Archive for Daily Graphings

Positional Power Rankings: Relief Pitchers (#1-#15)

For an explanation of this series, please read the introductory post. The data is a hybrid projection of the ZIPS and Steamer systems with playing time determined through depth charts created by our team of authors. The rankings are based on aggregate projected WAR for each team at a given position.

Over the last couple of weeks, we’ve been going position by position around the sport. We finish up the series with bullpens today, but it’s worth noting that these projections follow a slightly different structure than the rest.

For one, projecting specific innings totals for relievers is a taller task than projecting playing time for position players or even innings totals for starters. There are numerous outside factors impacting bullpen usage, including things that we can’t really predict like the distribution of runs scored and allowed by each team. One team might play in a bunch of blowouts and rarely need their closer, while another could end up in a continuous stream of one run games and ask their best few arms to carry a lion’s share of the workload. Beyond that, the health of a team’s rotation is going to be a factor, as some relievers are also reserve starters who might be pressed into duty mid-season. And the depth charts are continually evolving, as injuries and acquisitions move guys into differing roles that come with different usage patterns.

So, for the relievers, we’ve simply assigned IP totals to each slot on a depth chart. Closers and primary setup men get 65 innings each, with the 3rd/4th relievers getting 55 innings each, and then the rest have their innings allocated in descending order according to their placement on the depth chart. And, in order to make each team’s total number of innings pitched (both starters and relievers) equal out to 1,458, we’ve added in a set for each team that makes up the missing innings in the projections. The performance projection is the same for each team, and is set to be around -0.1 WAR per 100 innings, on the assumption that the 10th or 11th reliever a team uses throughout the season is probably a little bit below replacement level. The statline in the table is just there as a placeholder – those numbers aren’t actually affecting the calculation beyond just setting innings equal and being included in the WAR sum.

Also, since we don’t have separate ZIPS/Steamer projections for guys as starters and relievers, guys who were projected as starters but are going to pitch in relief will likely be under-forecast. Aroldis Chapman, for instance, is getting his starter projections prorated to reliever innings totals, and he’ll almost certainly pitch better in relief than he was projected to do as a starter. There aren’t a lot of those types, but for guys like that, adjust their numbers upwards accordingly.

One final note: we’ve mentioned this on the other lists, but it is worth emphasizing here – the gap between many teams is so slim that you shouldn’t read too much into a team’s placement in the ordinal rank. The gap between #12 and #22 is +0.7 WAR. That’s no difference at all, really. There are good bullpens, okay bullpens, and a couple of bad bullpens, but don’t get too caught up in whether one team is a few spots ahead of another team. With margins this small, the specific placement on the list is mostly irrelevant.

On to the list.

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Positional Power Rankings: Relief Pitchers (#16-30)

For an explanation of this series, please read the introductory post. The data is a hybrid projection of the ZIPS and Steamer systems with playing time determined through depth charts created by our team of authors. The rankings are based on aggregate projected WAR for each team at a given position.

Over the last couple of weeks, we’ve been going position by position around the sport. We finish up the series with bullpens today, but it’s worth noting that these projections follow a slightly different structure than the rest.

For one, projecting specific innings totals for relievers is a taller task than projecting playing time for position players or even innings totals for starters. There are numerous outside factors impacting bullpen usage, including things that we can’t really predict like the distribution of runs scored and allowed by each team. One team might play in a bunch of blowouts and rarely need their closer, while another could end up in a continuous stream of one run games and ask their best few arms to carry a lion’s share of the workload. Beyond that, the health of a team’s rotation is going to be a factor, as some relievers are also reserve starters who might be pressed into duty mid-season. And the depth charts are continually evolving, as injuries and acquisitions move guys into differing roles that come with different usage patterns.

So, for the relievers, we’ve simply assigned IP totals to each slot on a depth chart. Closers and primary setup men get 65 innings each, with the 3rd/4th relievers getting 55 innings each, and then the rest have their innings allocated in descending order according to their placement on the depth chart. And, in order to make each team’s total number of innings pitched (both starters and relievers) equal out to 1,458, we’ve added in a set for each team that makes up the missing innings in the projections. The performance projection is the same for each team, and is set to be around -0.1 WAR per 100 innings, on the assumption that the 10th or 11th reliever a team uses throughout the season is probably a little bit below replacement level. The statline in the table is just there as a placeholder – those numbers aren’t actually affecting the calculation beyond just setting innings equal and being included in the WAR sum.

Also, since we don’t have separate ZIPS/Steamer projections for guys as starters and relievers, guys who were projected as starters but are going to pitch in relief will likely be under-forecast. Aroldis Chapman, for instance, is getting his starter projections prorated to reliever innings totals, and he’ll almost certainly pitch better in relief than he was projected to do as a starter. There aren’t a lot of those types, but for guys like that, adjust their numbers upwards accordingly.

Oh, and we’ve mentioned this on the other lists, but it is worth emphasizing here – the gap between many teams is so slim that you shouldn’t read too much into a team’s placement in the ordinal rank. The gap between #12 and #22 is +0.7 WAR. That’s no difference at all, really. There are good bullpens, okay bullpens, and a couple of bad bullpens, but don’t get too caught up in whether one team is a few spots ahead of another team. With margins this small, the specific placement on the list is mostly irrelevant.

On to the list.

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Just Another Reason To Be Skeptical of Spring Stats

When FanGraphs was in Arizona earlier this spring, our merry band of nerds made our way to a Jarrod Parker vs Chris Sale afternoon tilt. The result on that 16th of March — an 11-5 win for the White Sox and bad performances from the two starting pitchers — was mostly unimportant to everyone in involved. But a few innings sitting behind the plate did provide some insights, including some reasons why those results were unimportant.

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Jose Molina on Jose Molina

Fun fact: Jose Molina‘s FanGraphs player ID number is 25. Mike Trout’s is 10155. All right.

According to numbers provided to me by Matthew Carruth, last year there were 78 catchers in baseball who caught at least 1,000 called pitches. Carruth defines his strike zone not by the rule book, but by an average of the strike zones big-league umpires actually call. Out of those 78 catchers, Molina posted the fifth-lowest rate of pitches in the zone called balls. Molina tied for the second-highest rate of pitches out of the zone called strikes. Overall, Molina posted the highest rate of extra strikes per game, at +2.5. The other guys over 2 were David Ross, Chris Stewart, and Jonathan Lucroy. Molina caught more than 6,000 called pitches. We’ve had an idea for some time now that Jose Molina is an expert pitch-framer.

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2013 Positional Power Rankings: Starting Pitchers (#1-#15)

For an explanation of this series, please read the introductory post. The data is a hybrid projection of the ZIPS and Steamer systems with playing time determined through depth charts created by our team of authors. The rankings are based on aggregate projected WAR for each team at a given position.

Last week, we tackled the positional players, grading out each team’s options at each spot that is occupied by a fielder. You can see all those posts here, and yes, they’ve now been updated to reflect the correct park adjusted numbers. So, today, we move on to the pitching side of things. Because we’re dealing with 7-10 starters and an equal number of relievers for each club, we’re breaking these posts into two parts, less they become our own version of War and Peace.

After doing the bottom tier this morning — while noting again that the dividing line is essentially a false one, since there’s basically no separation between teams from #13 to #17 — we’re on to the strong pitching staffs, including a couple at the top that are exceptionally strong. There are also a few surprises in the top half, but overall, I think the projections look pretty good. There are inevitably going to be innings allocations or performance forecasts than one can quibble with, but overall, I think this system has done a pretty good job.

On to the list.

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Brewers Find Starter, Lohse Finds Work

Monday morning, Dave Cameron posted his bottom half of the 2013 starting pitcher positional power rankings. Just going to go ahead and paste a few select excerpts:

There’s a reason the team keeps getting tied to Kyle Lohse – he would be a pretty big upgrade over the internal candidates for the Brewers rotation.

And:

If they had another quality starter, having two interesting upside guys with big variance at the back of the rotation would be more palatable. As it is, the Brewers look like they’re at least one good pitcher short of being a contender this year.

Funny story!

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Vetoed Trades, Part Six

We end at the beginning. If you need to catch up, here are parts one, two, three, four and five.

Vetoed/Completed trade: October 1969, Cardinals send Curt Flood, Byron Browne, Joe Hoerner and Tim McCarver to Phillies for Dick Allen, Jerry Johnson and Cookie Rojas.
Addition to vetoed/completed trade: April 1970, Cardinals send Willie Montanez and Jim Browning to Phillies for unknown compensation due to Flood’s refusal to report to Philadelphia.
Completed trade: Phillies send Flood and player to be named later (Jeff Terpko) to Senators for Greg Goossen, Gene Martin and Jeff Terpko

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Padres Austin Hedges Is Cerebral And Skilled

Austin Hedges is considered the third-best catching prospect in baseball behind the Mariners’ Mike Zunino and the Mets’ Travis D’Arnaud. Regarded as a fantastic defender, he surprised with the bat as a 19-year old in the Midwest League last season. With offensive numbers 19 percent above league average, Hedges effectively shed the draft label of defensive specialist. The top prospect in the San Diego Padres organization is now regarded as an all-around talent.

Asked last week if he considers himself more advanced with the bat or behind the plate, the confident youngster hedged his bets.

“I don’t think you can ask me that one,” responded Hedges. “I like to think they’re equal.”

Interview by David Laurila.
Scouting Observations by Mike Newman.

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Yankees Acquire Vernon Wells on Purpose

I can’t remember the last time a front office admitted to actually being desperate. Even if everybody knows that the front office is desperate, the front office has a vested interest in issuing denials, since no one wants to be taken advantage of. Brian Cashman and the Yankees, I’m sure, would say they haven’t been desperate lately, even despite all the Yankees’ injuries. But Cashman reached out to Derrek Lee, unsuccessfully. Cashman reached out to Chipper Jones, unsuccessfully. And now the Yankees are taking Vernon Wells off the Angels’ hands, two years after the Angels made the mistake of acquiring Wells in the first place.

When the Angels traded for Wells, there was no other explanation except that the Angels were desperate. The offseason hadn’t gone as the organization intended, and they felt like they needed to make a splash. With the Yankees trading for Wells, again there’s no other explanation except that the Yankees are desperate. The offseason hasn’t gone as the organization intended, and they felt like they needed to land insurance.

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Q&A: Jason Giambi, Hitting Guru

Jason Giambi isn’t what he used to be. The 42-year-old slugger is little more than a player-coach at this point of his career, his leadership adding more value to the Cleveland Indians than his bat. Last season, with the Colorado Rockies, he hit .225 with one home run in limited action.

Once upon a time, his bat was lethal. As recently as 2008 he was one of the most prolific hitters in the game. From 2000-2003 he was almost Bonds-ian, averaging 40 home runs and 126 walks with an OPS north of 1.000. Over 18 big-league seasons his slash line is .280/.403/.522. His 429 home runs rank fifth among current players.

Giambi talked about his favorite subject — hitting — last week in Goodyear, Arizona.

——

David Laurila: What have you learned about hitting over the course of your career?

Jason Giambi: Probably the biggest thing is that you can’t be afraid to make adjustments. That’s especially true as you get older and your body isn’t what it used to be. You have to make adjustments to your stance, bat size, where you stand on the plate. As you get older, things change. You don’t stay 23 years old.

When I was younger, I had a blueprint of how I wanted to stand, where I was at on the plate, where I kept my hands. I stood very tall, feet close together, back elbow up. My shoulder was closed to the shortstop. I was slightly closed, instep to toe. I had it down. My front foot was exactly on the break of the plate. I was perfect every time.

When I got to about 35, 36, 37, I had to start making adjustments. I had hit all the way up to that point, then it slowly became: open my stance a little bit, maybe spread out, maybe start with my hands a little higher or lower. That’s because you start to lose some bat speed. When you get older, you’re not the same. The wear and tear of playing the game starts to take its toll.

DL: Can you make up for a lack of bat speed without cheating on pitches? Read the rest of this entry »