Archive for Daily Graphings

Greinke’s Frustration

Last week, Zack Greinke spoke pretty candidly about his thoughts on the Royals organization. Needless to say, he’s not a big fan of where the organization is currently at. Years of losing have a way of taking a toll on a player’s loyalty.

As I flew up to New York last week for our live event, I was pondering Greinke’s comments. As most people know, he’s part of the stable of pitchers that like advanced statistics, and will look at sites like this one to evaluate how well they’re performing. He quoted FIP at his Cy Young Award press conference last year. Odds are pretty good that not only does he look at his own stats here on the site, but he looks at some of the other metrics available and some of the commentary as well.

Needless to say, none of it has been very favorable towards the Royals the last few years. If Greinke is looking at his own FIP, he probably knows that Yuniesky Betancourt ranks as one of the worst defensive shortstops in baseball by UZR, and yet he had to sit and watch as his team traded for Betancourt to try and turn ground balls into outs. Imagine the frustration of a guy who is being told to pitch to contact believing that the shortstop his team is excited about acquiring has the range of a wilted fern.

So, when someone asked me at the event on Saturday what I thought the effects of sabermetric ideas and statistics gaining traction with players was, this was the first thing that came to my mind. It is certainly not our intent to cause discord between players and their organizations, but I have to wonder if part of Greinke’s frustration with the Royals stems from the fact that the advanced statistics that interest him paint a poor picture of almost everything that Kansas City does.

If more players begin to take an interest in evaluating themselves and their peers in this way, it will be interesting to see if there’s a trickle-up effect. In some sense, it’s easy for Dayton Moore or Ed Wade to dismiss the criticism of their moves as just the rantings of fans, but it is a much more delicate situation when that frustration is coming from your best player. Will owners be willing to continue hiring GMs who ignore UZR if their pitchers are using it to determine how good the defenders behind them are?

Perhaps Greinke, Bannister, and Scherzer are just outliers, and we won’t see any serious uptick in this kind of statistical usage by big league players. That’s certainly possible. On the other hand, though, if this becomes more prevalent in major league clubhouses, it could present an interesting dilemma for teams that don’t really want to use these kinds of numbers to make decisions. Pressure from your players is a lot different than pressure from your fans.


The Return of Pat the Bat

In the 2008-2009 off-season Pat Burrell was in an excellent situation. After nine seasons in Philadelphia he had finally won a World Series. He had endured plenty of criticism while playing there, including particularly fervent booing in 2003. At age 31, he had options — including a possible return to the only team he had ever known. But in mid-December the Phillies signed Raul Ibanez to a three-year contract, which effectively ended Burrell’s time in red pinstripes. That put him in front of 29 other teams, most intriguingly the 14 AL teams that could use him as a DH.

Looking for another championship he signed with the team the Phillies beat in 2008, the Tampa Bay Rays. The marriage seemed perfect. Tampa Bay didn’t get much production out of the DH spot during their pennant year, employing Cliff Floyd while he wasn’t injured and a ragtag bunch of below-average DHs when he wasn’t. Adding Burrell would give them a right-handed power bat to complement left-handed first baseman Carlos Pena. Best of all, it meant that Burrell’s defense would no longer subtract from his overall value.

Nothing went according to plan. The Rays spent most of the year in third place, trailing the Red Sox and the Yankees in the AL East. Their run differential made it seem as though they were perpetually poised to make a charge, but that never materialized. Burrell didn’t help the cause, turning in the worst season of his career. Even with his poor defense, a career -44.9 UZR in left field, he was able to produce at least 2 WAR in each of his seasons with Philadelphia, save for his ugly 2003 campaign. In 2009, with no defensive issues holding him back, he produced the worst wOBA of his career, .309, which amounted to -0.5 WAR, more than a full win worse than his previous worst season.

His bounceback attempt in 2010 didn’t go well either. In fact, it went much worse than 2009. Burrell produced a .283 wOBA, including a mere .131 ISO. After 24 games at DH, the Rays designated him for assignment, releasing him four days later. He’d end up somewhere for sure, probably a team like the White Sox that could have used a DH. Instead he signed a minor league contract with the Giants. It seemed like an odd pairing, a defensive statue like Burrell potentially playing for an NL team, but the Giants needed bats.

After just five games at Triple-A, the Giants recalled Burrell and slotted him into his familiar position, left field. The gamble paid off almost immediately. In 74 June PA, Burrell produced a .425 wOBA. He slowed down a bit in July, riding a .237 BABIP to a .273 wOBA, but the Giants offense covered for him, scoring 149 runs, by far their most in any month of 2010. In August he’s picked up the pace again, going 12-for-32 with five doubles and two homers. He has had a hand in 10 of the Giants’ 36 runs scored this month, so again his presence has helped the team avoid a prolonged slump.

Burrell’s recent hot streak, and really his season overall, calls into question the reasons why he failed so horribly in Tampa Bay. Does playing the field really affect his hitting ability? Does he simply know NL pitchers better, even though there are many pitchers he didn’t face during his time in the NL last decade? Was there something making him uncomfortable in Tampa Bay? In the AL? Like most issues of causation, there are likely myriad reasons why Burrell failed in 2009 and the first two months of 2010. He has apparently put that behind him, though, and is now playing a prominent role on a contending team. A year and a half later, Pat the Bat is realizing the perfect marriage he thought he had in 2009.

Bonus trivia: Did you know that Pat Burrell is the all-time leader in home runs for players born in Arkansas? The previous record holder: Brooks Robinson.


The Underage Trio

When all is said and done, I would be willing to bet that the rookie class of 2010 will go down as the best in the history of the game. The new wave of talent that has arrived in the show this year is off the charts. With Stephen Strasburg, Carlos Santana, and Buster Posey, we’ve seen three guys step right in and become premier players right away, and the depth of players behind those three is just nutty.

But rather than focusing on the class as a whole, I just wanted to look at the trio of underage guys who are making a big impact for their clubs. Jason Heyward, Mike Stanton, and Starlin Castro are all in their age 20 season (Heyward turned 21 a couple of days ago), and all performing well, which is a rare accomplishment.

In terms of performance in a year before age 21, this group (Heyward, Stanton, and Castro) is almost certainly the best in recent history. They have combined for +6.6 WAR, a staggeringly high total for three guys who can’t drink, especially considering two of them began the season in the minors. While guys like Alex Rodriguez had a great individual age 20 season, it’s rare to see three super young guys come into the league together and all play well.

In terms of talent, this is probably the best trio to arrive together since 1989, when Ken Griffey Jr, Gary Sheffield, and Sammy Sosa all hit the scene at the same time. Of those three, however, only Griffey was a good player that year- Sosa and Sheffield would develop into productive players later on in their careers.

The ultimate comparison, though, is the three guys who showed up together in 1951: Willie Mays, Mickey Mantle, and Chet Nichols. Okay, fine, the last name in the group doesn’t really belong with the first two, but he was a sensation in his rookie year, posting a league leading 2.88 ERA and finishing second (to Mays) in the Rookie of the Year voting.

We don’t know where the careers of Stanton, Heyward, and Castro will go from here, though given their talents, its easy to suspect that all three are in line for some great things going forward. Whether they can match the ultimate star power of the 1989 group is something we’ll only know in 20 years. What we can say, however, is that we probably won’t see a trio of underage guys this good break in together again any time soon.


Expanded Four Factors: Austin Jackson’s BABIP

Expanded Four Factors links:
Aaron Hill
Ryan Howard
Average Player
Math/Reference

Yesterday afternoon, I took a look at Aaron Hill and his abnormally low BABIP. Naturally, today we will be taking a look at Austin Jackson, who leads all qualified hitters with a .422 BABIP. That’s 29 points above the second highest BABIP, Josh Hamilton’s .393, and 123 points above the MLB average of .299.

As with Hill, Jackson’s profile does suggest that he should have an above average BABIP. He has a line drive rate of 25.8% and a ground ball rate above 50%, and both serve his speed quite well. As such, an above average BABIP should be expected.

But there are limits. First of all, Jackson’s high line drive rate is second in the league and ripe for some amount of regression to the mean. Second of all, Jackson’s BABIP on ground balls in particular is .333, and bound to come down. Jackson’s excellent 10.1% infield hit rate is about 4% above the league average, meaning that he accrues an extra 5.5 hits among his 148 ground balls, which only accounts for about 30 points of BABIP on grounders – that .333 GB BABIP is over 100 points above the league average rate, and can’t simply be explained by speed.

His BABIP on fly balls is also above the league average, by just under 70 points, and I don’t think the abnormality on fly ball BABIP can be explained as simply as his speed. Simply put, Jackson’s BABIP is going to come down. He has a .342 wOBA this season, which, after taking out the SB/CS component (16 SB, 4 CS), comes closer to his Four Factors-projected .335 wOBA. Right now, Jackson is below average in the other three non-BABIP components, with a 6.2% BB%, a 26.1% K% (K/PA), and a .334 POWH (XB/H) to go along with that .422 BABIP. Let’s take a look at what happens when that BABIP starts moving down toward the mean.

To account for the fact that Jackson is 23 and could easily improve, I have included a forecast for a 4% decrease in K% (in blue), along with a forecast for the same K% as this season (red). In the optimistic projection, a drop to a more realistic .350 BABIP (think Ichiro level) has Jackson as a .300 wOBA player – as well as Aaron Hill has hit with his .199 BABIP. In the pessimistic projection, that same drop would make Jackson a .287 wOBA player – think Carlos Gomez. In fact, given both players’ fantastic defensive abilities, they make decent comps. The depressing part here is that any BABIP below .380 – something I think is a mortal lock for the future – leaves Jackson as a below average hitter in either scenario, which isn’t necessarily a bad thing.

Even if Jackson isn’t a terrific, or average, or even competent hitter, he has fantastic defense in center field to fall back on, which could easily make him a league average player. His minor league numbers don’t particularly suggest an incoming increase in contact skills, walk rates, or power, however, so Tigers fans will likely have to be content with a light hitting, slick fielding center fielder under team control for a long time. And really, that’s not so bad.


Attention! Wisconsinly Oriented Baseball Nerds!

Sadly, for those of us currently residing in the Badger State, Dark Overlord David Appelman has as yet to announce a Wisconsin-centric event like the one that just occurred this past weekend in New York City. (Although, to be clear, I didn’t actually ask him — i.e. the Dark Overlord — to his face or anything. Guy is scary.)

However, still flush with the joys of the New York event, I was excited yesterday to come across what appears to be a totally acceptable alternative.

Sponsored by Miller Park Drunk (@millerparkdrunk), the event — known, for too many obvious reasons, as the Pants Party — takes place at Milwaukee’s Miller Park on August 29th, starting at 11:00 am and going until Carlos Gomez adopts a skill-appropriate approach at the plate. Or till the game is over. Either one.

So far as I can tell, the Pants Party is an event fully dedicated to the exploration of The Good Times. Brats will be served, adult sodas will be (responsibly!) imbibed, and baseball will be watched.

Details about, and tickets for, the event are available here, the meat-tastic menu is available here, and a rousing post about the merits of the Pants Party — written special for MPD by Wezen Ball’s Larry Granville Granillo — is available here.

Note: on account of I, Carson Cistulli, have had no in arranging this event — have actually only known of its existence for 24 hours or so — neither I nor FanGraphs assume any responsibility for your decision to attend. So if it’s just a weird cult gathering or something — well, don’t blame me.


A Trio of Blue-Wearing Veterans Return

This time of the season is great for two groups of players within organizations of dying (or dead) playoff aspirations. One group is those of young players, some even legitimate prospects. The other is the group of veterans that will fill the gaps as the team’s way of saying thanks for a year of duty. These veterans may be on their last legs, but if their major league careers are soon to die, at least they will always live through box scores.

Jay Gibbons – Los Angeles (N)

The Dodgers are still without Manny Ramirez and recently dumped Garret Anderson. Thus opening a spot for Jay Gibbons, even with Scott Podsednik already around. It’s hard to believe that Gibbons last played in the majors back in 2007 because it seems like his name pops up at least twice a season, but that’s the case. It’s a little too early to declare Gibbons back from a period in which major league teams were inhospitable towards him, but he did have an OPS over .960 for the Dodgers’ Triple-A affiliate in nearly 400 plate appearances and he’s certainly a better player than the aforementioned Anderson.

Phil Humber & Bryan Bullington – Kansas City

These two soak together. In fact, Bullington started for the Royals last night while Humber finished the last two innings.

When the Pirates drafted Bullington as the first overall choice in the 2003 draft, they boasted about his middle of the rotation potential. Naturally, Bullington never fulfilled even that promise, and only pitched in 18 innings for the Pirates before moving on. He tallied more innings with the Indians and Jays over a combined seven games than he did for the big league squad in Pittsburgh. Last night represents his first start with Kansas City, although he’s worked out of the pen for them, and his numbers weren’t too bad (he walked one, struck four out, and allowed no dingers).

A year after the Bullington selection, the Mets tabbed Philip Humber with the third overall pick in the draft. There are about three things Humber is known for:

1) His performance at Rice University
2) His constant battles with injuries
3) Being involved in the Johan Santana trade

Last night marked the first time he appeared for the Royals and that he lasted two innings without suffering another injury is sadly a positive development. For his sake, maybe he can add a fourth item to his trivia card that involves rekindling his career as a middle reliever.


Expanded Four Factors: Aaron Hill’s BABIP

Expanded Four Factors links:
Ryan Howard
Average Player
Math/Reference

Aaron Hill has a .199 BABIP in 406 plate appearances in 2010. That is, unsurprisingly, the worst among qualified players, coming in 11 points below Carlos Quentin‘s mark and a staggering 34 points below Carlos Pena’s .233, second worst among players with at least 400 plate appearances. Naturally, this is a huge reason why Hill’s wOBA this season is all the way down to .300, 57 points down from his breakout 2009 season and 31 points below his career average.

This drop in BABIP isn’t completely unexplainable. Hill’s LD% is all the way down to 10.2% from 18.8%, and those missing line drives have all turned into fly balls. Some around the Jays have noted that Hill has had more loft to his swing, which would explain this change. Given that LDs are the most likely to fall in for hits (.722 BABIP) and FBs are the least likely (.140 BABIP), that explains a lot. That’s roughly 27 line drives turned into fly balls, or 15 fewer hits. In 296 balls in play, those 15 hits account for 50 points of BABIP. Still, that would leave Hill’s BABIP at .249, in the bottom ten of the league.

That provides us with a fantastic opportunity to use our new favorite tool, Four Factors Equivalent wOBA (ffwOBA). Check the links at the top if you’re interested in the methodology. The following graph shows how Hill’s wOBA should change as his BABIP increases.

The fact that Hill’s wOBA is still at .300 (estimated at .292 by the method) is encouraging. The 50 point difference in BABIP mentioned above would bring Hill’s ffwOBA up 55 points to .347 from .292. If he were to get back to .288, his mark from last year, his current peripherals would have him as a .389 wOBA player due to his high power and contact rate. Hill, especially now, certainly doesn’t profile as the kind of hitter who could post above average BABIPs. For something really extreme, if Hill’s BABIP were to reach .360, with the amount of power and contact Hill makes, the Four Factors method would estimate a .464 wOBA. That’s not likely to happen, but it’s interesting to see.

ZiPS projects Hill’s BABIP at .258, and I’d expect it to come up to the .270-.280 range, as he has shown the ability to do so in the past. Either way, Aaron Hill should, as long as he can turn a few of FBs into LDs, become an above average hitter once again, and soon.


Halladay And Verlander

After making his start today against the Rays, Justin Verlander has now taken the hill 24 times this year, throwing 2,674 pitches on the season. Roy Halladay has also taken the hill 24 times, and has thrown 2,623 pitches, 51 fewer than the Tigers ace, and yet he’s thrown 28 more innings than Verlander – 185 to 157.

Now, this isn’t meant to be a knock on Verlander – few pitchers can rack up the innings like Halladay. It does, however, illustrate one of the big advantages that that groundball strike-throwers have over dominating power pitchers who get a lot of outs in the air. Because Halladay keeps the ball on the ground, he’s gotten opposing hitters to ground into 19 double plays, while Verlander has induced just seven twin killings.

In addition, since Halladay throws so many strikes, each batter is dispatched more quickly. He has more three pitch strikeouts than Verlander, even though his overall strikeout rate is lower, and he rarely works into hitters counts. And, of course, since he walks fewer batters, he faces a lower number of batters per inning, allowing him to work deeper into games.

I bring this up because, when talking about the quality of a young pitcher (especially one in the minors), the first thing that is usually referenced is strikeout rate. As Bill James noted back in the 80s, a young pitcher’s K/9 tells us more of what we want to know about how well he’ll do in the majors than any other single statistic, mainly because it is the best proxy for quality of stuff.

However, while strikeouts are certainly a positive event for a pitcher, the Verlander approach to pitching is not the ideal, because it leads to extremely high pitch counts and shorter outings overall. Halladay’s economic approach to getting outs has given him the equivalent of four extra starts compared to Verlander, a huge difference in value for their respective teams.

The strike-everyone-out approach comes with an inability to work deep into ballgames. Even though Verlander is once again among the league leaders in pitches thrown, he’s only tossed one complete game and gotten through eight innings on three other occasions. For comparison, Halladay has eight complete games and has gotten through eight innings in five other starts.

It might not be as sexy, but getting groundball outs and limiting walks is a far more efficient way of pitching than trying to blow every hitter away. Strikeout rate is nice, but don’t let it be the only tool you use to evaluate a young pitcher – not only are Ks not the only way to succeed, they aren’t even the best way.


Why Is Luke Scott Still in Baltimore?

The Orioles have had a nightmare season (to put it mildly). Their off-season moves were not particularly brilliant, but given the young talent on the team — as well as on the farm — there were reasons for optimism. Prior to the season, I wrote about the enviable collection of outfielders the Orioles had assembled: Nick Markakis, Adam Jones, Nolan Reimold, Felix Pie, and Luke Scott. It seemed that Scott was likely to go. Little did anyone suspect that midway through August, Scott would not only still be on the Orioles, but be perhaps the team’s most valuable position player.

Given that Scott is 32 years old, heading into his third year of arbitration in 2010, and that the Orioles are a mess, one has to wonder why he’s still around. Sure, his trade value was probably hurt by his dreadful April but it was to be expected that he’d pull out of it, as he did with a May that was as monstrous as his April was terrible. While Scott’s current .396 wOBA is almost certainly far above his true talent, ZiPS RoS projects a .369 wOBA (.267/.345/.504) for Scott for the rest of the season. Even has a full-time DH, over a full season that would make him about a 2.5 WAR player in the current run environment. Moreover, Scott was a actually a pretty decent outfielder who was pushed to DH and 1B more because of the Orioles’ crowded outfield situation. One could make an argument for Scott currently being a 3.0 WAR player.

I suppose that some will say that I’ve answered my own question: Scott is still in Baltimore because he’s good. Funny thing about that, though… when it comes time to acknowledge that a fire sale is in order, we fans often start by saying that the team needs to get rid of its bad players who clearly aren’t helping the team, like, say, Miguel Tejada. However, if a team in a bad state actually wants to get a decent return, it is going to have to give up something of value. And in the case of Scott, they have something of value… at least to other teams. Scott is in his second arbitration year, and making about four million dollars. He is team controlled for both 2011 and 2012; my guess is that he will get somewhere between six and eight million dollars for 2011 if he goes to arbitration in the upcoming offseason. That’s still a very good deal for the team if we think he’ll be at least a 2 WAR (probably more like a 2.5 WAR) player in 2011. Adding in the surplus value he has for the remainder of the season, the Orioles could have expected at least a B prospect back, or a combination of lesser prospects. While Scott is currently good, by the time the Orioles might be good again, he probably won’t be — and the prospects might.

Different teams were, of course, rumored to be interested in Scott at the deadline (I’m not sure if he’s cleared waivers or not for a potential August trade). Perhaps the Orioles simply didn’t receive an offer to make it worth their time — Scott is worth more than a couple of fringe prospects, a la Scott Podsednik (and the Dodgers could certainly use Scott — Luke, that is). One has to wonder if Scott wasn’t a bit overlooked. For example, he would be a good alternative for a team that can’t pry Adam Dunn loose from the Nationals. Scott isn’t the hitter Dunn is, but with 50 or so games left, it isn’t that big a difference, Scott can play the outfield, and he’s under team control for 2011.

It is very possible that a good match for either side could not be found. Maybe the teams with the right prospects for Scott don’t need an LF/DH, maybe the contenders that could use him don’t have the the prospects. However, given Scott’s abilities and likely surplus value in 2011 as well as 2010, it’s hard to think that there isn’t some fitting trade partner out there, and thus wonder what Scott is still doing in Charm City.


Halladay’s New Changeup

Yesterday I read that Roy Halladay had changed the grip on his changeup and was throwing it more often (hat tip to Calcaterra on this one). Before this year Halladay held the ball in his palm when throwing a changeup, but during the offseason he worked with pitching coach Rich Dubee and changed to using a split-finger grip. Let’s see whether we can pick up the difference in the pitchf/x data. I think it is clearest in velocity-vertical spin deflection (vertical movement) space.

Definitely a difference: the changeup has about the same velocity but instead of rising about five inches it now drops a couple of inches. The horizontal movement on the pitch is also different.

So the different grip imparts different movement on the pitch, so I think it is fair to say it is a qualitatively different pitch. And Halladay is throwing the pitch more often. As is noted in the article, before 2010 Halladay was pretty much a three-pitch pitcher (cutter, sinker and curve — three great pitches), rarely throwing his change more than 5% of the time. But now he is throwing the change almost 12% of the time. It seems he is much more comfortable with it.

The results show that Halladay has good reason to be more comfortable with the pitch. By our linear weights it is worth 1.5 runs per 100, much better than his changeups in any full year before. Looking at components, the pitch is wildly more successful, getting 19% swinging strikes per pitch in 2010 compared to 6% in 2009-2007 (pitchf/x years). It also gets more ground balls (57% GB/BIP versus 55%) and a lower slugging on contact ( 0.452 bases/contact versus 0.505).

Looking at Halladay’s pitch-count splits, he uses the pitch often when he is ahead in the count. So it looks like he has developed a second out pitch — along with his curve — to put batters away when he is ahead in the count. As Calcaterra noted, it is not like Halladay needed another weapon, but he has one.