Checking In on Free Agent Contract Predictions

As of the time I’m writing this article, roughly half of our Top 50 free agents have signed new contracts this offseason. That sounds like a great time to take a look at how the market has developed, both for individual players and overall positional archetypes. For example, starting pitchers have been all the rage so far, or so it seems. But does that match up with the data?
I sliced the data up into three groups to get a handle on this: starters, relievers, and position players. I then calculated how far off both I and the crowdsourced predictions were when it came to average annual value and total dollars handed out. You can see here that I came out very slightly ahead of the pack of readers by these metrics, at least so far:
| Category | Ben AAV | Crowd AAV | Ben Total $ | Crowd Total $ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SP | -$2.8M | -$3.0M | -$16.9M | -$16.8M |
| RP | -$0.2M | -$1.7M | -$6.4M | -$9.4M |
| Hitter | -$1.1M | -$1.6M | -$17.5M | -$17.9M |
| Overall | -$1.9M | -$2.4M | -$16.3M | -$16.7M |
To be fair, none of us have done particularly well. The last two years I’ve run this experiment, I missed by around $1 million in average annual value, and the crowd missed by between $1 and $2 million. Likewise, I’ve missed by roughly $10 million in average annual value per contract, with the crowd around $18 million. This year, the contracts have been longer than I expected, and richer than you readers expected, though you did a much better job on a relative basis when it came to predicting total dollar outlay. We were all low on every category, though, across the board.
That’s not the only way of looking at things, though. If you’d like, you could focus on the absolute value of misses. For example, consider my projections for Juan Soto and Willy Adames. I predicted an average annual value of $48 million for Soto, $3 million too low. I predicted an average annual value of $29 million for Adames, $3 million too high. In the market for hitters as a whole, I was bang on – but I missed by $3 million in each case, merely in opposite directions. Absolute value everything, and our average misses look close to identical – my idiosyncratic adjustments from average haven’t done me any good. It’s done me a lot of harm, in fact, thanks to Gleyber Torres’s pillow contract:
| Category | Ben AAV | Crowd AAV | Ben Total $ | Crowd Total $ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SP | $4.5M | $4.3M | $21.4M | $20.8M |
| RP | $0.5M | $1.7M | $6.4M | $9.4M |
| Hitter | $2.8M | $2.8M | $35.3M | $28.3M |
| Overall | $3.5M | $3.5M | $25.6M | $23M |
I think that those conclusions alone are quite interesting. The biggest thing that’s gone on this winter is that contract average annual values have been much higher than expected. Don’t beat yourself up over that miss, crowd, because you’re not alone. I collected predictions from three other leading outlets, and thus far, we’re both doing better than that control group in terms of getting AAVs right. The picture is less clear when it comes to total guaranteed dollars; we’re both middle of the pack there.
The point of all of this data crunching: If there’s one thing to say about this year’s free agency class, it’s that players are getting more per year, and more overall, than the last few years have conditioned us to expect. I’m not sure why that’s the case, and I’d also like to wait until more of the top free agents have signed to get a better read. It’s at least feasible, though I haven’t tested this hypothesis yet, that the free agents who sign earlier in the offseason are the ones whose market exceeded everyone’s expectations, their own included, and that the rest of the winter will bring values down somewhat.
It’s also feasible that we all just missed, period. Baseball is an ongoing, booming business. Some recent offseasons have featured huge uncertainty – post-COVID hangover, CBA negotiations, uncertain future of sports networks, and so on. This year, that’s mostly in the past. The TV network fallout is still ongoing, but teams at the very least have more certainty about what will happen. Perhaps being slightly more confident in the future is leading teams to spend more money in the present.
Another possibility: Soto’s contract just broke things. Remove Soto’s contract, and everyone’s total dollar guarantee predictions improve markedly. Here’s a Soto-less table:
| Category | Ben AAV | Crowd AAV | Ben Total $ | Crowd Total $ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SP | -$2.8M | -$3.0M | -$16.9M | -$16.8M |
| RP | -$0.2M | -$1.7M | -$6.4M | -$9.4M |
| Hitter | -$0.9M | -$1.1M | $1.6M | $0.1M |
| Overall | -$1.9M | -$2.2M | -$9.3M | -$10.1M |
| Category | Ben AAV | Crowd AAV | Ben Total $ | Crowd Total $ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SP | $4.5M | $4.3M | $21.4M | $20.8M |
| RP | $0.5M | $1.7M | $6.4M | $9.4M |
| Hitter | $2.8M | $2.4M | $18.2M | $11.4M |
| Overall | $3.5M | $3.4M | $19.0M | $16.5M |
Now we’re really cooking. I think it’s at the very least defensible to treat Soto’s contract separately from the rest of the market. It’s weird to lump Paul Goldschmidt’s one-year deal and the largest contract in professional sports history together when it comes to grading forecasts; they’re clearly different animals.
If you exclude Soto, another pattern emerges: Both sets of predictions fared quite well on average annual values given to marquee free agents, but missed the length of these deals, often considerably. On the other hand, both sets of predictions were quite good at mid-tier free agents, the types who populate the back end of the top 50. This makes sense to me – we have far more data points on guys like these. What do aging first basemen get? We all basically know. Tandem catchers? Platoon DHs? Non-closer relievers? Ditto. We know how the game values these players, and therefore, their contracts are easier to estimate. Max Fried’s deal has far fewer comps, just by the nature of how few players are as good as him when they reach free agency.
Could the data be used to further improve contract predictions? In theory, that’s what’s already happening, but it didn’t exactly help me this year. In fact, I spent quite a while trying to adjust my initial projections for this year downward. They just didn’t match up with the past two years of outlays, even after adjusting for the caliber of players hitting free agency this year. In the end, I adjusted my estimates down a bit but left them much higher than last year’s. It appears that many of you did the same. That worked out quite well – a market-based estimate that anchored heavily on last year’s contracts would have done quite poorly this time around.
One frustration I had in working up the data: I wasn’t sure how to handle contracts where we ended up with markedly different predictions for length relative to the actual contract signed. Consider making a one-year, $20 million prediction for a player who eventually signs a three-year, $30 million deal. It’s strange to view that as a low estimate for total dollars. If anything, it seems like too high an estimate. You’d think that a player who could make $20 million in one year could probably exceed $30 million for three years, so when he signs that three-year, $30 million deal, it feels like you overestimated his value.
I’m working on some type of way to normalize contract predictions to the actual length signed. I want it to be objective, consistent, and based solely on the actual contract players signed, rather than using projections or anything like that. In other words, I want a simple function that translates every prediction without knowing anything about the actual player, strictly the contract I (or the crowd) predicted and the one they actually signed. I’m brewing up a few ideas, but if you have any, please feel free to drop them in the comments here or notify me however you’d like – Bluesky, Twitter, my chat, yelling at me when you pass me in the street, whatever tickles your fancy.
Finally, some takeaways in bullet point form:
- Pitchers are getting paid this winter.
- Soto set a new standard for contracts, and no one saw the exact extent of his deal coming.
- The first few contracts signed were all much higher than predicted, but those few free agents might have set the high water mark for this year.
- There are still 20ish deals left to sign for the purposes of this exercise.
- Give yourself a pat on the back – you, the crowd, did very well in predictions.
- Also give me a pat on the back for the best AAV predictions, and Kiley McDaniel of ESPN a pat on the back for the best total contract value predictions.
- Finally, check back in the spring for a fuller accounting of how things turned out.
Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.
Undervaluing the top 25 players also makes sense because those sets of players are the ones that teams will be more irrational about versus the back end of the 25 free agents. The more desirable and market competitive the player, i.e. commodity, the more likely, those competitors act irrationally.
Then we should expect that and predict accordingly
Right, for the very top players, there should be a ‘winner’s curse’ tax baked in to the predictions.
How will this analysis look in March? I assume- based on absolutely no data- that a player who gets an offer 20% higher than he expected is already signed, but the guy’s who’s best offer is 20% lower than expected is still unsigned, and thus excluded from these numbers. How does the delta between projected contract and actual contract change as a function of the date at which the contract is signed?
I also thought this, and luckily, so did Ben in the article:
It’s an interesting hypothesis, but I feel if it were true we’d know about the phenomena already. I don’t recall the market working like that in previous years, and can’t think of any recent change that would cause it to suddenly start working that way this year
It’s definitely true in some cases but we tend to dismiss those cases as outliers. So when no team steps up to give Cody Bellinger or Jordan Montgomery $140M we just all write it out of our collective memory.
In the past I think this might have been thrown off by Boras waiting out the market until a team got desperate or suffered an injury (the Prince Fielder strategy), which worked as recently as Bryce Harper but I don’t recall a case of that happening since then.
There’s maybe another phenomena going on here in terms of the tails of the bell curve that could exist for contracts. A player could theoretically sign infinitely more than their “perceived value” by contract estimates (i.e. Soto signed for 30+% more than Ben’s estimate in total value). But there’s some drop-off for what % under their perceived value a player will sign at (let’s call it 30%).
Below 30% of their perceived value (it’s likely a smaller % than that), a player is now likely to sign a pillow contract, which this exercise fails to really capture and looks like a huge miss (the AAV may end up being higher, but total value way lower)
Basically, we’re unlikely to see the “anti-Soto” because those contracts aren’t being signed. There’s some drop off between say 60%-30% below contract value that we are never going to see, even though we could see that in the positive.
I think the answer to this is that we mentally discard players who take pillow deals or deals with opt-outs because it seems even more flawed to include them. But that means that we’re erring on the side of excluding most of the players who would sign under the market prediction, and so the market will almost always look higher than it is.
Derp. I specifically looked for that in the article before posting, but I guess I’m just not literate today :-/
I think you should recalculate this taking into account the deferred money as the total and AAV and see where the results are. I really believe the tax threshold acts as a cap for many franchises and the tax value of contracts is far more important to teams than the general fan realizes. I bet in real tax value you guys did very well. Soto’s deal still breaks this, but he’s a once-in-two-decades type of free agent.
I don’t feel bad about being $100M+ off of Soto’s contract, and I think I was in good company with being wrong about the top tier of starters (I was off by about $40M for each of Burnes, Fried, and Snell). Or Eovaldi’s or Severino’s contracts, that was not something I expected but how would we have known?
I probably should have seen that Adames would get closer to $180M than $160M.
Looks like the corner guys who have signed so far have largely met expectaitons, as has much of the second tier of starters. I think Bregman is on track to get a similar contract to expectations. And Santander seems like a decent bet to beat Teoscar Hernandez, although I suppose he could surprise and wind up with $120M or so.
That leaves the following ones that are really up in the air in my mind:
-Alonso (I have no idea what will happen here)
-Flaherty (anywhere between $80M and $150M seems plausible. Or even a richer Montas-type deal if he’s annoyed with the offers)
-Kim (how do you value a guy with his health situation?)
-Profar (could be Tyler O’Neill type deal, could be another one-year deal)
-Pivetta (real upside here but how much are people willing to pay for that?)
-Tanner Scott (if the Mets are involved this is going to be a deal much larger than we expect)
Dodgers generally pay for upside and manage risk with sheer volume.
Mets could use upside. So could Orioles and Tigers
Terrible teams like White Sox and Marlins should want upside just for trade value purposes
I think Alonso gets a Bellinger type deal maybe four years with opt outs after the second and third years.
Sounds a bit like the JD Martinez deal from the Red Sox. Martinez was a better hitter at that point but it was a while ago.
Are buyouts for options included? I would think that “mutual” options with buyouts attached more or less means just deferring that money to the next year.
The last several years I have purposefully been guessing higher than my original gut felling and still underpredicting. This year I went even higher than my gut and was over the consensus here on a lot of players that I still was under on. Especially the pitchers this year. I actually have done pretty well on the hitters.
The interesting thing to me is Bergman vs Fried. They’re both basically 4 WAR players when healthy and Fried is less likely to be healthy. I’d be surprised if Bergman got $218 million over any number of years
It’s about comps and leverage. Nobody seems to take comps into account when projecting. Leverage is more understandable because it’s less predictable.
Soto saw Ohtani’s 700M number and wanted his bidding to start there. How did he get away with demanding that, especially without any deferrals? Leverage. He had both NY teams bidding against each other, and basically every other rich team doing so also.
Adames was the one that baffled me that people got it wrong. Dansby Swanson set the market for second-tier shortstops a couple years back. What did Adames want? Well, the difference between 182M and 170M doesnt really matter to him. That’s a rounding error on an interest rate change or the difference between picking a good stock or an average one in his investments. Being able to say “I got more than Dansby Swanson” is what mattered to him. So he got 5M more because a good SS on the open market always has leverage
Fried wanted the highest-paying contract for a lefty in MLB history. That’s kind of a weird demand. Outside of throwing with the same hand, what do Max Fried and David Price really have in common? But Fried had leverage. The Yankees wanted a big PR signing after losing out on Soto and Burnes apparently had location preferences. So you point to his results-based success (exceeds his projected/WAR rated) and he gets the demand he asked for because his leverage won out over the Yankees.
Pete Alonso has Scott Boras digging into 1B comps from a decade ago to try to get him a huge contract. But he has no leverage because all those comps turned out horribly and teams stopped valuing his profile. Thus, he’s still unsigned.
Bregman’s comp is Matt Chapman. He thinks he’s worth a lot more than Chapman based on previous results, a bit like Fried. But he doesnt really have the leverage Fried did. None of the big market teams see a glaring hole at 3B right now. They see, “well, maybe if I move this guy or that guy around and stick Bregman here we get better” and then some small and mid-market teams have some interest and his own team offered him a Chapman type deal and then moved on when he didnt bite…
Thus, he’s still unsigned. I expect he still gets the Chapman deal. But if he thinks he should get a Fried deal, maybe he takes last year’s Chapman deal.
I’m not sure that leverage is the what I would call this. I would just call it supply and demand.
The reason I should have figured out Adames was going to get a deal like this is that he would be an upgrade for virtually every team in Major League Baseball, and a major upgrade for most of the traditional big spenders.
Comps are helpful because they give teams and players a framework for the bidding, but ultimately the willingness for a team to play along depends on whether they think that comp is a wise investment.
It seems be to more that there are 5 SP jobs on a team and 1 3B job. So a 4 WAR SP has more bidders than a 4 WAR 3B, and the big budget bidders because it’s not likely that all big budget teams have filled all 5 slots.
I do think teams have adapted to moving guys around the diamond throughout their career more recently and this has impacted the corner market for guys that are not Juan Soto
Of course, we’re now seeing an uptick in mid career RP to SP conversions
Can’t you take the net present value for the $ value of each year? In the 1 year $20M vs 3 year $30M example, the difference isn’t $20M vs $30M since $20M of the $30 is being paid later, that $30M is actually worth less than that. The devil is in the discount rate you chose to apply.
Now I want to fly to San Francisco and yell at Ben while passing him on the street.
Actually, I’d rather chat with him for a while, but I don’t know where I’d find him.