Archive for Daily Graphings

I Still Want to Abolish the Draft

On Monday, the Los Angeles Dodgers used their first round selection on Zach Lee, a right-handed high school pitcher. For an organization that has drafted and developed Clayton Kershaw and Chad Billingsley, this wouldn’t appear to be an odd decision, but Lee comes with a pretty big asterisk – the perception of the strong commitment to college of any player in the draft.

Lee, a two-sport star, is signed on to attend Louisiana State University to play quarterback, and he’s one of Les Miles’ top football recruits. After the selection, Miles saw fit to release a statement to dissuade fear among his team’s fans, saying:

“Zach wants to come to LSU, get a degree and play football and baseball for the Tigers. I met with Zach and his parents today and I think that they are looking at LSU as a great opportunity both academically and athletically. Zach is an outstanding student and he’s excited about the college experience.”

Before the draft, rumors were swirling that Lee had put his price tag to sign at over $6 million, a figure generally reserved for the top two or three prospects in a draft. While Lee is seen as a good pitching prospect, no one thought of him as a potential top-three pick, and no one was lining up to pay the kid six million dollars.

The Dodgers can deny it all they want, and they can even prove us wrong if they get him under contract before the mid-August deadline, but everyone strongly suspects that the Dodgers took Lee knowing that they wouldn’t be able to sign him. If Lee goes to LSU, the Dodgers will simply get the 29th pick in the 2011 draft as compensation, one widely seen as much better and deeper than the pool of players they were selecting from on Monday.

In essence, the Dodgers traded their first round pick this year – a year in which they’re under significant financial constraints given their ownership situation – for an equivalent or better selection in a year from now. Because trading picks in baseball is not allowed, they simply used Lee as the pawn to get around the rules, much like the Reds did with Jeremy Sowers back in 2001.

For some, this situation will support a rule change to allow the trading of draft picks, where teams like the Dodgers could trade down or out of drafts if they so chose. For me, though, this simply represents another reason to abolish the draft entirely. Marc suggests that we move to two drafts – I counter that we shouldn’t have any at all.

There are better ways to disperse talent among teams. I laid out my thoughts for such a plan last year, and won’t rehash all the details, but I think the Zach Lee situation gives us yet another reason to doubt the ability of the draft to accomplish the goal of why it was instituted in the first place.

Rather than forcing teams to make sham picks to get around strange rules, or allowing talented players to end up with teams that have the resources to go over slot recommendations in later rounds, let’s just get rid of the whole system and start over. There’s a better way.


What Strasburg Means, Redux

A couple of days ago, Joe Posnanski wrote a beautiful post (okay, that pretty much goes without saying) called “What Strasburg Means,” in which he condensed why we’re all so excited about Stephen Strasburg: he’s limitless potential, possessed of such laughably, wonderfully, enjoyably freakish gifts that even in our era of cynicism and media saturation, we’re all reduced to anticipation and wonder. In Joe’s words, “Stephen Strasburg is Christmas morning.” And his debut did nothing but increase our wonder and anticipation for his next start. Especially in a season in which two (three) perfect games have already been thrown, there seems nothing he plausibly couldn’t do.

For us in the stat community, maybe, he might be significant for still another reason. As occupied as we often are with challenging conventional wisdom, with seeing the unacknowledged value in a pitcher like Bert Blyleven or the overvaluing of a hitter like Ryan Howard, we rarely get to join in the exact same cheers as the rest of baseball. Stephen Strasburg isn’t overvalued or undervalued: his 100 mile-an-hour-heat is exactly as blistering as it appears to the naked eye, and his knee-buckling hook is just as devastating as Lastings Milledge thinks it is. He makes our jobs easy: for once, as stat analysts, we can say that the conventional wisdom is earth-shakingly right. The kid’s legit.

I saw his first start from the upper deck of Nationals Stadium on Tuesday. I couldn’t see just how his hammer danced, but I could see the Nationals Pirates flailing, increasingly despondent, as he pounded the strike zone again and again, brought the crowd to their feet again and again, to the point that they expected excellence — audibly sighing every time the umpire called a ball — but erupted every time he delivered yet another strikeout. I was there as the guest of my friend Alyssa Rosenberg, who wrote a report of the game for a local magazine and wanted my “sabermetric” opinion of the start, and all I could tell her was what she already knew: he was amazing.

Sometimes seeing is believing.


The Future of Cameron Maybin

When the Marlins called up Mike Stanton earlier this week, the baseball world teemed with excitement. It wasn’t just Marlins fans. While they were the most excited of us, the rest of the baseball world watched intently. While Stanton has always been a highly regarded prospect, this year he developed something of a mythical lore akin to Matt Wieters and Jason Heyward. In just 190 at-bats at AA, Stanton hit 21 home runs, one every nine AB. Southern League pitchers were so afraid of him that they walked him 44 times, which is 13 more times than he walked in AA last year — in 109 more AB. By all appearances, he was ready to make his major league debut.

The Marlins would have to make a few lineup adjustments to fit in Stanton, a right fielder. They already had three outfielders. Cody Ross, an established player in his third season of full-time work, would certainly remain. The casualty, then, was between 2009 Rookie Of The Year Chris Coghlan and former top prospect Cameron Maybin. Both have been disappointing so far this season, and the Marlins would probably benefit in the short-term by using Stanton as an upgrade. The odd man out, given the numbers, seemed an obvious choice.

Coghlan started off the year horribly, but his low point came early. After an 0 for 4 day against the Phillies on April 18 his triple slash sat at .109/.146/.109. Since then he’s been much more like the Coghlan we got to know last season. In his last 185 PA he’s hitting .308/.359/.432 and has been the Marlins’ leadoff hitter.

Maybin, on the other hand, presents a nearly opposite story. After that same April 18 contest Maybin was actually as this peak, hitting .309/.377/.400. Since then he has hit .189/.252/.315 in 140 PA. When the Marlins made the decision to call up Stanton, they also made the complementary decision to remove Maybin from the starting lineup. Instead of sending him back to AAA, however, they instead moved him to the bench, optioning OF Brett Carroll. Given Maybin’s considerable talent, it seems like an odd move.

For years, dating back to his professional debut in 2006, scouts and scouting publications have loved Maybin. In their Top 10 Tigers prospects list after the 2006 season, Baseball America said, “Maybin has all the tools and, all the more impressive, those tools are well developed at his young age.” They went on to say that, “Maybin has very few shortcomings,” noting his high strikeout rate as the only factor that warranted even the slightest concern. Similarly, Baseball Prospectus’s Kevin Goldstein gushed about Maybin, remarking in early 2008 that, “[w]hen it comes to tools, Maybin is Home Depot.” Later that year, after the 2008 season, Goldstein again sang Maybin’s praises. “Maybin’s raw tools rate with those of any other prospect in the game,” he said.

Yet, for all the accolades, strikeouts became a bigger problem for Maybin as he advanced levels. In his pre-season assessment of Maybin, Goldstein noted Maybin’s biggest problem area. “He understands the strike zone well enough, but needs to improve his pitch recognition, as he’s prone to chasing breaking balls out of the zone,” he said. In the postseason assessment he said something similar: “His swing has a pronounced trigger in it, which makes it difficult for him to adjust on pitches in flight, often forcing him to flail badly.” The only question, then, was the degree to which this would hold him back at the major league level. The answer, as we’ve seen this year, is considerably.

A look at Maybin’s pitch type values shows that he has trouble with non-fastballs. His positive marks come on the cutter and split-finger, while he has a slightly positive mark on the four-seamer. Sliders, curveballs, and changeups all seemingly give him fits. It’s not exactly that he’s chasing these pitches outside the zone; his O-Swing% is a bit above league average but not greatly so. Instead, he’s missing a significant number of these pitches, 53.5 percent against a 66.3 percent league average. He’s also faring relatively poorly on pitches inside the zone, making contact on just 82.9 percent of his swings against an 88.3 percent league average. This shows up in his swinging strike rate, 11.6 percent, up about a point from last year and 3.4 points above league average.

It would seem, then, that pitch recognition remains Maybin’s biggest weakness as a hitter. He won’t learn to recognize pitches while sitting on the bench, though, so again the Marlins’ decision to leave him in the majors seems an odd one. He might not see high quality breaking balls in AAA, but that would still afford him a better chance to learn than a bench role on the major league roster. The Marlins, as we’ve learned in the past few years, are a shrewd organization. Surely they have a plan here.

Michael Jong of Marlin Maniac sheds some light on the situation. This weekend the Marlins head to St. Petersburg to play the Rays, and then, after two home series, will travel to Baltimore for a final interleague matchup. That gives the Marlins six games in which they can use the DH, and therefore use all four of their outfielders. It’s possible that they’ll use the next two weeks as an evaluation of sorts. If Maybin doesn’t show improvement, then maybe he’ll head back to AAA where he can continue to work on his pitch recognition.

Plenty could change between now and the trade deadline if the Marlins don’t work their way back into contention. Given the current outlook, though, it seems like Maybin will find his ticket to AAA at the conclusion of the Baltimore series. If pitch recognition is at the center of his issues, then he’ll do better to work on that playing every day in the minors rather than a couple times a week in the bigs. The Marlins have the option, and I suspect that they’ll use it. If that fails they’ll have to draw up a new plan, but for now it seems like the future of Cameron Maybin rests on his ability to develop his pitch recognition skill.


The Marlins Find Talent

As we learned from Moneyball, one needs to find undervalued assets when faced with a finite budget. When looking around baseball, analysts often refer to Billy Beane in Oakland and Andrew Friedman in Tampa Bay as two guys who have succeeded with a limited payroll. I’d like to add one more team to the list that always seems to get overlooked in this aspect: the Florida Marlins. For years the Marlins have stayed relatively competitive with one of the smallest payrolls in baseball, and even with a weak fanbase, have won two World Series despite being around for less than two decades. While we can go back and look at some bargains they got in the late 90’s, I think it’d be interesting to check out some of their latest grabs:

OF Cody Ross
Acquired: May 2006 trade with Cincinnati for cash/PTBNL
2007-10 WAR: 9.2

During the 2006 season, Cody Ross found his way around three National League teams, eventually finding a home in Miami, where he’s been one of the most underrated players in baseball since. For the ’06 season, Ross hit just .227/.293/.431, and although he had some pop, was considered nothing more than a fourth or fifth outfielder. He was not only twenty six years old, but was never considered a top prospect or anyone who would have an impact career. However, Ross has taken off in Florida. His best season came in 2008, where he racked up 3.7 WAR thanks to plus offense and defense in centerfield.

1B/3B Jorge Cantu
Acquired: January 2008 on a minor league contract with invite to Spring Training
2008-10 WAR: 5.4

Cantu might be the most interesting case of them all. He came up for neighboring Tampa Bay as a highly touted slugger, and after putting up a .346 wOBA in fifty games as a rookie in 2004, smacked 28 homers the following year. However, after a dramatic decline from 2006-2007, he found himself without a home going into the 2008 season. The Marlins gave him a chance, and he’s been a staple of their batting order ever since.

2B Dan Uggla
Acquired: December 2005 from the Arizona Diamondbacks in the Rule V Draft
2006-10 WAR: 16

This story is definitely the most well-known. Uggla was seen as a career minor leaguer by most teams, including his own, which meant he wasn’t protected by the D’Backs during the Rule V draft leading up to the ’06 season. Despite hitting extremely well in Double-A in 2005, he never earned a promotion even to Triple-A, and as a twenty five year-old was just seen as another guy who mashed minor league pitching but couldn’t handle the big leagues. The All-Star secondbaseman has certainly made geniuses out of the Marlins front office, never having a season with less than 2.4 WAR.

C John Baker
Acquired: March 30 2007 in trade with Oakland for 1B Jason Stokes
2008-10 WAR: 3.2

Baker, who ironically was a central figure in Moneyball, was swapped back and forth between Oakland and Florida via waivers before the Marlins finally held onto him after a 2007 trade. Baker blossomed in 2008, posting a .392 OBP, an excellent number for a guy at a premium position. After a stellar year in 2009, Baker has gotten off to a slow start in 2010 thanks to injury.

C Ronny Paulino
Acquired: March 2009 in trade with San Francisco for P Hector Correa
2009-10 WAR: 2.6

Primarily a backup catcher in Florida, Paulino has stepped up ever since Baker’s injury, and after posting 1.7 WAR in 2009 despite playing less than half of a season, has been even better this year, posting a wRC+ of 110.

CL Leo Nunez
Acquired: October 2008 in trade with Kansas City for current Buffalo Bison 1B Mike Jacobs
2009-10 WAR: As Dean Wormer would say, 0.0

Although Nunez had a so-so 2009 (4.41 xFIP), his 2010 has been phenomenal thus far, as his xFIP stands at 2.90. He could be the Marlins closer for quite some time.

Those are the most notable names, but you can also look to the entire Marlins bullpen over the past few years as a ragtag of journeymen or pickups who excelled when given the chance. The Marlins may not have the biggest budget, but they know a bargain when they see it, and that’s dangerous.


Who Should Catch?

A lot of you are pretty passionate about Bryce Harper’s future position. In Tuesday’s post, where I suggest that moving Harper to the outfield is in the best interests of the game, people raised the question of whether every catcher who can hit should be moved to another position to preserve their offensive abilities. Given that I’ve argued that the Twins have made the right decision to keep Joe Mauer behind the plate for now, I figured I should clarify my position on just who should catch at the big league level.

I believe that most players have, at any given time, a natural position that is the best fit for their overall skillset. Long striders who can cover ground and throw should play center fielder, where their physical abilities can be maximized. Stocky left-handed throwers with limited speed should play first base. None of this is revolutionary. Players should be, and usually are, put at positions where their strengths are magnified and their weaknesses hidden.

Using Mauer as an example, his physical skills include below average speed, a rocket arm, and good footwork. Additionally, he’s generally given off-the-charts reviews for his leadership abilities and communication skills. Regardless of how much offensive ability Mauer had, those abilities profile perfectly behind the plate. It is not just the position where he has the most offensive value, but the position where his defensive abilities are maximized as well. It’s a natural fit for his skills. He should be a catcher, not just because his bat makes him a rare commodity, but because his defensive profile fits the position.

It’s not always so cut and dry, of course. Take Jayson Werth, for example. Coming up through Baltimore’s farm system, he offered potential as an offensive minded catcher with a bat that would have been well above average for the position. However, he was not very good behind the plate, as his footwork left a lot to be desired. At best, he would have been below average defensively as a catcher. His athleticism, however, plays very well in the outfield, where he’s become one of the better defensive corner guys in the game. He has the physical skillset of an outfielder, and the Blue Jays made the right decision to move him out from behind the plate in 2003.

Harper is much more Werth than Mauer as an athlete. He runs well and has the abilities to become a plus defensive corner outfielder. He would need a lot of work to be even average behind the plate, and the time and effort required for him to get to that level would take away from the development of the rest of his game. Like Werth, Harper has a chance to be an asset defensively in the outfield, while few project him to be anything more than a liability behind the plate. The difference in defensive performance could easily make up for the scarcity issue, and that’s without getting into the benefit that his offense would receive from not catching.

I am not arguing that every single good hitting catcher should be moved. Mauer belongs behind the plate (for now). Brian McCann is playing the correct position for his skills. Matt Wieters should stay behind the plate, as should Kurt Suzuki. Bryce Harper, though, profiles better in the outfield.


What The Houston Astros Should Do

Previous: Washington Nationals

Overview

The Astros are currently in last place in a weak NL Central and are tied with the Arizona Dimaondbacks for the worst record in the National League. It seems like the obvious play for this terrible Houston team would be to sell, but one never knows with the combination of GM Ed Wade and owner Drayton McLane, who have been known to buy in hopeless situations. At 10 games back of both St. Louis and Cincinnati, this year’s situation would certainly qualify as hopeless.

Buy Or Sell?

As mentioned above, “sell” is the obvious choice for Wade and McLane. The real question is if they can find a buyer willing to give decent value for the players that they can sell. Roy Oswalt and Lance Berkman have already requested trades. Other players that could help teams down the stretch include Michael Bourn, Brett Myers, and Wandy Rodriguz. It’s not likely that either Bourn nor Rodriguez will be traded as they are still under team control for two and one more years respectively, but Myers is only on a one year deal and has performed excellently so far both in terms of results and peripherals (3.01 ERA, 3.50 FIP, 3.81 xFIP).

Oswalt and Berkman, as the best players involved, are naturally the most interesting to watch in this situation. Oswalt is due $18 million between his 2011 salary and 2012 buyout, which severely reduces his value. The Astros would likely have to eat a good deal of salary in order to land a decent prospect. Berkman is in the last year of his contract, but there is a club option for $15 million and, given his no-trade clause, may request that this option is picked up before approving a trade, leaving the Astros in the same situation that they have with Oswalt.

Regardless, the Astros need to get some value out of those contracts, and that won’t happen with the two players languishing on a roster that only includes five position players and ten pitchers above replacement level. Myers and Oswalt have both been excellent, as has Felipe Paulino, even though he hasn’t been getting support from his team. Rodriguez has been good but his 4.00 FIP isn’t as good as he’s been in recent years. Bud Norris is a solid youngster who rounds out the rotation and figures to be part of the Astros rebuilding process.

Out of the bullpen, Matt Lindstrom has pitched well. After that, Brandon Lyon has not been nearly good enough to justify his three year, $15 million contract, and the only other above replacement relievers have been Wilton Lopez and Gustavo Chacin.

The Astros could use upgrades at every position. Humberto Quintero has been serviceable at catcher but is already 30 years old. Another 30 year old, Jeff Keppinger isn’t much of a glove at 2B and is projected to be below average at the plate for the rest of the season by ZiPS. Tommy Manzella might be the worst player in professional baseball at SS, and Pedro Feliz seems to have completely lost his bat at 3B.

On The Farm

The Astros farm system was ranked 27th by Beyond the Box Score’s system of aggregating rankings from around baseball. Their top three prospects are catcher Jason Castro, shortstop Jiovanni Mier, and pitcher Jorday Lyles. A team can never have too many of either of those three positions, so the Astros can use any player at any level at any position. Their biggest need would be at the higher minors, though, as they did manage to pickup five picks in the first three rounds in this year’s draft.

Budget

Drayton McLane has always been willing to buy, so maybe we shouldn’t read too much into the fact that the Astros opening day payroll was $10 million dollars less than it was in 2009. Still, shedding payroll should be a priority for the Astros, and the easiest way to do that would be to get out from under the contracts of Berkman and Oswalt.


Masterson’s Shine

Entering last night’s start against the Boston Red Sox, Justin Masterson was 1-5 with a 5.46 ERA. His peripherals suggested he was a better pitcher than those old timey numbers gave him credit for. So how did Masterson respond while facing his old team but by causing his pitched baseballs to eat more grass than a sick dog. Yes, even more than his usual 62% groundball rate. Here’s his line:

9 IP
2 H
0 ER
6 SO
2 BB
110 Pitches
75 Strikes

That doesn’t tell the entire story though. Here’s the real beef:

21 BIP
17 GB
3 FB
1 LD

That’s 21 balls in play and 17 groundballs –- or 81% — unsurprisingly this left the Red Sox without an extra base hit on the night. The most ridiculous aspect of the night is that Masterson allowed two of those fly balls in the ninth inning. That means that through eight innings and 26 batters –- or nearly three times through the lineup — roughly 90% of the Red Sox’s balls in play were of the groundball variety.

The most surreal aspect is how this marks Masterson’s fifth start this season with a groundball rate over 70% and yet it’s not his highest rate this year. In fact, he’s only allowed more fly balls and line drives than grounders in one start all season; and even then his GB% was 46%. In a May 19th start against Kansas City Masterson faced 23 batters and had 14 of 16 balls in play pound the ground. Against the Orioles days earlier he’d allowed 20 balls in play with 15 being grounders. Then there was his outing against the Yankees two starts ago, where 13 of 28 batters faced hit grounders. That’s almost half the batters he faced, and they all smacked the ball into the earth.

Compare that to the Pittsburgh Pirates’ 17 strikeout performance versus Stephen Strasburg and the Washington Nationals on Tuesday night and one wonders which the more frusturating style of defeat is. Sure, fanning 17 times as a lineup is more embarrassing, perhaps humiliating, but at least the guy throwing at you for seven innings was straight out of a nightmare.

To drop some analogies on this thing, Masterson carefully placed the carrot in front of rabbits, but only in locations where they could nibble on it, never allowing for a solid chomp. Strasburg never let the rabbit feel as though he had a real shot at biting that carrot. Or, in more simplistic and gory terms: Masterson’s approach resembles death via a thousand papercuts, whereas Strasburg prefers headshots.


What the Washington Nationals Should Do

We’re kicking off a new series here at FanGraphs, where we’ll profile what each team should do as we head towards the July 31st trading deadline. R.J. starts us off with a look at the Nationals.

Overview

With the arrival of baseball’s Jesus Shuttlesworth and the ability to take on payroll (both in the short- and long-term) Mike Rizzo and the rest of the front office might be tempted to make a splash. After all, despite injury carnage to their pitching ranks, the Nationals were still in the midst of the divisional race through most of May before falling to the cellar in the past few weeks.

Buy or Sell?

Realistically, the Nationals are at least a year away from competing with the Phillies and Braves. Making a big deadline deal would be aimed towards public relation and posterity’s sake. That makes selling more likely.

The Nationals rotation currently features Livan Hernandez, J.D. Martin, John Lannan, Luis Atilano, and yes, Stephen Strasburg. Injuries have decimated a previously potential-packed unit. Jason Marquis won’t return for a few more weeks; Jordan Zimmerman, who underwent Tommy John surgery, might return later in the season; same with Chien-Ming Wang (shoulder surgery), Scott Olsen (shoulder inflammation), Garret Mock (cervical spine surgery), and Ross Detwiler (torn hip cartilage).

With that kind of depth soon returning, it could be ideal for the Nats to attempt and cash in a few of their current starters with limited upside. The problem is, well, they aren’t very good. Livan Hernandez is the most notable thanks to his 2.22 ERA although his peripherals suggest he’s a house of cards. Atilano and Lannan have the same issues of Craig Stammen. None of them can strike batters out and as a result they walk more batters than they should. Stammen had a 1.94 K/BB ratio upon demotion which looks overqualified next to Atilano’s 1.00 and Lannan’s 0.71. The starting pitchers desirable to other teams are equally desirable to the Nationals. Rizzo and company should, however, maneuver a full court press when it comes to moving a reliever or two. It’s not like the Nationals can’t replace the production by sliding a bumped starter into relief anyways.

The Nationals also have an overabundance of utility players too. Cristian Guzman (who had previously only played a non-shortstop position in the 2003 All-Star Game) has taken up second base and right field this year, potentially making him more attractive to suitors if not for an $8 million salary. Willie Harris is cheaper ($1.5 million) and while he’s primarily an outfielder, he has gotten a few starts in at third base and second base in these past two seasons. Adam Kennedy is even less expensive ($1.25 million with a club option worth $2 million or a half million buyout) and has played every position but catcher over his 12 seasons. The Nationals have no shortage of utility men in the minors either, with Eric Bruntlett, Pete Orr, and Luis Ordaz a phone call, meal ticket, and coach seat on the fastest moving missile away.

Even with the odd rumors of a potential extension, Adam Dunn is in the final year of his contract and could prove worthwhile to a team in need of a bat. The problem is that Dunn has never been willing to become a designated hitter, which lowers his value and could limit the potential destinations. Josh Willingham is also intriguing, although the Nats may as well hold onto him.

The Farm

Top catching prospect Derek Norris is still a while away, but his presence along with Ivan Rodriguez’s multiple year contract and Jesus Flores – if he ever returns – mean a catcher isn’t necessary. Double-A Harrisburg features two of the team’s top infield prospects in Danny Espinosa and Chris Marrero. Neither is raking at the moment. Most of the team’s top outfield talent is in the lower minors meaning acquiring an outfielder to plug in alongside Nyjer Morgan and Willingham could be an option. Their aforementioned pitching depth is mostly contained to the upper minors as well. The Nats really need impact talent, just like most teams without contention status. None of their pieces will bring that back, so depth with traces of upside should be the focus.

Budget

It’s impossible to say what the payroll ceiling is, but with more than $20 million in contracts due to expire at season’s end it doesn’t seem impossible to expect the Nationals to be able to take on money now and for the future if necessary.


94 Pitches, 14 Strikeouts

On April 9th, 2003, Javier Vazquez, with the Montreal Expos at the time, struck out 14 batters in only 96 pitches. He became the first player ever to strike out 14 batters in fewer than 100 pitches; only Greg Maddux, Tom Seaver, and Grant Jackson had ever struck out at least 13 with so few pitches.

On June 8th, 2010, Stephen Strasburg of the Washington Nationals struck out 14 batters in only 94 pitches. That’s the highest number of strikeouts ever recorded with so few pitches. It came in his first career start, besting the greatest marks players like Seaver (105.3 rWAR) and Maddux (98.8 rWAR) ever posted.

Strasburg also became the first player to record at least 14 strikeouts and no walks in his debut. Not only did Strasburg not issue any walks, he only reached three total 3-ball counts.

Stephen Strasburg’s first start was remarkable for a multitude of reasons. The sheer spectacle, the stuff, the velocity, and the strikeouts. Perhaps the most interesting thing to watch, as Strasburg’s career develops, will be his efficiency. His first start already ranks among the most efficient games ever. We already knew he had the stuff and the velocity. If he can combine that natural talent with the kind of efficiency he showcased on Tuesday, watch out MLB.


The 100 MPH Man

Well, that was quite a show, eh? Seven innings of just unbelievable, dominating stuff. Even the four hits felt like flukes as the opposing hitters just played self defense and hoped to slap the ball the other way. Pitch F/x doesn’t give out many legit 100 MPH readings, but it did it on multiple occasions, and the fastball averaged over 97 MPH for the night. Contrast that with a nasty change-up around 90 MPH and a knee buckling 82 MPH curveball, and you have major league hitters looking foolish with regularity.

Yes, that May 3rd start by Ubaldo Jimenez, where he just shut down the San Diego Padres, was a thing of beauty. Wait, were you thinking of something more recent?

Hey, look, I was as impressed by Stephen Strasburg as anyone else last night. But, in the rush to hyperbole, I noticed that it’s become common to talk about how Strasburg’s stuff is just so much better than anyone we’ve ever seen. That would be true if Ubaldo wasn’t walking around the planet right now.

Here’s his velocity graph from Brooks Baseball from that game against the Padres.

There’s 120 pitches in there. He hit 99.8 on the 117th pitch of the night. He struck out 13 hitters on the evening, by the way. While he issued three walks, he was also not facing the Pirates Triple-A line-up, so we’ll call that even. All in all, it was a very similar start to the one that went down in D.C. last night.

This isn’t to diminish Strasburg’s debut in any way, shape, or form. He was remarkably good, and will continue to be, I’m sure. But I think that it’s important that we recognize that the stuff isn’t once in a lifetime. It’s not even once in 2010. Strasburg has a great arm, but so does the Rockies ace, even if he comes with just a wee bit less hype.