I was asked the other day why there hadn’t even so much as been any noise on the Yankees trying to find a new shortstop. It was a known wide-open hole, and it didn’t seem like any negotiations had developed. But, sometimes, things come together quickly. Other times, things come together slowly, and we just don’t hear about them in the lead-up. The Yankees now have their new shortstop, and it’s a player who’s been rumored to be available for a while. Yet what we don’t have is a two-team straight-up player swap.

The Yankees are getting Didi Gregorius, who’s long been a candidate to fill the vacancy, what with Arizona also having Chris Owings. But this is a three-team trade, with the Tigers involved, and they’re getting Shane Greene from New York. Finally, the Diamondbacks are getting Robbie Ray and one Domingo Leyba, both from Detroit. It’s a trade full of second-tier intrigue, and I think the best way to do this is to discuss the move by breaking it up into team-specific sections. It seems to me like the Yankees did well, and the Tigers did well, too. The Diamondbacks are taking the biggest risk.

Read the rest of this entry »

A few weeks ago, Eno tried to make sense of Oakland’s Billy Butler signing by wondering about the holistic impact that Butler will have in the A’s lineup. Eno mentions the designated hitter penalty before examining how Butler could very well help the A’s by adding variation to their ratios of ground balls and fly balls. Batted-ball types could very well be the A’s primary motivation in signing Butler.

But I want to stop at just the designated hitter penalty: what if the A’s signed Butler primarily because Billy Beane both believed in the existence of this penalty, and also very much wanted his team to avoid it?

I’m personally inclined to believe in the existence of the penalty because it feels, to me, like a really elegant combination of intelligence gleaned from both statistics and on-the-field gameplay. On one hand it makes intuitive sense that playing as a designated hitter would be a sweet gig: your full day’s work is just four or five plate appearances! Sweet! So much less risk of injury! So much more ability to maintain endurance over the brutally long season!

There does exist a common-sense argument, though, in the favor of the DH penalty. Baseball is a game of rhythms, we know — even the additional off days in the playoffs, which would theoretically help a team rest, can jolt a team’s daily rhythms of play. It’s not hard to imagine being pencilled in as DH being disruptive just like those unwanted October off-days. These players have been constantly playing games their whole lives, and have only ever known the rhythm of going on the field, off the field, on the field, off the field, inning by inning. If you played left field on Tuesday, it could be pretty weird to suddenly have hours of in-game free time on Wednesday. What do you do with that time? How to you stay fresh and ready? Is it simply too much time to get bogged down with thinking?

For the last few years, the A’s have gone with a DH by committee, so Bob Melvin has had the daily task of pulling a new player off the field. This season, the A’s leader in plate appearances as a DH was Alberto Callaspo, with only 151. Just about everybody in their lineup spent at least a combined week at DH, and there were plenty of other A’s DH’s I won’t get to because of small sample sizes. (Yoenis Cespedes had 69 PA’s as a DH before his trade to Boston; Stephen Vogt had 23; Jonny Gomes had 17; Kyle Blanks had 8; Nate Freiman had 3, and shoot there are probably some others too.)

We know that the A’s constantly switched DH’s because they constantly switched the rest of their lineup in an attempt to play platoon advantages. Only, looking back at the 2014 A’s, it’s easy to see how this lack of lineup continuity backfired. Oakland DH’s who had preseason projections at DH (compiled by Matt Klaassen here) seriously underperformed those projections in their DH-PA’s. And also: they seriously underperformed compared to their own performances on the days when they played defense.

Callaspo had a down year in just about every way you could imagine, and you can see how his offense took an even lower dip when he was called on as a DH (statistics via Baseball Reference’s Splits pages):

John Jaso was second on the team in DH-PA’s, presumably to save him from the injury-inducing dangers of playing catcher. The transition to DH really threw Jaso for a loop, as he dropped at least 100 points in every category the days he was off the field:

Transitioning to DH also rocked Coco Crisp, who struggled as a below-replacement hitter during his turns in the dugout:

Even the team’s All-Stars, Derek Norris and Josh Donaldson, looked profoundly mortal during the rare days when they hit as DH:

Just about the only player who didn’t struggle during his handful of DH-PA’s was Brandon Moss:

Moss as DH is hardly the answer, though. Between his defensive versatility between first base and the outfield, plus his offensive versatility at hitting pitchers of both hands, Moss is one of the most important cogs in Oakland’s platoon-dominating machine. Slotting Moss in at DH makes it extremely difficult to have advantageous handedness match-ups at both first base and corner outfield.

Whether epiphany struck Billy Beane mid-season, or whether the opportunity only presented itself at the end of August, we do know that Beane values a full-time DH: Beane traded for one. He traded for Adam Dunn, who was in the midst of a season playing better as a DH than he did as a fielder:

Dunn has hit considerably worse as a DH than as a fielder for the whole of his career. This, however, can be explained by Dunn entering the American League only in 2011, with his prime slugging years well behind him: he hit better when he was younger, which was when he played the field. What’s important is that Dunn’s AL production when a DH compares favorably to his AL production when a fielder. For the month of September, Beane and Melvin had a guy they could pencil in at DH every day — which they did — and actually know that they would get the player’s best offensive self.

More importantly, you can envision how Dunn’s constant presence in the lineup would serve as a rising tide that could lift all ships: now Jaso and Norris and Donaldson and Crisp and (I guess) Callaspo can all put forth their best offensive performances too, once they went back to the familiar rhythms of playing defense.

Both the A’s and Dunn knew that he was the shortest of short-term options, given his subsequent retirement. Seeing as a full-time DH was a priority for the A’s in September, it’s safe to assume that it was a priority for them going into the winter as well.

So, what were their options? Signing Nelson Cruz means the A’s would have had to top the Mariners’ 4-year/$57M offer, and also Cruz hit better as a fielder last year, the first of his career with extensive DH experience. Even if his 2014 weren’t so scary, Kendrys Morales has also comparatively struggled as a DH for the entirely of his career. Although he definitely seems like a late-career DH, Adam LaRoche has only had 22 DH-PA’s in his whole career, meaning his abilities at the DH-skill are still entirely unknown. Victor Martinez actually totally fits the bill of what the A’s are looking for, having hit well as a DH both last year and for his whole career. Oakland’s winning bid would also have to top Detroit’s 4-year/$68M offer, which would be ill-advised if not also financially implausible for the A’s.

Perhaps the A’s scouting and/or analytics staffs could have found reasons to start up reclamation projects in Paul Konerko, Raul Ibanez, or Jason Giambi. Otherwise, we’re pretty much already down to one dude on the free agent market with the established DH skill: Butler. It’s not like there are a lot of established DH-skill guys in the league, period, for possible trades. David Ortiz or Edwin Encarnacion would cost an unattainable fortune. Adam Lind and Chris Carter seem like intriguing possibilities, although Lind has made it to 100 games played in only one of the last three seasons, and the A’s traded Carter away when they had him.

So, Billy Butler. He had a very poor 2014, and also played worse when he was a DH compared to when he was in the field:

This is Butler at his very, very worst. And still he outperformed the 2014 DH production of talented offensive players like Jaso and Norris.

Steamer assumes that Butler’s below-replacement 2014 is the exception, rather than the new rule, putting him down for 1.3 WAR next year. Butler posted 1.5 WAR in 2013, meaning that the A’s can expect Butler’s 2015 to look a lot like that season, which the projections nailed almost exactly:

Heck, let’s go back to 2012, to the very first FanGraphs Positional Power Rankings:

So Butler performed very, very slightly better when on the field in 2012. Still: the drop when he played DH is barely perceptible, which was not the case for the A’s in 2014.

Even if Butler produces three straight one-WAR seasons for the A’s, he’ll also essentially be giving the team the gift of 600 or so PA’s for his teammates to play the field and, consequently, hit at their best. Whatever in-game routine Butler has in order to come to the plate fresh and focused, it’s still a rare skill across the game of baseball, and it’s a skill that has and will pay dividends for both Butler and his team.

This offseason, it seems like everyone is coming at a premium price. Pablo Sandoval, Russell Martin, Victor Martinez, Nelson Cruz, Nick Markakis and Billy Butler all smashed their crowdsourcing projections. Zach Duke got $15 million and we didn’t even bother crowdsourcing him! And we haven’t even reached the Winter Meetings. Yet not every free agent has been uber-expensive — relievers in particular. Sure, Andrew Miller is poised to break the bank, but there have been a number of budget reliever signings. Let’s take a tour through some of them, shall we?

Read the rest of this entry »

As you understand and have presumably criticized, Nick Markakis has signed with the Braves, for four guaranteed years and a reported $44 million in guaranteed money. While the Braves know things we don’t, and while every team deserves some kind of benefit of the doubt, the signing seems puzzling, especially for a team that appears to be focusing more on contention down the road. We’ve written about trying to figure out why Markakis got so expensive. The numbers we have don’t exactly support the full commitment.

Later today, or maybe tomorrow, Andrew Miller is likely to sign with a team. Though he’s a free-agent reliever, he’s a virtual lock to get four guaranteed years, and if he doesn’t get $44 million, he’ll get almost that much. This is the state of the market, where Zach Duke gets three guaranteed years following a surprising one-year sample. However, while ordinarily you’d think you’d rather have an expensive right fielder than an expensive reliever, in this case the numbers are more supportive of Miller. Miller’s going to get Markakis money, and Miller is arguably more deserving.

Read the rest of this entry »

Yesterday, the Atlanta Braves signed Nick Marakis to a four year, $45 million contract. As Mike Petriello noted, the deal just doesn’t make much sense from a numerical perspective, since nearly every piece of evidence we have is that Markakis just isn’t that valuable of a player. I’ve previously compared Markakis to Nori Aoki, and would imagine that Aoki will sign for something like half of what Markakis just received from the Braves.

But, if we’re looking for an explanation of why the Braves — and others, since it’s not like Atlanta was the only team bidding for his services — valued Markakis, it’s actually not that much of a puzzle. The sentiment for the deal can essentially be summed up in this statement.

Read the rest of this entry »

Someday, an up-and-coming SABR scientist should try to measure the psychic effect that losing has on ballplayers. As everyone knows from watching “The Natural,” losing is a disease — as contagious as polio, syphilis and bubonic plague. Attacking one but infecting all, though some more than others. And no other major leaguer over the past decade, among hitters, lost as frequently as Josh Willingham did.

Willingham, 35, recently announced his retirement after playing nine full seasons and parts of two more. What a relief it must have been for him to finish as a part-timer with the Kansas City Royals, who made it to the seventh game of the World Series. Only once before had Willingham played significant time for winning team (with the Florida Marlins in 2008), and never had he played in the postseason. Cross it off the list, call it a career. And it was a good one, aside from all of the losing.

Overall, his teams went 503-644 in Willingham’s appearances, producing a .439 winning percentage, the worst among anyone who recorded at least 4,000 plate appearances since he broke into the majors in 2004. It usually wasn’t Willingham’s fault that his team lost; he was the best hitter on the Marlins as a rookie, after Miguel Cabrera, and he was better than Hanley Ramirez. He was the fourth-best hitter in ’07, the third-best in ’08 — and in ’09 and ’10 after being traded to the Washington Nationals. He was the best hitter on the Oakland Athletics in 2011, and the Minnesota Twins in 2012.  It’s just that Willingham’s teams lost anyway.

Read the rest of this entry »

The list of non-tenders is out. Time to dream!

It’s actually a very tough place to shop, even if there are a few names that seem attractive this year. Only about one in twelve non-tenders manages to put up a win of value the year after they were let loose. Generally, teams know best which players to keep, and which to jettison.

You’re not going to get 12 non-tenders in your camp in any given year, but there is a way to improve your odds. It’s simple, really: pick up a player that was actually above replacement the year before. If you do that, you double your chance of picking up a productive major leaguer. So let’s look at this year’s market through that lens first.

Read the rest of this entry »

It’s been quite a few days since the biggest trade of the offseason to date was consummated, but the Nelson Cruz signing intervened, preventing me from getting around to it until now. The move of Josh Donaldson from Oakland to Toronto in exchange for a significant package headed by Brett Lawrie and hotshot shortstop prospect Franklin Barreto is not only large in scope, it is complex both on and underneath the surface. Is it the Brinks Job that some pundits assert, another example of Billy Beane zigging while everyone else zags, or something altogether different? Read the rest of this entry »

There’s a current story, that Ken Rosenthal has reported and written about. Bryce Harper and the Nationals are butting heads, trying to figure out the specifics of Harper’s arbitration eligibility. At stake are several millions of dollars, now and down the road, and it seems like a situation that could cause there to be bitterness between the player and the team. But, probably, the business side will be separated from the baseball side, and they’ll go on to get along fine. People thought there might be an issue with Mike Trout, too, when the Angels renewed his contract that one time near the league minimum. It seemed like the wrong thing to do to a superstar, and then later on Trout signed maybe the most team-friendly contract extension ever. Sometimes there are feelings, and often those feelings pass.

And then, sometimes, they don’t. At the end of the year, Mariners officials made some pointed remarks about Michael Saunders‘ preparedness and durability. They were unusually specific, and they hadn’t bothered to talk to Saunders first, and so Saunders’ side shot back. There was a rift, and while there was a chance things could be patched over, it seemed likely that the Mariners would send Saunders away so he could try to thrive somewhere else. Jerry Crasnick had reported that Saunders was being shopped at the GM meetings, and, at last, Saunders has been traded, from a team that didn’t value him to a team that could badly use him.

Read the rest of this entry »

There was precedent for Wade Davis‘ amazing Royals transformation. You could, for example, point to Wade Davis, in 2012. Or you could point to any number of other guys who’ve found comfortable homes in the bullpen after struggling as starters. But a year before Davis turned into an unhittable Royals reliever — that is, the same year that Davis was a very much hittable Royals starter — there was, in the same uniform, Luke Hochevar. Hochevar, for years, was a very mediocre starter. In 2013, he took off in relief, and he projected to be of great help again in 2014, until he blew out his elbow at the start of spring training.

So, Hochevar had Tommy John surgery. And the Royals, famously, didn’t miss him. They rode defense and their bullpen almost all the way to a championship, and then they arrived at more or less the present day. And after paying Hochevar millions of dollars to not pitch in 2014, the Royals are going to pay Hochevar millions of dollars to hopefully pitch in 2015 and beyond. Word’s out that Hochevar has re-signed as a free agent, for two years and $10 million, and now one’s left to wonder what the Royals might do about their roster construction.

Read the rest of this entry »