Archive for Daily Graphings

Derek Jeter’s 4-6-3 Nightmare

The Twins rotation will be groundball heavy, with Scott Baker continuing to battle elbow soreness and Kevin Slowey on his way to the bullpen. The impeccable Francisco Liriano, the infamous Carl Pavano, the unheralded Brian Duensing, and the predictable Nick Blackburn will start the games for the American League Central Champions throughout at least the Divisional Series. This could lead to some frustration for opposing teams as each of those guys has a groundball rate of at least 50% this season. Their groundball dominance goes beyond this season, too:

Pitcher Career GB Rate
Liriano 48.2%
Pavano 46.0%
Duensing 50.0% (starting and relief)
Blackburn 46.7%

Part of the benefit in generating ground balls is the raised possibility of a double play. The league average this season is a twin killing in 12% of the opportunities. Liriano (9%) is the only starter who falls well below that mark with Pavano (11%) close and Duensing (16%) along with Blackburn (17%) well above the mark. These fellows will be pitching to one Derek Jeter, who happens to be amongst the tops in the league when it comes to rolling into double plays.

Twenty-two times in 120 opportunities results in 18%. That is a double play opportunity every six plate appearances. An absurd rate from a leadoff hitter and a tribute to how often Brett Gardner and Curtis Granderson reach in front of The Captain. Only Lance Berkman has a higher GIDP rate than Jeter on the Yankees, and his comes in a small sample size and without support from his past to legitimize this as a chronic issue. Robinson Cano and Austin Kearns are the other two Yankees with above league average GIDP rates.

It’s not unreasonable to think that at some point in this series Jeter will come up with Gardner or Granderson on first base and less than two outs against the Twins’ starting pitcher. Do not be surprised if the end-result is a decrease in the Yankees’ run expectancy and an increase in Jeter-related snark.


Drew Stubbs: Power Threat?

In the minor leagues, Cincinnati Reds center fielder Drew Stubbs hit 28 home runs in 1847 plate appearances, a rate of just over nine every 600 PAs. Stubbs posted a SLG over .425 and an ISO over .155 just once, in a 19-game stint with AAA Louisville in 2008. Just looking at those numbers, Stubbs’s Major League performance so far is surprising, particularly his first full season with Cincinnati this year. Stubbs has slugged 30 home runs in 779 MLB plate appearances, including 22 in 583 this season. He posted a .444 SLG and a .189 ISO as well, both above the respective MLB averages of .403 and .145.

We definitely have to acknowledge Great American Ballpark when discussing the power stats of Stubbs or any other Reds player. Stubbs hits right handed, and according to StatCorner, the park factor for home runs for right-handed batters in Cincinnati is a whopping 133, highly favoring hitters. That might make Stubbs more of a mid-teens home run hitter than a low-twenties home run hitter, but he was a sub-10 HR player in the minors. The effects of his home park don’t fully explain Stubbs’s power boost with the Reds.

Since there’s really nothing in the numbers to fully explain this boost – no low-minor power numbers and no trend towards power either – we have to look elsewhere for an explanation. Stubbs just turned 26 today (happy birthday, Drew!) and is in only his second MLB season and his fifth professional season. The best place to look for data, particularly to supplement his minor league numbers, would then be scouting reports.

First, John Sickels of Minor League Ball.

Drew Stubbs was drafted by the Cincinnati Reds in the first round in 2006, from the University of Texas. The eight-overall pick in the draft, Stubbs showed excellent tools and a power/speed combination in college, but he also showed a propensity to strike out. Some scouts worried that his long swing might not translate well against pro pitching, but his athleticism was too much for the Reds to pass up.

Reds fans want to know: was Stubbs’ power outburst in the majors for real? Given the perils of sample size, it’s hard to say. His batting average, OBP, steals, and defense were exactly in line with expectation. He’s quite strong physically and has shown sparks of power before, but my guess is that we’ll see him regress somewhat in 2010, putting up something like a .260/.330/.400 line.

Kevin Goldstein of Baseball Prospectus was slightly more bullish on Stubbs on multiple occasions, stating that he saw Stubbs as a similar hitter to Mike Cameron, a player with eight 20+ HR, although that 15-20 HR seasons may be more of the norm for Stubbs.

Baseball America comes to similar conclusions. In this prospect ranking post, Stubbs is described as having “above-average raw power” and his power surge with Cincinnati in 2009 is considered “unsurprising.” In this post on the top 10 organizational prospects, J.J. Cooper claims that Stubbs can be a high home run hitter if he takes some strikeouts, which he certainly has done at the MLB level, striking out in 28.8% of plate appearances.

This is only a small sampling of scouting information, but all of it seems to support Stubbs having more power than he showed in the minor leagues. Combine that with a favorable home park, and 22 HR years like 2010 aren’t quite the anomaly that they looked before. Drew Stubbs looks like a home run hitter in the Major Leagues now, and despite his minor league numbers, don’t be surprised if Stubbs continues to hit for decent power numbers as his career continues.


Halladay Versus Cincy

In his second (and final) season as Reds manager, Davey Johnson led his 1995 squad to its first playoff berth since their 1990 World Series victory. He then saw his team advance to the National League Championship Series against the juggernaut Braves. A sweep resulted with Tom Glavine, John Smoltz, and Greg Maddux inflicting most of the damage and Steve Avery finishing the series with six shutout innings. Roy Halladay, Roy Oswalt, and Cole Hamels might not be on the level of those first three names, but the Reds have their hands full if they hope to engage the Braves in a NLCS rematch 15 years later.

Everyone knows Halladay’s numbers are impressive. His name is equally intimidating. How does he do it? Superb fastball command allows Halladay to use his fastballs nearly three-fourths of the time while avoiding the middle of the plate and the upper part of the zone. Imagine the strikezone as a series of nine boxes. Now ignore the top row and draw a block-shaped U in the bottom two rows. Within that figure is where Halladay locates 75-80% of the time he throws a pitch in the zone.

Unlike many pitchers who use their changeups exclusively against opposite-handed batters, Halladay throws his off-speed pitch versus both hands at equal rates. Same with his breaking pitches. He lives to throw down and in (or away) against southpaws and northpaws alike. It should come as no surprise that Halladay’s career groundball percentage is over 50% versus both and nearing 60% versus lefties. The Book suggests that groundball pitchers generally own groundball hitters (and the same holds true for flyball pitchers and hitters), meaning Halladay is a nightmare for groundball-heavy lineups.

While the Reds are near the bottom of the league in team offensive groundball percentage, their lineup does not seem to be one built for combat with Halladay (not that many are). The Reds’ leadoff hitter is Brandon Phillips, who happens to be an extreme groundball hitter. Phillips’ career .705 OPS versus pitchers with groundhog stuff suggests he falls into the “generally” category when it comes to groundball hitters being muted by groundball pitchers.

From there, the Reds will bat Orlando Cabrera second. Now, far be it from me to question Dusty Baker’s lineup-making expertise, but Cabrera’s season-best on-base percentage is the .322 that he posted in late May. Cabrera could not even manage an above-average on-base percentage after the first few plate appearances on the season. That leads to Joey Votto who has the same career OPS versus groundball and flyball pitchers (.934) and then a combination of Scott Rolen, Jay Bruce, and Jonny Gomes which tend to fare better than the guys in front of Votto, but not as good as Votto himself. Drew Stubbs and both catchers are also groundball hitters (although only slightly for Stubbs) which plays into Halladay’s hands as well.

Obviously that does not guarantee every groundball hitter as an out or anything, but the Reds have a collective line against groundballers this season of .253/.324/.390 compared to .272/.340/.450 versus flyball pitchers and .284/.346/.452 versus neutral pitchers. That gives them the lowest OPS against groundballers among NL playoff squads and places them at 16th overall. Unsurprisingly, Halladay completed 17 innings against the Reds this season with 19 strikeouts, one walk, and four earned runs. Too small of a sample size to mean much at all, but given what we know about both sides, there could very well be a sequel to those starts in this series.


The Reds Are Coming

This morning, Matt Klaassen and I sat at Carson Cistulli’s incredibly round table and gave our thoughts on each first round playoff match-up. You’ll hear the results of that in podcast form shortly, but I wanted to expound on a point of disagreement between Matt and I in one series in particular – the Reds/Phillies contest.

Matt jokingly referred to the series as a question of whether the Phillies would win in three games or just two, pointing to the team’s starting rotations as the reason that the series is a pretty big mismatch. And he’s right – the Phillies rotation is vastly superior to that of Cincinnati’s.

But, if you look at the other aspects of the rosters, I think the Reds not only hold their own, but they probably have the advantage.

The Reds posted a .339 wOBA this year, third best in baseball. Yes, they play in a pretty decent offensive environment, but so do the Phillies, who posted a .328 wOBA. No, you shouldn’t rely on just one year of data when looking at player abilities, but even a current true talent estimation will suggest that the Reds can hit, and probably hit better than the Phillies.

Everyone knows about Joey Votto – he’s a monster, and the best offensive player in this series by a good margin. Surrounding him, they have a number of good hitters, including guys at positions where you don’t generally expect offense. Few teams got better production from their up-the-middle spots than the Reds got from Ryan Hanigan, Brandon Phillips, Paul Janish, and Drew Stubbs.

These guys aren’t just lumbering sluggers, either. Including studly defenders Scott Rolen and Jay Bruce, the Reds position players are generally some of the better glove guys at their positions in the league. In fact, of the 21 position players the Reds used this year, only three posted a negative UZR on the season – Miguel Cairo, Jim Edmonds, and Jonny Gomes. You probably won’t see a ton of those guys the playoffs.

They might not be household names, but the Reds lead all of MLB in WAR by position players this year. That wasn’t an accident – they have a lot of talent there. Of course, pitching counts too, and the Phillies do have a huge edge in the rotation, but some of that gets eliminated when we look at the bullpens. Everyone knows about Aroldis Chapman’s crazy velocity, but Arthur Rhodes, Nick Masset, and Francisco Cordero are pretty good themselves, and they’ll get the benefit of whichever starter they don’t choose from the Homer Bailey/Travis Wood combo.

For me, the only place the Phillies are better than the Reds is in the starting rotation. It’s a huge advantage, and clearly the biggest discrepancy of any area between the two teams, but I don’t think it’s such a large gap that we should expect Philadelphia to roll in this series. The Reds can hit, they can field, and they’ve got a pretty good crop of relievers that they can turn to early in games.

This probably isn’t going to be a cake walk for the Phillies. Halladay-Hamels-Oswalt make them the favorites, but this series will likely be a lot more competitive than people expect. Don’t sleep on the Reds. They’re a good baseball team.


Idle Thoughts on the “Regular” Season

Despite the best efforts of the San Diego Baseball Padres, yesterday marked the end of the 2010 regular season. I’m not sure what that means for you, but, for Carson Cistulli, it presents a bright, shining opportunity to wax intellectual — which, that’s what I plan to do in what follows.

One thing about which I was — and, really, still am — curious is the word regular itself.

The most peculiar use of regular is the way it’s used by the employees and (ahem) regulars of Dunkin Donuts. I don’t know how wide this particular phenomenon reaches, but I can tell you with certainty that, in both Concord, NH and Newton, MA, to order a “regular” coffee at Dunkins is to order a coffee with cream and sugar. (Although, perhaps this makes sense: given the relative lack of racial diversity in both towns, there is, for sure, nothing “regular” about being black in either. One can only assume that the coffee is mimicking the most abundant local demographic.)

* * *

Per Etymonline, regular actually originates with the Proto-Indo-European root reg-, meaning “move in a straight line.” In Latin, the verb regere (“to rule, direct”) informs words like rex (“king” or “ruler”), regens (“ruler, governor”), and regula (“rule”). The last usage is the same as that in, for example, The Rule of St. Benedict (or St. Francis, St. Augustine, etc).

That the word regular has religious origins isn’t so surprising, on account of (a) basically every word has some kind of religious origin and also (b) the MLB calendar itself is similarly cyclical.

The Liturgical Year (the Catholic one, anyway) is, broadly speaking, broken into four parts: Advent, Lent, Easter, and Ordinary Time. You could make any number of distinctions (i.e. separating Advent into Advent and Christmas, combining Lent and Easter), but these are the four periods that span at least one month.

The Baseball Year also — again, speaking broadly — also comes in four parts: Hot Stove, Spring Training, Regular Season, Postseason.

I’m not sure it’s an exact analogue. I mean, Ordinary Time and the Regular Season — they’re very obviously similar. But what’s more like Advent, the Hot Stove League or Spring Training? Hard to say.

* * *

The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following as one of the many definitions of regular:

Chiefly U.S. (colloq.). Of a person: ordinary, normal, unremarkable; (hence, as a general term of mild approbation) unpretentious, unassuming; decent, agreeable, esp. in regular guy.

That, in itself, isn’t particularly interesting or relevant. What is interesting and relevant is that the OED attributes the earliest instance of this usage to former Cub, Cardinal, and (in 1900) Orphan Roger Bresnahan, in an article from the December 21, 1912 edition of the Boston Globe.

I’ve reprinted the article below, in full. The relevant passage comes at the very end, but the whole thing is generally awesome.

Read the rest of this entry »


2010 Is Not a Constant, Either

Last December, Dave Cameron discussed the mistake of analyzing a team’s chances in the coming season by simply adding and subtracting the performances of players acquired and lost during the offseason to the remaining players’ performance the previous season. For example, if a team hit well except for one spot in their lineup, and they fill that hole with a better player in the off-season, some are tempted to say that one can simply add the new player’s previous performance to the rest of the team’s, and the lineup is now great. Dave pointed out that this is a mistake, because it doesn’t take into account the way in which individual players are likely to age, regress to the mean, perform in a new context (in the case of players changing teams), and so on. In the spirit of Dave’s reminder that the previous season is not a “constant” to be used in analysis of the next, we should keep in mind that current season statistics aren’t a constant when handicapping the playoffs.

Given roughly the same playing time in 2010 as in 2009, a player’s 2010 performance is obviously more relevant. But just as we shouldn’t expect a player to repeat his 2010 performance in 2011, we shouldn’t expect him to duplicate his 2010 performance in the 2010 playoffs. Regression to the mean isn’t a process a player goes through over the winter, but is an essential part of how a player’s “true talent” is estimated at any point in time. When Zack Greinke was not projected to repeat 2009’s 2.16 ERA in 2010, it wasn’t on the basis of him becoming less talented, but rather that he was quite unlikely to have been a true talent 2.16 ERA pitcher in the first place — he was an very talented player who nonetheless was likely pitching “over his head” during 2009. Ryan Hanigan has hit well this season, especially for a catcher, but he’s probably not going to hit for a .368 wOBA in 2011. For the same reasons (past performance, regression to the mean, etc.), he probably isn’t a .368 wOBA true-talent hitter right now, either.

Another mistake is analyzing playoff match-ups using a team’s corporate statistics from the current season, whether it is team OPS, ERA, wOBA, FIP, WAR, or whatever. In addition to the way in which this neglects the difference between observed performance and true talent on an individual level noted above, it also passes over the practical differences between how playing time works out in the regular season as opposed to the playoffs. One obvious example: the Twins offense was 78 park-adjusted batting runs above average this season, good for third best in baseball. However, Justin Morneau accounted for about 36 of those before his concussion — almost half, and Morneau is out for the playoffs. Javier Vazquez pitched 144 (mostly terrible) innings for the Yankees during the regular season, which obviously impacted their team stats, but he won’t being seeing that proportion of action during the playoffs. The Giants team batting runs include a -7 from Bengie Molina, who won’t be playing in the playoffs — not for San Francisco, at least. The Phillies batting statistics reflect Chase Utley only playing 115 games this season; I’m guessing he’ll start a bit more than 70 percent of the Phillies’ playoff games.

One can think of numerous similar cases. Moreover, team season stats include playing time for bench players to rest starters — something that rarely happens in the playoffs. This all may seem rather obvious, but when using raw team statistics to analyze playoff match-ups, these are the sorts of things that are forgotten.

It is understandable why people use team statistics from the current season to dissect post-season match-ups, and I’ve been guilty of doing it myself. But when doing so, we’re using a meat cleaver rather than a scalpel.


2010 NL Playoff Rotations: Atlanta Braves

It came down to the last day, but thanks to a Padres loss the Braves have earned a playoff spot. In the first round they’ll match up with the Giants, whose rotation we profiled on Friday.

1) Tim Hudson CHONE: 3.95 nERA, 3.76 FIP
2010: 2.8 WAR, 4.09 FIP, 3.87 xFIP, 3.89 tERA, 2.83 ERA

For Tim Hudson, 2010 was all about preventing hits on balls in play. His .250 BABIP was the lowest of his career by 11 points — and that previous low came in 2003. He combined this with the highest ground ball rate of his career, 64.1 percent, and the highest strand rate, 81.2 percent. With all that and a low line drive rate, it’s no wonder that he greatly outperformed his component ERAs.

The Braves schedule actually works out well for Hudson. As the Game 1 starter for the Wild Card team, Hudson would make at least one start in each series on the road. In the LDS he’d start Games 1 and 5 on the road. While away from Turner Field he has struck out fewer, walked more, and has given up more home runs. That has led to far worse results and component numbers. But, since he started on Sunday he’ll be out for Game 1, and could sit out Game 2 as well, given the performance of Tommy Hanson.

2) Tommy Hanson CHONE: 3.86 nERA, 3.55 FIP
2010: 4.4 WAR, 3.31 FIP, 4.04 xFIP, 3.23 tERA, 3.33 ERA

Hudson might have produced the best results on the season, but Tommy Hanson has been the Braves’ best pitcher in the second half. He hit a bump in the road during May and June, but since then has been on fire. He’ll likely start Game 2, but could just as easily lead off each series for the Braves.

If there is one concerning factor with Hanson it’s his strikeout rate. In the first half he struck out a batter per inning; in the second half he struck out just 69 in 100.1 innings. Yet his defense turned those additional balls in play into outs at an efficient clip, as evidenced by Hanson’s .233 second half BABIP. He has also avoided walking too many hitters and has kept the ball in the park.

At 24 years old, Hanson just might be the Braves’ best bet in the playoffs.

3) Derek Lowe CHONE: 4.27 nERA, 3.87 FIP
2010: 2.8 WAR, 3.89 FIP, 3.65 xFIP, 4.23 tERA, 4.00 ERA

He hasn’t been the Derek Lowe that the Braves signed after the 2008 season, but the 2010 version was a bit better than the 2009 one. Lowe actually came very close to his career marks in FIP and xFIP, and even his ERA was with in 0.15 of his career average. Compared to last year he struck out more, induced a few more ground balls, and left more runners stranded on base. The Braves might be disappointed, but overall his numbers fell in line with reasonable expectations — especially given his 2009 season.

While the Braves, especially on offense, stumbled through September, Lowe posted his best month of the season. He struck out 8.51 per nine, walked just 0.88 per nine, and allowed only a single home run. He compensated for a .335 BABIP by leaving a staggering 91.8 percent of runners stranded. He’ll need to continue riding that wave into October, and he’ll be the one to kick things off. He hasn’t started since September 29, and will likely be Bobby Cox’s Game 1 starter on Thursday.

Question marks

4) Jair Jurrjens CHONE: 3.99 nERA, 3.79 FIP
2010: 1.3 WAR, 4.19 FIP, 4.47 xFIP, 4.28 tERA, 4.64 ERA

After two excellent seasons in Atlanta, Jurrjens experienced his worst in 2010. Much of that was due to injury. He got off to a terrible start, but then bounced back. But he has had problems lately, and hasn’t started a game since September 14. There was a chance he’d throw in the bullpen this weekend, but that didn’t happen. It sounds like he might make a Game 4 start, but there are no guarantees. I’m not sure how the Braves can be overly confident in him, given that this is his second leg issue of the year.

5) Brandon Beachy CHONE: N/A
2010: 0.5 WAR, 2.48 FIP, 3.93 xFIP, 3.66 tERA, 3.00 ERA

6) Mike Minor CHONE: 4.21 nERA, 3.94 FIP
2010: 0.6 WAR, 3.77 FIP, 3.86 xFIP, 3.64 tERA, 5.98 ERA

Given the situation, I would think the Braves turn to Lowe in a potential Game 4 before going to Hanson or Hudson in Game 5. If Jurrjens is ready maybe they go there, but I’m not so sure they’d turn to either rookie to start a playoff game.

Minor was the first one up, recalled when Kris Medlen went down with an elbow injury in early Augut. He performed well at first, but a few bad starts did him in. He hasn’t gone longer than five innings since August 22. There’s a chance he works out of the bullpen, though. He did get in a scoreless inning and a third of work on Friday.

Beachy, called up for a start on September 20, pitched well in his three outings, two of which came against Philadelphia. Still, there’s little chance they’d let him start in the postseason. He made it into the sixth inning just once. While his peripherals are good, he won’t keep up his homerless streak. That could bite the Braves in the playoffs. I wouldn’t count him out of the bullpen, but I doubt the Braves start him based on three September appearances.


Making The Divisions Count Again

When the Wild Card was introduced, one of the main critiques of the idea is that it would cheapen pennant races, which historically had been fought down to the last week, as teams battled for their division’s only trip to the playoffs. While the benefits have generally outweighed the costs and the four team playoff has become accepted, we saw the downside of the system in full force yesterday. On the final day of the season, the Yankees and Rays had identical records and shared the top spot in the American League East. And no one cared.

Sure, a few Tampa players gave a fist pump when the Yankees loss was shown on their big screen, but a raucous celebration it was not. Both teams knew that they were in the playoffs regardless of the outcome of yesterday’s affairs, and the resulting lack of drama reflected that fact. While I like the current playoff system more than the old one, its hard to watch the final month of baseball in the AL East and not feel like it could be improved. Those games should have meant something. They could have been fantastic theatre, but instead, they were glorified exhibitions. There has to be a better way.

One popular idea, floated by Jayson Stark a few weeks ago and discussed in a community post here recently, is to make the Wild Card a play-in spot. Pick the two best teams that didn’t win their division, and once the regular season ends, make them square off for one playoff spot, with the winner of that moving on to face the best of the division champs. The three division winners would get a legitimate advantage over the Wild Card, which would put some meaning back in those races once again.

It’s a pretty good idea, honestly. It fixes the biggest problem with the current system and would serve to keep more fans interested in the final weeks of the MLB season, even after the NFL returned and started competing for attention. However, it presents a problem best summed by up Matthew Carruth in response to the community post:

Say going into the final day the standings are:

New York 95-66
Tampa 95-66
Minnesota 93-68
Boston 90-71 (2nd Wild Card)
Texas 88-73

Under your proposal,
New York and Tampa: have large incentive to win their final game so as to avoid the one game Wild Card playoff with Boston.
Minnesota, Boston, Texas: no incentive on final day.

So NY and TB play their best available starters to try and win. Say NY wins. The playoff match ups are then:

NY vs TEX
MIN vs (TB/BOS)
If seeds are done strictly on reg season record or

NY vs (TB/BOS)
MIN vs TEX
If done where Wild Card = 4th seed.

Here’s the problem. In the first scenario, NY and TB used their best starters in their final game to avoid the WC playoff. That gives an advantage to TEX, MIN and –most importantly– Boston, who had no such incentive and thus rested their best starters. You’ve punished Tampa to the favor of Boston, the worse Wild Card.

In the second scenario the advantage is limited to just BOS, but it’s still present. You’ve put the teams with the better record at a disadvantage by giving them incentives to win until the end of the season while not providing the same motivation to the lower teams.

Matthew’s right. We want the division races to be meaningful, but not at the expense of penalizing a team for trying to win a division. The one game play-in model could hurt a franchise that plays to win on the final Sunday. If MLB was going to add a second Wild Card, they would either have to go to a three game series or take more days off to expand the gap between the end of the regular season and the beginning of the division series, thus allowing division winners that played to the end to have a ready-to-go rotation for the division series.

That drawback makes the plan less appealing to me, and has me looking for alternatives. One idea that I haven’t seen get too much consideration is far simpler, and perhaps is even more of a potential reward for teams to finish with the best record – each division series could be played in just one city.

Home Field Advantage is smaller in baseball than in any other sport, with just a 54/46 split. Giving the team with an advantage just one extra game in their home city, where their odds of winning aren’t that much better than they are on the road, isn’t a huge motivator. But what if they got to host the entire series?

Now you’ve given them a tangible (even if small) advantage in each game, and in a full length series, that can add up. In addition, the home franchise gets a significant revenue boost, so ownership would almost certainly push their teams to try and make sure they were one of the teams hosting in the first round. You’d eliminate the need for travel days, so the first round could either be expanded to seven games or simply be condensed into a shorter time frame, shortening the overall playoff schedule and helping the season end before November.

The goal is to incentivize winning games in the last week of the regular season. By forcing the wild card and the worst division winner to play entirely on the road in the first round, you give teams a real reason to rack up as many wins as possible. Under this system, not only would Tampa Bay and New York have been fighting for a real home field advantage yesterday, the Reds would have had motivation to win out as well.

I think this system would give teams a legitimate reason to play for a division title and not settle for the Wild Card without creating the moral hazard of the play-in game. It’s not a perfect solution, but it’s one that I’d like to see get a little more notice, at least.


Sanchez’s Triple

I hit the triple and I said, “They’re done.’

–Jonathan Sanchez, from the Silicon Valley Mercury News

In game 162, playing against the division rival for the right to go the playoffs, it wasn’t Jonathan Sanchez’s job to hit. It was his job to pitch. Nobody would argue that Sanchez was transcendental on the mound, but he did what he had to do, throwing five shutout innings despite three hits and five walks. He certainly received some defensive help from some unlikely candidates in Pablo Sandoval and Juan Uribe.

Instead, it was Sanchez’s bat which became a story. In the bottom of the third inning, Sanchez hit a triple deep to right center field off young Padres starter Mat Latos. He would eventually score the first run of the game for the Giants, which would turn out to be enough as the bullpen managed to shut the door with four scoreless innings behind Sanchez.

The hit was the third most important play for the Giants on offense – behind the Freddy Sanchez RBI single which scored the pitching Sanchez and the Aubrey Huff RBI double which scored the second baseman Sanchez. Jonathan’s triple had a WPA of +0.083, which seems underwhelming. Somewhat surprisingly, accounting for his role as pitcher only increases the WPA of the at-bat to +.091 (according to calculations from the WPA Inquirer), but it is worth pointing out that Sanchez’s triple was only the 4th by a pitcher all season and only the 20th extra base hit of more than a double. There’s also something to be said for the fact that Sanchez set up the top of the lineup with a runner on third and nobody out – the better hitters at the top of the order aren’t accounted for in WPA.

Perhaps it was a bit much for Sanchez to claim that the Padres were “done” after that hit, but maybe he had so much confidence in the top of his order that he knew he would come around to score. As he indeed scored on the next plate appearance, the Giants win probability rose to 65.4%; by the end of the inning the Giants had a 74.5% win expectancy. Sanchez’s triple wasn’t even the most important play of the inning, much less the game – the two run scoring plays in the inning had WPAs above +.100. But the triple kick-started the rally which gave the Giants the lead, and it seems to represent the turning point of what was formerly a 0-0 tie.

In the end, Sanchez was right: his triple and the ensuing runs buried the Padres. The most prominent threat to the Giants’ chances came immediately after Sanchez was pulled in the sixth inning. His replacement, Santiago Casilla, immediately induced a 5-4 double play from Yorvit Torrealba. The next inning, the Padres managed two baserunners, but Miguel Tejada struck out to end the inning. Those would be the last two baserunners stranded by a Padre in 2010, as Sergio Romo and Brian Wilson took down the Padres in order in the eighth and ninth innings, respectively.

Over 162 games, things tend to even out, but sometimes, it takes only one to decide a season, and in one game, anything can happen. Nobody would’ve guessed before the game that it would be Johnathan Sanchez who would ignite the rally to vault the Giants into the postseason. What happened on Sunday night was simply part of the magic of the game, and now that magic brings the Giants into October with a chance to win it all.


An Ode to Mat Latos

Mat Latos pitched what was the Padres’ last game of the season yesterday, losing to the Giants in a game that, had the Padres won, would have forced a one game playoff against San Francisco. A triple by opposing pitcher Jonathan Sanchez led to a two-run 3rd inning, which proved to be enough to advance the Giants to the playoffs, leaving the Padres at home. For most baseball fans, the potential of a three-way tie for two playoff spots was what they were waiting for. Despite struggling in September, Latos was the best option in the Padres’ relatively unheralded starting rotation to force the crazy one-game playoff(s) scenario. Before we head into the postseason, I would like to profile just how spectacular Latos has been this season.

Latos was somewhat of a surprise young breakout pitcher, having struggled to locate the strikezone when he was first called up last season. Everyone in the National League knows his name now, as he has averaged 9.32 K/9 this season. Latos throws four distinct pitches: a mid-90s fastball, a mid-80s slider, a mid-80s changeup, and a high-70s curveball. He throws his fastball 60.1% of the time, but it’s his second most used pitch, the slider, that has been the key to his success this season, which he uses 22.8% of the time.

Of his four pitches, Latos uses the fastball, slider, and changeup the most. Let’s take a look first at his fastballs, how he locates them, where he induces swinging strikes, and where the ball is put in play:

The right-handed pitcher locates his fastball up and away to both RHH and LHH, going low and outside to LHH sometimes as well. Latos is able to get RHH to whiff more on his fastball than he is to LHH, who put the ball in play slightly more than RHH. Many of Latos’ swinging strikes are in the strike zone, but he’s able to get quite a few of them up and out of the zone. Let’s look at Latos’ slider, his second-most used pitch:

In the graphs above, we can see that Latos loves to throw the low and away slider to right-handed hitters and the low and out of the zone slider to left-handed hitters. His slider is effective against both hitters, getting 18.6% of right-handed hitters and 17.8% of left-handed hitters to whiff, as noted by the numerous red points in both graphs. Latos rarely throws an inside slider to right-handed hitters, but throws to all parts of the strike zone against left-handed hitters. What is apparent throughout all parts of the strikezone is that Latos throws sliders that are closer to the glove side to RHH than he does to LHH, whether it’s in the strikezone or low and out of the zone. Finally, let’s look at Latos’ changeup:

Latos’ changeup gets 18.2% of right-handed hitters and 12.8% of left-handed hitters to swing and miss. It’s interesting to note that Latos uses the changeup more against LHH (15.3% of all pitches) than he does against RHH (7.9% of all pitches) even though LHH put changeups in play slightly more (22.0%) than RHH do (19.1%) while whiffing less. My first thought was that maybe Latos throws the breaking ball more to LHH because he might pitch to contact in some situations. Looking at his batted ball splits by pitch type, a changeup put in play has similar batted ball outcomes for both batters, except that LHH will pop up the ball 10.6% of changeups put in play (4.55% for RHH).

The underlying reasons behind Latos’ changeup use are probably not obvious, and since he uses the pitch only 10% of the time, not much damage is done in the grand scheme of things. Perhaps the pitch outcomes and batted ball results indicate that Latos should use his changeup less against LHH, but the size of the sample precludes the necessity of a change in approach. According to Latos’ pitch type values, all of his pitches have contributed to above average run values anyway, his slider being the most valuable.