Archive for Daily Graphings

Shifting Michael Young

The Rays-Rangers portion of the American League playoffs is set to kickoff Wednesday. Michael Young might be the Rangers’ fifth or sixth best hitter depending on the day (and Lupe Fiasco’s favorite baseball player) but do not be surprised if he becomes a person of interest during the series, and not necessarily because of his performance either.

The Rays are notorious for taking advantage of every possible benefit – some would call it The Extra 2% — which includes shifting just about any batter they can. Teams usually only employ shifts against pull-heavy batters like J.D. Drew, David Ortiz, and Travis Hafner, but the Rays even shifted for Derek Jeter earlier this season.

Young and Jeter share many attributes, most notably as offensive-minded infielders with histories of defensive mockery. Both bat right-handed as well, but tend to go the other way and up the middle more than most. Since 2008, 73% of Young’s batted balls have ended up in center or right field. When Young does pull the ball it’s been of the groundball variety- roughly 70% of the time. He tends to hit the ball on the ground up the middle and in the air to right.

What that means for a potential shift is intuitive. The Rays would shift their outfield toward the right field foul line, perhaps placing their right fielder a couple of steps from the line. Their infield could remain in the same position, or they could slide toward right field as well. Evan Longoria would become responsible for the left side of the infield while Jason Bartlett played up the middle and Ben Zobrist moved a few steps to his left.

By playing the percentages, the Rays leave Young a tantalizing amount of open space on the left side of the field. All he has to do is pull or tap a ball in that direction and he could have a double, or who knows, maybe a triple. To assume Young’s swing is the only thing changing would be an oversimplification as his mindset has to alter too. If the Rays are aligned with the eggs in the basket of him going the other way then they are probably pitching him away, away, and away, right? But what if the Rays anticipate Young thinking that and bust him inside to catch him off guard?

It is hard to quantify exactly how much that game theory matters (if it matters at all), and further complicates a basic defensive philosophy. The only thing we know for sure is that Young facing the Rays’ shifted defense will be a battle of wits and god-given ability on one of baseball’s grandest stages.


Zito’s Disaster

The San Francisco Giants had good reason to feel confident going into their final series of the regular season against the San Diego Padres. After launching themselves into first place in the National League West on a run fueled by an incredible September performance from their pitchers, the Giants needed only one victory against divisional rival San Diego in order to win the the division and guarantee themselves a playoff spot. After losing on Friday, things probably got a bit tense. Then came Barry Zito’s start on Saturday:

There’s no need to go over Barry Zito’s performance relative to his contract once again. Zito started the season impressively, at least superficially, and some thought he may have turned a corner. However, Zito unsurprisingly returned to form by the end of the season: a mediocre pitcher whose most valuable attribute is that his fly ball tendencies play well in his home park. He’s not great, or even good, but he probably won’t kill his team. Most of the time.

If Zito wasn’t the sole murderer on Saturday, he was definitely the chief accomplice. Rob Neyer once suggested that a start in which a pitcher gives up more runs than innings pitched be labeled a “disaster start.” Zito allowed four runs in three innings, so Saturday’s start qualifies. What is particularly striking is that Zito “drove in” two of the runs himself on consecutive bases-loaded walks in the first inning. After giving up singles to Chris Denorfia and David Eckstein to open the game, Miguel Tejada bunted the runners over. Zito and Giants manager Bruce Bochy then vividly demonstrated why intentional walks are rarely a good idea. Yes, first base was open, and Adrian Gonzalez is a far superior hitter than Ryan Ludwick.* It “worked,” at least temporarily, as Ludwick made an out. However, the bases were still loaded, and Zito proceeded to walk Yorvit Torrealbea and Scott Hairston consecutively, driving in the first two runs of the game.

* Without doing the all necessary calculations, it is worth noting that the lefty Zito would have had at least something of a platoon advantage against the left-handed hitting Gonzalez.

That wasn’t all that mattered in the game — the Padres scored another run in the third on a Pablo Sandoval error and tacked on another in the fourth that was credited to Zito, who he had just been relieved by Chris Ray after allowing two more runners on base. But those walks were two of the biggest shifts of the game in terms of Win Probability Added, and probably two of the more devastating walks of the season from the perspective of the Giants and their fans.

It isn’t all on Zito, of course. The Giants still had a chance in the ninth when they were down 4-2 and had with runners on first and third and one out, but Jose Guillen grounded into a double play. Although San Francisco can still win the division by beating the Padres on Sunday, if the Giants do end up watching the playoffs on TV, Zito’s disastrous first inning (with an assist from Bochy) in today’s game will definitely stand out.


Morneau’s Forgotten Season

Justin Morneau hasn’t appeared in a game since July 7th due to post-concussion symptoms. According to a report from the St. Paul Pioneer Press, he won’t return until at least the ALCS. Despite only appearing in in 81 games and only compiling 348 plate appearances, Justin Morneau put up 5.3 WAR this season. That mark puts him at ninth in the American League and first among position players on the Twins (only behind Francisco Liriano’s 6.0 overall).

One could probably dispute Morneau’s +9.8 UZR in that relatively small stretch of games – he’s probably not a +20 fielder, if only because of the limited amount of attempts seen by a first baseman if nothing else. Still, even if we assume that Morneau was merely average, that would put him at 4.3 WAR – the total that he compiled in his 2006 MVP season – and still on pace for a total between 8.0 and 9.0 WAR, which would probably be the best season in the American League this year.

In previous seasons, Morneau was a great hitter. He was not, as the 2006 MVP voters and others saw him, an elite hitter. His OBPs ranged from .345-.375, and in order to truly create elite without getting on base 40% of the time, one has to be a mammoth power threat. Morneau wasn’t that either, as his SLG topped out at .559 in that MVP season and sat around .500 at other times. Again, it’s not that he wasn’t good – he was quite good, among one of the better hitters in the majors – but he wasn’t among the top five or top ten, and at first base, that doesn’t make him an MVP candidate.

This season, though, Morneau was the best hitter in the majors this side of Josh Hamilton before he got hurt. He posted a .345/.437/.618 line before going down, compiling a ridiculous 35 runs above average and a 187 wRC+. Those numbers are far, far above anybody on the Twins team and far above anything Morneau has done in the past. Of course, a .385 BABIP was the main booster of his mammoth early season line, but it wasn’t the only cause. He walked in over 14% of his plate appearances, easily a career high, and posted another career best in ISO at .274.

As Morneau hasn’t played in nearly three months now it can be easy to forget that he was putting a truly transcendental season before he was put on the shelf. His 5.3 WAR through half a season is a full win more than he has ever produced in any season. Morneau was easily having his best season as a MLB player, and one could easily make the argument that these 380 plate appearances actually do constitute the best MLB season by Justin Morneau.


2010 AL Playoff Rotations: New York Yankees

Going into the season, the Yankees looked like they might have the best starting rotation in the league. Things didn’t quite work out that way: Javier Vazquez had an unforeseeable collapse (I mean, “obviously can’t pitch in New York”), Andy Pettitte got hurt, A.J. Burnett Burnetted the season. The Yankees’ group of playoff starters still looks good against all of baseball once their updated CHONE projections are taken into account (using CHONE’s projected context-neutralized ERA and FIP derived from the projected line). However, the Yankees staff becomes less intimidating once compared with the Twins, Rangers, and Rays. This is not to say that the Yankees have the worst rotation in the AL playoffs, but it is not the clear advantage for them one might have expected in March.

1) CC Sabathia CHONE 3.28 nERA, 3.60 FIP
2010: 4.8 WAR, 3.55 FIP, 3.78 xFIP, 3.34 tERA, 3.18 ERA

To be clear: I don’t think CC Sabathia should win the AL Cy Young. Nonetheless, 2010 isn’t a constant, either, and if in earlier posts I seemed to give Sabathia a bit of the short shrift, it may have been due to an overemphasis on the current season. Yes, the most recent season carries the most weight, but 2008 and 2009 also (should) figure into estimates of a player’s true talent. When everything is taken into account, while Sabathia has been outperformed in 2010 by fellow playoff pitchers Cliff Lee, Francisco Liriano as well as others not in the playoffs, he’s probably still one of the best pitchers in baseball, and his CHONE projection reflects that. Sabathia’s strikeout and walk rates have declined a fair bit from his monster 2008, and a (very) small bit from 2009, but are both still very good. He’s still a horse, averaging about seven innings a start. This season his groundball rate is up to around 50%, making him an even tougher opponent. A number of pitchers clearly had better seasons than Sabathia in 2010; but he still matches up with anyone in the playoffs.

2) Andy Pettitte CHONE 4.27 nERA, 4.23 FIP
2010: 1.9 WAR, 3.96 FIP, 4.10 xFIP, 4.04 tERA, 3.17 ERA

Pettitte’s WAR is relatively low because injuries limited him to 125 innings over 20 starts so far this season. His ERA is excellent, but Pettitte doesn’t have a recent track record of being this much better than his FIP and xFIP, and his tERA is in line with FIP/xFIP as well. Pettitte isn’t a groundball machine any more. His strikeout rate isn’t average, but it isn’t terrible, and he avoids walks. Pettitte is far from dominating, but he is still a good pitcher when he’s healthy, and the Yankees really need to him to be healthy.

3) Phil Hughes CHONE 3.9 nERA, 4.10 FIP
2010: 2.0 WAR, 4.29 FIP, 4.37 xFIP, 4.02 tERA ,4.21 ERA

Hughes has had a bit of a rough time of it lately, and although he hasn’t become the ace some thought he would be, he’s had a solid if unspectacular season. In the transition into the rotation from the bullpen he has predictably lost some strikeouts, but his K rate is still good, and he has continued to do well in avoiding walks. Hughes’ main problem is that he’s been one of the more extreme flyball pitchers in baseball this season, which, combined with an average HR/FB rate, has led to a lot of homers. Hughes’ numbers up fairly well against #3 starters in the AL playoffs. However, although Yankee Stadium is relatively neutral with respect to run scoring generally, it seems to favor the home run, which could be a problem for Hughes in the playoffs given his skill set.

4) A.J. Burnett CHONE 4.16 nERA, 4.46 FIP
2010: 1.0 WAR, 4.81 FIP, 4.65 xFIP, 4.77 tERA, 5.33 ERA

Burnett didn’t quite (ahem) deliver what the Yankees were paying for in 2010. They didn’t expect a fourth starter, but that’s what he will be in the playoffs. In the first round, the Yankees are hoping Sabathia can go on short rest so Burnett won’t have to pitch at all. That’s a good idea. Putting the contract and expectations aside and comparing Burnett with the other fourth starters in the playoffs, he comes off okay. Although his strikeout rate is down, it’s still around average, and his walk rate is almost exactly the same as his career rate. When you compare his 2010 numbers to other #4 playoff starters like Nick Blackburn and Tommy Hunter, he’s the the better pitcher. Only three years and about $50 million dollars left on a guy I just tried to compliment with favorable comparisons to Nick Blackburn and Tommy Hunter.

I haven’t covered potential injury problems recurring with, e.g., Andy Pettitte. It is clear that the Yankees would not be too thrilled at the prospect of having to start Javier Vazquez (whose stunning 2010 collapse deserves a detailed analysis of its own) or Ivan Nova in a playoff game. Almost as frightening (or more) for Yankees fans would be that such a situation would force Burnett to start in the ALDS rather than potentially being skipped. Pettitte and Hughes compare well to other #2 and #3 starters in the AL playoffs, although I think the Rangers have an edge against them with C.J. Wilson and Colby Lewis. The Yankees obviously are counting on Sabathia quite heavily to match up with other teams’ aces, pitch deep into games, and possibly pitch on short rest to minimize the amount of Burnett. This last point is especially important if the Yankees’ opponent decides to pitch their ace on short rest as well. It will be fascinating to watch it all shake out, and some surprises inevitably are going to make me look foolish.


Have Pitchers Adjusted to Jose Bautista?

With 54 home runs in all, Jose Bautista has hit at least 11 home runs in May, July, August, and September. He is crushing fastballs in particular, with 2.63 fastball runs above average according to his pitch type values. He is doing a lot of damage against sliders and curveballs as well, both of which pitches he was below average at hitting in previous years. Say what you want about Bautista’s sudden power surge this season as he’s on his way to age 30, but his spectacular increase in wSL/C and wCB/C tells me that he has learned how to hit breaking balls better this season, which at least contributes to the increase in power in some form.

But how have pitchers responded to Bautista as the season went on? Let’s first take a look at a few of Bautista’s plate discipline and pitch outcome statistics broken down by month in 2010. (Edit: Note that I am using MLBAM data, so the following season stats are estimated differently from the ones on Bautista’s FanGraphs page, which are from BIS data.):

Since this is broken down by month, we’ll have to remember that the sample size is small, so don’t take these numbers too literally. Still, July may very well have been Bautista’s best month because of these stats. He made contact on 37.1% of all pitches, the most for any month in 2010, partly due to swinging the bat the highest percentage of the time as well. He was able to put the ball in play 20% of the time and rarely whiffed. He batted an MVP-like .347/.418/.765 in July compared to a .262/.381/.625 for the season. In the next table, let’s take a look at how pitchers have adjusted by the month in the location of their pitches, broken down by pitch type as well:

The first column shows first strike percentage by month, which has been up and down through out the the season. These don’t correlate directly with his slugging percentage though, especially when you compare April with July. However, Zone% decreased from 55.8% in April to 49.7% in August. Pitchers are throwing many fewer fastballs in the zone, in particular in September, compared to earlier in the season. Some of the other pitch types have decreased in Zone% but increased again later in the season, so I am not sure what is going here. Again, sample size is probably an issue, as Bautista has not seen more than 100 pitches of each non-fastball pitch type in any given month.

Still, it’s telling that the F-Strike% and Zone% of all pitches in September is much lower than it was in April.


Why Our Pitcher WAR Uses FIP, Part Two

This post builds on the one I wrote a few hours ago, so I’d encourage you to read that if you haven’t yet. If you really don’t want to follow the link, this is the paragraph where we’re picking up from:

In the end, we had to choose between two different methods – assuming that the pitcher had no responsibility for the outcome of a ball in play, or attempting to approximate the amount of time that the result was due to the pitcher or the fielder. Ideally, we’d be able to do the latter – which is how Sean approaches it – but I just don’t think we currently have the tools available to make an accurate enough judgment on how to apportion that responsibility.

Clearly, some hits on balls on play are the “fault” of the pitcher. He throws a fastball down the middle in a 3-1 count and the hitter whacks it for a double in the gap – that’s on him, certainly. However, most hits are not of that variety. Instead, they’re ground balls in between two defenders or fly balls that fall near a chasing outfielder before he can get to it. In those instances, we don’t really know how much responsibility for the hit should go to the pitcher or the fielder. Would Elvis Andrus have gotten to that grounder up the middle that Yuniesky Betancourt didn’t get close to? Maybe, maybe not. Did Carl Crawford run down a shallow popup that Juan Rivera would have had to pick up on the third bounce? Perhaps. We don’t have the luxury of having a control group for each ball in play. All we know is whether the guy who happened to be the defender on duty at the time was able to make the play or not.

So, what do we do a specific pitcher’s results on balls in play? This was the thing that I wrestled with the most while we were designing WAR for pitchers a few years ago. I can see an argument for doing it in one of two ways, though I think both have problems.

1. FIP-based WAR, which is what we ended up using, essentially admits that we don’t have enough information about dividing responsibility for the results of balls in play, and so it ignores them.

2. RA-based WAR, which is what Sean ended up using, attempts to adjust for defensive contribution by taking a team’s overall Total Zone rating and assigning an expected defensive debit or credit to each pitcher based on how the team performed on the season as a whole.

I get why Sean did it the way he did it, and I understand why there are people who prefer that path. It appeals to our inherent sense of runs allowed being a record of what actually happened, and presents the possibility of achieving the ultimate goal – a pitcher’s total contribution to run prevention with the effects of his teammates factored out. The problem, though, is a pretty big one, and the one that caused me to lean away from RA-based WAR for our purposes here. It assumes that the distribution of defensive performance was even for each pitcher on every team, which is quite obviously not going to be true. Simply put, it is not a record of what actually happened – it is an assumption of what might have happened if all defenders on a team were evenly skilled and were perfectly consistent on a day-to-day basis.

We can simply look at the distribution of run support for a pitcher on any given team to see that the assumption of even performance is not going to be true. If we use the Yankees rotation as an example, we see that the Yankees averaged 5.30 runs per game this year. Their distribution by starting pitcher is below:

CC Sabathia – 5.89 R/G
A.J. Burnett – 4.29 R/G
Phil Hughes – 6.75 R/G
Andy Pettitte – 6.00 R/G
Javier Vazquez – 4.12 R/G

No pitcher is actually within half a run of the team average. Burnett and Vazquez are over a run per game lower than the overall total, while Pettitte is nearly three quarters of a run per game higher and Hughes is a run and a half per game higher. If you built a metric that worked off the assumption that the Yankees offense scored the same amount of runs per game when Vazquez was on the mound as when Hughes was on the mound, you’d probably draw some pretty inaccurate conclusions. There is no reason to think that defensive performance is any more consistent on a day-to-day basis. If anything, there are reasons to believe that it would vary even more than offense.

In general, a team will run out a similar line-up on a day-to-day basis, and each guy will get about the same number of plate appearances per day, as required by having batters take turns in order. That boundary does not hold with defenders, however. There is no rule that says each player on the field get an equal number of opportunities each day. In fact, given that pitchers have different tendencies in terms of groundball and flyball rates, it’s nearly guaranteed that the defensive opportunities will not be equal between pitchers.

Using aggregate stats from a team’s entire season simply won’t give you the kind of detail needed to accurately determine the quality of defense that was played behind a given pitcher in a season. Doing pitcher WAR that way provides an end result that does not match what actually happened. It is not an accounting of what actually happened.

Since neither method gets us to that goal of accurate accounting, we’re left with a choice of two paths, both with structural problems that can’t be avoided based on the data we currently have access to. Personally, I prefer FIP-based WAR because it is easier to adjust for what we know is not included – BABIP and sequencing, essentially – than it is to take a defense-adjusted RA based WAR and make adjustments for places where the assumption of defensive distribution equality does not hold.

Let’s use Francisco Liriano and Cliff Lee as examples. Liriano’s RA results don’t match his FIP in large part because he has a .340 batting average on balls in play. Since our version of WAR doesn’t hold that against him, he comes out looking really good. An RA-based version not only holds his actual BABIP against him (by starting with runs allowed), but it then penalizes him further because the Twins have an above-average defense, and the assumption is that he got proportionate help from the guys behind him.

What is more likely – that Liriano gave up contacted balls that should have resulted in a .350 to .360 BABIP, and the good glove Twins helped bring that down to .340, or that the guys behind him didn’t make as many plays for him as they did when Carl Pavano or Brian Duensing was pitching? Considering that he posted a basically league average 19.1% line drive rate, I’m more inclined to believe that the latter is closer to the truth. We don’t know exactly what kind of defensive support Liriano got this year, but based on what we know about a pitcher’s control over BABIP, I think we’re better off assuming that there were some issues behind him that hurt him than we are assuming that the Twins defense supported him equally as well as they supported his fellow pitchers.

Lee’s case shows the other side of the coin that FIP ignores – when those hits occur. While he has a normal .302 batting average on balls in play, it is not at evenly distributed within the base-out states. His BABIP is just .257 with the bases empty, but jumps to .350 with men on base, and is .333 with runners in scoring position. Because of that split in when his balls are being turned into outs, he has a LOB% of just 67.9%, well below average and far below what pitchers of his quality have posted this year.

For Lee, it hasn’t been a problem of too many finding holes, but simply those balls finding holes at the wrong times. It’s possible that those hits were a result of poor location, but given that he ran a 10.00 K/BB ratio with men in scoring position, it doesn’t seem like Lee suddenly lost his command when men got on base this year. Maybe he did – I don’t know. But should we assume that a pitcher’s BABIP with RISP is under his control? That’s really the driving force of Lee’s ERA this year, we have to acknowledge that it is certainly possible that his defenders let him down in those critical situations.

It is also possible that he let himself down. We just don’t really know who is at fault – pitcher or defenders. FIP blames BABIP entirely on defense. That’s definitely wrong. Defense-adjusted RA assumes that each pitcher got the same support from their teammates. That is also definitely wrong.

So, we’re left with two imperfect options. Which should you prefer? I can’t answer that for you. They both have strengths and weaknesses, and both are valid attempts to answer the question that we’re really trying to get at. I prefer the FIP-based implementation because it’s easier to make mental adjustments from that number, knowing that BABIP and sequencing are not included, than it is to try and back out of a metric that is already attempting to account for defensive support and find out where it might have missed the mark, but that’s a personal preference more than it’s a right or wrong thing.

WAR is not perfect, and it’s less perfect for pitchers than it is for hitters. Separating out defense from pitching is hard, and we don’t have it all figured out yet. We don’t encourage you to use any version of WAR as the be-all, end-all of analysis. We think its a pretty nifty tool, especially if you understand its limitations, and it does a good in most instances. However, it’s not perfect. Our version isn’t perfect, and Sean’s version isn’t perfect. We’re both trying, and we’re trying from different angles. Rather than focusing on why the differences make both “wrong,” maybe we should admit that its nice to have both perspectives?


2010 NL Playoff Rotations: San Francisco Giants

With their afternoon win followed by a Padres loss, the Giants have clinched at least a tie for the NL West crown. All they have to do is win one game at home this weekend to put themselves in the playoffs for the first time since 2003. Even in the unlikely event of a sweep they’ll still have a Game 163 on Monday. They’d head down to San Diego for that one, since the Padres have the season series at hand. But that scenario is still not likely. The odds are heavily in favor of San Francisco playing in the postseason.

While the Phillies have a seemingly unstoppable rotation, the Giants have a formidable staff themselves. There is only a small chance that the two will meet in the NLDS — it would take San Diego winning the West and San Fran taking the Wild Card over Atlanta. But this would be one amazing NLCS pitching match-up.

1) Tim Lincecum CHONE: 3.40 nERA, 2.60 FIP
2010: 5.2 WAR, 3.16 FIP, 3.22 xFIP, 3.47 tERA, 3.43 ERA

This hasn’t been Lincecum’s finest season, nor has he been the best pitcher on the Giants. But he has still been excellent, despite the narrative that something is wrong with him. Regardless of his standing among his rotation-mates, he lines up to start Game 1 of the NLDS.

While Linecum’s strikeout rate is down this year, 9.79 per nine against 10.42 in 2009 and 10.51 in 2008, he still leads the NL. His home run rate has almost doubled from last year, but he’s still in the Top 20. His FIP ranks eighth and his xFIP ranks fourth. In other words, a down year by his standards is still an ace-like one. A Lincecum – Tim Hudson NLDS Game 1 sounds like a thrilling one.

2) Matt Cain CHONE: 3.88 nERA, 3.77 FIP
2010: 4.4 WAR, 3.51 FIP, 4.20 xFIP, 3.31 tERA, 2.95 ERA

Tonight Cain gets the first shot at delivering the NL West title, as he’ll take the hill for the Giants. This is the second straight year Cain has produced an ERA under 3.00, an the fourth in a row in which he has outperformed both his FIP and xFIP. He has, however, been a bit closer to his tERA this year, mainly because of his lower line drive rate, 16.8 percent against 18.7 percent last year and 22.8 percent in 2008. Yet he’s still outperforming that. Some guys simply defy their component ERAs.

One noticeable change in Cain this year is that he’s lost about a mile per hour off his fastball, as suggested by both the BIS data and PitchFX. Yet heh asn’t let it get in the way of his effectiveness. The BIS data has him throwing the changeup a bit more often, and at a lower speed than in previous years. The PitchFX data differs slightly in changeup usage data, but reports the same trend in velocity. It also appears that he’s getting a bit more movement away from left-handed hitters.

Just as Lincecum matches up with any other team’s ace, Cain can stack up to any other No. 2 pitcher he’ll face.

Question Marks

I’m placing the next three pitchers as question marks, because I honestly have no idea how San Francisco will line up their staff in the postseason. Barry Zito pitches on Saturday, so he would line up for a Game 3 start. But he hasn’t pitched as well as Jonathan Sanchez and Madison Bumgarner. Will the Giants go with Zito and his playoff experience, or a lefty who has pitched better? I’ll bet on the experience, just because that’s how these things seem to go.

3) Barry Zito CHONE: 4.47 nERA, 4.39 FIP
2010: 2.2 WAR, 4.25 FIP, 4.76 xFIP, 4.31 tERA, 4.08 ERA

In April it appeared as though we were witnessing the Great Barry Zito Resurgence. In 35.1 innings he produced a 1.53 ERA and 2.66 FIP. It was clear that he wouldn’t continue pitching like that all season, but he had a chance for a quality third season in San Francisco. But then in May he had a 4.50 ERA and 4.81 FIP, which evened out his numbers a bit. Later he had an August every bit as bad as his April was good, 7.76 ERA and 6.24 FIP, which has made his season look rather pedestrian on the whole. Yet given his veteran status and playoff experience he’ll probably get the ball in Game 3 — though I hope I’m wrong.

4) Jonathan Sanchez CHONE: 4.42 nERA, 3.91 FIP
2010: 2.6 WAR, 4.01 FIP, 4.10 xFIP, 3.67 tERA, 3.15 ERA

For the first time in his career Sanchez has out-performed his FIP, and the Giants’ staff is all the better for it. He has continued his career-long trend of being a high-strikeout, high-walk pitcher who allows about an average number of home runs. The difference this year is that he’s limited line drives to 14.6 percent, which has in part caused a dip in his BABIP to .263 from a career mark of .301. A 78.7 percent strand rate has also helped his ERA.

Based on his results for the 2010 season, Sanchez seems like the pick for a Game 3 start. There’s the risk that his walks come back to haunt him, or that he sees some hits fall in that didn’t during the regular season, but that’s a risk with any pitcher. He has produced the results this season, and the Giants should give him a chance to finish his strong finish to the season (1.17 ERA, 3.41 FIP, 10.86 K/9 in September).

5) Madison Bumgarner CHONE: 4.78 nERA, 4.45 FIP
2010: 2.0 WAR, 3.66 FIP, 4.04 xFIP, 3.59 tERA, 3.00 ERA

He’s just 20 years old, but Bumgarner has been a major contributor for the Giants this season. And, as is the case with Sanchez, he’s finishing the season strong. In 32 September innings he has a 1.13 ERA and 1.96 FIP, striking out a batter per inning along the way. His BABIP is a bit high at .340, but he’s helped off-set that with a 92.5 percent strand rate. It’s been quite a month, and if the Giants think they can ride that into October they should hand him the ball in Game 4. It’s a long shot, of course, with both Zito and Sanchez on the roster. But if the Giants want to go on results, it will be Sanchez and Bumgarner taking the ball while Zito watches from the bench. The more likely scenario is that Bumgarner finds a place in the bullpen.


Why Our Pitcher WAR Uses FIP

Yesterday, respected scribe Joe Posnanski put out the following message on his Twitter account:

Fangraphs WAR has Cliff Lee at 6.6, best in AL. Baseball Ref WAR has Cliff Lee at 4.2, not even in Top 10. We need a summit.

Since Baseball Reference implemented Sean Smith’s version of Wins Above Replacement, people have been pointing out the differences between the two systems. While they use the same basic framework, they have different inputs which naturally lead to different results. For position players, the defensive system is the main driver of the discrepancies, as we use UZR while Sean uses Total Zone. For pitchers, however, it’s not just a different system, but a fundamental difference of what is being measured, and this is what drives the big gaps in WAR for pitchers like Lee.

Our version of pitcher WAR is essentially based on FIP, meaning that a pitcher is judged by his walk rate, strikeout rate, and home run rate (and, of course, the quantity of innings that he throws and the role in which he throws them). Sean takes a pitcher’s actual runs allowed, then makes adjustments to try to compensate for the defense behind him. The two systems might have the same goal, but they’re measuring two different things. Over the last few months, I’ve seen plenty of comments about how some people don’t like our FIP-based version of pitcher WAR for various reasons, so today I thought I’d explain the thought process of why we decided to build it like we did.

There is essentially one big problem that anyone evaluating pitchers has to deal with: how do you separate responsibility for hits allowed? There are usually four or five variables at work on any ball that is put in play – the quality of the pitch, the quality of the swing, the quality of the defensive play, the effects of the ballpark that game is being played in, and sometimes weather. All of these factors influence whether that ball ends up as a hit or an out, and, obviously, they don’t all have to do with the pitcher. So, in creating a statistic that attempts to isolate just the pitcher’s contribution, you have to figure out how you want to deal with the other factors.

Pretty much everyone just assumes that the quality of the opposing hitter essentially evens out over the course of a season, and it likely does most of the time, at least enough to where it doesn’t make a huge difference whether that is factored in or not. The two environmental factors, park and weather, are usually lumped together in one estimate of how a park plays, which is part of the adjustment in pitcher WAR for both our version and Sean Smith’s version. I have some issues with using a single park factor for every player, and I think before too long we’ll have a better way of adjusting for those things, but that’s another post entirely.

The last issue – quality of defensive contribution – is where we do something quite different. When we sat down and talked about how to handle this issue, I essentially realized that there is no right way to do this, based on the statistics we currently have available. There are compromises that have to be made, as we simply don’t have the tools available to really allow us to correctly assign responsibility between a pitcher, hitter, or defender on each hit or out in play. So, no matter what we did, there’d be a problem, and we’d just have to acknowledge that issue.

In the end, we had to choose between two different methods – assuming that the pitcher had no responsibility for the outcome of a ball in play, or attempting to approximate the amount of time that the result was due to the pitcher or the fielder. Ideally, we’d be able to do the latter – which is how Sean approaches it – but I just don’t think we currently have the tools available to make an accurate enough judgment on how to apportion that responsibility.

The why for that last paragraph deserves its own post, so I’ll have a follow-up here on the site in a few hours, where we’ll go through the problems with using both defense-adjusted RA and FIP for pitcher WAR, and show why I think that the FIP model is preferable for now.


Matt Stairs Is Forever Young

Will Venable’s injury allowed Matt Stairs to make a few starts for the Padres in left field this week. Those starts resulted in enough playing time to push Stairs over 100 plate appearances for the season. Thus marking the fifteenth consecutive season where Stairs has reached the plateau, a streak that captures the majority of his major league playing time.

Stairs’ role has varied quite a bit over that span, as is the case with any non-elite player over a decade and a half of playing. In recent seasons, he’s been nothing but a glamorized pinch hitter – inspiring the great t-shirts with the everlasting “In Case of Emergency, Use Stairs” slogan – but he went through a period where he was a worthwhile designated hitter and even a corner outfielder despite following what some may describe as Rod Beck’s dietary habits.

Despite dwindling playing time, Stairs has rarely delivered offensive mediocrity. Stairs’ wOBA has never slipped below .320 for a full season during the streak and three of his five seasons below .330 have occurred since 2008. This year’s .323 comes in an arctic environment known to leave bats frost bitten, so it can be excused to a degree, but at this point the 42-year-old is all about not slipping away suddenly instead of whether he can improve.

Will there be a roster spot for Stairs next year? I’d like to think so. In a season where Jim Thome has played pat-a-cake with the hands of time, one would hope Stairs can stick around for another season or two, though maybe not long enough so that he becomes a burden on a team because nobody wants to live in a world where Stairs can’t hit.


Uribe Bounces Back

Juan Uribe is eight plate appearances away from topping 1,000 for his Giants’ career. An absurd twist to Uribe’s career has him playing the role of starting shortstop on a playoff team in the year 2010. Absurd in the sense that Uribe very easily could be out of the majors right now. His 2007 and 2008 seasons were downright horrible. Rarely do defensive-first middle infielders nearing the wrong side of 30 continue getting looks when their defense seems to be on the brink of extinction.

Uribe signed a minor league deal with the Giants in January of 2009 to salvage his career. For a man with the reputation as a stranger to conditioning and offense alike, Uribe hit better than he had previously in his career. Perhaps giving flashbacks to his outstanding 2004 season with Chicago in which he hit 23 home runs and contributed a career best ISO as well.

The 31-year-old has not mimicked that performance this season, but his wOBA is a decent .319. One of the main differences between this Uribe and the one that bombed out of Chicago is his willingness to take a walk. Working free passes in nearly 8% of his plate appearances may not seem like a big deal, but Uribe has the finest walk-to-strikeout ratio of his career when combined with a slightly reduced strikeout rate.

His position and defensive prowess fail to translate into great speed. For his career, he only has 39 stolen bases (with 37 caught stealings) and that helps to translate into a .282 BABIP. This year, only a little over 25% of his balls in play are turning into hits. The rate is not out of reach given his recent history and reliance upon hitting balls into the air, but Uribe’s contact skills are probably better than his .246 batting average suggests.

A free agent at season’s end, Uribe could potentially get a multiple-year offer if a team is willing to put his history of portly disappointments behind them.