Archive for Astros

2016 ZiPS Projections – Houston Astros

After having typically appeared in the very hallowed pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have been released at FanGraphs the past couple years. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the Houston Astros. Szymborski can be found at ESPN and on Twitter at @DSzymborski.

Other Projections: Arizona / Atlanta / Baltimore / Boston / Chicago NL / Cincinnati / Cleveland / Kansas City / Minnesota / New York AL / New York NL / Philadelphia / Pittsburgh / San Diego / Seattle / Texas / Toronto.

Batters
Whether by accident or design, the current iteration of the Astros does appear nevertheless to reveal a clue as to the method by which the club’s roster has been constructed. Per ZiPS, there are two sorts of player among Houston’s starting nine: those whose projected WAR figures can be rounded comfortably to three wins or higher, and those whose forecasts are rounded merely to a single win. Only two players (Evan Gattis and Jon Singleton) occupy the latter group and — again, whether by coincidence or not — they also happen to occupy those positions which require the least defensive skill (or, in the case of designated hitter, no defensive skill at all). One could reasonably make a case that the club has prioritized acquiring and/or developing players with some manner of defensive value. The case may not be correct, but at least it’s capable of being presented with tolerable credulity.

One player who possesses considerable offensive and defensive talent — and who was also a rookie in 2015 — is shortstop Carlos Correa. On the verge of entering just his age-21 season, Correa is the recipient of the top projection among the club’s entire roster, forecast to produce roughly five wins in 2016 on the strength not merely of average shortstop defense but also the team’s best batting line. Owing to how none of us is immune from the icy grip of the Reaper, Correa won’t be great forever. That said, he appears entirely capable of approximating those early versions of Troy Tulowitzki who avoided injury.

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Dallas Keuchel and Pitcher Plate-Discipline Aging Curves

The first time Dallas Keuchel broke out, it was because he found a new pitch. Moving from the curve to the slider really pulled his arsenal together. The second time he broke out, it was for reasons that were both more complicated but also just as conventional — it looks like Keuchel merely threw fewer pitches inside the zone, while getting batters to reach and swing just as much. More swings on pitches outside of the zone means more misses and more strikeouts.

All of that is nice, but it’s hard to know which breakout is easier to believe. Our intuition probably tells us that the first is less delicate — he needed a breaking ball, and he found a good one, and it should remain good. But batters could adjust more easily to the second one, couldn’t they? Just lay off more of those balls?

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Projecting Mark Appel

Last week, I wrote a piece about Derek Fisher, who was supposedly part of the package going back to Philly in exchange for super-reliever Ken Giles. Now that the dust has finally settled on that trade, we’ve learned that Fisher wasn’t actually involved. So I basically wrote about Derek Fisher for no reason in particular. Instead, the Astros included former first-overall pick Mark Appel. A couple of guys named Arauz — Harold and Jonathan, going to Philly and Houston, respectively — were also included.

It hasn’t exactly been smooth sailing for Appel since he went first overall back in June of 2013. Between 2013 and 2014, he pitched to a 5.93 ERA and 3.86 FIP over 121 innings, with most of his work coming in A-Ball. His ERA and FIP converged last season, when he put up a 4.45 ERA and 4.30 FIP between Double-A and Triple-A. All told, Appel’s struck out 20% of opposing batters, and has walked 8% over the past two and a half years — roughly the same as an average minor leaguer.

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Astros Land Dominant Giles for Potentially Dominant Velasquez

It wouldn’t be fair to say the ALDS game against the Royals was representative of the Astros’ bullpen, because that would be mean and wrong, but there was a definite lingering sense of unreliability. The Astros bullpen finished among the very best in WAR, but it was in the bottom half by WPA, and feelings mirror WPA better than anything else. Nor is this exactly a new problem — the last five years combined, the Astros bullpen is last in baseball by WPA at -22. The Mets are second-worst at -9. The bullpen hasn’t been a real strength for some time, and now the Astros’ bullpen actually matters. They’re no longer positioned to just see what sticks.

What’s the quickest way to upgrade a bullpen? Add one of the league’s true elite relievers. If he’s young and cost-controlled, all the better. Jeff Luhnow has talked a few times about wanting to diversify his group of relievers, bringing in someone overpowering. Enter Ken Giles. The Astros were circling around Giles for seemingly weeks, and now he’s about to be theirs, coming from the Phillies in exchange for Vincent Velasquez, Derek Fisher, Brett Oberholtzer, and Thomas Eshelman. In large part, it comes down to Giles and Velasquez. Giles is the proven power arm, with years of control. Velasquez is the unproven power arm, with real potential to start.

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A Market Correction for Arbitration-Eligible Sluggers

In Major League Baseball, the market tends to correct itself as clubs gain greater knowledge of players and their value. If aging players are less successful, the market for that group might slow a bit. Bullpen arms become more or less desirable depending on their scarcity. Increased revenues tend to move everyone up the pay scale. It is important to understand how and when to make adjustments in value as run-scoring environments, finances, and aging patterns change.

That is all well and good for those who run organizations and those who follow the game closely, but the arbitration process is much less nuanced. The non-tendering of contracts to Pedro Alvarez and Chris Carter, along with the trade of Mark Trumbo, are all the result of a failure to adjust — within the arbitration process, specifically — as the market slowly corrects for the overpayment of defensively- (and sometimes offensively-) limited home run hitters whose overall effectiveness has dimmed.

The arbitration process tends to favor the traditional stats that place like FanGraphs have tried to de-emphasize. Closers get big paydays in arbitratio, regardless of overall performance. As a result, the St. Louis Cardinals opted to let Steve Cishek go instead of moving to arbitration where he would receive a salary of around $7 million. Home runs and RBI tend to get paid as well, causing an overpayment for those players who rack up those numbers, but have big deficiencies in other areas.

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This Offseason’s Best Non-Tender Pickups

Last year was the worst year for shopping in the non-tender market since 2007. No player that was non-tendered after the 2014 season was worth even a win in 2015, which hasn’t happened since MLBTradeRumors started tracking non-tenders with their handy tool.

Before we consider it a trend, remember that the year before was the best year for non-tender shopping over the same time frame. Infielder Justin Turner netted the Dodgers three wins, oufielder Sam Fuld nearly did the same for the Rays, now-Cub Chris Coghlan was worth two wins, and catcher Michael McKenry was also nearly average.

In any case, looking over the past non-tender values, a few truths emerge. The best non-tender pickups were above replacement level the year before, for one. And, like Kelly Johnson, Willie Harris, Aaron Miles, and Jeff Keppinger before, they usually had some positional flexibility. Or at least positional value, in the case of the center fielders and catchers.

In that way, maybe last year did buck the trend to some extent. Kyle Blanks (0.8 WAR) and Justin Smoak (0.6 WAR) led the way, and they don’t offer much in positional flexibility or value. Still, last year’s above-replacement non-tenders also included Slade Heathcott (0.5) and Gordon Beckham (0.3).

So who will lead this year’s non-tender market?

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Two Versions of Jed Lowrie

Major League Baseball interrupts this Thanksgiving holiday week to announce that Jed Lowrie has been traded from the Astros to the A’s in exchange for minor-league reliever Brendan McCurry. Perhaps it’s a move you find a little strange — Lowrie is in his 30s, and he’s due real money for at least another couple years. He’s going from one team with a very low payroll to another, and last year, the team adding Lowrie won 18 fewer games than the team shedding Lowrie. Typically you see trades like this in the other direction, but for the Astros, Lowrie was no longer a necessary piece. And the A’s are forever on the bubble, trying to avoid any kind of major tear-down. The A’s want to try to contend again. Having Liam Hendriks and a hopefully healthy Sean Doolittle addresses what last year was a catastrophic problem.

That’s the whole idea, in short. The Astros didn’t need Lowrie, and they’ll take the financial flexibility and the interesting young reliever. McCurry could have a real future, and he could have it soon. The A’s, meanwhile, are happy to have Lowrie back at a modest cost, and they like his flexibility. From one perspective, he gives them depth; from another perspective, he gives them trade options. A healthier A’s team could be a .500 ballclub, and a .500 ballclub is always close to the hunt. Okay, everything checks out.

The thing I find most interesting isn’t the Astros’ position, nor is it the A’s position. It isn’t McCurry, either. It’s Lowrie himself. Just how good is Jed Lowrie, really? There’s room for very reasonable disagreement.

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The Nature of Dallas Keuchel’s Contact

Dallas Keuchel won a Cy Young last night, becoming the second pitcher in as many seasons to complete the two-year transition of “some guy with a 5.15 ERA” to “American League Cy Young Award winner.” Keuchel’s career turnaround, as was Corey Kluber’s, is absolutely remarkable, though the similarities between the two elite hurlers mostly end there.

Kluber, of course, is a righty, while Keuchel throws left-handed. You think of the way Kluber pitches, and you think of all the strikeouts. You think of the way Keuchel pitches, and you think of all the ground balls. Granted, Kluber gets his grounders, and Keuchel started getting his whiffs this year, too, but their primary methods of success lie on opposite ends of the spectrum.

Despite what FIP may lead you to believe, contact management is a real skill that certain pitchers have. Sure, the ability to miss bats entirely is a more reliable skill, and if you had to take one over the other you’d take the whiffs over the weak contact. But some pitchers miss bats, and some pitchers miss barrels. The best pitchers in the world do both, and that’s how Dallas Keuchel got to where he is today.

The whiffs are easy to see. The pitcher throws the amazing curveball and the batter tries to hit it but doesn’t. That’s a whiff. Do that a bunch of times and you have a bunch of whiffs. Soft contact isn’t quite as obvious. I mean, we can see it when it happens, but how? Why did the ball come off the bat like that? I know this is something people struggle with, grasping what it is exactly that a pitcher does to consistently generate weak contact. I’ve seen it asked in chats, live blogs, on Twitter and in comment sections. Understandably so. There’s only one kind of whiff. There’s like a million different ways the ball can come off the bat.

That being said, there’s plenty of ways we can examine the nature of Keuchel’s contact-management game. For now, we’ll stick to one.

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The Best Changeups of the Year by Shape and Speed

No, we aren’t just going to do a leaderboard sort for best movement in each direction and call it a day. It’s a little bit more complicated to figure out the best changeups by shape and speed, mostly because it’s all relative. The changeup, as the name implies, functions off of the fastball, as a change of pace and movement. So we need to define anything the changeup does relative to the pitcher’s fastball.

Then we can do a sort and call it a day.

In order to define fastball movement, let’s just group together all of the fastballs thrown by a pitcher. It’s probably more nuanced than that; the concept of tunneling or sequencing shows that pitchers can pair their changeup with one fastball or the other for different results. But some of this comes out in the wash: by averaging movement across fastballs, their selection of different fastballs will weight the movement in the direction of the pitcher’s usage.

So then our x and y movement, and velocity, are defined against this average fastball for each pitcher. Using a minimum of 50 changeups thrown, and z-scores to sum up the values, we can get a list of best changeups quickly.

First, the relievers.

Best Reliever Changeups by Movement, Velocity
Pitcher FB (pfx_x) FB (pfx_z) FB (velo) CH (pfx_x) CH (pfx_y) CH (velo) Sum Z CH swSTR%
Brad Boxberger -3.3 10.6 92.6 -7.8 2.0 79.8 6.7 14%
Shawn Tolleson -2.6 11.0 92.9 -4.8 4.0 79.8 4.9 15%
Josh Fields 0.1 11.5 94.1 -0.6 3.7 81.4 4.5 8%
Roberto Osuna -4.2 10.7 95.5 -8.0 6.9 82.3 4.0 16%
Josh Smith -4.1 7.6 89.9 -8.4 1.9 79.4 4.0 8%
Chasen Shreve 7.3 10.6 91.4 6.3 1.5 82.6 3.5 18%
A.J. Ramos -3.0 8.6 92.4 -7.5 1.0 85.5 3.5 35%
Jeff Ferrell -4.1 10.2 93.0 -7.4 4.9 82.4 3.5 20%
Danny Farquhar -5.0 8.5 92.7 -7.5 1.0 84.5 3.2 24%
Fernando Rodney -6.7 7.1 94.7 -9.6 3.3 82.7 3.1 17%
Andrew Schugel -7.9 7.8 91.6 -9.6 2.3 80.5 3.1 23%
Joaquin Benoit -6.5 8.9 94.2 -7.5 1.9 84.1 3.1 24%
Tyler Thornburg -0.8 11.1 92.2 -5.8 6.3 83.8 3.0 19%
Arnold Leon -5.1 9.8 91.6 -4.6 2.8 80.2 2.9 22%
Pat Neshek -8.5 4.9 89.9 -4.6 3.7 68.4 2.9 9%
Tommy Kahnle -1.9 7.4 94.8 -7.6 2.8 87.2 2.8 23%
Mike Morin -4.7 8.9 92.3 -0.5 6.8 71.7 2.8 25%
Deolis Guerra -5.1 10.0 90.8 -6.7 4.0 80.7 2.8 15%
Daniel Hudson -6.6 8.3 96.0 -9.9 4.9 84.8 2.7 18%
Erik Goeddel -3.9 9.2 93.0 -4.7 2.0 84.3 2.5 32%
SOURCE: PITCHf/x
pfx_x = horizontal movement
pfx_z = vertical movement
Sum Z = sum of the z-scores for the differentials between fastball and changeups in x, y movement and velocity
swSTR% = swinging strikes over pitches for the changeup
Minumum 50 changeups thrown in 2015

If you listen to The Sleeper and The Bust, you know I talk about this all the time and do the math in my head. Now the math is there for us on the sheet of paper.

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More Than a Curveball: Making Collin McHugh

“When the Mets drafted me, I had a sinker and a decent curveball,” the Astros’ Collin McHugh told me earlier this year. If you wanted to be reductive, he’s still almost all fastball and curveball — those pitches make up 96% of his repertoire this year, after all — but being reductive robs all the nuance out of how McHugh has become who he is today. The Astros’ Game Five starter has learned a lot about his craft as he’s bounced his way around the league, and it will all be on display on a national stage with Houston’s season on the line.

After joining the New York system, McHugh learned that he had to ditch his slider at first. “I had a slider and curveball in college, and the two started to get too close together,” he said of arriving in Kingsport. “I did away with the slider in pro ball. My curveball is my out pitch, and I need to make sure it is where I want it to be.”

McHughCurveball
The second-biggest curveball in the game.

Only Jose Quintana and Yordano Ventura got more raw whiffs from their curveball this year than McHugh. Even if you turn it into a rate stat, McHugh does well, with a top-15 whiff rate on the pitch among starters who threw the pitch 300 times. With eight inches of cut and eight inches of drop, only Rick Porcello’s curve matches McHugh’s for movement in both directions among qualified starters. It’s big, and it’s beautiful.

Of course, a curve and a fastball are more than a buck short of 200 innings in the major leagues, so he knew he had to find something to add back in. “Once I’m good with that,” McHugh remembered thinking, “I’ll start working on something else.” So he started taking his fastball, offsetting it a bit, and “throwing it hard as I could.” The result: a cut fastball.

The cutter gave him a second weapon, a hard breaking ball that got almost as many whiffs as a slider. The pitch drops a whopping eleven inches less than his curve, and goes 14 ticks faster, effectively making batters cover in and out horizontally as well as up and down vertically when it came to his secondary pitches.

McHughCutter
The cutter that gave McHugh the second out pitch he needed.

Especially lefties, even if the curve was already a weapon. “Anything that breaks plane as much as a slower breaking ball does, that makes hitter from that side of the plate has to respect up and down instead of just in to out, it makes it tougher on them,” McHugh said of using the curve against lefties. Big curves like his traditionally have reverse platoon splits, meaning they are more effective against opposite-handed batters than you’d expect.

The cutter is also effective against lefties, even if proving this in the numbers has been difficult due to the nebulous nature of the cutter. “Is it a breaking ball or a fastball?” agreed McHugh as he laughed.

But McHugh started with a true cut fastball as he approached the big league team in New York. “When I first started throwing it, it was specifically a cutter, it was always a cutter, that’s what I wanted it to be,” McHugh remembered. “To lefties, make it a little flat, and find that spot right at the belt.”

While the curve makes the lefty respect up and down, the cutter keeps them from getting extension and showing their power in another dimension: in and out. “It’s just something to keep guys from getting extension on you, which, as a righty to a lefty hitter, it’s always been our issue, lefty extension, whether it’s extension down here or away there. That’s where power comes from.”

LeftyonRightyISOheat
Lefties show power low and in and out over the plate against righties.

Still. Armed with a cutter, a curve, and a sinker, McHugh debuted with the Mets in 2012 and… did poorly. A 7.59 ERA in just over 20 innings that also featured five home runs must have turned the team on his future, as they traded him to Colorado for Eric Young, who had been designated for assignment.

Colorado was a terrible place for a pitcher with a sinker and a curve. “When I got to Colorado, when I first trying to pitch there, I couldn’t get my ball to sink,” sighed McHugh. “That was a challenge.” A challenge that’s been well documented, but a challenge nonetheless.

But pitching there allowed something to crystallize in McHugh that he’d been thinking about when it came to his fastball. His sinker was getting crushed, whether it was at home or away, New York or Colorado. Something was wrong.

He started throwing the four-seam more, and not only because the sinker wasn’t sinking. “Make it look as fast as possible,” he said of his newer fastball philosophy. “Work it up-down. A fastball down, the perceived velocity is slower than a fastball up. A fastball moving, the perceived velocity is slower than a straight fastball. When I’m trying to throw sinkers down, my 89-91 mph looked — especially to a lefty — like 85-87 mph.”

Watching a mediocre sinker, thrown away, lefties got all kinds of a look at the pitch. They could extend on it, and it just looked crushable. So in came the four-seam, and when Houston claimed the pitcher off of waivers from Colorado, they agreed. Astros pitching coach Brent Strom “basically told me, I think you should use your four-seamer more,” laughed McHugh.

McHughFourSeam
The right fastball for McHugh.

Houston wasn’t happy with just throwing it more, though. They wanted the pitcher to elevate it and work on showing more “ride” or “rise” — the riding fastball drops less than you’d expect, given gravity. More fastball spin leads to more rise, and his new team was fluent in this sort of stuff. “They talk about spin rate, in the organization, but not in the way of getting more,” said McHugh. “They talk about how it helps or affects what you do. Like, Vincent Velasquez throws a high-spin-rate fastball, how does that affect what he does?”

The task put in front of McHugh was more simple. Elevate the four-seam. The rise will come. While Curt Schilling said you want to slap the seams for rise, and Sean Doolittle talked about his hands and release points, and Phil Hughes talked about keeping a stiff wrist, McHugh felt that gaining that vertical movement on the fastball was a matter of intention:

The way I started out being able to do it was thinking about long toss. You’re playing long toss with the catcher from 60 feet the same way as if you were out playing long toss at 180 feet. You’re trying to throw the ball through them, you’re not trying to throw the ball down the mound. Get that extension. You can throw the ball 180 feet when you get down into it, as long as you get that backspin. The mound makes you want to get on top of the ball. Some people do an eye level thing. I want to do everything the same but long-toss through the umpire’s mask.

McHugh added over three inches of rise, and a better weapon against same-handed batters. “It’s an out pitch against righties,” admitted McHugh. “Especially to power righties, you want to deny extension, so you throw the four-seamer which acts like a left-handed cutter.” Against righties, McHugh’s rising four-seam gets 56% more whiffs than your average four-seamer. That whiff rate would also put him between Matt Harvey and Clayton Kershaw on the four-seam leaderboard, which is somewhat amazing considering he barely cracks 90 mph on average with it.

McHughRise

If the Mets taught him to focus on the curveball, Colorado told him to ditch the sinker, and Houston coached or coaxed rise out of his four-seamer, it was some combination of the three that helped him refine his cutter. “The more I’ve gotten the feel for it, the more I’ve been able to do both with it,” McHugh said. “To righties, I can make it more of a slider with some depth now.”

McHugh does this by manipulating the cutter’s release and the grip slightly. For the true, flatter cutter, he’ll “really try to get on top of the ball.” For the deeper slider, he’ll pick up the index finger a little bit, and “hook” the fingers a bit more around the seams.

McHughSlider
McHugh moves his fingers slightly and changes focus to get more slider movement from his cutter grip.

When asked if these small alterations affected his ability to command the pitch, McHugh shrugged, even as he admitted that it’s been a little tougher to get depth on his slider to righties this year than last year. “It’s just a matter of focus,” the Astro said. “You focus on what you want the pitch to do.”

That’s a bit of a mantra for him. Focus is what helped him continue to develop in the face of bad results and an uncertain future in baseball. Focus helped him incorporate the best advice from each organization he was with. Focus on improving his pitches helped him learn more about how pitches are perceived and how he could best make use of his skillset.

And it was focus that helped him turn two pitches into four — with a rising fastball, a slider, a cutter, and a curveball, he’s much harder to face these days than he was back with the Mets in 2012. “If they can figure out what pitch you are going to throw in what count, they can figure you out,” he thought. “But if you have four pitches you can throw in any count, they aren’t going to figure you out.”