Archive for Daily Graphings

The Braves’ Punishment Is In and It’s Harsh

On Tuesday, Major League Baseball levied punishments on the Atlanta Braves after completing an investigation into the club’s methods of talent acquisition. In addition to the departure of general manager John Coppolella (who was banned from baseball for life), special assistant Gordon Blakeley (who has been suspended for a year), and president of baseball operations John Hart, the Braves are losing 12 players signed during international free-agency periods ranging from 2015 to 2017. Scouting reports on those players, who are now free agents subject to international amateur bonus restrictions, are below.

In addition to losing these players, Atlanta will be barred from signing shortstop prospect Robert Puason, who isn’t eligible until the 2019-2020 IFA period, as well as Korean prospect Ji-Hwan Bae, who MLB found was offered “extra-contractual compensation.” In a similar vein, the Braves will lose their 2018 third-round pick in the domestic amateur draft for extra-contractual compensation violations involving 2017 second-round pick Drew Waters, a high-school outfielder. Waters is remaining with the Braves.

As further punishment, Atlanta will be prohibited from signing players international players for more than $10,000 during the 2019-2020 signing period, and their bonus pool will be cut in half for the 2020-2021 period.

MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred’s statement on the investigation and punishment details:

“During the 2015-16 international signing period, the Braves signed five players subject to the Club’s signing bonus pool to contracts containing signing bonuses lower than the bonuses the club had agreed to provide to players. The Club provided the additional bonus money to those players by inflating the signing bonus to another player who was exempt from their signing pool because he qualified as a ‘foreign professional’ under MLB rules.”

“As a result of the 2015-16 circumvention, the Braves were able to sign nine high-value players during the 2016-17 signing period who would have been unavailable to thhem had the Club accurately accounted for its signings during the 2015-16 signing period.”

Those players are the ones listed below, as well as 18-year-old Cuban OF Juan Carlos Negret (who spent 2017 in the DSL) and three players who were part of an illegal package deal — Brandol Mezquita, Angel Rojas and Antonio Sucre — who had yet to make their pro debuts.

Below are the scouting reports on the prospects cut loose.

Kevin Maitan, INF
The crown jewel of the 2016 signing period, Maitan signed for $4.25 million out of Venezuela after a late push from Washington increased an earlier agreed-upon figure. Scouts were on Maitan early, around age 13 or 14, and monitored his development closely. By age 15, he was drawing comparisons to Miguel Cabrera and Chipper Jones. They thought he’d hit for average and power from both sides of the plate and, though he was likely to move to third base eventually, thought he had a non-zero chance to stay at shortstop. All-around talents like this are rare, and Maitan ranked No. 1 on our July 2 board in 2016.

I saw Maitan firsthand during his stateside debut in the 2016 Fall Instructional League. He had already thickened up quite a bit at that point and seemed likely to move to third base sooner than anticipated. But the bat speed, arm strength, and feel to hit were all as advertised. I left satisfied that Maitan, whom I had already projected to third base anyway, was as advertised.

Then 2017 reports started coming in. Scouts expressed concern over Maitan’s thickening body, some dropping a 30 on his lateral range at shortstop and projecting him over at first base. Others didn’t like his swing, citing stiffness and length. Pro scouts couldn’t understand what all the international fuss was about.

Maitan still has enviable bat speed and bat control, but any team that pursues him is pursuing a talented reclamation project, not a presently enticing talent. He’s still just 17 and it’s far too early to give up on Maitan as a prospect, but unless you view him using his amateur reports as context, you might not even think he is one.

Abraham Gutierrez, C
Also from Venezuela, Gutierrez’s frame started filling out early, and some international scouts believe he rose to the forefront of the 2016 J2 class simply because he had something resembling adult physicality sooner than his peers did. He signed for a lofty $3.53 million but ranked 23rd on that year’s July 2 board after scouts soured on him as signing day approached. He has viable catch-and-throw skills but will need to keep his frame in check to retain them as he ages. Offensively, the hit and power tools are fringey, requiring a long-term stay behind the plate for Gutierrez to be an everyday big leaguer. He spent 2017 in the Gulf Coast League.

Yunior Severino, INF
Signed for $1.9 million out of the Dominican Republic, Severino is a switch-hitting middle infielder with surprising power for his size. Scouts think his long-term defensive home is second base and are skeptical about his long-term ability to make contact. He takes big, violent swings but still hit .286/.345/.444 in the GCL this year.

Juan Contreras, RHP
Contreras touches 97 with his fastball and sits 92-95. There’s some effort to the delivery, but Contreras’s lower half is long and strong, and the arm works fine. His best secondary is a slider with purely vertical movement, a result of Contreras’ vertical arm slot. It flashes plus. It’s hard to generate any changeup movement from a slot like Contreras’s. Due to a combination of that arm slot, his size (a slightly built 6-foot-1), and issues with command (Contreras walked 21 hitter in 18 innings this year), there’s a good chance he’s only a reliever. He signed for $1.2 million in 2016.

Yefri Del Rosario, RHP
A Dominican righty who might be the most sought-after name on this list, Del Rosario signed for $1 million out of the Dominican Republic in 2016. Physically projectable, athletic, and the owner of efficient arm action, Del Rosario sits in the mid-90s with a potential plus curveball. Scouts have projected heavily on the changeup and command due to Del Rosario’s athleticism. He started the year in the Dominican Summer League but was quickly promoted to the GCL, where he struck out 36 hitters in 37.1 innings.

Livan Soto, INF
Another Venezuelan infielder from the 2016 class, Soto was considered a utility prospect by scouts who saw him this year due to a lack of physicality. He signed for $1 million.

Guillermo Zuniga, RHP
A Colombian righty, Zuniga was 18 when he signed as part of an illegal package deal. He’s a projectable 6-foot-3 with a fastball in the 88-93 range and a potential above-average curveball. His fluidity allows for command projection.

Yenci Pena, 3B
Pena is from the Dominican Republic and signed for $1 million. He has a big frame and above-average power projection. As he grows into that power, he’ll almost certainly move off of short and to third base. The actions, footwork, and arm strength will play there, possibly as plus.

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As teams pursue these players, they’ll be restricted to signing them to bonus amounts governed by the current international-signing bonus pools, although, as a Yahoo!’s Jeff Passan reports, teams will be allowed to use their 2018-19 pool money to sign the Braves’ cast-offs.

Here are clubs’ remaining bonus pools for this year, as compiled by the Associated Press:

TEX: $3.53 million
NYY: $3.25
MIN: $3.25 (after voiding the $3 mil bonus of INF Jelfry Marte)
PIT: $2.27
MIA: $1.74
SEA: $1.57
PHI: $0.90
MIL: $0.76
ARI: $0.73
BAL: $0.66
BOS: $0.46
TBA: $0.44

This mess is complicated by the yet-unknown fate of the Japanese posting system and its impact on Shohei Otani’s potential earning power/signing restriction — and even more complicated by the presence of recently defected Cuban OF Julio Pablo Martinez, a short but athletic and tightly wound 21-year-old center-field prospect with speed and some pull power.

Many teams have deals in place with prospects for next year’s signing period, but teams have reneged on deals in the past, as the player/trainer have little recourse when that occurs, since the initial deals were technically illegal.


Revisiting the Angels Hypothetical

It was a little over three years ago that I first took a look at this question. The article was a hit!

Now I think it’s time to run the numbers again. People change. Situations change. Statistical projections change. Mike Trout is fantastically good. He is probably the best player in baseball, and he’s under contract with the Angels for another three seasons. Albert Pujols used to be fantastically good. He’s not so much anymore. He was just one of the worst players in baseball, and he’s under contract with the Angels for another four seasons. You know where this is going. You’ve probably wondered about this before, even though the hypothetical is stupid and unrealistic.

Trout isn’t going to get traded. Aside from everything else, he has no-trade protection. Pujols isn’t going to get traded. Aside from everything else, he also has no-trade protection. But let’s say the Angels wanted to make a trade. Let’s say they wanted to package the two players together. Does Pujols’ negative value outweigh Trout’s positive value? Would the Angels trade these players, combined, for nothing? Again, this is stupid. Let’s dive in.

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Trey Mancini (and Mark Trumbo) on Trey Mancini

Trey Mancini had a successful first season with the Baltimore Orioles. The 25-year-old University of Notre Dame graduate hit .293/.338/.488, with 24 home runs. Last week he was rewarded with a third-place finish in American League Rookie-of-the-Year balloting.

Every bit as notable is the fact that he played the majority of his games as an outfielder. Coming into the year, Mancini had served exclusively as a first baseman or designated hitter. At 6-foot-4, 215 pounds, he profiled as a slightly more athletic version of Mark Trumbo.

Neither would dispute the comparison. When I talked to the Orioles teammates late in the season, both agreed they have a lot in common. The body types, the determination to overcome their defensive limitations, the plus power and the strikeouts, the hot and cold streaks. By and large, Mancini is Trumbo 2.0.

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Trey Mancini: “This season has been a whirlwind, for sure. Changing positions in spring training and learning to play the outfield at this level has been the coolest experience I’ve ever had. I grew up a first baseman — I’ve been a first baseman all my life — and nobody really thought much of me switching positions. People didn’t think I was athletic enough.

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The 2018 Free-Agent Bargains

Last week, I released my top-50 list for the free agents available this offseason, including both my own and our community’s forecasts for the contracts those players will receive this winter. Over the next couple of days, I’ll provide a few names that I think look like particularly good or bad bets based on our contract expectations.

Today, we’ll do the expected bargains. I think that, last year, my picks turned out okay. I had Justin Turner and Rich Hill as the two best bets for the price, with Neil Walker, Brett Cecil, and Matt Holliday rounding out my top five. Walker was pretty good when healthy, but health is part of why he took the Mets qualifying offer. Cecil was lousy early in the year but ended up being fine overall, while Holliday was the opposite, posting a good first half until injuries caused him to collapse in the second.

Of course, my track record isn’t always that good, and several of the players I identify as potential bargains below will probably be terrible next year. So it goes when signing free agents. But if I had some money to spend this winter and were looking to make my team better in the short-term, here’s where I would be looking to spend it.

As always, more credit is given for higher-impact players; getting a bargain on a role player isn’t as useful as finding a good everyday guy. On to the list!

5. Doug Fister, RHP
Contract Estimate
Type Years AAV Total
Dave Cameron 1 $9.0 M $9.0 M
Median Crowdsource 1 $8.0 M $8.0 M
Avg Crowdsource 1.5 $7.5 M $11.2 M
2018 Steamer Forecast
Age IP BB% K% GB% ERA FIP xFIP WAR RA9-WAR
34 138.0 7.9% 18.2% 47.7% 4.52 4.51 4.51 1.5 1.4

Outside of the top few arms available, this starting pitching class is mostly filled with pitch-to-contact starters who a contender should slot in at the back of their rotation. There are some solid innings-eaters around who will get paid for their ability to produce solid results in bulk, but if a team wants to shop in these waters, I’d suggest Fister as a lower cost option than most of his peers.

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The Giants Need More Than Just Giancarlo Stanton

If the Giants weren’t 2017’s biggest disappointment, it’s only because the Mets lived their own waking nightmare. The Giants remain a popular product, but with popularity comes expectations, and the Giants have been garbage for a year and a half, in large part because the home-run spike seems to have passed them right by. Fast-forward to the present day, and the Giants find themselves in a situation of some urgency. They want to maintain their market share in the region, and they could stand to add some dingers. The Giants haven’t hit many dingers. They don’t want to spend another year in the basement.

It seems like the stars are aligning almost perfectly. When the Giants have needed help the most, there has become available a certain player, a certain dinger-hitter and league MVP, a lineup-changing colossus who’s rumored to want to play out west, around where he grew up. It’s no secret the Marlins are looking to trade Giancarlo Stanton, and it’s no surprise the Giants are deeply involved in the mix. Nothing has yet actually happened, but the two current favorites would have to be the Giants and the Cardinals. They’re the suitors who’ve been most aggressive.

And yet I’m not sold the Giants make such great sense. One can speculate only so much about a move that would be undoubtedly complicated, but the Giants don’t find themselves in an enviable position. Acquiring Stanton could be an awfully dangerous commitment.

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The Impact of Payroll Tax on the Pursuit of Giancarlo Stanton

“I know all teams have plenty of money.”

Giancarlo Stanton

This season’s National League MVP, Giancarlo Stanton, recently addressed rumors that Miami might trade him, noting that the club could immediately become a postseason contender with the addition of pitching. His suggestion that all teams have plenty of money certainly appears to be a response to speculation that the Marlins intend to slash payroll a few months after having been purchased for more than a billion dollars.

It also stands to reason that he was commenting upon the fact any club could theoretically afford to acquire Stanton and the $295 million remaining on his contract. In one sense, he’s probably right. Revenues in baseball are at an all-time high. For a number of reasons, however, there’s not a direct correlation in baseball between revenues and spending.

One main reason is the competitive-balance tax, formerly known as the luxury tax. The cap for the tax has increased at only about half the rate of MLB payrolls. Accordingly, more teams find themselves up against a tax that was made more painful in the last CBA. Those taxes have pretty drastic effects on the trade market for Giancarlo Stanton, putting some teams out of the bidding and making the cost for others high enough that a competitive offer might be unreasonable.

Two years ago, Nathaniel Grow wrote an excellent piece about the implications of the luxury tax this century, showing how many teams used the tax as a cap, which has driven down spending relative to revenue over the last decade. In the last few years, the tax threshold has grown at a very slow rate, such that, by the end of the current CBA, teams with an average payroll will find themselves just a single major free-agent signing away from transcending it. The graph below depicts both average team payrolls and the tax threshold since 2003.

Over the last 15 years, payroll has grown at a pace 50% faster than that of the competitive-balance tax amount. However, the chart above actually overstates the rate at which the competitive-balance threshold has grown. From 2003 until the beginning of the previous CBA in 2011, the luxury tax grew at a rate pretty close to MLB payrolls, even if it did depress salaries compared to revenue. Beginning with the CBA that started in 2011 and the new CBA, which goes through 2021, the competitive-balance tax has seen barely any growth, especially when it comes to payroll.

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What Should the Rays Do?

The Tampa Bay Rays are a fascinating case study this offseason. They’re not bad, but it’s been a while since they were contenders. They haven’t finished with a winning record in any of the past four seasons, and as things stand right now, they aren’t projected as a 2018 playoff team either. Our depth charts currently peg them for having the 16th-best WAR in the majors, and the ninth-best in the American League. There isn’t a lot of separation between the Rays at 16th and the Diamondbacks at 10th, but by that same token, they’re not that far from the Orioles at 18th overall, either.

With some upgrades, the Rays could conceivably push a little closer to the top of the list and put themselves more firmly into the Wild Card mix. But as Craig noted on Friday, the Rays have already committed to a more expensive roster in 2018 than they did in 2017. As such, they may not have any money to spend in free agency. In fact, they may have to jettison some salaries. Who would they jettison, exactly? Let’s take a look:

Tampa Bay Rays, $5+ Million Salaries, 2018
Player 2018 Salary ($M) 2017 WAR Proj. 2018 WAR
Evan Longoria $13.6 2.5 3.0
Wilson Ramos $8.5 0.4 2.0
Jake Odorizzi $6.5 0.1 0.9
Corey Dickerson $6.4 2.6 1.1
Chris Archer $6.4 4.6 4.4
Kevin Kiermaier $5.6 3.0 3.8
Alex Colome $5.5 1.2 0.7
Adeiny Hechavarria $5.0 1.3 0.7
Highlighted = Projected arbitration salary from MLB Trade Rumors
Projected WAR via FanGraphs depth charts

So the Rays have eight players who are expected to make $5 million or more next season, either as part of their current contract or through arbitration (estimates of which have been provided by Matt Swartz). Brad Miller is projected to make $4.4 million in arbitration, which is also noteworthy.

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Putting WAR in Context: A Response to Bill James

Nine years ago next month, we introduced a new stat to the pages of FanGraphs. We called it Win Values, and on the player pages and leaderboards, it went by the acronym WAR. We wouldn’t actually start calling it that, or use the words for which the acronym stood (Wins Above Replacement) for a little while, since we thought Win Values sounded cooler. And as the people who bring you WPA/LI and RE24, we’re clearly the experts on statistical naming coolness.

Over the last nine years, WAR has become something of a flagship metric, not just for us, but for the analytical community at large. Baseball-Reference introduced their own version, while Baseball Prospectus modernized their version of WARP — their version adds the word player to the name, thus the P — to provide something that scaled a bit more like what was presented here and at B-R. Because WAR is a framework for combining a number of different metrics into a single-value stat, there are also quite a few other versions of WAR out there, each with their own calculations.

But while everyone uses different inputs — and therefore arrives at slightly different results — almost all of the regularly updated WAR metrics are built on some version of linear weights, which assigns an average run value to each event in which a player is involved, regardless of what actually happened on the play. If you hit a single, you get credit for hitting a single. It’s worth some fraction of a run, regardless of whether you hit it with two outs and the bases empty in a the first inning of an eventual blowout, or whether it was a walk-off two-run single to give your team the lead. In most versions of WAR, the value of a player’s contribution is calculated independent of the situation in which it occurred.

Bill James is not a fan of that decision.

We come, then, to the present moment, at which some of my friends and colleagues wish to argue that Aaron Judge is basically even with Jose Altuve, and might reasonably have been the Most Valuable Player. It’s nonsense. Aaron Judge was nowhere near as valuable as Jose Altuve. Why? Because he didn’t do nearly as much to win games for his team as Altuve did. It is NOT close. The belief that it is close is fueled by bad statistical analysis—not as bad as the 1974 statistical analysis, I grant, but flawed nonetheless. It is based essentially on a misleading statistic, which is WAR. Baseball-Reference WAR shows the little guy at 8.3, and the big guy at 8.1. But in reality, they are nowhere near that close. I am not saying that WAR is a bad statistic or a useless statistic, but it is not a perfect statistic, and in this particular case it is just dead wrong. It is dead wrong because the creators of that statistic have severed the connection between performance statistics and wins, thus undermining their analysis.

James strongly believes that the metric falls apart by building up from runs, rather than working backwards from wins, since the context-neutral nature of the metric means that what WAR estimates a group of players are worth won’t add up to how many wins their team actually won. In his mind, the decision to make WAR context-neutral isn’t a point on which reasonable people can disagree; it’s just a mistake.

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Sunday Notes: Mike Rizzo and the Nats’ Analytical Wavelength

When I talked to Mike Rizzo in Orlando earlier this week, he told me the Washington Nationals have an eight-person analytics department that includes “three or four employees” who have been added in the last two years. The veteran GM also told me they have their own “Scouting Solutions, which (they) call The Pentagon.” In Rizzo’s opinion, his team has gone from behind the times to having “some of the best and brightest analytics people in all of baseball.”

A pair of uniformed-personnel changes further suggest an increased emphasis on analytics. Dave Martinez has replaced Dusty Baker as manager, and Tim Bogar has come on board as the first base coach. According to Rizzo, their saber-savviness played a role in their hirings.

“It was part of the process,” related Rizzo. “Davey is a 16-year major league veteran who can appeal to a clubhouse of major league players — there’s a respect factor there — and he’s also coming from two of the most-analytical organizations in baseball, in Tampa Bay and Chicago. He’s bringing that love of analytics and the implementation of those statistics with his thought process. Read the rest of this entry »


The BBWAA Did A Great Job

Yesterday, the BBWAA announced the last of their major awards for the 2017 season, with Jose Altuve and Giancarlo Stanton taking home the MVP honors for their respective leagues. And while there were certainly more-than-reasonable cases to be made for the runner-up to take the top spot, the overall results of the voting show that the BBWAA is, more than ever, doing a pretty great job in rewarding the right players for their performances.

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