Archive for Daily Graphings

Derrek Lee’s Down Year

If I told you coming into this season that Derrek Lee was going to have the worst season of his career offensively aside from one half season stint as a twenty-three year old, you probably wouldn’t be shocked to hear that the Cubs were in the lower percentile of runs scored in Major League Baseball. But the Cubs have gotten steady production from a bunch of regular players this year. Geovany Soto, Alfonso Soriano, Marlon Byrd, and Tyler Colvin all have wOBA’s of over .350, with Kosuke Fukudome and Starlin Castro not too far behind. Unfortunately for those who bleed Cub blue, this hasn’t been enough to keep them competitive, and the down years of Lee and Aramis Ramirez are large contributors.

Lee, in 2009, was coming off of his second-best offensive season in the majors when he put up a .412 wOBA (153 wRC+), and his impending free agency led many to believe this would be another huge season for the thirty-four year old slugger. Let’s dig deeper into some of the peripherals behind Lee’s struggles with last year’s corresponding number in parentheses:

BB%: 11.2% (12.4%)
K%: 23.8% (20.5%)
GB%: 39.0% (35.1%)
FB%: 38.3% (45.7%)
IIFB%: 1.7% (4.6%)
LD%: 22.7% (19.2%)
HR/FB%: 10.0% (17.9%)

Some interesting stuff. While it may be obvious to notice a lack of fly balls by Lee this year, which seems to be dangerous for a first baseman playing at Wrigley, the loss has been mitigated by an increase in line drives and a decrease in infield flies. Take those into account and Lee is actually doing better than he was last year in that regard. His HR/FB rate has been a huge problem, which is a career low for Lee. If we use the wisdom behind xFIP on Lee and adjust his HR/FB rate to his career average (16.4%), then he’d be at ~19.7 homers this year rather than just the twelve at which he currently sits. But we know that for hitters, unlike (generally) pitchers, HR/FB is not just a matter of luck but is deeply rooted in skill.

Also, Lee’s BABIP is currently at .292, almost forty points below his career average and with an even wider margin than that for any year he has had since 2005. The disparity is particularly odd considering his LD rate is higher while his infield-fly rate is lower. Here are the breakdown’s of Lee’s BABIPs on batted ball types this season with last year and career averages following:

Grounders: .246, .267, .252
Fly balls: .120, .163, .134
Line Drives: .634, .756, .759

So Lee is “underperforming” on his BABIP on each batted ball type with the worst offender being line drives. Sure, it’s nice that Lee is hitting more of them, but if they’re not going for hits, and especially extra bases, then it’s not as important. I wish we had some Hitf/x to see if Lee is just hitting the ball less hard as of late, but he’s still probably been unlucky to a certain extent. How much of that decrease in batted ball performance is due to bad luck, and how much is due to skill, is a question that well have to wait for more data to roll in to answer.


Mike Minor’s Up and Down Debut

Mike Minor is a perfect example for why draft day armchair analysis doesn’t work. In 2009, the Vanderbilt lefty went seventh overall to the Braves, amid fairly consistent criticism from pundits. His fastball, at the time, graded out below average for some scouts, and his breaking ball was inconsistent at best. Everyone agreed that Minor had a good (great?) change-up, but while the comparisons people made to Jeremy Sowers would have once been a compliment, Minor seemed more like a late first round pick than someone that should be drafted ahead of Aaron Crow, Alex White, or Kyle Gibson.

Then, suddenly, Minor wasn’t the same pitcher anymore. Or, maybe he was exactly who Braves scouts thought he could be. This kid that wasn’t “dominant” in college — striking out just one batter per inning, and holding an ERA around 4 — was leading the minor leagues in strikeouts. Once a command specialist, who had a 1.89 BB/9 as an SEC freshman, Minor was now wild, with a walk rate of 3.5. Explanations were hard to come by. I assumed it was a mastering of his curveball, a pitch that college coach Tim Corbin told me on draft day last year was quickly becoming a weapon for him. It wasn’t until even later in the season that we found out his velocity had taken a step forward. In the Futures Game, he touched 95 mph. And by that point, Minor was dominating Triple-A.

Yesterday, the Braves called up Minor to open their series against the Houston Astros. I’m a geek for Major League debuts, and seeing as though Mike Minor was opposite Bud Norris — a former breakout prospect of mine, and current xFIP underachiever — it was must watch television for me. Ultimately, and probably unsurprisingly, it was a pretty sloppy game. The Astros won 10-4 after a seventh inning Braves bullpen implosion. Minor certainly gave the team a chance to win: six innings, one walk, five strikeouts. He did find that even Major Leaguers aren’t immune to ball-in-play variance, as two bloop hits and one Alex Gonzalez error were responsible for three of his four runs allowed. Given the overall success of the outing, his FIP (2.44) tells a better story for the start than his ERA (4.50). But that’s hardly a surprise.

Minor was a good study in the difference between control and command: he wasn’t wild, but he wasn’t hitting Brian McCann’s glove behind the plate, either. In Minor’s problem inning, the fourth, his first run came on a bloop double by Carlos Lee. McCann set up further in and up than where the pitch ended up, and while Minor probably didn’t deserve the run, 92 mph belt-high and middle-in won’t get it done at the highest level. Two batters later, his worst pitch of the night came to Brett Wallace, and by his reaction, Minor knew it. Wallace stung the down-the-middle offering, but with topspin, preventing the first home run of both their careers.

Even with the addition of velocity — Minor was 92-94 mph early on, touching 95, before pitching at 89-91 in the 5th and 6th innings — it’s hard to see it becoming a dominant Major League offering. According to Texas Leaguers (I should note that I have some problems with their pitch classifications after one start — what they list as two-seam fastballs were actually changeups), Minor’s whiff rate on his fastball last night was just 3.4%. In multiple at-bats, the southpaw struggled to put batters away with his fastball, giving up a huge percentage of foul balls. Perhaps if he can maintain consistent 92-95 mph, that will change, but we’ll first need to see it to believe it. This was an Astros lineup, after all, that featured Angel Sanchez and Jeff Keppinger hitting second and third, respectively.

But there are positives to take away from this start; namely, that Minor showed a fantastic change-up. The whiff rate of that offering was somewhere north of 25%, and, while he elevated a few, had pretty solid command of the pitch low and away to right-handed hitters. It’s a weapon, and dare I say, it has the opportunity to be one of baseball’s best. He’s a better pitcher than Jason Vargas or Wade LeBlanc, and a different pitcher than Ricky Romero or Jaime Garcia, but the strength of those change-ups is what I’m trying to convey.

In conclusion, while we have to adjust Minor’s long-term projection as a result of the first four months of his minor league season, I don’t want the numbers to have expectations too high. Minor is still more of a #3 starter than anything else, and there’s work to be done on his game. His breaking ball needs work, even though there are signs of a plus pitch there. His fastball is a bit of a tweener: not consistent-enough velocity to blow people away, not good-enough command to hit all his spots. He is close to being pretty damn good, but there is still work to be done. And with the Braves in the height of a playoff race, I’m not sure now is the time to be learning.


Expanding on Four Factors: Fun(?) With Math

I feel like my Four Factors series, which has covered a few interesting hitters, has gone over well here. I felt that it could be more, however, and I believe I’ve taken the first step into making it more than a simple tool or rule of thumb. The following is more of a reference post than an analytical post, and as the title suggests, there will be some math involved here. What I put forth here also suggests a possible addition of a fifth (or sixth) factor, albeit one (or two) that appears to be much less important than the other four.

For the four factors to have more use besides as an at-a-glance hitter evaluation tool, it would have to mean something in terms of runs. For hitting, that means wOBA. A bridge between the Four Factors and wOBA would mean that we could find how meaningful it is that Ryan Howard has seen his strikeouts drop if his power returns to previous form, or how much better my boy George Kottaras would be with a respectable BABIP instead of his current .195 mark.

Of course, BB% and K% can give us raw (or, even better, per plate appearance) numbers for walks and strikeouts. Working to figure out the other four events – 1B, 2B, 3B, and HR – would give us a working estimate of wOBA. This can be done with the use of POWH (XB/H), the version of Isolated Power that only looks at slugging percentage on hits, and BABIP (H/BIP), the other two factors. These four relatively isolated hitting skills can almost completely account for a player’s overall line.

The tricky part comes with estimating home runs, because of the four stats we have, only two of them deal with contact, and of those, one deals with balls in play, excluding home runs. But we can solve for home runs as follows. Follow the jump for the math.

POWH*BABIP = (XB/H)*((H-HR)/BIP) where BIP = PA-BB-SO-HR, or balls in play. Now, it’s time to use some “fancy algebra,” which means a lot of steps. Note that instead of using PA, I use 1, as instead of calculating raw PA totals, I prefer per plate appearance totals for the results.

Read the rest of this entry »


Alex Rodriguez’s First Big Deal

This post is not timely whatsoever, so apologies for that; also, props to Tommy Rancel for suggesting it and helping with the research.

On July 27, 1996, Alex Rodriguez turned 21 years old. He also signed an extension valued at four-years and $10.6 million. Despite Rodriguez’s age, he was in the midst of his first major league season and third overall. Through the season’s first 86 games, Rodriguez had started 85 of them while hitting .351/.410/.632 with 21 home runs in just 353 at-bats. For comparison, Jason Heyward was 20 when he had a scorching hot May. He hit .337/.453/.628 over those 25 games. Rodriguez was not too far off and he did it over a full season while being only a little older.

Rodriguez was about as close to a sure thing as possible from a stats or scouting perspective; after all, that’s why he was the top pick in the draft and that’s why he ascended the ladder so quickly. That extension by today’s standards looks woeful for Camp Rodriguez and amazing for Woody Woodward and the Mariners but the economic environment in baseball was wholly different 14 years ago. The highest payroll in baseball still belonged to the Yankees, but at $52 million instead of $206 million. The highest paid player in baseball that season was Cecil Fielder, just over $9 million. Ken Griffey Jr. ranked third with a $7.5 million salary. In 2010, a $7.5 million salary doesn’t crack the top 25, in fact, a $15 million dollar salary doesn’t either, as Hiroki Kuroda’s $15.4 ranks 25th overall.

Still, for the production the Mariners received, the market rate for wins had to be extremely, extremely low for them not to rake on this deal. From 1997 until he left following the 2000 season, Rodriguez racked up 27.4 WAR. He was paid $10.6 million. That is roughly $390 thousand per victory. One would have to set the market rate for wins very, very low to say the Mariners made anything but a profit off Rodriguez’s extension.

His current and previous contracts are well publicized and overwatered from snark and critique alike. At one point, though, Alex Rodriguez was a hell of a bargain.

Most of the salary data courtesy of USA Today


Youkilis, Lowell, Delgado, Platooning

With first baseman Kevin Youkilis out for the the season, the Boston Red Sox have been giving Mike Lowell starts at first base. Lowell hasn’t hit well this season (.300 wOBA so far). However, it has only been a bit over 100 plate appearances, and ZiPS RoS projects him for a .335 over the rest of the season. That is a far cry from what Youkilis had been producing (.419 wOBA) or was projected by ZiPS to produce over the rest of the season (.399 wOBA). Assuming 200 PA over the rest of the season (leaving aside the relatively minor difference in PA given their likely batting order placement), the difference between Youkilis and Lowell over these last 50 games or so would be about 10-11 runs, or about one win. (Youkilis is also defensively superior at first base, although over 50 games it’s probably only a couple of runs.) With the Red Sox still not out of the hunt for the playoffs with less than a third of the season to go, the difference is significant.

Boston has been giving catcher Victor Martinez occasional starts at first, but recently signed former Blue Jay, Marlin, and Met first baseman Carlos Delgado to a minor league deal with hopes he can help the team soon. The underrated-in-his-prime Delgado was unsigned in the off-season and spent the first part of the season rehabbing from off-season hip surgery. He doesn’t have a ZiPS RoS projection given that he hasn’t played in the majors yet this season. Given his layoff and rehab issues, I think it’s fair to use his CHONE pre-season projection of .337 wOBA true talent (ZiPS projected .364 prior to the season), which, his poor defense at first base aside, would make him about as valuable offensively as Lowell over the rest of the season assuming he could start right away — about a win or more worse than Youkilis.

A wOBA in the mid-.330s for a first baseman is not very good. However, with two players like Lowell and Delgado, a platoon is a good idea (at the moment, I’m not sure what the Red Sox plan on doing). As I discussed earlier this year in a Book-inspired post, one can’t just apply observed splits to players, one has to regress them against league average, etc., to get a useful platoon skill estimate. In a different post, I actually used Delgado as an example. Delgado’s larger-than-average splits actually make him more useful in a platoon role than players with smaller splits. Based on his .337 CHONE projection, I estimated Delgado’s true talent versus right-handed pitchers to be .352 wOBA. There is less variation (and a smaller split) among right-handed hitters with regard to platoon skill, but Lowell’s estimated skill vs. LHP is about the same as Delgado’s versus RHP: .351 wOBA.

Over a full season (700 PA), a Lowell/Delgado platoon is worth between nine and ten runs more than either one of individually — one win. Over the remainder of the season, of course, it’s only worth about 3 runs more than either one of them individually. It isn’t much of a difference over the last 50 games relative to the loss of an underrated superstar like Youkilis, but with the Red Sox not completely out of it yet, platooning Delgado (if he is ready to play) with Lowell at first would be a smart move.


FanGraphs Prospect Chat


Jim Edmonds for Chris Dickerson

The Cincinnati Reds attempted to strengthen their postseason chances by acquiring OF Jim Edmonds from the Brewers today for OF Chris Dickerson. Edmonds was apparently a decently hot commodity on the waiver wire with the lack of big bats available at the trade deadline, but the first place Reds were able to snag away a potential future Hall of Famer (*fingers crossed*) in hopes to bolster their outfield.

Cincinnati has an eclectic mix of outfielders that makes the addition of Edmonds all the more interesting. Jonny Gomes actually has a wOBA of .335, but his below average defense (-10.0 UZR, -10 DRS, generally poor scouting reports) and inability to play centerfield hurts his value tremendously. Second in wOBA is Laynce Nix, who, at .328 (100 wRC+), will probably see time reduced due to this trade. Last is Jay Bruce, whom R.J. Anderson wrote about at length a few weeks ago. Bruce is just at a .322 wOBA, and has never cracked the .330 wOBA mark throughout his three-year major league career. The best Reds outfielder this season has been rookie Chris Heisey, who has put up a .397 wIBA (147 wRC+) while playing solid defense. His bat is real, and hopefully Edmonds doesn’t cut into his playing time significantly. Drew Stubbs has played a bunch of centerfield this season, but his modest .316 wOBA doesn’t impress ZiPS; it projects him for .302 from here on out.

Meanwhile, Jim Edmonds is having a fantastic year all around. He’s played great defense in both center and right field, as well as shown his ability to play first base (although I doubt Joey Votto has anything to worry about). His .369 wOBA is generated by a .286/.350/.493 slash line, his highest slugging since 2005. However, he is walking at just 8.5%, but this may be due to pitchers being reluctant to pitch around him early on given that he missed the entire 2009 season. His walk rate has steadied around ~9.7% over the past two months, which is closer (but still significantly far away) from his career average of 12.5%. Edmonds is hitting right-handed pitchers this year to the tune of a .373 wOBA, but his peripherals all show an ability to hit lefties extremely well; most of the difference in production between facing righties and lefties has been due to an inflated BABIP versus righties. His .344 overall BABIP is well above his career average, especially his last few seasons. However, his LD rate is at an absurdly high 28.5%, a number that may be due slightly to scoring bias, but either way will probably regress. Still, even a regressed/adjusted LD rate will be generally favorable. Either way, the ZiPS projection likes Edmonds for a .340 wOBA going forward.

Going to Milwaukee in the deal is outfielder Chris Dickerson, who is a real nice grab for the Brewers for a few months of Jim Edmonds. Dickerson put up 3.2 WAR in 128 games from 2008-09, playing good defense in centerfield with an ability to play the corners well also. However, after a .339 wOBA last year, Dickerson struggled mightily in 2010 with a .205/.222/.273 line. Since being sent to Triple-A Louisville, Dickerson has raked; he’s hitting .442/.528/.767 in fifty-five plate appearances. Dickerson has MLB-ready talent both at the plate and in the field. He’ll have opportunities to teach his old team a lesson in the NL Central. ZiPS thinks he’s good for a .322 wOBA for the rest of the season, and at twenty-eight years old could be close to his offensive peak.

Overall, this wasn’t that poor of a trade for either team, although Cincinnati may have slightly overpaid for an outfielder who could see serious regression while giving up a much younger outfielder who could be useful in the future, maybe even now. They’re clearly going all out in the NL Central race, which they should, but I wonder if this move was necessary for them, or if the asking price for Edmonds was really as high as Dickerson. Milwaukee comes away with a big plus, acquiring a solid outfielder just because they offered a Spring Training invite to an older outfielder who hadn’t played pro ball in over a year.


Britney Spears! Hot Pics! (Or, Notes on the Live Event)

Note: If you’re curious about the significance of this post’s title, fast forward to the fourth-to-last bullet.

As you might’ve heard, FanGraphs brought its act to New York this past Saturday with a view towards letting smart baseball people say smart baseball things.

“How’d it go?” maybe you’re asking.

Well, actually, kinda even better than this author could’ve imagined.

With the exception of some French Canadians who kept loudly chanting Jonah Keri’s name — that, and the seven or ten bareknuckled fights in which I personally engaged with Patrick Sullivan of Baseball Analysts — the Event (and the congregation afterwards at Amity Hall) were about as frigging convivial as one could imagine.

In what follows, I reduce all of the nuance and personality of the Event to a few shallow observations and badly strained insights.

In other words: Enjoy!

• Discovery: Mitchel Lichtman (creator of UZR, contributor to The Book blog) is not a prick. How do I know? Well, for one, those were the first words out of his mouth on the Stats panel. “Just to clarify,” he said, grabbing the microphone by its stand, “I am not a prick.”

Duly noted, Mr. Lichtman.

Here’s another way you could find out that Mr. Lichtman isn’t a prick: by talking to him and, while talking to him, to avoid statements that demonstrate a lack of clear thinking. So far as I can tell — and he said as much on the Stats panel — baseball very much represents for Lichtman an opportunity to practice thinking, to practice asking questions, to practice being curious.

• This last point was echoed by other panelists, both explicity and implicity: baseball, they might agree, is an excellent medium for practicing critical thinking.

Let’s also be clear, however: that’s not the only thing for which baseball’s good.

• Question: Is sabermetrics — and the wider net that it’s continually casting — producing a generation of young men (and — gasp! — even some women) with more highly developed faculties of reason? with a stronger understanding of randomness? with a better idea of how to separate signal from noise?

• ESPN radio announcer Jon “Boog” Sciambi is our greatest ally*. Before I say why exactly, I’d like just to talk about his voice for a second. Here’s what it (i.e. his voice) sounds like: like it’s covered in an entire barrel of delicious forest honey. Here’s what I wish it (i.e. still his voice) would do: read me stories at night so I could fall asleep more easily.

*By “our,” I mean either (a) those who care about discussing baseball in thoughtful, even tones, or (b) people of Italian descent. You decide which!

With that out of the way, let me tell you another thing: Sciambi is committed to searching for the capital-T truth, and is dedicated to filling his broadcast full of that search. This doesn’t necessarily mean rattling off xFIPs and BABIP, mind you — it has to play to a general audience — but Sciambi made it clear that he makes it a priority to work at his smartest.

• At a post-Event lunch, the question was posed: “What’s harder to predict, the stock market or baseball players’ futures?” The answer? The stock market, hands down.

“The stock market” someone added — maybe it was Tommy Bennett, maybe our Dark Overlord himself — “is more like projecting the future performance of all high school baseball players.” Which, that would be harder.

• During the Media panel, moderator Jonah Keri began one of his questions for the group by positing the existence of purely hypothetical Boston-area sports columnist with the totally made-up name of Shman Shmaughnessy.

It’s still a mystery upon whom exactly this character could be based.

• Also on the Media panel, both New York Magazine’s Will Leitch and the Wall Street Journal’s David Biderman mentioned — offhandedly, if nothing else — mentioned the importance of the headline to generating page views.

“Unfortunately, it’s important,” Biderman said.

I second Biderman’s sentiments on this matter. It’s frustrating to imagine that a well-written post or article would go unread (or less read, at least) merely because it lacked a provocative title. I don’t know, and won’t pretend to know, how greatly the numbers fluctuate given the “quality” of a title. My immediate reaction is this, though: there’s no use wringing one’s hands over the matter. If a good title gets eyes on good writing, so be it. My other reaction is this: good writing gets read.

• Observation: saber-oriented Yankee fans, just like all other kinds of Yankee fans, are disgustingly confident.

• The truth comes out: after long being suspected of such bias, Dave Cameron finally admitted — via a tearful, handwritten confession at the end of the Live Event — to hating all teams except the Mariners and to using FanGraphs as his vehicle for promoting Mariner fandom.

Video available soon. Scout’s honor.

• To echo Cameron’s sentiments from earlier today, but to do it with French words, the esprit de corps of the afterparty was terrifically gratifying, humbling. Essentially, all my interactions were with enthusiastic and curious people. That’s really the most I could ever ask of life.


The Odd Timeline of Raul Ibanez in Philly

Early in the 2008-2009 off-season it sounded like Raul Ibanez desired a deal that didn’t exist. After five very good years in Seattle Ibanez wanted a multi-year deal, something that teams didn’t seem to be offering non-stars that winter. For a 37-year-old with poor defensive skills, even a two-year offer seemed unlikely. Yet in December newly minted Phillies GM Ruben Amaro signed Ibanez to a three-year, $31.5 million contract that would keep him in Philadelphia through his age-39 season.

That didn’t sound like a great deal at the time, and the move faced predictable criticism. Defense dominated the conversation, but there were plenty of concerns about Ibanez’s bat. There was no denying his production in Seattle, but it’s tough to project how a player will hit as he reaches his upper 30s. Some players retain most of their skills and continue producing. Others either see a gradual decline or fall off a cliff. The Phillies risked the latter, but Amaro bet on the former. Two and a half months into the season he was looking pretty smart.

Ibanez came out swinging for his new team. In 90 April PA he produced a .485 wOBA, and then followed that with a .427 wOBA in 123 May PA. That production continued into June, as he hit in 12 straight games that month before going 0 for 8 on the 16th and 17th. Those would be the last games he’d play for a few weeks, as he hit the DL with a groin strain. It hurt the Phillies, of course, but it didn’t seem too serious. Ibanez would be back within a month.

As happens any time an older player goes on an prolonged run, steroid speculation surfaces. For Ibanez that came in the form of a now-infamous article on Midwest Sports Fans, in which Jerrod Morris ran some numbers and determined that — well, he didn’t determine anything, really, except that we couldn’t rule out PEDs, something that can be said for just about any player in the game today if you want to stretch the point far enough. It caused a stir that ran right up to Ibanez’s injury.

Upon his return Ibanez hit more like he had earlier in his career and less like the flukey run he experienced in April and May. He produced horribly in August, a .244 wOBA, but he surrounded that with a .375 wOBA in July and a .367 wOBA in September. It added up to the best offensive season of his career, a 379 wOBA. He also came closer than ever before to a World Series victory. There might have been downturns, but Ibanez’s first year in Philly can’t be classified as anything but a success.

In 2010, though, things started off on the downslope with a .295 wOBA in April. That got Phillies fans and analysts talking, of course, but Ibanez did his part to quell the criticism with a .340 wOBA in May. It wasn’t like any month, save August, in his 2009 campaign, but it was still above average. But then came June, which Ibanez started off with a 1 for 17 skid. His 0 for 4 day on June 6 represented a low point, after which his OPS dropped to .699.

That very evening, after the 0 for 4, Corey Seidman of Phillies Nation spilled something he must have been thinking for a while: it was time for the Phillies and Ibanez to part ways. This went beyond mere fan emotion. He went on to cite the myriad struggles Ibanez faced during the year, including a slugging percentage lower than David Eckstein and defense that rivaled the worst corner outfielders in the league. I had a few issues with the premise — for example, Seidman claims that Ibanez had “two great months, one horrible month, and three average months,” even though, as we saw above, .375, .362, and .367 wOBAs are considerably above average — but the point was sound. Considering his defense, age, and recent trends, Ibanez might have been done.

I’m not sure what happened between the games on June 6 and June 7, but whatever it was changed Ibanez’s season. He went just 1 for 3 in the following game, but on June 8 broke out with a 4 for 5 performance. Since June 7 Ibanez has hit .314/.388/.500 in 219 PA. His early season slump comprised 210 PA. Of the 61 hits he has accumulated in this span, 20 have gone for extra bases, including eight home runs. In July he produced a .406 wOBA, and in his first 28 August PA he’s at it again, going 9 for 23 with a double and a homer.

The months of April and June were marked by terrible BABIP marks, .259 and .247. That might have included some luck, though considering the reactions of Phillies fans it didn’t sound like he was striking the ball well. This seemed particularly true in June, when he had a paltry 10 percent line drive rate. In recent months he’s seen his BABIP climb, to .386 on a 21.6 percent line drive rate in July, and a .500 BABIP so far this month. While he won’t keep up those marks for the rest of the season, it has provided him with something of a statistical correction. His .343 wOBA doesn’t look pretty, but it’s far better than where he sat a few months ago.

Through the slumps, Ibanez continued to walk. This year he has walked in 12.4 percent of his PA, easily a career high rate. In April he walked in 16.5 percent of PA, and in May he walked in 12.4 percent. Despite his turnaround starting in early June, it was still a poor month overall, and he walked in just 8.5 percent of his PA. But that shot back up to 12.4 percent in July and is 14.3 percent in August. Last year, in the three months following his injury, Ibanez walked in 12.7, 10.2, and 12.9 percent of his PA, big improvements over his early-season numbers.

In his reaction to the release Ibanez article, Bill Baer hit on an important point:

The 2010 season has been a real struggle for Raul Ibanez and the Philadelphia Phillies, but it is not unique. The Atlanta Braves are wondering if they are ever going to get anything out of Nate McLouth; the New York Yankees have been waiting for Curtis Granderson to find his power; the Houston Astros are trying to find out who took away Carlos Lee‘s offense. Over the next four months those three hitters will, most likely, improve offensively not because someone found a mechanical flaw or they fixed their timing (although that could certainly happen), but because they are simply regressing to their mean. I can flip a coin ten times and get eight tails. If I continue to flip a coin 100 more times, I should expect that coin to come up tails not 80% of the time, but 50% — its true probability. The same holds true for Raul and many other struggling baseball players.

Patience, of course, can be over-extended, and there was a solid case in early June for not granting Ibanez any more time. The Phillies could have called up Domonic Brown then and moved Ibanez to the bench or to the waiver wire. But they saw something, I guess, that gave them a bit of pause. That little pause was the difference between realizing superior production over the past two or so months and having to find yet another player to fill a spot in the outfield.

It has not been a smooth year and two thirds for Raul Ibanez in Philadelphia. He’s faced criticism from all angles, some of it justified, some of it not. Chances are the final year and a third of his contract will play out in a similarly up-and-down manner. His age, poor defense, and, recently, streaky tendencies will not make life easy. But we now know that Ibanez can be a productive player for the Phillies. That might not add up to the $11.5 million he’ll make next year, but it should be good enough as to avoid the mid-season DFA.


More on Morrow

After Brandon Morrow’s 17 strikeout game, the next step, after acceptance, is to wonder what the performance means for his career. Reservations for complete games with exorbitant strikeout totals and miniscule walk rates are for the finest of fine pitching. I wanted to find out just how fine the pitchers’ careers turned out who managed to spin one of these gems. In doing so, I used Baseball-Reference’s Play Index with the following query:

– Individual games spanning the 1920-2010 seasons as a starting pitcher
– Requiring at least 17 strikeouts, fewer than three walks, and at least one inning pitched

The reason for including fewer than three walks is multilayered. It trims the list of candidates down while increasing the difficulty level of the performance, thus giving us the cream of the crop. The above mandates returned 35 individual games. Quite a few being repeats of the true greats. One thing I did not adjust that I’ll disclaim here is how I did not control for age. Randy Johnson’s 20 strikeout game as a 37 year old is included just as Kerry Wood’s game as a 20 year old. Presumably age plays some role in the expectations for Morrow heading forward, as does his background, but there was just no sensible way to really adjust for either with such a limited sample size.

Here is the list of pitchers with their career innings pitched, earned runs allowed, and ERA+. I’m not saying these are the best instruments for judging pitcher worth or anything of the sort; instead I’m just giving an idea of how this group matches up with those metrics:

From there, I get a collective ERA of 3.30 and using the methodology outline by Tango here, a collective ERA+ of 118. In other words: Morrow has some big shoes to fill if he wants to fit in with the rest of these guys.