You play 81 games at home a year, so it seems like it might be a good idea to think about that park when you’re building your team. Then again, you play 81 games on the road, maybe it’s not a good idea to worry too much about one half of the ledger, particularly if your home park is an extreme one.

Extreme parks lead to extreme home-road splits. That part seems obvious, but it bears out in the winning percentage, too. Take a look at how teams that have called extreme parks home have faired over the last five years compared to the middle.

Read the rest of this entry »

Throughout the early stages of the calendar year, I’ve been taking a pre-spring training look at each of the six MLB divisions from a slightly different perspective. Utilizing batted ball data, we’re going back over the 2014 season, attempting to calculate each club’s true talent level. Making adjustments for teams’ offensive and defensive K and BB rates and team defense, each team’s true talent 2014 won-lost record is calculated. Then, we’ll take a look at the current Steamer projections for 2015, evaluate key player comings and goings, and determine whether clubs are constructed to be able to handle the inevitable pitfalls along the way that could render such projections irrelevant. Today’s last installment of this series features the AL Central.

Read the rest of this entry »

The fantasy baseball industry is more popular every day, but it sometimes seems rooted in yesterday. The statistics have moved on since it was invented in the seventies, at least. Is today’s fantasy baseball too far removed from real baseball? Is it just fake?

Fantasy’s traditional scoring system does seem arcane. That old 5×5 fantasy rotisserie game uses runs, RBI, batting average, home runs, and stolen bases as the key batting statistics, and many of those stats have fallen by the wayside as we attempt to better evaluate players. Runs and RBI, in particular, are not consulted at all when it comes to the modern stats of the day. They are just too context-dependent, since your teammates are heavily involved in both.

On the pitching side, the story is the same. Wins are one of the five categories, and a prominent numbers-savvy analyst has declared war on that statistic. Strikeouts, like home runs, are remarkably clean in that they require two participants and no judging from a scorer. But WHIP (Walks plus Hits over Innings Pitched) is full of noise — each hit is not only declared as such by a scorer, but it’s made into a hit through some nebulous combination of pitching and fielding as well.

But if that makes you want to pet fantasy baseball on the head, you might be surprised by how well those ten “old” statistics track with the more modern versions we have today.

Over at FanGraphs, we’re debuting a fantasy auction calculator and ranking tool today. The basic mechanism that powers the calculator is an attempt to look at the spread of certain statistics over a common baseline, look at a player’s production in each stat compared to that spread, and then adjust for position. If that sounds familiar, it’s because it generally follows the roadmap for Wins Above Replacement, one of today’s more sophisticated and complicated advanced summary stats.

If you compare the results of that auction calculator using 5×5 roto stats — batting average, home runs, RBI, runs, stolen bases, wins, ERA, WHIP, strikeouts, and saves — to the current WAR projections for next year, the two valuations are actually fairly close. In laymen’s terms, the ‘old’ 5×5 stats predict over three-quarters of the variance in WAR projections. That’s a strong relationship.

Here are the relevant correlations for a few different sets of scoring systems. (All p-values less than .0001, r value shown.)

Read the rest at Just a Bit Outside.

Following the departures of free agents Melky Cabrera and Colby Rasmus, the Toronto Blue Jays were down two-thirds of last year’s opening day outfield. They filled one of these holes when they traded for Michael Saunders, but have opted to go the internal route in filling the other, turning to the inexperienced duo of Dalton Pompey and Kevin Pillar to handle center field duties.

Pompey easily has the brighter future of the two. Kiley McDaniel ranked the 22-year-old 80^th in our top 200 list, giving him a Future Value of 50, which equates to an average everyday player. Pillar, on the other hand, hasn’t done much of anything in parts of two seasons with the Blue Jays, and at 26, he’s unlikely to get much better than he currently is. Non-roster veterans Chris Dickerson, Ezequiel Carrera and Caleb Gindl are also theoretically in the center field mix, but are likely in camp to provide depth more than anything. Given his competition, the starting center field job is Pompey’s to lose this spring.

Read the rest of this entry »

Last Friday, I took a look at the exceptional nature of Carlos Carrasco‘s split-change. I had trouble finding any kind of decent comparison for it, and when I did a little further analysis in the comments, the best I could come up with was Masahiro Tanaka’s splitter, and Tanaka’s splitter is supposed to be one of the best in the world. So, that was neat, and fun, and people are all about Carrasco hype because of the statistics he just posted down the stretch last summer. This post is about Odrisamer Despaigne. Despaigne isn’t nearly as statistically appealing as Carrasco is, and he’s not even assured a starting spot in the majors this coming season. But, just as Carrasco has an unusual split-change, Despaigne has an unusual changeup. A very, very, very unusual changeup.

Maybe that’s not a total surprise — last July, Eno talked about his weird grip. And Eno, see, knows a lot about grips. Here’s an image:

Read the rest of this entry »

If you watch the Athletics, you may have noticed something about their pitching staffs over the last few years. They’re… shorter than average. Sonny Gray, Scott Kazmir, and Jarrod Parker are all six foot one or shorter, and none of the A’s pitchers are taller than six foot six.

Look across the country at the Phillies, and the difference becomes more stark.

@enosarris Phillies have 4 guys 6'6" or taller to the Athletics 0, it would be interesting to see if it is an org philosophy or just random

— Matt Winkelman (@Matt_Winkelman) February 20, 2015

Turns out, these two staffs define the range between the tallest and shortest pitchers in the majors.

Read the rest of this entry »

When the New York Yankees make a signing, it is big news in baseball. When the Yankees fail to make to a big signing, it is even bigger news. The Yankees targeted Yoan Moncada. They worked him out multiple times. They offered the potential star $25 million, willing to commit $50 million with penalties, showing they believed in his talent. Yet they let the rival Boston Red Sox outbid them by $13 million.

The Yankees are rich and they spend like it. In 2015, their payroll will grow past $200 million for the sixth time in seven years. One offseason ago, the Yankees made $483 million in salary commitments to free agents. Just last summer, the Yankees blew past the international spending limits to sign the biggest international free agent class in Major League Baseball. The high level of spending is confusing when the difference in offers to Moncada is less than the amount they committed to pay a 39-year old Carlos Beltran in 2016 and the total cost is roughly one-third of the commitment they made to obtain Masahiro Tanaka.

As Miles Wray pointed out earlier this month, with the exception of last offseason, the Yankees have used considerable restraint in free agency since winning their last World Series in 2009. The first few sensible years made sense. They went on a spree after 2008, signing Mark Teixeira, CC Sabathia, and A.J. Burnett to big contracts that helped them to the World Series. They continued winning, putting up 95 wins in 2010 and followed that season up with 97 wins and 95 wins the next two years. Even before the 95-win 2012 season, Yankees ownership put a plan in place to save the team millions of dollars.
Read the rest of this entry »

This is it. This is the year Adrian Beltre finally declines.

Yep, you heard it here first, folks. Adrian Beltre is donezo. I mean, come on — dude’s about to be 36 years old. He’s logged 10,001 plate appearances since he entered the league in 1998, a number topped by only Derek Jeter. His defense has declined significantly the past two seasons, no matter what metric you use. He only hit 19 dingers last year after averaging 32 over the previous four seasons. Clearly, all that wear and tear has taken its toll on Beltre. The jig is up! The fat lady has sung.
Read the rest of this entry »

On Friday, I talked about the current iteration of the Royals, and their propensity toward making contact on a lot of pitches outside the strike zone. In one of the graphs I created, I presented the relationship between O-Contact% and ISO. After some spirited comments on the article about the lack of correlation (given the small sample size and lack of R2), I got to thinking: What is the actual relationship between the percentage of times a batter makes contact on pitches outside of the strike zone (O-Contact%) and offensive production, especially power?

We know certain facts related to the topic of the impact of plate discipline statistics — like players that swing at more pitches out of the strike zone tend to have lower walk rates — but today we’re interested in just O-Contact% and the headline maker, power. This is in large part due to my sometimes unhealthy fascination with the Royals of the past few years, who have been known for winning (at least last year) while not exactly crushing the ball. They only hit 20 home runs through the first 43 games of 2014 and were dead last in ISO (.113) at the end of the season. They also came within a game of winning the World Series, because baseball.

While the Royals might make a great case study, we shouldn’t be too quick to jump to conclusions given their unusual plate discipline statistics and lack of power: we should let the much larger sample size I’m about to go over tell the story. We’re going to focus on two statistics today in relationship to plate discipline: one is ISO, so we can look at raw power, and the other is wOBA, so we can have a look at a more general, catch-all measure of offensive value. Then we’re going to look at a player who truly stands out in the data.

Read the rest of this entry »

Part 1 is over. Part 1 was figuring out which team was going to sign Yoan Moncada, and now we know, with the Red Sox having given up more than $60 million for the right to try to make him into something. Most conspicuously, the Sox beat out the Yankees; less conspicuously, the Sox beat out everyone else. Moncada joins an organization with a silly amount of talent and resources, and he is now presumably Boston’s No. 1 prospect. Not a whole lot of prospects better than Blake Swihart, either. So that’s meaningful.

Now we move on to Part 2. What’s Part 2? Figuring out what Yoan Moncada is going to be. You can kind of deduce what teams expect him to be — based on the price, and based on all the attention, Moncada figures to be some kind of big-leaguer, with a high ceiling. But what have we seen from prospects like this before? Moncada’s going into his age-20 season. We can put some numbers to this, trying in a way to project the unfamiliar. Let’s scan some historical top-prospect lists.

Read the rest of this entry »