Archive for Daily Graphings

Twins Again Surge Without Morneau

Justin Morneau played his last game of 2009 on September 12, his team 5.5 games back of Detroit, and even a half-game back of Chicago, in the AL Central. The Twins were, in fact, two games below .500 at that point, and with just 20 games remaining their chances of making up the deficit seemed bleak. They had just lost three straight and Morneau, their second best hitter, was done for the season with a stress fracture in his lower back. It looked like the MVP-Mauer-led Twins would watch from their homes in October.

What came next surprised everyone. The sans-Morneau Twins rattled off six straight wins, including the first two in a series with Detroit. They dropped that last game, but then came back to win another five straight, including a three-game sweep of the White Sox. After dropping three of four, including two to Detroit, they won their final four games of the season. With a little help from Detroit they were able to catch up and force a one-game playoff, which they also won. Including the sudden death game the Twins went 17-4 in their last 21 games. All without Morneau and his .371 wOBA.

This year the Twins started off hot, but tapered off a bit as the season wore on. Morneau had been doing his part, producing a .447 wOBA and 5.2 WAR through July 7. But on that day, while sliding into second, he took a knee to the head and suffered a concussion. That figured to keep him out for a few days, but his recovery has not gone so well. A little more than a week after the injury the Twins placed him on the DL, and to this day he remains there. There is no real timetable for his return, though it sounds like the weekend is the earliest possibility. That has to be hurting the Twins right now.

Instead of seeing the Twins fall further behind the White Sox, we’ve again seen them gain ground since Morneau’s injury. After the game during which Morneau sustained his injury the Twins fell to 45-39, 1.5 games back of Detroit and a half game back of Chicago. Losing Morneau looked like an even bigger blow this year than it was last year. Joe Mauer led the Twins then, but his production has dropped a bit this year. A .379 wOBA from a catcher is excellent, but it’s still significantly below the .438 wOBA he produced last year. Morneau has led the team this year, and so the Twins have been without their best bat for more than a month now.

The Morneau-less lineup didn’t fare as well as it did in 2009, at least off the bat. In fact, the Twins dropped three straight after the injury, scoring just eight runs in those games. That put them four games behind Detroit and 3.5 games behind Chicago. At just three games over .500 and having no idea when their best hitter would return, there was some doubt about the Twins’ season. They had gone from best team in the Central to also-rans in a short span. How could they survive without Morneau?

After those losses, though, the Twins caught fire. They beat Detroit to avoid a sweep, and after dropping the first of a four game series to Chicago they came back to win the final three. The turnaround didn’t seem evident in the next five games, as they went 2-3 against the Indians and Orioles, but following the loss in Baltimore they rattled off eight straight wins in which they scored 66 runs. Since then they have split a series at Tampa Bay, won two out of three against Cleveland, and, after last night’s 12-6 drubbing, have reclaimed first place by defeating the White Sox.

The Twins 19-10 record in Morneau’s absence might not seem particularly torrid, but it does outpace their season record by a decent margin. After the loss on July 7 they had a .536 win percentage, so they’ve won more since then. Even crazier, after the initial three losses they’ve gone 19-7, a .731 win percentage. It’s not quite the .810 win percentage of their final 21 games in 2009, but it has been enough for them to retake sole possession of first place in the Central for the first time since July 2.


A graph of the Twins performance since Morneau’s injury. Thanks to Tommy Bennett for whipping this up. Click for larger.

While the typical talk radio reaction might involving lamenting Morneau’s return — they’re better without him, just look at the standings! — clearly it will be a nice boost for the team. Michael Cuddyer filled in admirably at first for a while, producing his best month of the year, but his bat has again tapered. But even when Cuddyer was hot he was no match for Morneau’s production. Few players in baseball are.

The Twins have made a nice run, and with one more win in the next two days against Chicago they’ll be set up well as they return home for nine games. Chances are we’ll see him back in the lineup some time during that stretch. That should scare other teams, particularly the White Sox (whom the Twins will face in another three-game series starting next Tuesday). If the Twins are playing this well without Morneau’s bat, imagine how hot they can get once her returns.


Getting Ahead

For those of you that visit Fangraphs, wOBA has become a favorite stat of not only this website, but many other sabermetrically-inclined sites as well. The theory behind it is simple: assign value to individual offensive events via linear weights and then apply those numbers to a player’s performance. We go ahead and adjust the formula so that it looks like OBP, meaning that league average usually falls ~.333 and is properly distributed along the curve.

But there has recently been more research done into linear weights so that we can see the value of not only a single or a double, but of certain pitches. While this has been mostly popular in the domain of Pitchf/x, we can also use this information to further our understanding about hitters. For example, let’s say Miguel Cabrera and Magglio Ordonez come up to the plate consecutively. Miguel Cabrera works a 3-1 count and then lines a fastball into the right field gap for a stand up triple. Next, Magglio Ordonez hits a ball in the exact same spot on an 0-2 count and slides in safely at third. Back-to-back triples. For our purposes of wOBA, we would assign both Cabrera and Ordonez equally with ~1.56 runs, the linear weight value of a triple relative to an out.

But was that all we could gauge from those at-bats? With count-based linear weights, we can actually do more. Miguel Cabrera worked a 3-1 count before his triple; there’s value in knowing that information. Since we can say that a 3-1 count is worth somewhere around .14 runs, why not credit Cabrera in some capacity for getting into that count? Likewise, we know (based on the same run value charts linked last sentence) that an 0-2 count is worth roughly -.104 runs. Why not also take that into account? The moral here is that those triples were not made equally.

But we do have to be somewhat careful we don’t double count. A player is more likely to hit a triple (or for our purposes, get a higher run value) if he gets to a 3-1 count, and the oppposite is true for an 0-2 count. Those count-based linear weights are based on how many runs are likely to proceed from that count, so we would probably have to regress the run values somewhat so we don’t double credit a hitter. Maybe the most interesting experiment would be to just take a batter’s count-based linear weights for an entire season and compare players, or even apply their batted ball linear weights for if/when they put the ball in play to their count-based run total.

This is a thought experiment, so I’d like to see what people think. The next step may be crunching the numbers.


FanGraphs Chat – 8/11/10

Back from New York, I’ll be chatting about the event this past weekend and baseball in general.


Rob Manfred on Minor League Drug Testing Program

Say the words “performance-enhancing drugs” in a baseball discussion, and if there’s more than two people involved in it, chances are, you’re going to get strong opinions on the topic. For Major League Baseball, the issue is most often centered around its records and awards, most notably the Hall of Fame.

But, if you look at every drug suspension in baseball (see the All-Time Drug Suspension list), players in the majors that have been suspended make up a tiny fraction of the total. Whether it has been players being able to afford substances or trainers to administer them that avoid detection, or the way that the program, called the Joint Drug Agreement (JDA), has been collectively bargained, major league players coming up positive in testing, or being caught through non-testing means termed non-analytics, chances are slim that a player under the major league testing program is announced as being under suspension.

Indeed, this year, there has been exactly one drug suspension under the major league policy (Edinson Volquez of the Reds on April 20), and last season there were just two (Kelvin Pichardo of the Giants, and the most high profile player to be suspended for PEDs since 2004, Manny Ramirez of the Dodgers).

The minor league testing policy, however, is a different animal. The number of players suspended each year is much higher, with the reasons being an incredibly complicated mix. There are young players in the Dominican and Venezuelan Summer Leagues that make up a large percentage of players that test positive each year. That ties into everything from players coming from desperate poverty to the buscóns– unlicensed managers/agents that work with some of the youngest prospects baseball has to offer. These young players, often times desperate, will do whatever a buscón will tell them. “Take this. Drink that,” without knowing whether what they are consuming is a vitamin or a possible banned substance. Throw in players from North America that are looking for any advantage that can get them into the majors, players using nutritional supplements that can be tainted with banned substances, plus drugs of abuse such as marijuana, etc. and, as mentioned, it gets complicated. (For more on the buscón culture, I highly recommend reading Sean Gregory’s Baseball Dreams: Striking Out in the Dominican Republic on TIME.com)

For MLB, the minor league testing program allows them to move unfettered by the MLBPA. Without being challenged by the union for the players, everything from the levels of a substance within the body, the ability to increase testing as the league sees fit, to the recent addition of hGH testing, are green lighted depending on the direction that the league wishes to go.

Read the rest of this entry »


Expanded Four Factors: Ryan Howard

Expanded Four Factors links:
Average Player
Math/Reference

For our first use of the expanded four factors with a real, live Major League Baseball player, let’s take a look at Ryan Howard. Howard has had an interesting season this year, posting a solid .377 wOBA despite a pretty severe drop in both power and walk rate. His ISO is down from .292 to .236 and his POWH (XB/H) is down from 1.05 to 0.81. His walk rate has dropped from 10.7% to 7.5%, but the strikeout rate (in K/PA) has also dipped, from 26.5% to 23.7%.

Basically, we see two bad signs combined with one excellent sign for Howard. Some in Philadelphia are excited to see what Howard can do making more contact, especially if the power and discipline were to return to their normal rates. Let’s take a look at what would happen for Howard if his K-rate were to decrease from its career mark of 27.4% to his current mark of 23.7%, if his power and walk rates were to return to their typical levels. For his career, Howard has posted a .393 wOBA, which the Four Factors method overshoots by 5 points, even after his career 2B/HR and 3B/HR rates are input.

Here we see why Phillies fans would be so excited about a new, relatively contact happy Howard. Howard was truly an elite hitter in 2006, putting up a .436 wOBA, thanks in large part to 58 homers as well as a 15% walk rate. If Howard were to hold his strikeout rate as low as it has been in 2010 while returning to the power and discipline numbers that he’s shown over his career, his ffwOBA jumps up to .418 from .398 – not as high as his 2006 season nor Pujols’s crazy numbers from the last 3 calendar years, but still elite and likely top-5 type material.

That said, there are legitimate reasons to worry about Howard. He has been a second half hitter by the numbers, but stranger things have happened than a player losing a significant amount of his power in his age 30 season. What if instead of the K-rate staying down, it’s the power numbers that decline. Let his career BABIP remain at .329, slightly below his rate from this season. Finally, let’s look at this decline both if the walk rate stays at 7.5%, its current rate, his career low, or if it rebounds to 12.2%, his career average. The low walk rate is in blue; the high in red.

Here we see cause for concern. If the walk rate returns but the power stays as low as it has, Howard will be around a .360 wOBA hitter, which is right around the level of David DeJesus and Vernon Wells, and it would be exceptionally difficult for Howard to justify his 5 year, 125 million dollar contract providing such little pop at the plate. If the walks and power both are gone, than Howard’s wOBA slips to .350, right in line with Daric Barton – a good first baseman, particularly with the glove, in a pitcher’s park, but that’s hardly the all-star level performance expected out of Ryan Howard.

Of course, we come now to the question of what we actually think will happen with Howard. ZiPS projects a .398 wOBA due to a spike in BB% and a jump in power to just below previous levels, along with a rise in K rate back to previous levels. CHONE doesn’t project that Howard’s walk rate will rise above 10% again. Along with a rise in K% back to previous norms and a rise in power that doesn’t quite reach its old heights, CHONE projects a .273/.344/.537 line.

Interestingly, power is the one aspect that takes the longest to stabilize. To me, that suggests that the power could easily return to 2009 levels, but the walk rates and strikeout rates may not. Howard’s ability to reach the base via the walk is extremely important, and his 2010 BB rate is merely half of what it was in that fantastic 2006 campaign. Still, the numbers here suggest that even a drop in XB/H from 1.05 to 0.95, as CHONE projects would cause nearly a 20 point drop in wOBA.

So, in summary, yes, Howard’s drop in power will be of concern unless he has another monster August/September, which, given his 153/175 career wRC+’s in those months, isn’t exactly unlikely. At the same time, Howard’s drop in strikeouts is great to see, but the projection systems don’t appear to be convinced in the slightest. Howard would likely be the best non-Pujols hitter in the league if both the drop in strikeouts persists and his power fully returns. The flip side, however, would see Ryan Howard and Daric Barton fighting it out on a yearly basis, and that would be disastrous for the Phillies. The most likely scenario, however, is the simplest: Howard returns to his old form with a slight drop in power, which would leave him as still one of the better hitters in the National League, although not quite a top-5 or necessarily even a top-10 hitter.


Intent and Jeff Karstens

A common adage is that a pitcher needs either good stuff or location to make it in the major leagues. Jeff Karstens is not someone with good stuff. On the best of days his fastball can average a severe wind-aided 90 miles per hour. Hurricanes are uncommon in the greater Pittsburgh area so the righty settles for an average of 89 miles per hour. Karsten’s secondary offerings are superior – including a very good curveball – but the book on him is that he’s not going to get a ton of strikeouts or grounders. What he will rack up – as the adage suggests – is strikes.

Karstens is throwing 66% strikes this season, which places him in a tie with Joe Blanton and ahead of Felix Hernandez, Francisco Liriano, David Price, and a slew of pitchers with superior stuff. He’s amongst the 25 starting pitchers who throw the most strikes on a rate basis which is led by Cliff Lee (72%) and Scott Baker (70%) amongst others. This within itself isn’t too interesting or worthy of adulation because Karsten’s phobia towards throwing balls is yet to result in fantastic performances – minus one heck of a start during the 2008 season versus the Diamondbacks.

The real story to tell about Karsten’s strike rate is really about the reciprocal or his ball rate in this case. Karstens has issued five intentional walks in a little over 100 innings of work. His career total through about 217 innings entering this season was seven. That kind of really free pass rate has the tendency to creep into and distort things like strike ratio. Nobody ahead or near Karstens on the strike rate leaderboard is over more than 2% intentional balls/balls thrown, so his intentional balls are skewing his strike rate the most. What has it meant to his rate of strikes thrown?

Since we know that five intentional walks equals 20 intentional balls, then we can just subtract those balls from his total (491) and redo the division by his total pitches with those 20 pitches subtracted (1430 after the minus); giving us a real strike rate of 67%. That’s not entirely fair, though, because Karstens would have had to throw pitches versus those batters and we can’t simply pretend they never happened. What if he threw 20 pitches to each, and half were strikes – after all, 10 extra strikes instead of 10 extra balls is better than 20 balls to 0 strikes. Well, then we get a strike rate of 67% again.

67% to 66% is a minute difference; no doubt, but when we talk about strike rates or even walk rates, the amount of intentional balls and walks is often ignored.


A Playoffs Overview

In less than two months the regular season will come to a close and the postseason will begin. In each of the past three seasons we’ve had teams go to game 163 in order to decide a tiebreaker. Frankly, those win or go home games rank right up there with some of the best games in recent memory. Whether it be the controversial Padres/Rockies finish in 2007, or the White Sox and Twins in 2008, or even the Tigers and Twins last season; each came down to being decided by a single run. The way the standings are shaping up right now, we might be in store for another tiebreaking game or two.

AL West

You can all but call this race. Baseball Prospectus has the Rangers at 92% likely to make the playoffs. The Angels and Athletics spit the remaining ~8% of simulations, but right now the Rangers hold the league’s largest divisional lead (8 games) which is more than five times the next closest. It really is hard to see the Athletics or Angels make a legitimate push for the crown and a lot would have to happen for Texas to miss the postseason.

AL East

The Yankees are the next surest thing, at 87%. Tampa Bay is on their heels (80%) and Boston isn’t dead quite yet (25%) meaning, unlike Texas, it’s possible to imagine the Yankees not winning the division crown at this point. The goal for these teams need not be much more than to finish in the top two of the division and assume second place guarantees a wild card berth…

AL Central

…which makes this race all the more vicious. The Twins and White Sox are tied for first place at this point. Most would probably give the edge to the Twins, but the White Sox always find a way to surprise everyone. The only wild card involved will be whether Kenny Williams can work some magic on the waiver wire.

NL East

Believe it or not, the Braves are projected to make the playoffs more often than any other National League team despite having an identical win total to that of the Reds and Padres (and Giants). Their lead over the Phillies is slight, but this Phillies team that has Mike Sweeney and Wilson Valdez starting on the right side of the infield most days isn’t too inspiring, even if they have beat up on Florida and New York since losing Ryan Howard.

NL Central

With last night’s defeat, the Reds’ lead over the Cardinals is down to a game and a half. This very well could be the most difficult race to call in the entire league.

NL West

The Padres might be baseball’s best story this year and they still have the division lead and a 76% shot at the playoffs. The Giants, though, are breathing down their necks, with an equal number of wins and three extra defeats. If the season ended today, both would be in the postseason.


Expanded Four Factors: The Average Player

In case you missed it, this morning I went over the mathematics necessary to take the four factors of hitting to the next level. Now, it’s time to put it to good use.

As Eric pointed out in the comments section, the way that the math is done, we could figure out how much a change in one of the factors changes a player’s wOBA by taking the derivative of the new formula for wOBA derived from the four factors equations. However, that’s a lot of work, so instead, as he suggests, I’m going to do this analysis numerically using a little program called Microsoft Excel.

Let’s test run this method on the simplest of targets: the league average player. In this case, we’ll use the league average player from 2009 MLB. In 2009, the league average BB% was 8.9%, the league average K% (K/PA) was 17.9%, the league average POWH (XB/H) was .595, and the league average BABIP was .299. The following chart shows how changes in each variable changes the player’s Four Factors Equivalent wOBA (ffwOBA).

In order to more easily visualize these on the same scale, I looked how changing each statistic by one standard deviation impacts ffwOBA. In this case, one standard deviation for BB% is 3.7%, for K% it’s 7.3%, for POWH it’s .257, and for BABIP it’s .049 points.

The slope of these lines tells us how sensitive wOBA is, at least as predicted by the four factors, to changes in each stat. BABIP is the steepest, as changing BABIP by one standard deviation changes wOBA by 41 points. Next is POWH, which although it isn’t perfectly linear, it’s close enough that we can treat it as such. Changing POWH by one standard deviation changes wOBA by 33 points. One standard deviation change in K rate changes wOBA by 26 points. A player’s wOBA is by far least sensitive to BB%, as a one standard deviation change in BB rate only changes wOBA by 13 points.

My explanation for the small changes in wOBA brought upon by BB rate changes is that increasing BBs, at least in this model, reduce all favorable outcomes (all hits) as well as reducing outs. The reduction in outs is enough to mean that an increase in BB% is a good thing. However, decreasing K% only means decreasing outs, increasing POWH means increasing 2B, 3B, and HR at the expense of 1B, which is a high net increase, and increasing BABIP means increasing all hits at the expense of outs, which is clearly the best of all results.

Through the rest of the week, I’ll be taking a look at some interesting players, hopefully examining how this method performs at the extremes.


Wakamatsu and Others Fired

In a move more inevitable than surprising, Jack Zduriencik fired Manager Don Wakamatsu, Bench Coach Ty Van Burkleo, Pitching Coach Rick Adair and Mental Coach Steve Hecht from the Mariners yesterday afternoon. Several coaches received promotions to fill the vacant roles, including Triple-A Manager Daren Brown becoming the Mariners’ interim manager.

It seems that whenever a manager is fired, the question of whether he deserved it will arise and usually the first point brought up will be the team’s record to date — usually a poor one — followed by someone countering that a manager rarely has much of an effect over a team’s record. For instance, the Mariners were 42-70 at the time of Wakamatsu’s firing. Was he responsible for that? He wasn’t at fault for all 70 losses. He was probably to blame for more than zero. He was also probably to credit for more than zero of their wins. Where does the scale balance out? I don’t know, but I do find it odd that this sort of back-and-forth is almost exclusively applied to coaches only.

Sticking with the Mariners, earlier this season Eric Byrnes earned his release after a brutal stretch of play. There was some discussion about whether he deserved that release given the roster make up and what his future projections looked like, but I do not recall anyone stating that the Mariners were 11-14 at the time and thus he deserved to be let go.

We don’t apply the same expectations for managers as we do for players, and we shouldn’t. Players are paid to produce on the field and we’ve gotten pretty good at isolating one player’s contributions to a team’s wins so we generally disregard the team’s overall record when talking about a single player. We do not have a good way to evaluate the impact of a manager, though, and so a team’s overall record becomes sort of the default metric.

On its own, using a team’s record as justification for firing the manager implies that he had direct control over said record. I would contend that no matter who helmed the Mariners this season, they were unlikely to post a meaningfully different record. I think most people agree with that. I think most people agree that the brunt of the blame falls on a combination of random variation, the players themselves for not producing up to expectations and on the front office for assembling said players. To those that disagree, however, to those that believe that a manager has — or can have — a major impact on a team’s wins and losses, I have a question. Why are managers paid so little?

We assume that all teams seek to maximize their number of wins for their expenditures. If managers could routinely positively or negatively affect their teams by more than a few wins, then it would stand to reason that they deserve exorbitant salaries.

We do not have good up-to-date data on manager salaries, but as recently as 2007 the average manager made $1.4 million and the median salary was just $850,000 due to Joe Torre’s $7.5 million really busting the curve. Torre no longer makes that much and I doubt there’s been any major inflation in the salaries paid to managers during the past three years. If we apply the same dollar-to-win conversion that we use for players, then front offices are valuing a manager’s contributions to the team’s won-loss record at around a quarter of a single win on average and even the highest-paid managers clock in around a single win worth of salary.

Front offices should have the best insight into how much chemistry and leadership in the clubhouse matters. If it’s too unpredictable to judge, then why use that to justify hiring and firing of managers? If it matters and is predictable, then my question is, why aren’t they paying for it?


The DH Free Agents

Look around the American League and you’ll see teams using the DH spot in a few different ways. Some, like the White Sox and Tigers, use it, or have used it, as a rotating spot that can afford a veteran a half day off. Others, like the Blue Jays, use it for a player without a position, whether the position is filled by someone else or the player himself isn’t particularly good at any one spot. Yet it seems like a good number of teams reserve the DH spot for an aging slugger who, freed from the physical rigors of playing defense, can save their energy for the one thing at which they excel. The Red Sox, Yankees, Rangers, Angels, and Twins employ this strategy.

This past off season four of those teams signed a veteran to fill the DH spot on a more or less full-time basis. The Twins signed Jim Thome with designs of him being a bench player, but knowing that he could fill the DH on a more permanent basis if necessary. The Angels brought in World Series MVP Hideki Matsui to fill the spot vacated by Vladimir Guerrero, who signed on with the Rangers to handle DH duties. The Yankees brought back Nick Johnson, a defensively capable first baseman who moved to DH in an attempt to reduce the physical toll on his oft-injured body.

Despite having signed similar players for the same position, each team has experienced different results with their DHs. This was the gamble heading into the off-season. The free agents all had something going against them. Thome was headed into his age-39 season and had seen his numbers dip for two years after a strong 2007 season. Matsui had his knees drained twice during the 2009 season and despite quality production still presented an injury risk. Johnson had spent plenty of time on the DL in his career, including missing most of the 2008 season with a wrist injury. Vlad missed time in 2009 and had also seen his numbers decline in the last two years.

Faced with this dilemma, the GMs seeking a full-time DH got to work. Two of them filled their spots with apparent cast-offs from other teams. Matsui signed first, going from New York, which sought a DH, to Anaheim, which had let its incumbent DH, Guerrero, leave via free agency. About a month later Guerrero signed a one-year, $5.5 million contract with a $9 million mutual option and $1 million buyout. New York, seeking to get a bit younger, let Matsui walk without a counter-offer, opting instead to sign Johnson, a player whom they had traded for Javier Vazquez, a player they would re-acquire later in December. The Twins already had Jason Kubel as an in-house DH option, but signed Thome to the curiously cheap salary of $1.5 million, with playing time escalators that could bring it to $2.25 million.

Out of the gate Vlad and Matsui looked like winners. In 93 April PA Vlad produced a .374 wOBA while Matsui was close behind at .357. Thome actually led the pack at .415, but that came in just 52 PA, so he add quite as much value as Vlad or Matsui. The Yankees appeared on the short end of this one, as Nick Johnson produced a mere .308 wOBA, which was almost completely based on his 25.9 percent walk rate. His batting average .138, and his ISO, .086, were downright terrible. He was the youngest out of the four, which is a big reason why the Yankees chose him. That completely backfired.

His season wouldn’t last that much longer, though. After just 17 May PA Johnson complained of wrist pain, which resulted in his second wrist surgery in three years. This was a lesser procedure and his return remains a remote possibility, but the signing was a nearly complete loss for the Yankees. The only consolation is that it opened a spot for them to acquire Lance Berkman. He hasn’t had an easy go in New York so far, but his track record suggests that he could provide ample value.

For Matsui, things have turned south. After his .357 wOBA in April he dropped all the way to .248 in March. He does have a streaky tendency, and in the early goings of 2009 he didn’t hit particularly well. To that end he recovered well in June, producing a .389 wOBA. In July and August, however, that has fallen to around .300. That brings his season wOBA to .323, not the stuff of a DH. Manager Mike Scioscia has defended Matsui while he’s slumped, but he has still kept him out of the lineup a few times in the past week.

Through June Vlad looked to be the best of the bunch, as he continued to hit better and better. From his .374 wOBA in April he went to .405 in May and then .437 in June, making him a big part of Texas’s first place run. In June he also uncharacteristically walked 10.7 percent of the time. But ever since he’s slowed down. In 100 July PA he produced a .275 wOBA that comprised a .282 OBP and .130 ISO. Things have gotten even worse in his 23 August PA, where he’s just 5 for 22 with two doubles and one walk. Joey from Baseball Time in Arlington examined the issue, and noticed that Vlad has been hitting the ball the other way lately, perhaps suggesting a slowing bat or timing issue.

Thome, the elder statesman, has actually been the best of the bunch. His wOBA has been over .400 in each month of the season save for May. He doesn’t have a ton of PA, just 232, so he won’t have standout counting numbers, but given the context his 14 homers looks pretty impressive. So does his .404 season wOBA. The Twins can also afford to play him almost exclusively against righties, as he’s hitting them hard this season. Not only does he have a .336 ISO against righties, but he has also walked in 20.7 percent of his PA.

Since he’s been healthy all season and productive for most of it, you might think Vlad would stand out as the WAR leader of the group. You’d be right, of course, as he’s produced 2.1 WAR. But Thome, despite 212 fewer plate appearances, comes in a close second with 1.8 WAR. There is a contingency of Yankees fans who continually scold the front office for signing Johnson over Matsui, but the two have produced identical WAR values this year, 0.1. It goes to show that when general managers have to make choices among a number of flawed players, there’s no real correct answer at the time. We just don’t know what these oft-injured and aging players will produce.