Archive for Daily Graphings

Orioles Unsupportive of Kevin Millwood

The Orioles do not score many runs. In fact, their 3.33 runs per game in 2010 puts them not only at the bottom of the American League, but also at 28th in the majors. Therein lies the crux of their league-worst 16-42 record. While their young pitchers have struggled at times, the offense has lacked the power to bail them out. Even with the veteran pitchers on the mound, the O’s have struggled to stay in games.

That wasn’t the plan when Andy MacPhail acquired Kevin Millwood at the Winter Meetings last December. The Orioles had scored 4.57 runs per game last season, a bit below league average but serviceable given the circumstances. Their lineup featured a number of young players coming into their primes. Improvement and maturation from Adam Jones, Nolan Reimold, Matt Wieters, and, to a certain extent, Nick Markakis (who had already established himself) figured to help catapult the offense a bit and provide support for the young pitchers.

Adding Millwood gave the Orioles another veteran presence in the rotation. He, along with Jeremy Guthrie, afforded MacPhail and Co. the flexibility to keep some of its less developed arms in the minors. Also, since he was likely to outperform the young arms, he gave the team a better chance to win some ballgames. The scheme was well laid, but it doesn’t take a Robert Burns to understand what can go wrong between plan and execution.

Wieters and Jones have struggled to produce anything so far. Reimold performed so poorly that he’s now at AAA — though could return as a first baseman, which is just another of the Orioles’ problems. Miguel Tejada, brought in to provide an upgrade over the departed Melvin Mora, has hit just as poorly as the latter. Those troubles extend to nearly everyone in the lineup. Of the nine Orioles with 100 or more PA, only three have an OBP above .320. That has made life tough for their pitchers.

To start the season Millwood did exactly what he was supposed to. Through 10 starts he had allowed just 28 earned runs, a 3.71 ERA against a 4.09 FIP. It wasn’t ace-like, but it should have been good enough for a team that scored between 4.5 and 5 runs per game. Yet, as we know, the Orioles fell far short of that. They had managed wins in just four of those 10 games, and in none of them did they have, or hold, a lead when he left the game.

While the Orioles have a poor offense to begin with, they’ve been even worse with Millwood on the mound. They have scored just 3.1 runs per game in his starts, compared to 3.3 per game overall. Over the course of 32 starts that amounts to about 6.5 runs, which doesn’t seem awfully significant, but can certainly make a difference if it’s concentrated in a few starts. What stands out more, however, is the support the Orioles have provided while Millwood is in the game.

To preface, Millwood is currently averaging 6.6 innings per game, which is more than he has averaged in any year since 1999. He’s helping the Orioles by pitching deeper into games and taking the burden off their woefully inadequate bullpen. The Orioles have rewarded his efforts with just 2.2 runs during the innings he pitches. Obviously they’ll score more than that in some games and fewer in others, but on average it means the Orioles are wasting even his quality starts. It means that efforts like his seven-inning, three-run outing against the Twins on May 8 go to waste. It means they don’t have much of a shot when he pitches all eight innings, allowing just four runs, in a game on the road, as he did on April 21 in Seattle.

Things have gotten much worse for Millwood in his last three starts. On May 28 he allowed five runs, four earned, in six innings against the Blue Jays. Then he ran into the Yankees twice, allowing six runs in 5.2 innings both times. In the four starts following his eight-inning, three-run performance against the Royals his ERA has jumped a full run. That should get better once he starts facing offenses not in the league’s top four, but the offensive problems will still persist.

The Orioles offense is just not scoring, and it’s affecting no one quite as greatly as Millwood. He has done exactly what the Orioles expected. He has afforded them flexibility with their young pitchers, and he has, until recently, kept opposing teams at bay. Andy MacPhail had a solid plan, but, as Burns so duly noted, those plans often gang aft agley.

—-

I’d say Millwood is the least-supported pitcher in the league, but that would ignore Zack Greinke. As Joe Poz tweets, the Royals have failed with Greinke in the game during his last four starts. They have scored 2.4 runs while he’s in the game, which is a tick more than Millwood, but have scored only 3.1 for the entire game in which he pitches. The Royals offense as a whole has scored 4.34 runs per game, so the Royals seem to be failing Greinke more than the Orioles are failing Millwood. Also, like Millwood, Greinke has stumbled lately. Not that there’s a causal connection between poor run support and declining performance. But it is an interesting connection, at least.


Assessing Conor Jackson

Going into the 2009 season, one player on top of everyone’s “Must Watch” list was Diamondbacks 1B/LF Conor Jackson. Jackson, a former first round pick out of UC-Berkeley (smart guy), had put up a 3.0 WAR season in 2008, hitting .300/.376/.446 while playing plus defense in left field and okay defense at first base. However, he was turning twenty seven years old going into the ’09 season, and was primed to at least repeat his numbers from the previous year.

But then something sad happened. After getting off to an already rough start to the 2009 campaign, Jackson caught a bad case of Valley Fever, which the Mayo Clinic says, “…is highly variable. It can take from six months to a year to fully recover, and fatigue and joint aches can last even longer. The severity of the disease depends on several factors, including your overall health and the number of fungus spores you inhale.” The Valley Fever eventually turned into pneumonia, and Jackson just couldn’t take it anymore:

Jackson said he had a cough, was sore and achy and had been feeling constantly tired.

“By the third inning, it felt like I had played 20 innings with an 80-pound backpack on,” he said. “It was brutal.”

…He said the first signs of sickness came during the team’s first road trip of the season to San Francisco in mid-April. He said the pneumonia hit him during the most-recent homestand, at which point the club placed him on the disabled list.

…”I haven’t lifted a weight, I haven’t run, in three weeks pretty much,” he said. “We haven’t even talked about timetable. One doctor told me, ‘You’re going to be fatigued for the rest of the year.’ The infectious-disease guy said everybody reacts differently, so I don’t know what to expect.”

Jackson would end his season on May 11th, hitting just .182/.264/.253 in 110 plate appearances, good for -1.0 WAR for the season despite playing just thirty games. The Valley Fever did not go away immediately, and it took months for Jackson to finally get over it. The results were damaging; weight loss, muscle atrophy, and rust all set in, and even though Jackson was able to come back for the start of the 2010 season, the results have not been pretty. He’s hitting .242/.336/.333 with just one homer in 148 plate appearances, good for a wRC+ of just 82. Jackson also missed time on the DL in late April this year after straining his right hamstring.

Most shockingly for Jackson has been his balls in play. He’s hitting line drives at a staggering rate of 27.6% (!), but has a BABIP of just .270 for the season. Those numbers lead me to believe Jackson’s line drives have been more of the Juan Pierre variety than that of Albert Pujols, as the power numbers still remain staggeringly low.

Jackson still has the possibility of reviving his career, but his natural talent has not been able to supersede his temporary physical problems. Until Jackson’s power numbers come back, his value at first base and left field is extremely limited, and the Diamondbacks have to wonder how much rope they’ll give him before they’re forced to go in a different direction.


FanGraphs Chat – 6/9/10

Our weekly Q&A about the goings on in Major League Baseball. Join us at noon.


Zimmerman’s Power

Last night, a superstar stepped on to the field for the Washington Nationals. In the very first inning, after yet another feat of strength, the player had 40,000 strong standing, roaring, clamoring for more.

Huh? Oh yeah. That Strasburg guy was pretty good, too. But I was referring to Washington’s other franchise pillar, Ryan Zimmerman.

The fourth overall pick out of the University of Virginia in the 2005 draft, Zimmerman zipped through the minors, reaching the show the very same summer that he was drafted. Over the 2006-2008 seasons, he combined spectacular defense with a quality bat, averaging about +10.3 UZR per 150 defensive games with a 110 wRC+. Zimmerman compiled 3.9 Wins Above Replacement per season over that time frame, though that total was stunted somewhat by a left shoulder injury in ’08 that put him on the shelf for two months.

Since then, Zimmerman has taken his game to another level. He had 6.6 WAR in 2009, tied with Adrian Gonzalez for 9th among position players. This season, Zimmerman’s 3.2 WAR total trails only Justin Morneau, Robinson Cano and Alex Rios.

The 25-year-old third baseman is swift as ever with the glove, posting a +14.1 UZR/150 last season and a +24.7 UZR/150 in 2010. But it’s his bat that has taken a great leap forward — Zimmerman had a 132 wRC+ in 2009 and currently owns a 169 wRC+ this year.

Zimmerman’s power numbers have spiked since the beginning of the ’09 season. He had Isolated Power figures of .184, .191 and .159 over the 2006-2008 campaigns. Last year, his ISO climbed to .233. This season, it’s up to .282. Zimmerman’s home run per fly ball rate, 11.4-11.5 percent from 2006-2008, was 15.9 percent in 2009 and sits at 20.3 percent in 2010.

With the exception of 2009, Zimmerman has always posted excellent totals when pulling the ball to the left side. This season, he has been off-the-charts good..

Also, his power to center and the opposite field has surged:

Zimmerman’s pop up rate to the right side has fallen each year of his career, which certainly helps his opposite field numbers. Take a look at his infield/fly ball rates when hitting to the right side:

A more powerful Zimmerman is getting fewer pitches thrown within the strike zone. His percentage of in-zone offerings was right around the major league average each season prior to 2010. But that mark has fallen this year:

His walk rate has climbed as well — Zimmerman took a free pass in 8.2 percent of his plate appearances from 2006-2008, but walked 10.4 percent last season and 14.3 percent in 2010. He is getting more intentional walks (nine last year, four so far this year). That could affect his zone percentage a bit, too — without the intentionals, Zimmerman’s Zone% is around 46.4, though that’s still below the MLB average. Intentional walks or not, Zimmerman’s unintentional walk rate is up. It was 7.6 percent from 2006-2008, 9.1 percent in 2009 and is 12.4 percent in 2010.

Last year, Dave Cameron showed that there’s an inverse relationship between the percentage of fastballs a hitter sees and his ISO: the more pop a player has, the fewer fastballs he gets. That has been the case for Zimmerman. He got a heater a career-high 61.4 percent in 2007, and saw fastballs 59.9 percent in 2008 and 59.1 percent in 2009. This year, he’s getting challenged 55.3 percent.

Perhaps there’s some game theory going on here: Zimmerman mashed fastballs last season (+1.32 runs per 100 pitches seen), and pitchers have responded by throwing more breaking and off-speed stuff this season. Zimmerman’s performance against fastballs in 2010 is still good but has fallen (+0.51 runs/100), while his performance against more frequently thrown breaking balls and changeups has improved. Maybe Zimmerman is looking for something that bends or tumbles more often.

Will he continue to hit for this type of power? My guess would be that Zimmerman keeps some of the gains that he has made, but not all of them. According to Hit Tracker Online, Zimmerman leads the majors in “Just Enough” home runs, with six. A “Just Enough” home run, per the definition on the site, “means the ball cleared the fence by less than 10 vertical feet, OR that it landed less than one fence height past the fence. These are the ones that barely made it over the fence.”

Zimmerman’s rest-of-season ZiPS projects a .227 ISO, which seems reasonable. He has been beating the snot out of the baseball for too long to consider it a total fluke, though I’d bet that he won’t keep hitting a homer two-thirds of the time that he pulls a fly ball.

Be happy, Nats fans — a superstar debuted on the mound last night, but remember that you guys have one at the hot corner, too.


Ervin Santana Back in Form?

Quick answer: sort of.

In 2008, Ervin Santana had a fantastic season. He struck out nearly a batter per inning and walked fewer than two per nine. He sustained this performance for a remarkable 219 innings, amassing 5.8 wins in the process, with his FIP, xFIP, and ERA all under 3.55.

Last year was not so kind, as he was worse in every facet of the game. The major culprit behind this descent was a nearly two MPH drop in fastball velocity, from 94.4 to 92.2. In 2007, as well, Santana posted a 92.2 average fastball velocity and struggled mightily. In both 2007 and 2009, Santana posted FIPs above 5.00 and xFIPs above 4.60.

Santana’s results have been fantastic so far, as he has a 3.29 ERA in 82 innings. His peripheral numbers are improved as well. Strikeouts are up, walks and home runs are down. However, neither of these numbers are at the point at which we would expect such a low ERA; his FIP is 4.36 and his xFIP only slightly better at 4.19.

The fastball velocity which Santana showed in 2008 simply isn’t back. Santana’s fastballs in 2010 have averaged 92.7 MPH, still nearly 2 MPH below their 2008 mark. It appears that he is making up for this lack of velocity with deception. Batters are swinging at far more pitches outside of the zone (30.2% vs. 25.8%) and far fewer pitches inside it (57.9% vs. 64.4%). Naturally, hitters’ contact percentage is far worse outside of the zone, and so Santana is drawing slightly more swings and misses. Presumably, these pitches chased out of the zone, which are still contacted just over half the time, are not hit as well as those in the zone, which could also be contributing to Santana’s success, particularly with regards to his decreased home run rate.

He’s still not drawing ground balls, and so he will be limited by a prevalence for the home run ball going forward. Still, even if his ERA reverts to the levels that his advanced metrics would suggest, he will be a productive, average or slightly above starting pitcher. Santana will likely never be the pitcher that he was in 2008 without that upper tier velocity, but he’s showing this season that he can still be effective without it.


LeVon Washington’s Gamble Seemingly Pays Off

Many pundits labeled the Rays’ selection of LeVon Washington in the 2009 draft a typical Tampa Bay pick. Athletic, fast, and with raw baseball skills, Washington hailed from a local high school and held a commitment to the University of Florida. Making the pick a bit more interesting for the conspiracy theorists was a slight hint of nepotism stemming from Washington’s shared bloodline to area legend and team employee Fred McGriff. Soon the 30th selection in the draft would be shown on the team’s local broadcast and announce his desire to quickly sign with the Rays and begin his professional baseball career.

Washington never signed with the team, though. Advisor Scott Boras and the Rays played hardball throughout the summer and (eventually) through the signing deadline. Even after Washington was ruled academically ineligible to play for the Gators he chose against signing; instead he would attend a local junior college by the name of Chipola. Meanwhile the Rays were awarded pick 30B (or in normal person land: pick 31) in the 2010 draft as compensation for failing to sign him. The move reeked of boldness from Washington’s camp since he was fresh off labrum surgery and had to bank on his ability, not only to raise his stock, but to not get injured once again.

At Chipola, Washington would bat .327/.429/.578 with eight homers, 24 walks, and 20 strikeouts. Keith Law and Baseball America alike ranked Washington in the 60s heading into the draft and earlier today the Cleveland Indians popped him with pick number 55. That Washington nearly doubled his pick number brought a smirk and knowing chuckle from those who felt he overplayed his hand by passing on the Rays’ offer, a reported $1.1 million. Yet, Jon Heyman reported (and later rescinded to an extent) that Washington and the Indians were nearing an agreement worth $1.55 million.

It would appear that Washington and Boras made the correct decision from a raw dollars perspective, but of course, things are rarely that simple. Using the time value of money formula and estimating a 10% interest rate (for simplicity’s sake), Washington could’ve placed the entirety of that $1.1 million into a bank last year and have it be worth $1.21 million today. The flip side is that Washington’s new deal necessitated a signing value of at least $1.41 million last year to equal the amount he may receive soon. That he gained $340 thousand likely constitutes a victory in the Washington household.

There is at least one drawback though and that is with Washington’s free agency eligibility. Since Washington missed a matter of months in development time rather than years – as he would if he were a member of the Gators right now – there’s probably not too much concern about a delay in free agency qualifying. And why should there be? He’s not even guaranteed an appearance in the show. Forget trying to guarantee a full season worth of playing time and don’t even think about six years of service time in the majors. That’s something that won’t be a factor for at least seven years and given the bust rate of even the best prep and collegiate draftees, it likely won’t ever come into play here.

This analysis can get a whole lot more intricate by examining and implementing other factors. Like say, tuition and insurance costs or potential tax ramifications. Surely Boras and Washington’s family went through those and found this a worthwhile risk 10 months ago, and you know what? They look right if this proposed deal goes down.

As for the Rays, they used that 31st pick on a prep catcher from Indiana named Justin O’Conner. Who knows how he’ll turn out; still, the early word is he’s going to sign relatively quickly which would be a welcomed sight following last year’s debacle when the team failed to sign its first and second round selections.

(Note: Jonathan Mayo has since posted an outright refusal from the Indians on the proximity of a deal, writing that the Indians say they haven’t even contacted Washington.)


Nyjer Morgan Getting Caught

Around baseball, and sabermetric circles in particular, Nyjer Morgan is best known for his stellar defense. However, because of his incredible speed, he’s also known for his ability to steal bases. After stealing a whopping 42 bases between Pittsburgh and Washington last season, Morgan’s name would be a priority among fantasy circles for those elusive steals. He has 12 steals in 56 games this season, which would put him on a pace for a mid-30s total, which could see an increase if his OBP can rebound up to the .351 mark he posted last year.

However, Morgan has also already been caught stealing a league leading nine times, and picked off another four. That makes 13 total outs on the bases against only 12 advancements. Ten of the steals and all of the caught stealings have came at second, and the other two steals have came at third.

Overall, this is simply terrible production from a player who is supposed to be a major asset on the bases. According to EQSBR, Baseball Prospectus’s statistic for measuring runs created from steals, Morgan has been the worst runner on the Nationals and the second worst to the Padres Nick Hundley, who hasn’t successfully stolen a base yet and has made five outs on the bases.

Obviously, Nyjer Morgan is a much better base stealer than Hundley and likely most of the league. However, somebody who is going to be caught stealing or picked off on 13 of their 25 opportunities should not be running 25 times. Either Morgan has been very unlucky, or he’s picking poor spots to run. He also appears to have a serious problem with pickoffs, as he was picked off a whopping nine times in 2009, making his 42:17 SB:CS ratio much less impressive.

This doubly hurts the Nationals, as Morgan is fantastic at taking the extra base. This season, he’s been worth roughly +.6 runs on the non-SB components of EQBRR, BPro’s overarching baserunning metric. Last season, he was roughly +2.5 runs.

Morgan’s excellent speed is not debatable, but right now he’s not using it optimally on the bases. If he can’t find a way to be more successful in his steal attempts, he and the Nationals must reduce his number of attempts. If they don’t, and Morgan keeps running into outs, it will simply be a waste of a large asset on offense.


The First Six Years

Yesterday, I suggested that the Nationals were making the right decision for Bryce Harper’s career by putting him in the outfield. The most popular response to that assertion was that the Nationals shouldn’t care about Bryce Harper’s career, only the first six years of club control that they are guaranteed under the CBA. I find this sentiment confusing, honestly, especially considering the crowd that it comes from.

10 or 15 years ago, one of the big arguments from the sabermetric community was that managers were abusing young pitchers, making them throw so many pitches at a young age that their arms would almost certainly fall off. People like Dusty Baker and Dallas Green were vilified for their handling of their pitching staffs, and baseball reacted to the criticism of short term thinking.

From 1990 to 1999, a pitcher was allowed to throw 151+ pitches in a game on 35 different occasions. From 2000 on, it has not happened once – Livan Herandez’s 150 pitch outing is the most any pitcher has thrown in the last decade. The sabermetric community saw what it perceived to be short-sighted thinking, publicized the issue, and the game reacted.

Now, however, it seems like the statistically inclined are on the other side of the fence. Rather than asking baseball teams to be good stewards of a player’s career, the popular refrain is to extract as much value from the first six years of a player’s career as possible with no regard for his long term future.

I find that strange. Putting aside the fact that most elite players re-sign with their original teams for years beyond their first six, making it an act of self-interest to preserve a player’s value beyond his initial term, I believe that teams have a responsibility to look out for the long term well being of players on their team, regardless of whether they’ll be lifetime members of the organization or not. If not just for ethical reasons, then for the good of the game.

I see very little difference from the argument about the first six years of service time compared to how college coaches have traditionally treated pitchers in their care. It is no secret that many universities have put extraordinary pressures on young arms in pursuit of league championships – most notably, the deicision to let Texas RHP Austin Wood throw 169 pitches last year out of the bullpen, after he threw 30 pitches in relief the day before.

There was outrage about that misuse of a young player, and rightfully so, but Augie Garrido’s reasoning is the same as those who argue that a team should only focus on a player’s first six years – why care about the value that he may produce for some other team at the expense of my own benefit?

It’s this kind of short-sighted thinking that has led many players to avoid college baseball, unfortunately. College baseball itself has been hurt by these short term decisions, and I’d argue that the same would be true if Major League teams adopted this “get mine and get out” philosophy. It’s good for baseball that Bryce Harper becomes a superstar who enjoys a long career, and anything that is good for baseball is also good for the Washington Nationals.

Mike Rizzo should be commended for taking a big picture view of the situation, and I am left to wonder why a community that used to fight for the proper treatment of players has now seemingly switched sides.


Why Are Hitters Swinging At More Bad Pitches?

Today, instead of telling a story using numbers, I’ll let the numbers do all the storytelling. I think in this case that they have something to say. The table below comes from Jamie Moyer’s plate discipline stats. While I am interested in Moyer in general, it’s not his stats here that jumped out at me. Instead it’s the major league averages, which appear in the orange-colored rows.


Click for larger size

The first two columns certainly stand out. While overall swing percentage isn’t too far off from previous years, both O-Swing% and Z-Swing% have moved moved a bit. This year hitters are swinging at 28 percent of pitches outside the zone, a nearly three point jump from 2009. The number does move around a bit, dipping as low as 16.6 percent in 2004. On the other side, hitters are swinging at fewer pitches inside the zone as last year, 63.8 percent against 66 percent from last year. That number appears to increase to some degree all the way back to 2002. We’re also seeing much more contact on pitches outside the zone.

I’m obviously wondering why we’re seeing this discrepancy. Why are hitters swinging at pitches outside the zone more frequently than in the past? This seems like a good question to crowdsource. I’ll present a couple of ideas, and you guys can build on them. It’s certainly something I’d like to hear more about.

1, This is just an early season thing. They say hitters get better as the weather warms. Maybe that has as much to do with them getting into a groove — hitters are getting closer to the 250 PA mark — as it does the weather.

2. It’s just part of the natural cycles of the game. Hitters were more patient earlier in the decade. Maybe now they’re starting to be more aggressive.

3. Related to No. 2, and perhaps a bit to No. 4, pitchers are exploiting a weakness and are making hitters chase more.

4. Pitchers are just hurling nastier stuff. Hitters are having a hard time adjusting to tougher breaking and off-speed pitches. I’m not sure how you could go about proving this one, so it’s probably an afterthought, if that.

5. The criteria for pitches inside and outside the zone has changed.

6. Just blame the umps.

Again, I’m not really sure if this is something that we’ll see continue all season, or if No. 1 more fully explains it. I’m also sure that there are many, many more possible reasons. I’d like to hear them, though.


Where Is Robert Manuel?

The answer is Triple-A Pawtucket. The question is why. The Red Sox have a very interesting reliever on their hands in Robert Manuel, who is still in the minor leagues despite being past the point of being called a “prospect.” This off-season, upon the Sox picking up Manuel off of waivers, I wrote about my general enthusiasm for the move:

Is Manuel the next coming of Papelbon? No. His stuff probably isn’t good enough to make him a lights out force out of the pen in the big leagues. However, as long as he’s able to get strikeouts and avoid walks, Sox fans should be wary to overlook this guy, and instead be anxious to give Theo a nice pat on the back for this one. He deserves it.

I’m starting to take my hand off of Theo’s back pretty quickly. Manuel, a 26-year-old, 6’3″ right-hander who throws a fastball, slider, and changeup, has absolutely dominated in the minor leagues throughout his career. According to MinorLeagueSplits, his career MiLB FIP is 2.88 in 390 innings pitched. Over the past few years, Manuel has pitched 98.2 innings in Triple-A in a few organizations, compiling a 2.28 ERA with a 75:23 K:BB ratio. In Pawtucket this season, he has a 1.16 ERA in 31 innings, along with a 26:7 K:BB ratio.

But most importantly, Manuel could realistically be better than some of the other guys to see the mound for Boston this year. Scott Atchison, Scott Schoeneweis, and Ramon Ramirez have all pitched poorly, while Joe Nelson recently got the call up to Fenway despite a very poor outing with the Rays last season. Manuel could also be used as a bit of an early-inning ROOGY, as he’s struck out 208 and walked just 32 righties in his minor league career, good for a 2.80 FIP. Here are what the prognosticators said before the season:

Marcel: 4.31 FIP
CHONE: 4.30 FIP
ZiPS: 4.80 FIP

Not bad. However, there are legitimate concerns as to Manuel’s potential to be successful in the majors leagues (many scouts see him as a Quad-A reliever). About half of his balls in play during his minor league career have been in the air, including 57.1% this year. He’s been aided by a HR/FB rate of just 3.4%, a very low number. Considering his fastball sits in the mid to high 80s, it’s very possible he could be homer happy in the big leagues while successful in the minors.

Manuel is by no means a panacea for the Red Sox in their journey to climb over the Rays and/or Yankees in 2010. However, he can be a valuable arm in the bullpen, and maybe even more if finally given a chance to succeed in the big leagues. I think it’s just a matter of time before he forces the front office’s hand to give him that shot.