon to say if Winker’s new approach will work in a larger sample size. Still, it’s not hard to see why the Mets think he’s worth a longer look. In a best-case scenario, he could be an even more productive hitter than he was overall in 2024. And if this new approach doesn’t befit him going forward, he doesn’t have to be anything more than the hitter he was in Washington to be valuable on a one-year, $7.5 million deal. After all, the Mets will continue to shield him from left-handed pitching, and his track record against righties is strong:

So, that’s Winker. But this signing is an iceberg – and ironically, it’s the rare kind of iceberg that isn’t so good for a polar bear. At first glance, this is just a 1.0- to 1.5-WAR player signing a short-term deal commensurate with his talents. Yet, there’s a lot more to it than what you see on the surface. When SNY’s Andy Martino first reported the Winker signing, he added that the Mets are now preparing for life after Pete Alonso. Indeed, while no one could argue that Winker is a direct replacement for the All-Star first baseman, there is a connection between this signing and the Mets’ possibly giving up on Alonso if you follow the trail of dominoes far enough.

With Soto, Brandon Nimmo, Jose Siri, and Tyrone Taylor to man the outfield, the Mets are likely to use Winker as their primary DH against right-handed pitching. However, he can still play the corner outfield if he needs to; he spent 95 games on the grass last season, including 27 with New York. So, in the event of an injury to one of the team’s other outfielders, Winker can fill in. That means the Mets are less likely to ask McNeil to play the outfield in 2025. Instead, he can ideally play second base almost every day. As long as McNeil is covering the keystone, the Mets won’t need any of their young infielders at second base, therefore allowing Brett Baty, Luisangel Acuña, and Ronny Mauricio to focus their efforts on third. If just one of them, or some combination of the three, can competently cover the hot corner, Mark Vientos will be able to play first base full-time. Long story short, Winker improves the outfield depth, which indirectly improves the infield depth, which should allow Vientos to formally replace Alonso at first.

Another aspect to the iceberg is how this all affects Starling Marte, whose Gold Glove years are long behind him. In 170 games in the outfield over the past two years, he has accumulated -13 DRS, -14 OAA, and a -12 FRV. Meanwhile, neither ZiPS nor Steamer sees him as much more than a league-average bat. As a righty hitter, he could theoretically platoon with Winker at DH. After all, he posted an impressive 141 wRC+ against left-handed pitching last year. Yet, even with the platoon advantage, Marte might not be a strong enough hitter to warrant the reps. While he has had positive platoon splits the last three years, he had reverse platoon splits every year from 2014-21. In other words, he’s hardly a guaranteed lefty masher. On the contrary, ZiPS projects him for a .698 OPS against lefties and a .713 OPS against righties in 2025. Even if the Mets were willing to give a roster spot to the short side of a DH platoon, Marte probably wouldn’t be that guy.

The final component of the iceberg is what the Mets do next. Steve Cohen’s pockets are already deep, but if the Mets aren’t going to give Alonso a multi-year contract, and if they can get someone to take on any of Marte’s remaining salary, they’ll only have more to spend. With a projected payroll still $49 million below last year’s final tally and a luxury tax payroll still $17 million below the top penalty threshold, the Mets remain major players to watch as the offseason rolls on.

Since the last time Josh Bell suited up for the Nationals on August 1, 2022, he has played for four different teams. The Nationals dealt him to the Padres alongside Juan Soto at the 2022 trade deadline. Then he became a free agent and signed a two-year, $33 million deal with the Guardians, only for Cleveland to flip him to the Marlins the following summer. He swam with the Fish for just under a year before it was Miami’s turn to cast him off at the deadline in 2024. Finally, after finishing out this past season with the Diamondbacks, Bell is returning to Washington on a one-year, $6 million contract. That closes the circle on a two-and-a-half-year expedition that took him from the East Coast to the West Coast to the Midwest to the wetlands to the desert and back to the nation’s capital. According to Google Maps, it would take you just over 166 days to walk that journey. Bell, not exactly known for his footspeed, did it in 881.

With the Gold Glover Nathaniel Lowe likely to see most of the playing time at first base, Bell should slot in as Washington’s everyday designated hitter. Bell has primarily played first throughout his career, but his defense has always been lacking, even by the standards of the position. He has never finished a season with a positive DRS, and only once has he finished with a positive OAA or FRV. In 2024, Bell ranked last among all first basemen in DRS and second to last in OAA and FRV, despite playing just 98 games at the position. As long as Lowe stays healthy, which he’s largely managed to do throughout his career, the Nationals won’t need to worry about Bell’s glove at first. Meanwhile, Bell won’t need to worry about the harsh positional adjustment for designated hitters dragging down his overall numbers. A full-time DH who plays all 162 games would finish with -17.5 Def; Bell finished with -17.8 Def in 2024. As long as he sticks at DH, things can’t get any worse.

Of course, that also means Bell’s defensive value won’t get any better. If he’s going to improve upon a replacement-level (-0.1 WAR) 2024 season, he’ll need to do it with his offense. More specifically, he’ll need to do it with his bat. Over the past four years, Bell has been the least productive baserunner in the sport, with -17.6 BsR. His best baserunning season in that span was 2021, when he finished with -3.9 BsR, eighth-worst in the majors. To put that in context, -3.9 BsR is so low that Steamer doesn’t project anyone to finish with -3.9 BsR in 2025. Heck, Steamer doesn’t have anyone else finishing below -2.9, while Bell is projected for -2.3. Bell’s baseline is such an aberration that Steamer refuses to accept it as his (or anyone’s) 50th-percentile outcome. Read the rest of this entry »

I think a lot of us overestimate the significance of geography when predicting where free agents will sign. In Max Kepler’s case, however, we all might have underestimated the role geography would play in his decision. Perhaps it was inevitable that the greatest German-born player in MLB history would head to the state with the greatest German population in the country. Lo and behold, on December 19, the all-time leader in runs, home runs, RBI, and WAR among Deutschland natives agreed to a one-year, $10 million contract with the Philadelphia Phillies.

Yet, aside from helping the Phillies pander to their fans in Germantown, it’s a little difficult to see how Kepler fits this team. Entering the offseason, many expected Philadelphia would pursue a right-handed batter to play left field who could split playing time with Brandon Marsh. Instead, they signed Kepler, who bats lefty and hasn’t played left field since his days at Double-A in 2015. What’s more, president of baseball operations Dave Dombrowski has made it clear the Phillies plan to use Kepler as an everyday player, despite the fact that injuries have kept him from playing more than 130 games in a full season since 2019.

Kepler’s limited experience in left field is the least concerning aspect of all this. Whether you look at OAA, FRV, DRS, or Baseball Prospectus’s DRP, Kepler has never been a below-average outfield defender in any season of his career. His strong track record as a right fielder, and his past experience in center, should help him adjust to left. Furthermore, Kepler might benefit from playing a position where throwing isn’t quite as important. Although his arm strength consistently ranks above the league average, he has been worth -3 throwing runs in his career, according to Baseball Savant.

Even if it won’t be a major adjustment, it’s not nothing for the Phillies to ask Kepler to re-learn a position after almost 10 years away. It makes me think of the movie line I quote more often than any other. In Moneyball, when Billy Beane tries to convince catcher Scott Hatteberg that he can play first base, Beane asks Ron Washington to tell Hatteberg that’s it not that hard. “It’s incredibly hard,” Washington replies. Read the rest of this entry »

I’m going to show you a short video compilation I made. Can you figure out what these seven baserunning plays from the 2024 season have in common?

Admittedly, there’s a red herring among those video clips. One of them focuses on Bobby Witt Jr. stealing third base, but what I really wanted to highlight was Vinnie Pasquantino stealing second behind him. Here’s a better angle than what’s available on MLB Film Room:

Read the rest of this entry »

According to the Billboard Hot 100 charts, the biggest hit of Justin Bieber’s career is “Stay,” a song you either can’t get out of your head, won’t admit you can’t get out of your head, or just don’t realize you can’t get out of your head because you hear it playing everywhere — all the time — but didn’t know the title or artist. Anyway, it seems as if the not-so-subliminal messaging of one Bieber influenced the other. Shane Bieber has decided to stay (oh, ooh-woah) with the Guardians, and he’s hoping the decision proves to be just as lucrative as Justin’s song.

Bieber’s contract is essentially a one-year prove-it deal with the added security of a player option for a second year. The right-hander will earn $10 million for his age-30 season in 2025. After that, he can either exercise a $16 million option for 2026 or take a $4 million buyout and return to free agency. In other words, the player option is really only worth $12 million to Bieber, which means he surely doesn’t intend to exercise it unless things go particularly wrong. After all, he managed to net this contract halfway through his rehab from Tommy John surgery. The Guardians are prepared to pay him $14 million for half a season of work, and reportedly, that wasn’t even his highest offer. It’s safe to say he’s not picking up that option unless he suffers another injury.

So, if Bieber’s plan is to continue his rehab, rebuild his value, and cash in next offseason, it’s easy to understand why he might have taken less money to stay in Cleveland. Not only does he already have a relationship and a rehab plan with the Guardians, but this is an organization with a strong track record for helping pitchers thrive. Just look at Matthew Boyd, who came back from Tommy John this summer and turned a handful of starts with the Guardians into a two-year, $29 million deal with the Cubs. Alternatively, look at Bieber himself. The organization took a fourth-round draft pick (122nd overall) and 45-FV prospect and developed him into a Cy Young winner. It’s hardly surprising that he wants to stick with the same organization as he works his way back from a career-altering injury. The chances that he’ll ultimately receive a big, long-term deal from the Guardians are slim to none, but he’s counting on them to help him get that offer from someone else. Read the rest of this entry »

Enlightenment era poet Alexander Pope famously wrote, “Fools rush in where angels fear to tread.” His words imply that angels are the opposite of fools. If that’s true, I wonder if it wouldn’t be such a bad thing for angels to give rushing in a try every once in a while. Could that be precisely what Perry Minasian is thinking?

Including the piece you’re reading right now, the FanGraphs staff has written about four trades and three free agent signings this November. Five of those seven transactions have involved the Angels. It started with the first major trade of the offseason: Before the Dodgers even held their parade, the Angels flipped Griffin Canning to the Braves for Jorge Soler. Then they signed free agents Kyle Hendricks, Travis d’Arnaud, and Kevin Newman. Along the way, the Halos also picked up Scott Kingery and Ryan Noda, and dropped Patrick Sandoval (among others) ahead of the non-tender deadline.

On Monday morning, the Angels continued getting an early start on the offseason – this time in more ways than one. At 5:38 AM PST, news broke that they had agreed on a three-year, $63 million deal with left-hander Yusei Kikuchi. I’m imagining the news came out so early in the morning because Kikuchi is in Japan right now, and given Kikuchi’s well-known sleep schedule (and the 17-hour time difference), Minasian only had a brief window in which both he and his top target were awake. Like MacGyver racing to deactivate a time bomb, Minasian cut the right wire just in time and successfully negotiated the biggest free agent deal of his Angels tenure. Read the rest of this entry »

The 2023 season gave us the most predictable pair of Rookie of the Year races in recent memory. Gunnar Henderson and Corbin Carroll were our top two prospects entering the year and the overwhelming preseason ROY favorites among our staff. At season’s end, they each earned all 30 votes on their respective ballots. It was only the second time in the 21st century that both the AL and NL ROY winners were unanimous decisions (Aaron Judge and Cody Bellinger won unanimously in 2017) and the first time that the clear preseason favorites were also the undisputed victors. By comparison, the 2024 Rookie of the Year races were about as predictable as a toddler’s favorite food.

You don’t want Wyatt Langford? But you loved Wyatt Langford yesterday!

So you either like Paul Skenes or Jackson Merrill, but you won’t tell me which one and if I pick wrong you’ll throw him on the floor and scream? Got it.

AL Rookie of the Year Luis Gil missed most of the 2022 and 2023 seasons recovering from Tommy John surgery. Even before he tore his UCL, a future move to the bullpen seemed possible, and if it weren’t for his strong spring training (15 2/3 IP, 2.87 ERA) and Gerrit Cole’s elbow injury, that’s likely where Gil would have begun the 2024 campaign. Runner-up Colton Cowser was a slightly more promising prospect; he graduated with a 45+ FV to Gil’s 40+. Still, like Gil, his starting role in the majors was not guaranteed until he earned it with a red-hot spring and an equally scorching start to the regular season.

Of the three finalists in the AL, only third-place finisher Austin Wells ranked among our top 100 prospects ahead of the season. And of the five players who earned votes for AL Rookie of the Year as part of our preseason staff predictions exercise (Langford, Evan Carter, Junior Caminero, Holliday, and Colt Keith), only Langford ended up earning so much as a single vote from the BBWAA. He finished seventh with one second-place vote and four third-place selections.

The NL contenders weren’t quite as surprising. All three finalists, Skenes, Merrill, and Jackson Chourio, were among our top 30 prospects entering the season. Meanwhile, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, the most popular NL Rookie of the Year choice in March, only fell out of the race due to a triceps injury that cost him almost half the season. Yet, although the NL field was not so surprising, at least not like the AL field turned out to be, the final results were just as hard to predict. The voting ultimately wasn’t all that close – Skenes earned 23 first-place votes to Merrill’s seven – but those numbers might undersell what a difficult decision all 30 voters had to make. Dan Szymborski did a great job breaking down why it was such a tough choice (and why he ultimately cast his ballot for Merrill).

Merrill showed off all five tools in 2024, the most impressive of which was his center field defense, considering he was a shortstop up until this year. OAA, UZR, and Baseball Prospectus’s DRP loved him in center. Only DRS disagreed (0 DRS), but even a perfectly neutral defensive performance is admirable coming from a 21-year-old playing the position for the first time. Combine that glove with good baserunning, great contact skills, and a surprising amount of power, and you get Merrill’s 5.3 WAR, more than a full run higher than any other rookie in either league. The last rookie to produce more WAR and still lose the ROY was Kenny Lofton (5.8 WAR) in 1992. Thus, the fact that Skenes came out on top is a testament to the dominant season he put together. Over 23 starts and 133 innings, he pitched to a 1.96 ERA and 4.3 WAR. No rookie starter has thrown more innings with a lower ERA in over 50 years. If Skenes had been on the Pirates’ roster on Opening Day, it’s very likely he’d have surpassed Merrill’s 5.3 WAR, and this conversation wouldn’t have been so complicated. But that’s the debate in a nutshell. On the one hand, you can’t blame Skenes for not pitching in the majors sooner. He was clearly ready to make the Pirates’ roster out of camp. On the other hand, you can’t give him credit for innings he didn’t pitch.

Only two more rookies earned votes in the NL, and either of them very well could have won the award outright if they’d played in the opposite league. Chourio wasn’t quite as strong of a hitter as Merrill, but he excelled on both sides of the ball, finishing with 21 homers, 22 steals, 6 OAA, and 3.9 WAR. Meanwhile, fourth-place finisher Shota Imanaga was terrific in the first year of what now looks like an incredibly team-friendly four-year, $53 million deal with the Cubs. His 2.91 ERA ranked third among all qualified NL pitchers. His 3.72 FIP was significantly higher, so his 3.0 WAR ranked just 19th among NL hurlers. Still, among rookie pitchers, it was second only to Skenes.

A trio of NL infielders also deserve some recognition for their strong rookie seasons; any of them might have earned some down-ballot votes in a weaker year. Masyn Winn (3.6 WAR) and Joey Ortiz (3.1 WAR) were strong defenders with roughly league-average bats, while Tyler Fitzgerald (3.0 WAR) put up a .217 ISO and 132 wRC+ over 96 games while looking just capable enough with the glove to be an everyday shortstop.

The AL rookie class didn’t have quite as much top-end talent or mid-tier depth. Gil was a solid, mid-rotation starter who moderately outperformed his peripherals. That’s no knock on the righty, who was a valuable member of the Yankees’ AL pennant-winning roster, but he didn’t have a star-making debut season like Skenes, Imanaga, or Yamamoto. According to WAR (and 14 out of 30 voters), Cowser actually had the more impressive season. Even so, it’s hard to ignore how similar Cowser’s numbers were to those of the NL’s distant third-place finisher Chourio. And considering neither Gil nor Cowser was a slam dunk to win, one might have thought Wells would earn some first-place votes himself. He blossomed into a terrific defensive catcher by anyone’s metrics (13 FRV, 11 DRS, 14.5 DRP), which is quite the accomplishment. Unfortunately, he disappeared at the plate in September (22 wRC+) and may have cost himself the hardware in the process.

Where the AL rookie class really stood out this year was in the bullpen. Two of the top three relievers by WAR were AL rookies: Cade Smith (2.7 WAR) and Mason Miller (2.3 WAR). Miller was the bigger story because of his triple-digit fastball velocity, gaudy strikeout totals, and strong start to the season, but Smith ended up with a lower ERA and FIP in 11 1/3 additional innings. Nonetheless, narrative often prevails in awards voting, and Miller finished ever so slightly ahead of Smith. It probably didn’t help Smith’s case that he was hidden behind Cy Young finalist Emmanuel Clase in the Guardians’ bullpen, whereas Miller racked up 28 saves as the A’s closer.

The other two AL rookies receiving votes were outfielders Wilyer Abreu (3.1 WAR) and Langford (2.9 WAR). The two had similarly valuable seasons; each was above average at the plate, while Abreu was the stronger fielder and Langford the better baserunner. However, Abreu came into the season as a relatively unheralded name, and Langford’s top-prospect reputation preceded him. Thus, compared to Abreu, who looked like a blossoming star, Langford almost seemed to be a disappointment — at least relative to expectations. That could explain why Abreu earned a couple more votes, including a pair of second-place selections from outside the Boston chapter of the BBWAA.

The emergence of star prospects like Skenes and Merrill, the breakouts of less-heralded rookies like Cowser and Gil, and the close ROY races in both leagues highlight what was another banner year for rookies. Overall, they combined for 138.3 WAR in 2024, surpassing the previous record of 134.8 set by last year’s rookie class:

What’s more, this past year’s rookies represented 13.8% of WAR league-wide. That figure isn’t quite record-breaking, but it is the highest percentage of WAR to come from rookies since 1947, fittingly the first season of the ROY award, created for and won by Jackie Robinson. These are the top seasons in history according to percentage of WAR produced by rookies, excluding 1871 (when everyone was a rookie):

Of course, all of this is partly because rookies have seen a steady increase in playing time since the start of the 21st century. When rookies play more, it stands to reason that they’re going to produce more value. Therefore, it’s also relevant to look at the ratio of rookie WAR to rookie playing time, which I’ve calculated by taking the percentage of league-wide WAR produced by rookies and dividing it by the percentage of league-wide plate appearances and batters faced by rookies. Rarely is that ratio going to be higher than 100% (that would mean rookies were outproducing non-rookies on a rate basis), but the closer the number is to 100%, the better rookies have performed compared to the rest of the league.

By this metric, the 2024 season isn’t quite as historic. Still, it was the strongest year for rookies since 2012 and one of the top three seasons of the last 30 years. The graph begins in 1916, when TBF data is first available:

Another metric to consider is the number of rookies who reached a certain WAR threshold. Decimal places of WAR are pretty insignificant, and any WAR threshold I pick is going to be somewhat arbitrary. Still, I think it’s interesting to identify the number of rookies who made a lasting impression in any given season. For instance, 28 players on our rookie leaderboards finished with at least 2.0 WAR this past season. The last time there were more two-win rookies was 1920, which was the first season that any of the Negro Leagues are considered major leagues, and therefore the rookie season of all-time great players like Oscar Charleston and Cristóbal Torriente. Meanwhile, the last time rookies made up such a high percentage of all two-win major leaguers was 1947:

Similarly, the last time there were more three-win rookies on our leaderboards was 1920, and the last time rookies made up a higher percentage of three-win players was 1947.

At this point, I feel compelled to note that due to MLB’s two-pronged rookie eligibility requirements, our leaderboards include a handful of players who have already exhausted rookie status. It’s easy to filter out players who have reached 130 at-bats or 50 innings pitched in the majors; it’s harder to filter out those who have accumulated 45 days on an active major league roster during the championship season (not counting days on the injured list) without reaching either of those other playing time thresholds. For the sake of consistency, the numbers I’ve cited up to this point come directly from our leaderboards. I could have manually extracted the few players who weren’t technically rookies in 2024, but it would be impossible to do that for every season on record. Moreover, I don’t think it’s a grave sin to include a player like Lawrence Butler when I’m looking at general rookie trends; if he had been called up just a week later in 2023, he’d still have been rookie eligible in 2024.

However, in case that makes you skeptical about the greatness of this year’s rookie class, let me ease your troubled mind. Even if I manually correct the 2024 data and remove players like Butler, rookies still made up a higher percentage of all two-win players in 2024 than in any season since 1920 and a higher percentage of all three-win players than in any season since 1984. And keep in mind, that’s without manually correcting the data in any other season.

Some of these rookies will become superstars in the years to come. At least one of them already is. Others may look back on 2024 as the best year of their careers. As their futures unfold in different ways, we may soon forget that all of these players crossed the major league threshold in the same season. Still, for this brief moment in time, all of these players are a unified graduating class. So, let me leave them with the distinctive, touching, and unforgettable words of my high school principal’s graduation speech: “Today is the first day of the rest of your lives.”

It’s not hard to remember who had the biggest hits of the postseason, nor is it hard to remember which superstar sluggers came up short. But what about the components of offense that don’t take place at the plate? This past October had no shortage of riveting plays on the basepaths, so I thought it would be fun to look back at some of the most skillful baserunning, some of the least skillful baserunning, and either way, some of the most consequential baserunning plays of the 2024 playoffs.

To calculate baserunning value, the bright minds at Baseball Savant have developed a system that estimates runs above or below average for 10 different categories of “advance opportunities” on balls in play. There is certainly room for disagreement with the way the automatic system evaluates plays, but these numbers are a great jumping-off point. That’s especially true when it comes to bad plays, for which there is a clear delineation between the most harmful baserunning decisions and more forgivable mistakes.

Six runners ran into an out that cost their team 0.80 runs or more this postseason. No other baserunning play scored worse than -0.20 runner runs. Here’s a chart and a video compilation of those six disastrous decisions. I’ve also included Savant’s seventh-most detrimental baserunning play of the postseason for comparison:

The decisions by Bohm and Malloy to try for second, as well as third base coach Luis Rojas’ choice to wave Torres home, were all varying degrees of justifiable. That’s not to say any of them were smart plays, but it’s important to remember that getting thrown out doesn’t necessarily mean a baserunner made a mistake. A player who never gets thrown out on the bases isn’t taking enough risks.

Stanton’s out at home is at the top of the list for a reason. It was tough to watch him lumbering down the third base line in the moment, and it’s even harder to watch in hindsight when I know the outcome. It makes me feel like I’m watching a horror movie, but instead of wanting to scream at Stanton to stay out of the basement, I want to tell him to hold up no matter what Rojas was signaling. I could say the same of Perez, who is every bit as slow as Stanton. Juan Soto made a terrific throw, but all the same, third base coach Vance Wilson had no business sending Perez on that play. As for the inelegant slide into home, that’s all on Perez.

That being said, I hesitate to call either of those plays the worst example of baserunning in the postseason. For one thing, it’s clear from the clips that their coaches were more to blame. What’s more, it would be pretty boring of me to pick one of the biggest, slowest players in the game as the culprit behind the worst baserunning flub of October. So that brings me to Winker in Game 1 of the NLCS.

Here’s that play one more time:

By my count, Winker made three baserunning blunders in a very short time. His first mistake was taking too far of a turn around second base. His second mistake was realizing his first mistake and briefly turning back toward second before changing his mind once again and continuing toward third. His third mistake was giving up far too easily. He didn’t bolt for third and try to slide under Max Muncy’s tag, nor did he force the Dodgers to run him down, which might have given Jose Iglesias a chance to reach second base. Rather than putting up a fight, he basically just admitted defeat.

The Dodgers went on to win that game 9-0. Winker’s poor baserunning was hardly the only thing that did the Mets in. Still, if he’d held up at second base, it would have been the only time in the entire game the Mets had a runner in scoring position with no outs. Instead, Winker killed what little momentum the Mets almost mustered. So, of the 513 ball-in-play baserunning events that Baseball Savant scored during the playoffs, this gets my vote as the very worst of the lot.

I also went back and watched every caught stealing and pickoff play of the postseason to find the worst bit of baserunning that didn’t come on a ball in play. None of the straight-up caught stealing plays stand out to me as particularly egregious, although I made a compilation video so you can judge for yourselves. The compilation also includes Matt Vierling getting caught at second — a play that technically wasn’t considered as a stolen base attempt, presumably because it would have been officially scored a wild pitch if he were safe:

As for the pickoffs, all four look embarrassing for the baserunners. Pickoffs almost always do. Here they are, and I apologize in advance that the clip of Trevino’s pickoff on MLB Film Room is incomplete. But it’s not like you can’t extrapolate what’s going to happen. I also included Anthony Rizzo’s TOOTBLAN is Game 2 of the ALCS. Like the Vierling play, it technically wasn’t scored as a pickoff because it started with a ball in the dirt, but it’s close enough for our purposes:

The clip of Francisco Lindor is a bad look for the typically excellent baserunner. The camera shows that Lindor misread pitcher Brent Honeywell and started to take off for second base far too soon. Honeywell made him pay. Rizzo’s rundown was embarrassing, too, although after seeing the way Winker responded in a somewhat similar situation, I’ll give Rizzo credit for making a bit more of an effort.

The very worst of all those caught stealing and pickoff plays came just before Rizzo’s slip-up. Two batters earlier, Jazz Chisholm Jr. also ran into an out at second, and this one was a proper pickoff. It was the only instance out of all the caught stealing and pickoff plays I showed you in which the runner was already safely in scoring position with no outs. There was little reason for Chisholm to take such an aggressive lead toward third base. (Apparently the Yankees were planning to attempt a double steal, but Chisholm took off too early). According to Baseball Reference WPA, Chisholm’s pickoff was the most harmful caught stealing or pickoff play of the postseason (-0.076 WPA). It was also, by far, the worst caught stealing or pickoff play by championship Win Probability Added, reducing the Yankees’ chances of winning the World Series by 1.21%. And yet, I can’t blame Chisholm too much for his aggressive leads because, as you’re about to see, he was also responsible for some of the very best baserunning plays we saw this past October.

It’s significantly harder to identify the best baserunning plays than the worst. Simply put, it’s much easier to find plays in which a runner ran into an out than to separate the best advancement decisions from more commonplace ones. A runner goes from first to third on a single almost every game; when is that good baserunning as opposed to routine execution? All this to say, there aren’t any positive baserunning plays worth upwards of 0.80 runner runs on Baseball Savant. The top three plays of the postseason each added 0.25 runs of value. The next six came in at +0.24 runs. That said, these data still offer a good jumping-off point for this exercise.

I went digging for the top 10 baserunning plays on balls in play this postseason and came back with 11 due to a tie at the bottom of the list. Here are those 11 plays in chart form:

I wasn’t blown away by any of the three plays with a +0.25 run value. All three were the result of at least one defensive miscue and none involved a competitive throw. Understanding how to take advantage of poor defense is certainly a skill, as is moving fast enough to take an extra base without the defense even bothering to make a throw. Much like how the best defenders make tough plays look routine, the best baserunners can make low-percentage advancements look easy. Still, take a look at these three clips, and I’m sure you’ll forgive me for skipping past them as I try to find the best baserunning plays of the playoffs.

I was much more impressed with a few of the plays that had a +0.24 and +0.23 run value. But let’s start with the five that didn’t turn my head. Lindor made a nice slide to secure a double in Game 2 of the Wild Card Series, but he was only safe because Turang couldn’t hold onto the ball to apply the tag. Meanwhile, Stott bolted his way to an RBI triple in Game 2 of the NLDS, but everyone was safe without a competitive throw.

Moving on to the NLCS, Ohtani scored from first on a Mookie Betts double in Game 1, but he did so without a throw. Indeed, the Mets pretty clearly knew he was going to score well before the ball landed in the cutoff man’s glove. Then, in Game 4 of the NLCS, Marte doubled because Betts badly misread a groundball to right field. Finally, Volpe earned 0.23 runs of baserunning credit for a double in the World Series, but he would have been out if Lux hadn’t lost the baseball. Here’s a compilation of those five plays for your viewing pleasure:

Now, let’s get to the three plays I really liked. Back in the NLDS, Lux made a great read on an Enrique Hernández single to shallow center and sprinted from first to third, beating Jackson Merrill’s throw. Meadows also made a terrific read on a pop fly in the ALDS, turning what could have been a routine out into a double. Here’s what those two plays looked like:

However, of these 11 baserunning plays, one clearly stood above the rest. Here is Chisholm scoring from second on an Alex Verdugo single in all its glory:

This was terrific television from start to end. The mind games going on between Chisholm and Michael Lorenzen were almost palpable. The footwork dance battle between Chisholm and Bobby Witt Jr. was delightful. Chisholm’s decision not to slide could have been disastrous, but instead it worked out perfectly (although the home plate umpire might disagree). And the greater context of the game only makes the play more thrilling. Chisholm was only at second base because of a controversial safe call on a stolen base earlier in the inning. The umpire on the field called him safe. The umpires in New York found the replay evidence inconclusive, even though it seemed pretty clear to the average viewer that Chisholm was out. While a less courageous baserunner might have exercised more caution after surviving by the skin of his teeth, Chisholm remained aggressive. It paid off.

According to Baseball Reference WPA, Verdugo’s single was the 10th most valuable ball in play (i.e. non-homer) of the postseason. A few of those nine other plays involved good baserunning, but there were none, I’d argue, in which good baserunning was quite as essential to the shift in win probability. Take a look for yourself. (Side note: While putting this compilation together, I learned that MLB film room won’t let you make a video with the word “balls” in the title. Seems like a design flaw.)

So, Chisholm gets my vote for the best ball-in-play baserunning play of the postseason. And that’s not all. He also provided the two most consequential stolen bases of the postseason, according to Baseball Reference WPA and cWPA. Not only that, but those two stolen bases came three pitches apart in the top of the 10th inning of Game 1 of the World Series. Another three pitches later, he scored what would have been the winning run if not for Freddie Freeman’s walk-off grand slam. Even without a compilation video of the other 60 stolen bases this October, I feel confident giving Chisholm the crown for the best stolen base sequence of the playoffs. Here’s a look at the complete series of events:

None of the plays I wrote about today will be remembered for nearly as long as Freeman’s big hits, Gerrit Cole’s valiant efforts, or the poor defense that ultimately sunk the Yankees in Game 5. But I love writing about baserunning precisely because it gets far less attention than most other aspects of the game. I’m glad I had the chance to look back on all this action on the basepaths before we all turn our attention to the offseason ahead.

As Dan Szymborski pointed out in his ALCS preview, ZiPS saw the Gerrit Cole vs. Tanner Bibee face-off in Game 2 at Yankee Stadium (and the potential rematch in Game 6) as the most lopsided matchup in the series. It’s not hard to see why. The Yankees looked like (and still look like) the better team. They have the better no. 1 starter. And they had home field advantage.

At the same time, you can see why the Guardians might have liked their chances entering Game 2. Bibee is their only starter who Stephen Vogt can trust to throw five innings; he pitched into the fifth in each of his starts against the Tigers in the ALDS. If he could give his team some length in Game 2, they could close out the contest with a barrage of well-rested bullpen studs: Tim Herrin, Hunter Gaddis, Cade Smith, and Emmanuel Clase. Simply put, the Guardians can look like a completely different team with those five arms pitching all nine innings. I imagine the projections wouldn’t have been so lopsided if Bibee, Herrin, Gaddis, Smith, and Clase were guaranteed to pitch the full game.

Unfortunately for the Guardians, Bibee couldn’t make it out of the second inning on Tuesday, let alone the fifth. Meanwhile, it was the Yankees whose airtight bullpen secured the win. New York also had a little help from nearly everyone in the lineup, powering the Yankees to a 6-3 victory and putting them up 2-0 in the best-of-seven ALCS.

Cole made quick work of the Guardians in the top of the first. Bibee couldn’t do the same in the bottom of the frame. Gleyber Torres hit a 3-1 fastball into left field for a leadoff double, and Juan Soto drilled a single into right, putting runners on the corners for Aaron Judge. We all know what happened next. Judge hit a towering shot 103.3 mph off the bat and the Yankees took the lead. And to clarify, by “towering shot” I mean “towering infield popup,” and by “took the lead” I mean “took a 1-0 lead when Gold Glove finalist Brayan Rocchio dropped the popup and Torres scored from third.”

Bibee worked his way out of the inning without any more trouble (aided by a nice sliding catch by right fielder Will Brennan), but a seven-pitch at-bat from Jazz Chisholm Jr. ran up his pitch count before he escaped. The righty was at 27 pitches by the end of the first.

Cole allowed his first baserunner in the second when Josh Naylor pulled one of his high fastballs into right field for a single, but the Yankees ace settled in after that. A first-pitch fly out from Lane Thomas, a three-pitch strikeout of Brennan, and a foul pop out by Andrés Giménez got Cole out of the inning with his pitch count after two frames barely higher than Bibee’s after one; he looked comfortable.

Bibee came out for the second with a clean slate and a chance to settle in against the bottom of the Yankees order. Instead, Anthony Volpe chopped Bibee’s two-strike putaway pitch over the mound and into center field for a single, and Anthony Rizzo laced a fastball to right center for a single of his own. For the second time in as many innings, the Yankees had runners on the corners with no outs, and while that’s not nearly as scary with Alex Verdugo at the plate, it turned out to be a bigger problem for Bibee than it was in the first. Verdugo doubled past a dancing umpire in left field, scoring Volpe and putting New York up 2-0.

After that, the Yankees had runners on second and third. There were still no outs. The top of the order was due up. The time was ripe for drama, and the game delivered. Here’s what happened next: 1) Mound visit. 2) Smith starts getting loose in the bullpen. 3) Torres pops out. 4) Another mound visit. 5) Vogt intentionally walks Soto to load the bases for Judge. 6) Vogt calls for a pitching change.

There’s a lot to unpack here. For one thing, Bibee’s day was done after 39 pitches and four outs. The Guardians would need at least another 23 outs from the bullpen if they were going to win the game. Bibee never looked awful, and in a regular season game he would have gotten the chance to work his way out of the jam. Maybe he could have done it. Still, the Yankees were clearly seeing his pitches well and hitting them hard. Part of the problem might have been that the sinker he used as a valuable weapon in his first two postseason starts was nowhere to be seen.

Meanwhile, this was only the second time a team has intentionally walked Soto to face Judge. I’m not sure I agree with Vogt’s decision, but at least in this case, it’s clear what he was thinking. With runners on second and third, any ball in play could potentially drive in a run. Soto is better than Judge at putting the ball in play. Furthermore, with Soto on first, a double play ball from Judge could get the Guardians out of the inning. No AL batter hit into more double plays this past season than Judge. Walking Soto may have increased the Yankees’ run expectancy, but Vogt must have thought it would also increase his team’s chances of escaping the inning without any further damage. That was his priority.

We all know what happened next. Judge hit a high fastball out to center field, and the Yankees padded their lead. And to clarify, I’m talking about a sacrifice fly. Smith didn’t get the big strikeout or the double play, but he managed to avoid the worst-case scenario, retiring Austin Wells to end the threat.

“They were hitting the ball around the ballpark, and we needed to stop the game,” Vogt said. “In that situation, you want to try to get a double play ball. You want to try to get two outs with one pitch. You want to try to find a way to get out of that inning, and Cade did a great job doing that.”

After another scoreless inning from Cole, Smith returned for the bottom of the third and retired the side. He threw almost exclusively fastballs, and he didn’t need anything else to stymie the Yankees. There’s a reason his four-seamer was the most valuable pitch in the league this season. If Smith’s performance was any indication, perhaps the Guardians bullpen could keep them in the game over six more innings. Still, the offense would need to get something going against Cole for any of the bullpen’s efforts to matter.

The elder Naylor brother led off the fourth with his second single of the game, sending another high fastball to right field for a base hit. Thomas came up next and reached on a tapper that Chisholm tried to steal from Volpe. Neither of them came up with the ball, and it was ruled an infield hit. After a groundout from Brennan put runners on second and third, a cautious Cole walked Giménez on four pitchers, loading the bases and prompting Vogt to make an early substitution: David Fry came in to bat for catcher Bo Naylor.

It wasn’t an ideal situation to use Fry, who is much better suited to pinch-hit against left-handers, but Vogt must have wanted anyone other than Naylor taking that crucial plate appearance. Regrettably, Fry popped out on the first pitch he saw. That sent the nine-hole hitter Rocchio to the plate with two outs and the bases loaded. He put up a real effort, driving up Cole’s pitch count with a nine-pitch at-bat, but ultimately the ace won out, getting the rookie to strike out looking on a perfectly placed curveball on the upper outside corner of the strike zone.

The left-handed Herrin was the next man out of Cleveland’s ‘pen, and while he gave up a two-out single to the righty-batting Torres, he used his balanced arsenal to retire all three lefties he faced: Rizzo, Verdugo, and Soto. After four innings, Smith and Herrin had kept the Yankees lead at a manageable 3-0, and the Guardians bats finally did some damage in the top of the fifth.

Cole’s fifth inning started out a lot like his fourth. He gave up two hits and a walk to load the bases, and this time, he couldn’t wriggle his way out. Josh Naylor drove in Steven Kwan on a sacrifice fly, and Thomas drew a walk. It was Cole’s fourth walk of the game, and also his last; with the bases loaded again and only one out, Aaron Boone called for Clay Holmes. Holmes gave up another run on a fielder’s choice and walked the bases loaded again, but weak-hitting catcher Austin Hedges, who replaced Fry, struck out to end the inning. The Yankees had a 3-2 lead.

With half the game still to play, Vogt was always going to need to use a reliever outside of his trusted core, and he did so in the fifth, handing the ball to Eli Morgan. Yet, Morgan may have been the most effective Guardians reliever of the game. He was excellent, getting three fly balls on six pitches to sit down Judge, Wells, and Stanton in order. After that, the Yankees sent Tim Hill (their own left-handed Tim H.) to the mound, and he, too, produced a 1-2-3 inning, retiring Rocchio, Kwan, and Kyle Manzardo.

With the lefty-heavy lower portion of the Yankees’ order due up, Vogt called on rookie southpaw Erik Sabrowski next. Sabrowski made his major league debut on September 4 and had just eight regular-season appearances under his belt by the time he made the Guardians’ playoff roster. But across those eight appearances, he pitched 12 2/3 scoreless innings, and then he added two more innings without allowing a run in the ALDS. If could pitch a clean sixth, then Gaddis and Clase might be able to handle the rest of the game. Unfortunately, it turned out to be too much to ask from the inexperienced hurler. On Monday, Sabrowski gave up the first run of his big league career – a home run to Stanton. Then, in Game 2, Vogt asked him to pitch on back-to-back days for the first time as a major leaguer. That’s not easy.

Sabrowski started the inning by giving up a double to Chisholm and walking Volpe to bring up Rizzo, but a baserunning blunder briefly bailed him out. Chisholm left too early from second base on what Boone said after the game was supposed to be an attempted double steal, and Sabrowski picked him off. Rizzo came through after that, doubling in Volpe (with help from a fielding error by Brennan) and bumping the lead to 4-2.

Sabrowski stayed in to face Verdugo, who flied out, before Vogt went to Pedro Avila to face the top of New York’s order. Though, as it turns out, Avila wouldn’t end up needing to retire a single batter. This time it was Rizzo’s turn to TOOTBLAN. He misread a sweeper in the dirt and took off for third, thinking it had gone to the backstop. Instead, Hedges kicked out just enough to block it, got to his feet, and picked up the ball. At about this point, Rizzo realized that Hedges had the ball and halted between the bases, so Hedges pump-faked a throw to second to force Rizzo to decide which base he’d try to reach. He turned toward third and then shuffled a little in each direction, prompting Hedges to gallop toward him. Rizzo committed just enough to second base for Hedges to fire to Giménez, so Rizzo broke for third. Giménez threw to José Ramírez; Rizzo retreated. Ramírez then threw it to Giménez, and Rizzo ran to third again. Giménez sent it back to Ramírez, who finally tagged Rizzo to end the inning with a classic 2-4-5-4-5 putout.

Hill came back out in the seventh and quickly retired Ramírez and Naylor, before Boone brought in Tommy Kahnle to face Thomas. Thomas drew a walk, but Kahnle got Brennan to ground out and end the frame.

Although Avila had thrown only three pitches, there was no question that Vogt would turn to Gaddis in the seventh. Torres led things off with his third hit of the game, and after Soto flied out, Judge stepped to the plate. Facing a dominant right-handed reliever, Judge finally, actually did exactly what you’d expect him to do, crushing his first home run of the postseason to give the Yankees a 6-2 lead:

Dating back to September, Judge had gone more than 30 trips to the plate without a home run. That wouldn’t be so noteworthy for most hitters, but it was a veritable drought for Judge, who homered once every 12.14 plate appearances during the regular season.

Gaddis stayed in for one more batter, but with the game no longer close, Vogt went back to the ‘pen and asked Ben Lively, who was added to the ALCS roster on Tuesday in place of an injured Alex Cobb, to finish the game. Needless to say, Clase never needed to warm up. On the bright side for the Guardians, at least that means the Yankees have yet to see his stuff this series.

After Kahnle and Lively each pitched a scoreless eighth inning, Cleveland came to bat one more time in the top of the ninth. Somewhat surprisingly, Boone chose closer Luke Weaver to pitch in that spot, even though the Yankees were up by four and Weaver had recorded a multi-inning save the night before. Evidently, Boone wasn’t taking any chances as he sought to secure the win.

Facing Ramírez for the second time in as many days, Weaver gave up a solo home run to the Guardians’ best hitter, snapping his scoreless streak at 18 1/3 innings. Like Judge, Ramírez had been rather quiet in the postseason before his Game 2 blast, and it was a welcome sign of life for Ramírez and the Cleveland offense. However, that home run was all the Guards could muster against Weaver, and the Yankees closer ultimately secured his team’s 6-3 win.

The Yankees were far from perfect on Tuesday night. Cole labored through 4 1/3 innings, giving up six hits and four walks. The offense was 2-for-10 with runners in scoring position. Chisholm and Rizzo were each picked off second base (in the same inning, no less!). Still, seven of the nine hitters in the starting lineup recorded at least one hit. Torres, Soto, and Rizzo continued to hit the ball well, while Volpe had a terrific game of his own. Most importantly, the bullpen threw 4 2/3 innings, giving up just two hits and one run. Hill and Kahnle, in particular, were excellent, and for most of the game, it looked as if the bullpen was going to have to be near-perfect to close out a close contest. Then, of course, Judge made it not so close after all.

As for the Guardians, they needed a longer outing from Bibee, and they needed more from an offense that has averaged less than four runs per game during the playoffs. Moving forward, they’ll need a better plan than hoping for their bullpen to be perfect. As Gaddis demonstrated on Tuesday, that’s just not something they can always count on.