Author Archive: Jon Becker

RosterResource Chat: November 12, 2026

There are reports that a lot of free agents are being offered 1 year deals because of the uncertainty, but there are also reports that teams aren’t interested in trading for guys with 1 year remaining because of the uncertainty. How does this make sense?

Big difference in risk here. If you're trading prospects with 6+ years of club control for a rental, there's a chance that there's no season (or a significantly shortened one) and you gave up prospects for a player who barely played for you, if at all. Signing a player only costs money, money that the player will never get (and that you won't have to pay) if there's no season, and players would only get the prorated portion of their agreed-to salary if the season has, say, 81 games.

Odds that each of Trevor Story and Masataka Yoshida are on Boston’s Opening Day roster? Is it possible to trade them to save a little bit of money by attaching a prospect, or are they just going to get cut if it comes down to that?

I don't think they'll cut either. Worst-case, they'll take on a big % of salary remaining. Both have enough value to trade. How much another team takes on would be the question. Would depend on return and, of course, any prospects attached.

Also, I think the Red Sox believe Franklin Arias will be ready in 2027. But can he be the starting SS on Opening Day? Not sure they want to do that with no backup plan, although their depth then becomes important. Do they trust Monasterio/Sogard to hold it down until Arias is ready to step in? Probably. But I think they value Story's veteran presence. They won't just give him away for nothing.

I think Duran is more likely to be traded since he's not far removed from being really good for 3 consecutive seasons. Even then, Yoshida might not have a big enough role to stick around. He can hit. But the Red Sox treat him as un-playable in the OF so not sure why another team would think otherwise.

Ketel Marte for Anthony Santander (plus other valauble assets from TOR, say a top pitching prospect) – is that a potential fit?

Both teams shed a problematic player. Both deals have complicated deferral structures, too, which may make it easier to accomodate a swap.

I don't really see the value in this from the Diamondbacks' end unless they're really getting a ton back from Toronto. I don't think you can count of Santander for much of anything health or production wise and while Marte does have a lot of contract left, his contract isn't actually a bad value even if 2026 Marte is just who he is now. Santander's contract is underwater. I'd think a Marte-to-Toronto trade is very possible but would be much more straightforward than foisting Santander on anyone.

What are your thoughts on Buster Posey’s comments hinting that they are only planning to sign 1 starting pitcher? Seems very light.

Didn't see the quote so I have no context, but I'd assume he's talking one impact addition to go along with Webb and Roupp. Adding a SP4 from the free agent group at a reasonable rate should also be on the priority list and I think they have a decent group of No. 5 candidates (Houser, Wilkinson, Molina, Marte, Whitman). Then you have Birdsong possible back in the 2nd half and Jackson Flora could force his way to the majors in 2027.

But, at least on paper at this moment, you'd probably have a good argument that they should be looking to add 2 impact starters.

Lots of Cashman's comments yesterday hinted at minor changes (outside of the pen maybe), suggesting they could roll with Volpe, McM, Stanton, and Ali Sanchez again. Is this just GM speak to not create a desperation tax (we can call it the Bubba Crosby rule that Cashman himself used)?

I only thought he was really definitive about Stanton, who Cashman said in no uncertain terms is going to be with the team in spring training (whenever it is) and that they expect production from him. The other comments I saw were more leaving the door open to possibilities that Volpe (starting 2B), McMahon (starting 3B) and Sánchez (backup C) would all have roles on the team. I think that's basically the most you can say as a POBO/GM, you're not going to get up there and say "yeah I don't think this guy has a future with us" when he's on the 40-man and projected active roster right now. Sánchez ending up with a spot would be especially surprising to me.

Baltimore has returning Westburg, disappointing Holliday, disappointing Mayo, surprisingly decent Alexander, and surprisingly decent CES for like 2.5 lineup spots (assuming Basallo gets a bunch of DH time). All too good to bury at the end of the bench, nothing left to do in AAA, and none with real trade value. All but Holliday are right-handed. How do you figure that shakes out?

At this point, they're relying on Gunnar Henderson bouncing back, Jordan Westburg returning to his pre-injury form, and a lot of young guys taking a big step forward. Even if Alonso continues to be productive, I think they probably need to add one more impact bat. They need someone who is reliable enough that they can be fine with just some combination of those things happening. Because not all the young guys will step up. The good version of CES might not show up. Tyler O'Neill might never be healthy/productive.

Coby Mayo absolutely crushes LHP so I think they're in a good spot there as long as they don't need him to be an everyday guy. Blaze Alexander has been really good offensively the past 2 seasons and can play just about every position. Maybe he can be even better if locked in at one spot. I think they can probably shake things up a bit — trading someone like Holliday or Cowser? — but having a solid rotation/bullpen is going to be the priority.

Is Chandler Simpson untradeable? It seems like he'd be a great fit for the Mariners who need more speed, more defense, a left fielder, and players who get on base.

I think the Rays have one untradeable player, and that's Junior Caminero. But I don't think the timing for a Simpson trade is quite right, without a clear heir apparent with Jacob Melton having an injury-ravaged 2026 and not likely to be stepping in early on in 2027. But I could definitely see it get more and more into consideration with Melton in Triple-A, Theo Gillen probably starting in Double-A, and Brendan Summerhill behind Gillen. That's a lot of LHH OF to think about and Simpson is a really fun player but if he loses a step a lot of that value goes away really quickly.

The over/under for games played in 2027? I will go with 100

I'll go with over/under 144 and go with the Over. I'm optimistic compared to most people but the lockout is just an obvious move for the owners. They have so much leverage in these negotiations and they're going to use it. Players only have a limited window to monetize their talent. Owners think they're gonna live until 100 years old or longer and never stop making money. No pressure for them. I do believe they'll take it further than 5 years ago, but baseball is in a great place and they won't want to lose more than a handful of games. My guess would be mid-to-late April start and 154 games after re-scheduling.

I'm going to set it at 120 but still take the over. A lot of the same reasoning Jason gives, and I'd also add that if owners are so concerned with franchise values growing at a slower rate than other sports… you probably don't want to tank an entire season or anywhere near it, because that'll certainly kill value growth.

What do you think the Cubs wind up doing to fill out their rotation? I feel like Peterson is a no-brainer since he’ll probably be cheap for a 1-year deal and he was mostly fine as a back-end guy. On paper Holmes seems like a fit, but he didn’t impress. Does Matt Shaw have any trade value left? It feels like there’s a fit with NYY to trade for one of their young starters, and then see if you can bring back Happ for cheap or splurge on Suzuki and hope for the best.

I don't think I've seen a single free agent prediction that thinks Peterson is going anywhere but back to the Cubs, he's a great fit there with all the ground balls and I think he has more upside (and should be cheaper) than Clay Holmes since he's much younger. I saw some pontificating that they could be a fit for Logan Gilbert as a trade-and-extend candidate (since there's so much risk in trading for a rental, as I talked about earlier), and Shaw would be as good a fit for the Mariners as Gilbert is for the Cubs, a righty super utility complement to Brendan Donovan. All the talk with the Cubs has (rightfully) been on pitching but losing Suzuki, Happ, Conforto, and Kelly to free agency leaves big shoes to fill, too, and it'll be interesting to see how they go about it.

Do you think the Blue Jays being interested in Adames has legs?

Sure, it's possible. Not straight up, though. Adames is due an est. 5-yr, $140MM and Gimenez is something like 3-yr, $70MM. Giants might have to eat some salary and additional players would likely be part of a deal, but I can see the reasoning for both sides. Giants upgrade defense and could save $. Jays add some power, vibes, and bounce-back potential.

Important part of this would be each team's SS prospects. JoJo Parker is likely the Jays' starting SS in 2028 so they'd likely move Adames to 2B/3B for the last 4 years of his contract. So his SS defense is not going to hold things up. If they think he'd be a productive bat with adequate defense at 2B or 3B, he's a fit.

Giants have 4 great/really good SS prospects (Jhony Level, Gavin Kilen, Josuar Gonzalez, Luis Hernandez), although Gimenez is only under contract for 3 more seasons and can also play 2B. So might not be as much of a factor, especially if the Giants can save money.

As to the leverage point, isnt there a cutoff date where the broadcasting deals get tolled for an additional year? Thats a huge leverage spot for the union.

Right. If at least 60 games are missed, all the deals get punted back a year, which delays Manfred's plan to revamp all the TV deals, line them all up, etc. The flip side is that if an entire season is missed the league still gets paid for 2027 but then they have to give away all of 2029 for free. Evan Drellich wrote about it in The Athletic a few months back: https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/7627090/2026/09/25/mlb-lock…

West Sacramento Tommy White over under Plate Appearances?

Even before they make any offseason additions, I have him with 120 PA … https://www.fangraphs.com/projections/playing-time/teams/ath…

So maybe 100 PA would be my over/under. He wasn't very productive in 2026. As long as Nick Kurtz is healthy, there won't be many opportunities at 1B. Same with Brent Rooker at DH. I think he was fine at 3B, but not sure he's going to get an extended look there.

If you were the yankees or mets, would you be interested in alec bohm

Yes, but only for a pretty limited, Paul Goldschmidt-like role where he's only facing lefties and certain righties, platooning with Garcia or McMahon in the Bronx or Jared Young in Queens. But if I'm Bohm, I don't see a reason to sign such a deal. It's a weak free agent market and he should have no problem getting a decent-size deal (one year or two years with an opt out, perhaps, for $10M-$12M a year) to start. We've only seen those two teams connected to him so far but plenty of others make a lot more sense. The Pirates and Cardinals both come to mind there.

Where's your wRC+ cutoff where a hitter goes from "you can contend with this guy batting 8th or 9th" to "he is a black hole who seriously limits your offense"? I say it's 83.

Really depends on position and how good they are defensively. Most extreme example is Patrick Bailey. He had a 70 wRC+ in 2025 and that was probably just good enough for the Giants to pencil him as their everyday guy in 2026. He was at 13 wRC+ when they traded him but I'm guessing that anything under 60 and he would've lost playing time.

Ke'Bryan Hayes is another extreme example. With his elite defense, I think the Pirates or Reds could've lived with an 85-90 wRC+. But he's not even close to that, which is why he's probably not a starting 3B anymore.

For someone who is just an average defender (or worse), I think anything 100 wRC+ and their job is on the line.

Skubal landing spot: you picking the Dodgers or the field?

Definitely the field, and specifically the Mets. I'm seeing too much cold water poured on the idea that the Dodgers are going to be super in on him (they don't want to go long-term, for example) and too much Mets chatter and articles more or less saying that everyone is focused on the Mets there to see him end up anywhere else at this point. But, of course, the meetings he's taking with teams next week could change things, and there are always mystery teams!

How is it possible to project IP for guys like Glasnow and Snell?

Projecting is easy. Predicting is impossible because you have no idea when either is finally going to stay healthy. Thus, a lot of people will disagree with a “projection” because they’re thinking of it as a “prediction”.

With those two specifically, they’re getting a lower % just based on injury history. And then you consider that the Dodgers will be super cautious with them in order to have them ready for the playoffs. That’s specific to the Dodgers because of their division. So maybe a bit lower again because of that factor.

Even after considering that, they’re both healthy, not old, and likely coming into camp with no limitations. So my current projections of 150 IP (Snell) and 140 IP (Glasnow) are already assuming that they’re going to get hurt and miss close to 2 months with a yet-to-happen injury. I do think of these as reasonable over/under totals, based on several factors that could change before Opening Day.

The chatter on the Red Sox blogs is that they are all-in on Suzuki which would only add to the mess that is the team's outfield. I assume Rafaela is locked in and Anthony, despite not showing much yet, is penciled in for LF. Abreu has taken home 3 Gold Gloves while playing the toughest RF in baseball, and has 25 HR power, but looks like the odd man out. I am thinking that he might be able to pry Hancock, Woo or Kirby from the Mariners.

I haven't seen it specifically framed as all-in and more just interest, but anyway I don't think it'd be very hard to squeeze him in. Duran is as good as gone and Suzuki and Anthony could just rotate DH and LF without much friction, players will get hurt, etc. The Red Sox ultimately really need another power threat and Suzuki (or Arozarena for that matter) would be the best way to add one in free agency.

Anthony Volpe has had individual seasons in which he ran a >10% barrel rate, played a 13 OAA shortstop, stole 20+ bases, ran a double-digit BB%, increased his avg. bat speed 3 ticks, and gotten his ZCon% up around the 85% mark while lowering his Chase%. Needless to say he has not put these all together. What are the odds that he eventually does?

I have no idea. But one of the really cool things about this sport is that "I have no idea" has nothing to do with all of the analytics we have to tell a story and everything to do with these are human beings and it's just going to click for some guys and it can be much later in their career. It can click for one season and they can suck the next season. It's a mental grind and I don't think any of these players (current, past) are great at explaining it. It makes the game more unpredictable. It makes for a lot of great stories.

That will do it for today. Thanks for joining us! We'll be back next Thursday at the same time.


Postseason Manager Report Card: Kevin Cash

Kim Klement Neitzel-Imagn Images

For my final Postseason Manager Report Card of the 2026 season, I’m here to evaluate Kevin Cash, Rays manager and World Series loser. While Tampa Bay fell short of its first World Series championship in franchise history and ended the year with something of a whimper, Cash did a commendable job steering his club during its a deep postseason run.

As both Ben Clemens and I have mentioned before each of our previous manager report cards this postseason, I care about process and not results here. It’s easy to say, “That was a great move because it worked,” or “That was a bad move because it failed,” but managers obviously can’t know the results of their decisions as they’re making them. I’ve tried my best to transport myself back to the moment of each decision — taking into account the pitches, innings, and plate appearances that led up to it — while ignoring the outcome.

Lastly, before we get into the grades, I’ll also reiterate that while these are ostensibly manager report cards, there’s a much larger group of people behind the skipper that helps to inform his decisions. Before the game, that includes discussions with the front office, which provides the reams of data that every manager has at his disposal during play. During the game, he’s getting feedback from his coaching staff and players on their levels of health and readiness. It really does take a village to get through a baseball game, and realistically, the praise and scorn doesn’t belong to the manager alone. Read the rest of this entry »


Postseason Manager Report Card: Stephen Vogt

David Butler II-Imagn Images

For lack of a more G-rated way to put it, Guardians manager Stephen Vogt managed his ass off during the playoffs. Though let’s be clear up top, a lot of managing is not always a reflection of smart managing. The Guardians operated with their usual duct-taped-together lineup, but in an uncharacteristic break with their recent history, they had just two bona fide starters in Parker Messick and Gavin Williams. That gives us a boatload of managerial decisions to dissect across Vogt’s 11 postseason games, especially on the pitching side. So with the team having fallen just two wins short of reaching the World Series for the first time in a decade, I’m back to grade Vogt’s October performance.

As both Ben Clemens and I have mentioned before each of our previous manager report cards this postseason, I care about process and not results here. It’s easy to say, “That was a great move because it worked,” or “That was a bad move because it failed,” but managers obviously can’t know the results of their decisions as they’re making them. I’ve tried my best to transport myself back to the moment of each decision — taking into account the pitches, innings, and plate appearances that led up to it — while ignoring the outcome.

Lastly, before we get into the grades, I’ll also reiterate that while these are ostensibly manager report cards, there’s a much larger group of people behind the skipper that helps to inform his decisions. Before the game, that includes discussions with the front office, which provides the reams of data that every manager has at his disposal during play. During the game, he’s getting feedback from his coaching staff and players on their levels of health and readiness. It really does take a village to get through a baseball game, and realistically, the praise and scorn doesn’t belong to the manager alone. Read the rest of this entry »


Postseason Manager Report Card: Walt Weiss

Brett Davis-Imagn Images

After a nine-year hiatus from managing, which he mostly spent with the Braves as Brian Snitker’s bench coach, Walt Weiss made a triumphant return to the top step of the dugout this year. Promoted to replace the retiring Snitker, Weiss made the playoffs for the first time as a big league skipper, winning 94 games, the NL East crown, and the Wild Card Series against the Phillies. With his season completed, following a 3-1 NLDS loss to the Dodgers, I’m making a trip to the grade book for the last time this year to evaluate his performance at the helm.

I’ll remind for you, as Ben Clemens also has for his AL manager report cards, that I care about process and not results here. It’s easy to say, “That was a great move because it worked,” or “That was a bad move because it failed,” but managers obviously can’t know the results of their decisions as they’re making them. I’ve tried my best to transport myself back to the moment of each decision — taking into account the pitches, innings, and plate appearances that led up to it — while ignoring its outcome.

Before we get into the grades, I’ll also reiterate that while these are ostensibly manager report cards, there’s a much larger group of people behind the skipper that helps to inform his decisions. Before the game, that includes discussions with the front office, which provides the reams of data that every manager has at his disposal during play. During the game, he’s getting feedback from his coaching staff and players on their levels of health and readiness. It really does take a village to get through a baseball game, and realistically, the praise and scorn doesn’t belong to the manager alone. —>


Postseason Manager Report Card: Craig Stammen

David Frerker-Imagn Images

While his season ended with a sour taste, having been bounced from the playoffs by the Brewers in the NLDS, it’d be hard to argue that Craig Stammen’s first season as Padres skipper was anything but a success, with 91 wins plus a Wild Card series victory over the Cubs. Now that his season is over, I’m back to the grade book to give Stammen a report card for his postseason performance in the six games he managed.

I’ll once again remind you, as Ben Clemens also will for his report cards for the AL managers, that I care about process and not results here. It’s easy to say, “That was a great move because it worked,” or “That was a bad move because it failed,” but managers obviously can’t know the results of their decisions as they’re making them. I’ve tried my best to transport myself back to the moment of each decision — taking into account the pitches, innings, and plate appearances that led up to it — while ignoring its outcome.

Before we get into the grades, I’ll also re-reiterate that while these are ostensibly manager report cards, there’s a much larger group of people behind the manager that helps to inform his decisions. Before the game, that includes discussions with the front office, which provides the reams of data that every manager has at his disposal during play. During the game, he’s getting feedback from his coaching staff and players on their levels of health and readiness. It really does take a village to get through a baseball game, and realistically, the praise and scorn doesn’t belong to the manager alone. Read the rest of this entry »


Postseason Manager Report Cards: Joe Espada and Chad Tracy

Troy Taormina and Jerome Miron-Imagn Images

Over the weekend, I graded the managerial performances of the two National League managers eliminated in the Wild Card round. Now, it’s on to the American League. Both Joe Espada’s Astros and Chad Tracy’s Red Sox lasted just two games in the playoffs and didn’t even make it to October, but each still had plenty of decisions to make in their 18 innings at the postseason helm.

I went over this in the NL rundown, but I’ll say again that like Ben Clemens, who originated this series, I care about process and not results here. It’s easy to say “that was a great move because it worked” or “that was a bad move because it failed,” but managers obviously can’t know the result of their decision as they’re making it. I’ve tried my best to transport myself back to the moment of each decision — taking into account the pitches, innings, and plate appearances that led up to it — while ignoring the outcomes.

Before we begin, I’ll also reiterate that while these are ostensibly manager report cards, there’s a much larger group of people behind the manager that helps to inform his decisions. Before the game, that includes discussions with the front office, which provides the reams of data that every manager has at his disposal during play; in-game, he’s getting feedback from his coaching staff and players on their levels of health and readiness. It really does take a village to get through a baseball game, and realistically, the praise and scorn doesn’t belong to the manager alone.

Let’s get into it.

Joe Espada

Batting: Incomplete

None of the managers who lost in the Wild Card round made fewer changes than Espada, who pinch-hit just once in two losses to the White Sox. That one substitution worked brilliantly, with righty Nelson Velázquez hitting for lefty Taylor Trammell against southpaw Sean Newcomb and promptly homering to give the Astros their first two runs of Game 1. That was a no-brainer of a decision for a team that needed runs; Velázquez had an 88 wRC+ against lefties this year to Trammell’s horrendous 12.

Espada’s ability to go to his bench was hamstrung in Game 2, as right knee soreness incurred in Game 1 limited Isaac Paredes to DH duty and forced Nick Allen into the starting lineup at third base. Letting Allen hit in the fifth inning down by a run with a runner on first and one out was understandable. Using a bat like Trammell or Joey Loperfido would have forced Raynel Delgado into the game at third, and no matter the leverage of the situation, Espada would have had to pinch-hit for him when his spot came up, with no backup infielders left at that point.

The overall lack of offensive mixing-and-matching from Espada was more of a roster construction problem than a manager issue, as was the club’s batting order. Espada’s lineup created a pocket of righties from spots three through six, with Yordan Alvarez batting second as the only hard-hitting lefty to plan around. Still, he really couldn’t have put his lineup together any better given the cards he was dealt.

Pitching: C+

When grading the Wild Card managers, I’ve tried to be sympathetic to those without much to work with, and that was absolutely the case for Espada and his pitching staff. I wouldn’t wish a Game 1 bullpen game on a manager even if he was my worst enemy, and especially not one with Houston’s pitching staff. And given that the Astros clinched on the last day of the season, they couldn’t have lined the pitching up any differently, either. But while a bullpen game was necessary, starting the game with AJ Blubaugh on the mound wasn’t.

Blubaugh, who led all relievers in innings pitched this year with 96, was an unsung hero for the Astros during the regular season. But his 2026 was marked more by quantity than quality; his 3.66 ERA outpaced his 4.25 xERA and 4.31 FIP, and he limped to the finish line with 10 runs allowed in his last 10 appearances. Fellow righty Miguel Ullola finished his season stronger and could have provided length similar to the best version of Blubaugh (as he showed later in the game). Or, given the White Sox’s penchant for aggressive in-game platooning, going with a lefty like Josh Hendrickson, Bennett Sousa, or Bryan King may well have forced White Sox manager Will Venable into aggressively substituting once a lefty was out of the game. That might have led to Randal Grichuk starting the game with the platoon advantage and then being pinch-hit for as soon as Espada brought in a righty. Once that happened, Espada would have had a clearer lane of lefty bats to manage against, allowing him to use a second lefty pitcher like Hendrickson, Sousa, or King. Venable may well have countered with someone like Tommy Pham, but getting Grichuk’s lefty-mashing bat out of the game after a single plate appearance would’ve been a big win.

Espada managed from behind for the rest of the game, and once Blubaugh exited, all of his decisions were logical but came too late for the offense to recover. King ended up with a logical pocket of four lefties in six batters before turning the ball over to Ullola, who was a godsend, providing length without Espada having to worry about left-right matchups. Once Ullola was done, it was the standard manager playbook of alternating lefties and righties to play matchups, before giving the ball to his highest-leverage arms in Bryan Abreu and Josh Hader in the eighth and ninth. Houston was down by four runs when Abreu entered and by three runs when Hader came in, but in a best-of-three series, chasing a Game 1 win by using your best arms is what I would have done, too.

Game 2 could not have started more disastrously, with the Astros’ best starter, Hunter Brown, unable to make it out of the first inning. While he was let down by his defense and didn’t pitch quite as badly as his line would suggest, I understand Espada’s urgency in pulling the plug and making it a second straight bullpen game. But Blubaugh again being the first reliever out of the ‘pen was puzzling, and my evaluation doesn’t care that it happened to work out. This was another chance for Espada to bring in a southpaw against a lineup with five lefties in its first six spots, and yet Blubaugh was called upon to face Sam Antonacci and the top of the White Sox lineup for the second time in two days. Doubling down by sending Blubaugh back out for the second was equally perplexing, especially with Peter Lambert available for length.

After the second inning, however, I thought Espada redeemed himself with a near-perfect set of moves given his personnel. Lambert was the best arm available for the middle frames, and with very few trusted arms on staff, I’m giving his manager a pass for allowing him to face more than nine hitters. Batters 10 and 11 drawing walks made it Bryan Abreu time in the sixth with nobody out, again the appropriate move given that the Astros were down by one at the time and it was a must-win game. Abreu is no stranger to coming in and cleaning up messes, and while Chase Meidroth took him deep, he carved through eight outs thereafter before turning the ball over to Hader for four outs.

After Meidroth homered, the Astros trailed by four for the remainder of the game, and knowing that the Astros would need Hader for a third straight game if they miraculously pulled off a Game 2 comeback, I think Espada struck the right balance between getting Hader into the game and being cognizant that he’d need his closer the next day. With the benefit of hindsight, that exposes the danger of chasing a comeback by using Hader in Game 1 — and I certainly wouldn’t have liked using him in that game if the Astros were down four or five — but as I’ve mentioned repeatedly during these report cards, the manager can’t know the future. The best chance of pulling out win in a Game 1 that was still within striking distance comes by using Hader in the ninth, and the same is true for a Game 2 comeback.

Chad Tracy

Batting: Incomplete

Tracy entered the Wild Card Series with his healthiest and most complete offense of the season, and he lined things up about as well as you can against a tough customer like Cam Schlittler in Game 1. The Yankees used two righties in relief of Schlittler, and the only move Tracy made was to pinch-hit Andruw Monasterio for the injured Roman Anthony in the sixth, with Schlittler still in the game.

Anthony was removed from the roster prior to Game 2 due to his hand injury, and the combination of that and a tough opposing lefty in Max Fried led to a very different lineup for Boston, though one that I also didn’t have any problems with. Tracy’s one pinch-hit move of the night was playing the platoon game by swapping Nate Eaton out for Jarren Duran against Will Warren in the eighth. There weren’t many moves, hence the incomplete, but the ones he made were good.

Pitching: C

Out of the eight grades I’ve given to the managers eliminated in the Wild Card round, this was the toughest one to sort out. In a nutshell, I loved what Tracy did with his starting pitchers and strongly disliked which relievers he chose to deploy when.

Payton Tolle faced 19 batters in his Game 1 start, and was presumably allowed to face Paul Goldschmidt for a third time because Tracy would’ve rather had that matchup than likely pinch-hitter Luis García Jr. against a righty pitcher. That allowed Tracy to deploy lefty Erik Miller against Ben Rice… which immediately backfired, as Rice homered. Still, I have no problem with that choice. Rice was worse against lefties this year, and while Miller struggled in September, I understand going with the big stuff against Rice’s big swing. The bullpen arms used after Miller, though, represented baffling choice after baffling choice.

Still down just two runs, Tracy used lower-leverage arms Greg Weissert and Alec Gamboa, with Gamboa, Wyatt Olds and Brayan Bello allowing the Yankees to blow the game wide open on their way to a 9-0 drubbing. In a postgame exchange with the Boston Globe’s Tim Healey, Tracy defended using the pitchers he did — thereby lowering his win probability for that game compared to using better arms like Garrett Whitlock or Aroldis Chapman — as being a consequence of an offense that was, in his estimation, unlikely to come back no matter who pitched.

While I understand taking the long view of potentially needing to play three games in three days, if you aren’t going to chase a win down two runs with Schlittler soon to come out of the game, when are you going to chase a win? A manager can only manage the game in front of him, and for all Tracy knew, the Red Sox could end up winning Game 2 without needing Whitlock or Chapman anyway.

Game 2 ended up having a similar inflection point, with starter Sonny Gray pulled after just 70 pitches and 19 batters. That led to quite the anti-analytics firestorm on social media, but here in my corner of the internet, removing Gray was a clear-cut decision. I don’t care about Gray’s third-time-through-the-order performance being really good this season; he was bad in that scenario last year, and the third-time-through penalty is always going to exist to at least some extent. Gray had also allowed four of the last eight batters to reach and was clearly losing effectiveness. But giving Cody Bellinger another look at Miller a day after the lefty’s own ineffectiveness wasn’t ideal; unless Garrett Crochet was completely uncomfortable coming in with runners on base, I’d have preferred him in that scenario.

Instead, Crochet came in to start the following inning and the game went sideways from there. Spencer Jones reached on a strikeout-wild pitch and the inning spiraled thereafter, and while it wasn’t all Crochet’s fault, his performance all but assured a loss. Tracy then proved my earlier point about not knowing what the next day’s game will hold by using Whitlock down two runs with the bases loaded in the sixth and Chapman down seven runs in the eighth. Using Whitlock there was a coherent attempt to keep the game close, while Chapman was a “well, we need a miracle” pitching change. Had the Red Sox used Chapman and Whitlock to chase a win in Game 1 and ultimately won, Chapman never would’ve pitched down seven runs in Game 2, since Game 3 would be on the horizon. In sum: Yes, it matters when there’s a game tomorrow, but tomorrow’s game can go any which way. If you’re only down a couple runs and have a rested leverage arm, use him.


Postseason Manager Report Cards: Craig Counsell and Don Mattingly

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Ben Clemens’ managerial report cards have become a postseason staple here at FanGraphs. We’re continuing the tradition this year, while expanding the pool of writers who’ll contribute, and I’ll be stepping in with grades for the abbreviated Wild Card Series. Since I’m only going over two or three games per manager, these will be briefer than the report cards for the managers who are eliminated from the playoffs in later rounds. We’ll start with the two eliminated National League managers today, and then get into Joe Espada’s and Chad Tracy’s decisions in a couple of days.

Like Ben, I care about process and not results here. It’s easy to say “that was a great move because it worked” or “that was a bad move because it failed,” but managers obviously can’t know the result of their decision as they’re making it. I’ve tried my best to transport myself back to the moment of each decision — taking into account the pitches, innings, and plate appearances that led up to it — while ignoring the outcomes.

Before we get into it, I’ll caution that while these are ostensibly manager report cards, there’s a much larger group of people behind the manager that helps to inform his decisions. Before the game, that includes discussions with the front office, which provides the reams of data that every manager has at his disposal during play; in-game, he’s getting feedback from his coaching staff and players on their levels of health and readiness. It really does take a village to get through a baseball game, and realistically, the praise and scorn doesn’t belong to the manager alone.

And now, away we go.

Craig Counsell

Batting: Incomplete

I was going to give Craig Counsell an A here because the moves he did make were perfectly fine, but that’s giving him far too much credit for three pinch-hitting decisions. The Cubs didn’t hit well this series, through no fault of Counsell’s own, and they have a pretty plug-and-play lineup that became even more rigid after Alex Bregman’s facial fractures limited him to DHing during the team’s anemic offensive showing.

The lineup mirrored the one that had made the Cubs successful basically all season, and the three pinch-hit opportunities Counsell did pull the trigger on were obvious platoon-advantage layups. In Game 1, he hit Michael Conforto (113 wRC+ against righties this season) for catcher Carson Kelly (84) down by eight runs; at that point, leaving Kelly in wouldn’t really have mattered anyway. In Game 2, Tyrone Taylor and his 153 wRC+ against southpaws hit for Michael Busch (who had a still-solid 117 wRC+ against lefties this year) against extremely tough lefty Adrian Morejon; Conforto was used again to hit for Matt Shaw against ninth-inning demigod Mason Miller. Shaw had just 90 plate appearances against righties this year and was 21% below league average by wRC+.

Pitching: C

Normally, I really enjoy watching Counsell manage a pitching staff in the postseason. He’s aggressive. Roles and innings go out the window, and the idea that a starter has to go at least a time or two through the order is nowhere to be found. But I really didn’t see that level of urgency in this series. In Game 1, Matthew Boyd was shaky from literally the first pitch, a changeup that Fernando Tatis Jr. deposited over the center field wall. It didn’t get any better after that; he gave up another homer on another changeup to Manny Machado two batters later. I wouldn’t have necessarily gotten the bullpen up at that point, but I certainly would not have given Boyd the rope to go through the order almost a full second time before pulling him after 17 batters.

Game 2 was a similar story, with Kevin Gausman laboring through the second inning after a strong first. He clearly lacked the higher-end velocity that I thought might show up with the adrenaline of the playoffs but (unfortunately for the Cubs) never did. That created a tighter velocity band between his fastball and splitter, and his whiff rate was a rather mediocre 23%. And yet, he too was permitted to face the top of the order for a second time.

Perhaps Counsell’s reticence to call for a reliever was due to the bullpen’s personnel. The Cubs pitching staff was injury-ravaged the entire season and came into the playoffs without a closer; trade deadline acquisition Ryan Zeferjahn didn’t stabilize the bullpen as hoped, taking a step back after his acquisition from the Angels. But the Cubs had length options in spades, namely David Peterson, Aaron Civale, Shota Imanaga, and Clay Holmes. Imanaga or Holmes may well have been earmarked to start a potential Game 3, but the other options were underutilized. Pairing the righty Civale with the lefty Boyd, or the lefty Peterson with the righty Gausman, and more aggressively managing the starters would have created more inflection points for opposing manager Craig Stammen to have to sort through as he thought about deploying his bench.

Instead, the shaky starters were pushed too far, leading to Game 1 being all but decided by the time Javier Assad was first out of the bullpen, while Daniel Palencia was forced into a dirty inning in Game 2.

Don Mattingly

Batting: B+

The Phillies lineup limped down the stretch, almost blowing the team’s playoff spot in the process. To add injury to insult, Luis Arraez’s badly sprained ankle kept him off the Wild Card roster entirely. That left Don Mattingly with a restricted bench and a handcuffed set of in-game options, not to mention a somewhat makeshift starting lineup. Shielding Brandon Marsh and Justin Crawford from lefties almost entirely in favor of Derek Hill and Bryan De La Cruz made sense, and considering the tools he had at his disposal, I have no qualms with how Mattingly handled his in-game platooning.

Ultimately, I bumped Mattingly down just a hair here for sticking with Trea Turner in the leadoff spot, as he did for the last few games of the regular season while the Phillies were spiraling. I know that a single lineup spot in a handful of games doesn’t actually matter that much, but having a struggling batter guaranteed to get as many or more plate appearances as anyone else on the team still doesn’t sit quite right with me. Additionally, having Kyle Schwarber and Bryce Harper hit back-to-back (with Bryson Stott just two spots later) created an obvious pocket for Walt Weiss to deploy southpaw Dylan Lee, and even Chris Sale, out of the bullpen. For as bad as Turner’s struggles had been, having a righty amidst the two big lefties may have given Weiss just a little bit more pause when making pitching changes.

Pitching: D+

Like Counsell, Mattingly didn’t have a whole lot to work with here. Jesús Luzardo, Cristopher Sánchez, and Zack Wheeler are awesome. Beyond that, well… it seemed like Jhoan Duran was the only reliever Mattingly thought he could truly trust, and he used him like it in Game 1.

Duran came in to start the seventh inning with the Phillies ahead by a run and Atlanta’s 9-1-2 hitters due up. If things went perfectly, Drake Baldwin and Ronald Acuña Jr.’s last plate appearances — in a Phillies win — would come against Duran in that inning, with Matt Olson looming. With that in mind, I fully endorse using Duran in that spot — and sending him back out for the eighth — with the information Mattingly had at the time. Your best reliever has to face the meat of the lineup and not whoever is due to hit with three outs left in the game. Starting Duran with the nine spot and a clean inning rather than going batter-to-batter with Alex McFarlane or another reliever was perfectly sensical considering Duran’s regular season usage, which almost invariably started with nobody on base.

We have no way of knowing if Duran would have gone three innings and taken it to the house had Austin Riley not taken him deep in the eighth, but there weren’t obvious warning signs showing that he shouldn’t have been allowed to face Riley. Riley was coming off a horrible regular season, and his three-run homer was set up by a well-placed but poorly-hit groundball by Michael Harris II and a yanked knuckle-curve Ozzie Albies hit-by-pitch, this after having secured two outs on three pitches. One poorly-placed fastball doesn’t make leaving Duran in a bad decision; it’s not as if he had thrown 40 pitches and was clearly tiring.

The crushing Game 1 loss left the Phillies with their backs against the wall and Duran unavailable after 27 pitches and nine batters, and considering Donnie Baseball’s hands were tied even more, I thought he mostly did a passable job with his choices in Game 2. If I had been in Mattingly’s shoes, I would have pulled Sánchez immediately after a Baldwin RBI double gave the Braves the lead in the seventh rather than intentionally walking Albies to set up a platoon-advantaged matchup of a gassed Sánchez facing Matt Olson. As the manager there, I’d much prefer a fresher McFarlane against the worse bat of Albies than Sánchez against Olson for a fourth time; that non-move was overly deferential to left-on-left and living and dying with your ace rather than recognizing how little Sánchez had left.

Mattingly and pitching coach Caleb Cotham redeemed themselves to some extent by recognizing that with Duran unavailable, Andrew Painter was the best option out of the bullpen for the eighth and beyond. Sending Painter back out there for the 10th and ultimately letting him face Riley and Harris a second time later in the inning was not without risk, but Painter’s velocity and stuff held, and again, who else did the Phillies really have at that point?

If the series had ended after two games, I’d give Mattingly a solid B or B+ for his moves. But Game 3 was so baffling in its entirety that I tanked his grade a full two letters. The decision to start Aaron Nola over Wheeler frankly defied logic in its reasoning. Nola purportedly got the nod because he was the more rested of the two, with the NBC broadcast also noting that the Phillies thought Wheeler profiled better in relief. But the sequencing of pitcher usage should prioritize the best pitcher, not the guy who’s the most-rested or has the best relief profile. Plus, Wheeler ultimately proved he could be stretched to four innings and 68 pitches — he didn’t exactly turn in a traditional relief outing. (I know, I said I would operate based on the information known to the managers at the time and not what ended up happening, but Wheeler’s eventual workload shows that he had a good amount in the tank, which the Phillies would have been aware of before the game.)

Regardless of how much he had to give, Wheeler having anything at all meant he should have started the game; it guaranteed that his outing would start with the Phillies tied or ahead, not when the club was already playing catch-up. To be clear, Nola was almost surely going to have to pitch at some point in the game — the Phillies put themselves in this mess by taking so long to clinch that Wheeler had to pitch the last game of the season, and he was on short rest in Game 3 — but using him as the opening salvo was the wrong move.

Mattingly was sufficiently aggressive in pulling Nola for Tim Mayza after nine batters faced, though while I’m picking nits, I’ll say I would have brought Mayza (or José Alvarado) in for Dominic Smith in the nine spot rather than have Nola face him. Weiss had been aggressive with pinch-hitting with his down-lineup hitters to that point in the series, and it would’ve been worth finding out if he’d go to his bench early and take one of his weapons for later in the game off the board. Even if Weiss had countered, I’d rather have had a lefty reliever against a righty than Nola against a lefty, as shaky as he had looked to that point.

From there, I can’t quibble with much. Wheeler gave what he could and Duran’s availability was evidently limited to a single inning, with Jonathan Bowlan filling the space between the two arms. Bowlan was a fine choice down by three runs, with McFarlane having pitched the prior two games and presumably available but potentially considerably less sharp. Luzardo was reportedly available for an inning or two despite starting Game 1 and throwing 77 pitches coming back from shoulder inflammation, but I’m okay with not using him as a Hail Mary at that point in the game. Perhaps Wheeler or Duran could’ve instead been stretched to cover the gap that Bowlan filled, but at that point the Phillies were chasing runs, and I’ll give the benefit of the doubt to Mattingly and Cotham for knowing their pitchers’ limits better than I do. The decision to start Nola ultimately had the team playing from behind and using its best arms while trailing, not exactly an unforeseeable outcome.


San Francisco’s 40-Man Cleanup Will Be a Giant Pain

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As I was scrolling The Website Formerly Known As Twitter on Sunday, perusing for articles to read and news to get caught up on, I stopped dead in my tracks at this post from Giants reporter Alex Pavlovic:

If you’re a normal baseball fan, that’s not the most interesting piece of news Pavlovic reported around that same time; that would, of course, be the bombshell that Rafael Devers was undergoing core muscle surgery, ending his season and making him that 16th player on the 60-day. The lefty slugger finished his season scorching hot before it came to its abrupt end. He ultimately finished with 3.4 WAR and 37 home runs, just one off his career high set back in 2021. Had he remained healthy and clubbed three more, he would’ve become the first Giants player since Barry Bonds in 2004 to reach the 40-homer threshold.

But from my purview as a roster freak, my wheels immediately started turning and thinking about how the Giants were going to clean up their 40-man roster at the start of the offseason. Our RosterResource data goes back to 2021, and for only one other stretch has a team had 16 players on the 60-day IL: The 2021 Rangers from August 27-30. But that late-August timing afforded the Rangers some in-season wiggle room to work through the 40-man shuffle, a luxury the Giants won’t have. Nobody on San Francisco’s 60-day is expected back this season, the 60-day IL can’t be used again until the onset of spring training, and the Giants have just one pending free agent in JT Brubaker. Needless to say, Buster Posey, Zack Minasian, and the rest of the team’s decision makers have their work ahead of them, with 55 names to sort through all at once and no intermediate moves in the offing.

I began where I tend to start my rabbit hole of research: tabbing back and forth from RosterResource and a spreadsheet of categorizing players into various buckets. I settled on 24 players for the initial 40-man who should be in no danger of getting cut. This includes all the usual suspects and big contracts, plus some nice mini-breakouts representing silver linings of a lost season.

I’ll Eat 16 Pounds of Garlic Fries if They’re Not on the 40-Man
Name Position Current Status
Drew Gilbert OF MLB roster
Jung Hoo Lee OF MLB roster
Bryce Eldridge DH/1B MLB roster
Jonah Cox OF/2B MLB roster
Turner Hill OF MLB roster
Logan Webb SP MLB roster
Landen Roupp SP MLB roster
Blade Tidwell SP MLB roster
Trent Harris RP MLB roster
Dylan Smith RP MLB roster
Matt Wilkinson SP/RP MLB roster
Yunior Marte SP/RP MLB roster
Marcelo Mayer INF 10-day IL
Willy Adames SS 10-day IL
Rafael Devers 1B/DH 60-day IL
Matt Chapman 3B 60-day IL
Casey Schmitt INF/OF 60-day IL
Hayden Birdsong SP 60-day IL
Adrian Houser SP/RP 60-day IL
Trevor McDonald SP 60-day IL
Carson Whisenhunt SP 60-day IL
Randy Rodríguez RP 60-day IL
Keaton Winn RP 60-day IL
Miguel Mendez SP Double-A

A special shoutout is in order for Trent Harris, who may singlehandedly be keeping the rainbow curveball alive. The bullpen hasn’t had a set closer all season (Caleb Kilian, currently on the Phillies’ IL, leads San Francisco with eight saves), but Harris and 2025 All-Star Rodríguez (on the IL all year after undergoing Tommy John surgery) could make for an interesting one-two punch next year. Hey, there has to be something positive about the future of the club.

That leaves 31 players for 16 spots, which for many teams would be a gargantuan task. Imagine if the Rays or Dodgers had to sort through that many names with how deep their rosters always are. But not for the Giants, because there is, shall we say… a lot of slop here.

On the 40-Man Bubble
Name Position Current Status Contract Status
Harrison Bader OF 60-day IL 1 yr, $10M remaining
Rowan Wick RP 60-day IL $800k club option for 2027
Sam Hentges RP 15-Day IL Arbitration (FA after 2027)
Andrew Knizner C MLB roster Arbitration (FA after 2027)
Jason Foley RP MLB roster Arbitration (FA after 2028)
Ryan Walker RP Triple-A Arbitration (FA after 2029)
José Buttó RP 60-day IL Arbitration (FA after 2030)
Scott Bandura OF MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Shay Whitcomb INF/OF MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Drew Cavanaugh C MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Christian Koss INF MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Osleivis Basabe INF MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Nate Furman INF MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Brett Harris INF MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Grant McCray OF MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Anthony Molina SP/RP MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Cesar Perdomo SP/RP MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Joel Kuhnel RP MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Reiver Sanmartin RP MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Carson Seymour SP/RP MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Philip Abner RP MLB roster Pre-Arbitration
Victor Bericoto OF 10-day IL Pre-Arbitration
Jesus Rodriguez UTIL 60-day IL Pre-Arbitration
Daniel Susac C 60-day IL Pre-Arbitration
Matt Gage RP 60-day IL Pre-Arbitration
Joel Peguero RP 60-day IL Pre-Arbitration
Zach Morgan C Triple-A Pre-Arbitration
Duncan Davitt SP/RP Triple-A Pre-Arbitration
Seth Lonsway SP/RP Triple-A Pre-Arbitration
Braxton Roxby RP Triple-A Pre-Arbitration
Tristan Beck RP Triple-A Pre-Arbitration

The most puzzling situation here is Bader, whom the Giants signed to a two-year, $20.5 million contract this past offseason. While it’s smaller scale than the contracts of Adames and Chapman, which have been a mixed bag so far, the Bader deal is probably the single biggest disaster of Posey’s tenure. He’s gotten into just 30 games this year, been placed on the IL twice, and the Giants are currently suspending payment to the 32-year-old following a scooter accident, which he suffered while already on the injured list, that ruled out a 2026 return. When able to play, he’s been 51% worse than league average by wRC+ and merely scratch in center field by FRV. Whether the Giants have to pay Bader or not, it’s hard to envision a significant role for him on the roster in 2027, the final year of his contract, especially with the emergences of Schmitt, Gilbert, Cox, and Hill.

Where the Giants go with the rest is anyone’s guess, though some of these players’ jobs are certainly safer than others. For example, they traded Patrick Bailey in part to accommodate Susac, meaning his spot is likely secured. However, I’ll be the first to admit there are plenty of easy cuts here, even if there isn’t consensus on who those easy cuts are. When I teased I was writing this article, a few Giants fans came into my mentions with their ostensible obvious cuts, but their cut lists didn’t even match each other’s, and the Giants’ own list is impossible to nail perfectly without being inside the room with them. (Buster, if you’re reading this, call me.)

The above lists, which feature a combined 55 names, don’t even account for the players who need to be added to the 40-man roster to protect them from the Rule 5 draft. At a minimum, the Giants will add Henry Lalane and Bo Davidson, but the club has other Rule-5 eligible 40-man candidates, including Marty Gair, Luis De La Torre, Joe Whitman, Reggie Crawford, and Sabin Ceballos. The deadline to protect players is a bit later, though (it was November 18 this past offseason), affording the front office more time to shuffle the furniture and make further cuts.

Most of these roster cuts won’t garner major headlines when they happen, but they are decisions that teams don’t make lightly because they could end up biting them later on. This initial roster culling won’t determine the overall trajectory of the 2027 Giants, whether they are a good or bad team, but these moves could make the difference of a few wins — which could be crucial if they are to have any hope of claiming a wild card berth next season.


Waiving Goodbye: Explaining the August 31 Not-Trade Deadline

Lon Horwedel-Imagn Images

Just so you know, the trade deadline was August 3. Tarik Skubal is on the Dodgers. Adley Rutschman is on the Red Sox. José Soriano is on the Blue Jays. Did you hear about this? Anyway, that was the last major opportunity for teams to revamp their 26-man rosters for a playoff push, but it was not the final chance to add players who can appear in October games. Enter the August 31 playoff eligibility deadline, which Ken Rosenthal just brought into the news with his report that the Reds put Eugenio Suárez and TJ Friedl on waivers. (Both have since cleared, will remain with the Reds, and can’t be placed on waivers again.)

The waiver trade deadline — the mechanism by which Justin Verlander joined the Astros from the Tigers in 2017 — is long gone, and in its absence over the last several years, the process has been streamlined. The waiver process for all players works the same as it does for a player who is designated for assignment, with two exceptions. The first is that, while on waivers, a non-DFA’d player can continue to play; both he and the public might not even know he’s on waivers. Only reporting like Rosenthal’s is guaranteed to give us knowledge without a claim.

The second wrinkle is that if a waived player goes unclaimed, he simply stays on the active roster, unlike players who are DFA’d. He also stays on the active roster during the waiver process, as Suárez and Friedl did. Everything else is identical: waiver priority order is worst-to-first by record at the time of the waiver placement, and waiver claims are irrevocable. No compensation may change hands besides the $50,000 waiver fee that every claiming team pays on every waiver claim throughout the season, and the entire remainder of the player’s contract is the responsibility of his new team. Players may be waived after August 31, but any player who joins a new organization in September is not eligible for postseason play, making Monday a meaningful deadline. Read the rest of this entry »


Updated Splits Leaderboards and Splits Tools Are Here!

If you’ve visited our splits leaderboards or the player page splits or splits tool in the last few days, you’ve probably noticed a change. And you’d be right to have noticed! Our development team just deployed our upgraded splits, and I’ve been tasked with running through the changes. Here’s a top-level summary before I dive deeper:

Splits Page on the Player Pages

  • We’ve added nine new stat groups to the splits page, including Statcast, Bat Tracking, plate discipline, and pitch-level metrics.
  • We’ve changed the UI to include a stat group selector at the top of the splits page to accommodate the addition of more stats. If you want to see stats that appear in Advanced, Batted Ball, or our new stat groups, you’ll simply click on those options instead of scrolling down.

Splits Leaderboards and Player Page Splits Tool

  • We’ve added the same new stat groups we added to the player page splits, including Statcast, Bat Tracking, plate discipline, and pitch-level metrics.
  • We’ve refreshed the UI using our modern interface, making it responsive to user interaction.
  • We’ve integrated the page with our updated Custom Teams feature. Please note, this integration is only available on the splits leaderboards.

Read the rest of this entry »