Chris Sale Finally Cashes In
Chris Sale has long been one of the top pitchers in baseball — not only for pure performance but for bang for the buck, as he’s been working under one of the game’s most team-friendly contracts since 2013, which runs through this season. After an uneven season in which he reprised his 2017 dominance until shoulder inflammation limited his availability down the stretch, before capping a rocky October by closing out the World Series-clinching Game 5 against the Dodgers, the wiry southpaw has become the latest star to lock in big money early instead of testing the free agent market next winter or the one after that, following in the footsteps of Nolan Arenado, Mike Trout, and Paul Goldschmidt, all of whom have agreed to nine-figure extensions over the past four weeks. On Friday, Sale and the Red Sox agreed to a five-year, $145 million extension that will take him through 2024, his age-35 season. The deal reportedly includes some deferred money that lessens the impact on the Red Sox’s payroll for tax purposes, as well as an opt-out and a vesting option.
[Update: As some of the details regarding the structure of the contract were not reported until after this article’s original publication on Friday, I have revised this where necessary.]
Sale’s new deal succeeds the five-year, $32.5 million extension he signed in March 2013, his first year of arbitration eligibility. Via the two club options tacked onto that contract, he made $12.5 million in 2018 and will make $15 million in 2019, for a total of $59 million. That’s not exactly chump change, but it’s far below what the White Sox and Red Sox would have paid on the open market for the 34.7 WAR he’s delivered so far under that deal, the third-highest total among all pitchers. The two pitchers ahead of him, Clayton Kershaw and Max Scherzer, signed seven-year contracts worth $215 million and $210 million in 2014 and 2015, respectively. A similar payday for Sale has been long overdue, something the Red Sox had to know when they acquired him from the White Sox in a December 2016 blockbuster that cost the team infielder Yoan Moncada (who topped our prospect list the following spring and ranked second on that of Baseball America), pitcher Michael Kopech (21st on our list), outfielder Luis Basabe (now sixth on the White Sox list), and pitcher Victor Diaz.
Taking that initial extension, which Sale signed on the heels of a 192-inning age-23 season, wasn’t “the wrong” decision, necessarily. It was a move that guaranteed security for a pitcher whose mechanics and injury risk had already become the subject of much debate throughout the industry, and those concerns didn’t abate even after he signed his deal. Nonetheless, he’s avoided any disaster scenarios, throwing the fifth-highest total of innings in that 2013-18 span (1,196) while never dipping below 4.9 WAR even in the seasons in which he fell short of 200 frames.
In 2017, Sale’s first season with the Red Sox, he became the first AL pitcher to notch 300 strikeouts in a season since the turn of the millennium (308, all told) while leading the majors in innings (214.1), FIP (2.45), and WAR (7.5), though he faded somewhat down the stretch and finished second in the AL Cy Young voting behind Corey Kluber, whose 2.25 ERA (and 8.2 bWAR) carried the day. It was the sixth consecutive season in which Sale had earned All-Star honors and received Cy Young consideration.
Through the first four months of last season, Sale appeared to be on track to finally win the award, starting the All-Star Game for the AL and carrying a 2.04 ERA and 2.08 FIP into late July before missing two starts with shoulder inflammation. Upon returning, Sale threw five innings of one-hit shutout ball against the hapless Orioles, striking out 12 — his 11th double-digit game of the year — on just 68 pitches. But he went back on the DL before he could start again, and the Red Sox, who were running away with the AL East at the time, chose to play it safe. Sale pitched just 12 innings in four September appearances, and finished with 158 innings, four short of qualifying for the ERA title; his 2.11 mark would have ranked second in the league and his 1.98 FIP first, and even with the limited work, his 6.2 WAR ranked second. The shortfall of innings cost him the Cy Young, as Blake Snell and his 21 wins and 1.89 ERA in 180.2 innings brought home the hardware.
The Red Sox’s cautious handling of Sale extended into the postseason, as he totaled just 13.1 innings in three starts, with only his Division Series Game 1 turn against the Yankees lasting longer than four innings. He made two one-inning relief appearances, one in Game 4 of that series and the other in the ninth inning of Game 5, where he struck out the side to seal the Red Sox’s fourth championship in the past 15 seasons.
Repeatedly, Sale and the Red Sox have expressed confidence in the pitcher’s condition. In late August, Sale said that his shoulder felt “like Paul Bunyan’s ox” and in September he said he had no plans to fuss over his mechanics because his shoulder was structurally sound. “There was never any major issue with my shoulder,” he said. “This wasn’t something that happened on a single pitch or a mechanical issue or anything.” As of January, he felt “normal again. Being able to throw free and easy and feel loose … obviously is a nice feeling.”
Apparently the Red Sox are still confident enough in the condition of Sale’s shoulder to commit to him for five years beyond this one, at a salary near the top of the scale for pitchers. While initial reports regarding the contract contained no word of the various bells and whistles beyond some unspecified amount of deferred money, the structure has since been clarified by multiple sources. Sale will be paid $30 million per year for the first three seasons (2020-22), after which he can opt out; if he does not, he will receive $27.5 million per year for 2023-24. His annual salaries can increase by up to $2 million per year based upon his finishes in the Cy Young voting, and a $20 million option for 2025 will vest if he finishes in top 10 in the 2024 Cy Young vote and does not finish the season on the injured list. The deferrals lower the average annual value of the deal to $26.5 million for tax purposes. Based upon that figure, Sale’s AAV trails only those of Justin Verlander ($33 million, for a 2020-21 extension announced hours after Sale’s) Zack Greinke ($32.5 million after deferrals), Kershaw’s latest extension and teammate David Price (both $31 million), Kershaw’s previous extension, which he opted out of after the 2018 season ($30.71 million), Scherzer ($30 million), Jon Lester ($25.83 million), and Verlander again ($25.71 million via his current deal). That said, according to Craig Edwards’ recent inflation-adjusted look at the largest contracts in history, Sale’s deal would actually rank eighth behind the deals of Kevin Brown, Kershaw and CC Sabathia (both pre-opt out), Scherzer, Verlander, Mike Hampton, and Felix Hernandez.
As with Arenado and Goldschmidt, running Sale’s numbers through our contract estimation tool using even conservative parameters ($8.0 million per WAR and just 3% average annual inflation, as opposed to $9 million or more, and 5%) yields an eye-opening valuation:
| Year | Age | WAR | $/WAR | Est. Contract |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 31 | 5.7 | $8.2 M | $47.0 M |
| 2021 | 32 | 5.2 | $8.5 M | $44.1 M |
| 2022 | 33 | 4.7 | $8.7 M | $41.1 M |
| 2023 | 34 | 4.2 | $9.0 M | $37.8 M |
| 2024 | 35 | 3.7 | $9.0 M | $33.3 M |
| Totals | 23.5 | $203.3 M |
Assumptions
Value: $8M/WAR with 3.0% inflation (for first 5 years)
Aging Curve: +0.25 WAR/yr (18-24), 0 WAR/yr (25-30),-0.5 WAR/yr (31-37),-0.75 WAR/yr (> 37)
Where Goldschmidt’s estimate using the same parameters came in 20% higher than his actual deal, the estimate for Sale is around 40% higher. But unlike in the case of Goldschmidt, where applying estimates of $9 million per win and 5% inflation to a ZiPS projection — which is generally more conservative than this model — provided by Dan Szymborski produced a figure that more closely resembled his actual contract, sticking with $8 million per win and 3% inflation for Sale in this model overshoots the mark by even more:
| Year | Age | IP | ERA | ERA+ | FIP | WAR | $/WAR | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 31 | 171 | 2.58 | 171 | 2.40 | 5.6 | $8.24M | $46.1 M |
| 2021 | 32 | 166.7 | 2.70 | 163 | 2.48 | 5.2 | $8.49M | $44.1 M |
| 2022 | 33 | 153 | 2.71 | 163 | 2.50 | 4.8 | $8.74 M | $42.0 M |
| 2023 | 34 | 143.3 | 2.76 | 160 | 2.59 | 4.4 | $9.00 M | $39.6 M |
| 2024 | 35 | 132.7 | 2.85 | 155 | 2.60 | 4.0 | $9.27 M | $37.1 M |
| Totals | 24 | $209.0 M |
Even while projecting relatively low innings totals, ZiPS sees Sale as half a win more valuable over that timespan than our contract estimation tool does. Indeed, Szymborski says that only Luis Severino and German Marquez (!) project to produce more WAR over the remainder of their careers. Dan’s computer is so sweet on the southpaw that it’s probably sending heart-shaped boxes of chocolate to his locker as I type. Remember, for both of Sale’s estimates I’ve lopped off his 2019 performance, in which he projects to deliver something around $47-$49 million of value while being paid just $15 million.
Based upon that $145 million figure, either the Red Sox are significantly underpaying Sale or expecting a lot less, performance-wise, than the projection systems (for what it’s worth, Baseball Prospectus’ PECOTA system projects Sale for 22.1 WARP over the 2020-24 period). Which doesn’t seem entirely unreasonable, as they’re the ones with access to his medical file, and the risk of a career-altering injury for a pitcher is ever-present. Working backwards with the ZiPS projection and our conservative $8 million and 3% parameters, a five-year forecast of 17.0 WAR produces a valuation of $147.7 million. At $9 million per win and 5% inflation, 14.0 WAR produces a valuation of $144.2 million.
Regardless of the projections, the contract adds one more hefty salary to the Red Sox payroll, which for tax purposes already has $105.5 million worth of commitments for 2020 and $106.0 million for 2021, primarily via the deals of Price (an AAV of $31 million), J.D. Martinez ($22 million), Nathan Eovaldi ($17 million), Dustin Pedroia ($13.75 million), and Christian Vazquez ($4.517 million). That’s before any extension or arbitration raise for Mookie Betts (who has just one more year of club control), and without counting the pending free agencies of Rick Porcello or Xander Bogaerts, though it’s worth noting that Martinez can opt out after this season. If the Red Sox, who already project to be about $31.6 million over this year’s Competitive Balance Tax threshold — so far over that they incur a surtax — are going to avoid progressively larger tax bills, they’ll have to make some tough choices in the near future, and find some lower-cost players to fill out their roster. Keeping Sale, alongside Price and Eovaldi, almost certainly means letting Porcello walk, and Bogaerts, too, because as a Scott Boras client, the likelihood of his agreeing to a team-friendly extension appears to be slim.
As for Sale, he doesn’t have to remain in perennial Cy Young contention to make this deal worthwhile, but the fact that he’s been able to do so is what’s made him so attractive a player in the first place. He’s earned his big payday, and while he might have received an even bigger one by going on the market, the inherent risks of pitching make this a sensible move for him as well.
Brooklyn-based Jay Jaffe is a senior writer for FanGraphs, the author of The Cooperstown Casebook (Thomas Dunne Books, 2017) and the creator of the JAWS (Jaffe WAR Score) metric for Hall of Fame analysis. He founded the Futility Infielder website (2001), was a columnist for Baseball Prospectus (2005-2012) and a contributing writer for Sports Illustrated (2012-2018). He has been a recurring guest on MLB Network and a member of the BBWAA since 2011, and a Hall of Fame voter since 2021. Follow him on BlueSky @jayjaffe.bsky.social.
I like this deal for both sides. It’s not every last dollar that Sale’s probably would be worth, but it only takes one injury year (not out of the question) to knock out surplus value. And Sales is a terrific pitcher, but he’s got to know his own body–and the state of the FA market, which is looking increasingly erratic. What you are seeing is the RedSox FO making their priorities clear for the longer term. The team is going to be strong for the duration of Sale’s contract.
$7m less AAV than Trout doesn’t seem like much of an “underpay” to be honest – I feel like current $/WAR models have failed to account for the flattening effect of the luxury tax on salary inflation.
Trout and Sale’s AAVs aren’t comparable though. If Trout’s contract ended at agree 35 like Sale’s, he’d be receiving a much larger AAV. If Trevor Bauer gets 1/$45M it wouldn’t be an overpay because relative to Trout – the better player – he’s making $9M more, the terms and circumstances vary too much to compare AAV at face value.
Though you do acknowledge this concept in a comment below so not sure why the comparison here.
I always come back to the $/WAR thing. The pseudo-cap is certainly having an effect, but $/WAR is really just an average and over simplifies what should probably be team specific calculations. Maybe I need to spend some time looking into this but it feels inaccurate to apply a single figure across all teams. Do the A’s value WAR the same way in FA that the Red Sox do? Given their resource disparities it’s not really possible.
The issue with this comparison is that Trout’s $36M AAV Is a big underpay, which creates a false baseline. trout should be making well over $40M per year. He left a big chunk of change on the table.
You can’t compare AAV without also figuring in contract length.
If Sale got an 11 year extension, his AAV would probably be more in the $20Mish range or even lower.
If Trout’s extension was only for 4 years, it would likely be for $50M+ per year.
Wow, Chris Sale is getting paid the same as Patrick Corbin and less than Strasburg. Kind of shocked he didn’t at least try to top Stras’ extension, given his track record.
Over 5 years, starting at age 31, rather than 7 years starting at age 27 or 6 starting at age 30.
Much higher AAV, from an older age.
30-35 y.o. Corbin is projected for ~17 war while 31-35 y.o. Sale is projected for 24 war.
That is a huge difference and it is not just the Steamer/ZiPS that think so.
I am sure if the Nationals were allowed to commit to Sale for $145M/5 years one year in advance, they would choose that over Corbin in a heartbeat.
I don’t necessarily think Sale would have topped this by too much if he had actually hit FA. Those Price and Greinke deals aren’t going likely to happen again–those guys are good, but teams just don’t want to spend that kind of money for a pitcher over 30 anymore. Even if Sale puts up another 6+ win season teams would have been very skittish (Greinke was coming of a 5.4 win season and Price was coming off a 6.7 win season, and Sale has all the documented concerns about everything Jay mentions).
These extensions with one year left–Arenado, Sale, and Goldschmidt–have been awfully close to market value. In some ways, that makes a lot of sense, because teams aren’t buying out team control years. On the other hand, how many guys looked like they were going to be awesome in free agency in 2018-2019, but scuffled in 2018? And the year before that? And before that? (2015 was different). And extending players who are already in their 30s (doesn’t apply to Arenado like the other two) often look really bad in a couple of years, because teams can’t accurately project what a player’s trajectory is going to be like 2 years out. And even if you do, take a look at ZiPs, which projects basically everyone to fall apart in 2 years in their 30s.
So good for Sale and the other guys for making teams feel like they can’t lose them, and are willing to lock them up now for only a modest discount. And hey, it very well might work out for the team too, but the extensions that are going to pay big dividends are the ones that take players through their age-30 season, not the ones after that.
My issue is that players spend their first three years making almost nothing, the next three making well below market value, and then they become free agents or sign extensions for maybe market value these days.
So the owners bank huge surplus value for six years, then pay roughly market value, while players never have a chance to recoup the surplus values they provide the first six seasons.
The previous free agent situation, with players signing contracts longer than they typically provide value – such as Pujols and similar – allowed them to “catch up” money-wise.
Now that that situation is largely gone, the next CBA is going to have to get more money to players at a much earlier point in their careers.
The $8/9M per WAR is only for free agents and only possible because pre arb/arb players are relatively cheap. If players were paid what they are worth as soon as they get to the majors, the $ per WAR figure would be much lower. Right now MLB revenues are about $10 billion per year with $4 billion going to players so $4M per WAR would be the going rate.
The problem seems to be that 6 (7 with manipulation) years of indentured labour is too long now owners are unwilling to pay older free agents who are still good (see Gio Gonzalez). This needs to be reduced. It’s necessary to allow small clubs to compete, but 7 years is too long.
Agreed. Also, there are many ways to offset the negative effect on small market clubs that reducing the time to free agency would have, the easiest of which is to just increase revenue sharing.
Next to nothing! There are 500 Fortune 500 CEOs and their median salary is lower than the MLB minimum wage.
It looks like their median compensation is about $10M? Are you excluding stock options etc.?
RIP MLBPA
With deferrals, the value of this extension is only $118.5M. Plus the fact that it doesn’t replace this season, when he’s only getting paid $15M. Plus a team-friendly $20M vesting option for 2025 if Sale finishes in the top 10 of Cy voting and does not end the season on the IL.
This is a massive bargain for Boston, especialy compared to Kershaw’s 3 year, $93M extension.
I would think that anyone who has amassed 60 million $$$ and won a World Series by age 30 has already cashed in.
So, he is (on paper) expected to produce $200M but signed for $150M?
Could it be as simple as both sides expecting him to sit out a full season’s worth over the life of the contract? Not necessarily in one IL trip, but rather a month or so every year. Which is how it’s gone the past couple of years.
If both sides agree he’s a five month pitcher the discount lines up.
He isn’t the only one out there: Kershaw is starting to look the same, possibly Kluber. Strasbourg, naturally…
Maybe innings limits isn’t the only way to manage pitcher health.
If you are saying that simply because he’s a pitcher and that’s a common occurrence for pitchers, that’s fine. Most guys miss time somewhere along the line, especially pitchers.
If you are predicting he misses time based on his skinny body and nontraditional mechanics…people have been doing that since he came into the league and it hasn’t happened. He is 12th in all of baseball in GS and 6th in IP since he became a starter in 2012. That’s a pretty big sample size.
Both.
Pitchers get hurt.
And Sale, for whatever reason, has a track record of running out of gas by late season/playoff time. Not all his innings pitched are premium innings. Last year he barely clocked 150 innings and this year isn’t projected to do much better.
As for Kershaw and Kluber they have their own issues, mostly back problems. They’re all in the same general age group, early 30’s. That adds a bit of extra risk to the “pitchers get hurt” truism.
I wouldn’t want to bet on any of the three getting to 900 innings over the next few years, much less 1000.
Perhaps instead of simply giving up $50M, he was paying the Red Sox $50M to take 100% of all of the risk (major injury, horrible season)…
Injuries are baked into the projections that value his performance at over $200M. It’s a very team-friendly deal, simple as that. Sale himself said this weekend that the best deal for him wasn’t the most money.
There is an error in one of the two contract estimates. In the fifth year $/WAR is $9MM in the first chart but $9.27MM in the second even though both assume $8M/WAR in the first year and 3% inflation. The first chart should have $9.27MM/WAR in the fifth year unless I’m miss reading something.
Also – I’ve stated this before but fangraphs really needs to reconsider how they compare contracts over time. I know its only alluded to in this article but using inflation as a discount rate is not valid.
Of course the small error, makes virtually no difference to the analysis — it makes a $1M difference in the expected value (about half a percent). Given the error bars we have projecting out **one** year, let alone two to six, it doesn’t really matter.
Hell, ignore salary inflation entirely (and just use $8M/win) and you get $188M, or 92% of what you get figuring in the 3% inflation. I’m not sure any number you choose +/- 10% or so of what they got really makes a lot of difference here.
IMO, in this horse-shoes-and-hand-grenades sense, if you can pick a method and apply it uniformly and it is even just fairly reasonable, you are probably doing fine.
But that said, if you think you’ve got something much better, outline it and apply it to a couple of players and see how things stack up; I’m sure both the “professional” and “amateur” contributors on this site would find it interesting to say the least!
What happened last year never seemed too clear. He never was really injured but he just couldn’t quite get it all together enough to pitch. Call me old-fashioned but I just can’t see paying top dollar for anything less than 200 innings. If the Red Sox are going to treat him with kid gloves and limit him to 30 starts at a maximum of 6 innings which sounds like their plan, give or take a little, then where is the value? But if he does adhere to that plan he might have a line that looks something like this 170/ 85/ 20/ 25/ 250 with a FIP of 1.02.
The value is in 180 innings of some of the best pitching in baseball. If he was going to pitch 200 innings every year for the next 5, he’d be making $40M a year.
In other words, this is not top dollar at all. There’s a big discount for the injury risk and the limited number of innings he’s expected to throw.
that is very old-fashioned. eventually no one will pitch 200 innings.
It seems so silly to me to have concerns on maybe the best SP per inning in the MLB’s mechanics.
Given his history of fades and also last years injuries, there are major concerns. Was reading a thing on ESPN where MLB execs were shocked at the extension given especially last August-October. The extension would have made sense in MLB era 10 years ago, but given where the owners have taken the analytical side of things- it was a huge surprise for them.