Five Things I Learned at Saberseminar 2026

David Frerker-Imagn Images

Once a year, the baseball statistics world converges on Chicago for a weekend of presentations, discussions, networking, and a frankly shocking number of job interviews. I’m talking about Saberseminar, if you’re not familiar. The conference has long been a source of baseball learning, where a mixture of leading analysts and up-and-coming students present their latest research. Every time I go, I leave with my head overflowing with new avenues of study, new things I’m curious about, and a bunch of cool knowledge that I won’t expand on but am nevertheless happy to have learned. I went two weeks ago, and I have a notebook full of ideas to investigate now. I can’t tell you everything that I learned – if you want that, you’ll just have to go to Saberseminar yourself. But there were five talks in particular that I loved. They weren’t the only good presentations by any means. But I have a column for highlighting five things, and it felt only appropriate to highlight five of my favorites from the weekend.

1. Injury Research by Scott Powers et al
The first presentation of the weekend is usually a good one, and this year didn’t disappoint. Scott Powers is a professor at Rice University who has a long history of good presentations at analytical conferences. His past research runs the gamut from batted-ball modeling to volleyball serve optimization. This year, his presentation focused on injury prevention. Powers, Rose Graves, Marina Vannucci, James Buffi, Daniel Barrueco, John D’Angelo, and Amanda K. Glazer set out to come up with some realistic injury guidance based on pitch characteristics and biomechanical data from the major leagues. As the name of the talk implies, they took a central idea into their work: Don’t pitch an injury prevention plan that boils down to “stop throwing so dang hard.”

The first part of their work focused on what they could glean from Statcast data. They identified a number of characteristics that are correlated with increased likelihood of elbow injury. Most of those won’t surprise you: fastball velocity, fastball break, and slider usage were the top culprits. Interestingly, they also included some measures of effort – the ratio between average and 90th-percentile fastball velo, for example – and found no linkage there. That’s a great proof of concept for the idea, but unfortunately it doesn’t really present a workable plan for pitching coaches. “Hey, just, uh, make your fastball slower and give it less movement.” As the title of the pitch implies, that’s no good, so they went deeper by using biomechanical data to look for more granular data.

I won’t pretend to understand how to turn three-dimensional motion capture data into workable data sets, but hey, that’s what a team of PhDs is for. One trait jumped out as a marker of reduced injury risk but not reduced velocity: off-arm momentum generated. In other words, after holding a number of things constant (hey, they’re the research geniuses, don’t ask me exactly how that part works), pitchers who generated more momentum with their glove arm saw reduced incidence of injury without declining velocity. That’s a notable and actionable finding, because most of what we have on arm injuries is “no one knows why this happens and that’s bad.”

Is that the answer to our prayers? Surely not, because if a single change could reduce injuries, some team would have figured it out by now, and the knowledge wouldn’t stay private for long. Going from “swinging your glove arm more is good” to turning that into actual pitching technique is a big leap. But research like this can only help advance the state of pitching development, and anything that can help slow the epidemic of elbow injuries is a good idea in my book. I also appreciated that the group published some null results, most notably: spin rate, slider break, and their various measures of effort. It’s good to know what we don’t know – and in this case, we don’t know whether spinnier pitches carry a higher likelihood of injury, despite what you might hear from an armchair analyst.

2. Changeup Biomechanics by Ben Lerch, Harry Pavlidis, Stephen Sutton-Brown, and Gretchen Oliver
There was a lot of biomechanical talk at this year’s Saberseminar, which mirrors the way that team-side (and lab-side) research is heading. Candidly, I’m not a biomechanist, and so I spent a lot of these sessions scribbling down cryptic notes and moving my arm around experimentally to try to understand the motions that people were discussing. But this presentation, “Biomechanical Predictors of Fastball-Changeup Velocity Delta in Division 1 Collegiate Pitchers,” spoke to me. It asked a question that I assume we’ve all wondered: How do pitchers produce such varied speeds on changeups?

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Obviously, plenty of changeup speed variation comes down to grip. But that’s not the only determinant, and pitchers with the same grip can produce meaningfully different speed differentials. Lerch, a PhD student at Auburn, gathered a ton of the team’s own markerless biomechanics data, as well as pitch-level data on the same pitches. He and the rest of the researchers used that data to hunt for mechanical markers that were associated with either less or more speed differential between a pitcher’s primary fastball and changeup. Grip isn’t measured in these, and so it’s out of the experimental treatment by default; instead, this was about the other things that pitchers do to manipulate their changeups.

The primary suspect, both listed by the researchers and what I thought of in my seat, was torso velocity. Arm speed is part of the deception inherent in a changeup, but I thought that using a normal arm swing but with less forward transfer of momentum, measured by torso velocity, would be a good way to make a changeup look fast and yet go slow. But there was essentially no correlation to be found. In fact, most of the factors Lerch and company considered had no measurable effect.

That said, one marker worked. The more a pitcher allowed their lead knee to collapse during their delivery, the more velocity differential they tended to create. This is a different channel than the one I expected, but it works fairly similarly. When you keep your lead knee stiff, force gets more efficiently transferred from ground strike to your throwing motion. The opposite is true when you keep that knee poised – the force transfers more readily. By allowing more of a collapse, the same grip and arm action produce less velocity.

Not everyone wants a larger gap between their fastball and changeup velocity. Some pitchers would be well served by a pitch that’s hardly slower than their fastball; Félix Hernández’s elite changeup is my favorite example of this. Some pitchers succeed thanks to huge gaps. There’s no one right answer. But as we learn more about the physical movements that create separation between pitches, the toolkit for creating the perfect changeup for each individual pitcher is getting filled out. I don’t know how easily this will be incorporated into pitch design, but I’m confident that independent pitching labs and teams will both be trying it.

3. Modeling Uncertainty by Aidan Resnick
This one was perfectly calibrated to get my attention. Resnick works in financial markets, and he took some of the concepts of his job – namely option pricing and theory – and applied them to pitch modeling. As a former market maker (among other hats), I already look at innocuous data and see connections to the way securities and derivatives are priced. Someone else doing the same thing was music to my ears.

The basic concept here relates to what are called “Greeks,” so called because they’re all represented by Greek letters. They denote derivatives of various types. In finance, they’re things like change in value per change in price (delta), change in delta per change in price (gamma), change in value per change in interest rate or time, etc. In Resnick’s version, he set velocity as the “underlying” and made derivatives off of that. Change in expected pitch result per change in velocity is delta. Gamma is change in delta per change in velocity, or in other words, whether the amount your fastball improves by with an additional mile an hour changes based on how fast you were already throwing. There are other Greek characters too, like change in value relative to sweep (vega-x) and (ride) vega-y. The point is that the central idea of measuring change in expected run value for change in some underlyings is a new and interesting project.

I’ll get to the big takeaway from this project in a moment, but there are some fun little takeaways too. Not every pitcher gets the same benefit from a change in fastball velocity. A tick on Mason Miller’s fastball is worth four times as much as a tick on Kyle Hendricks’ heater. That shape is generally true across the league – the harder you throw, the more gains you make from adding a marginal mile per hour. That interplay between speed and the effectiveness of adding speed is intuitive, and it also explains why these concepts are interesting. Universal takeaways like that are useful even outside the confines of a specific model, and even if you don’t buy the pitches-as-options state of the world Resnick is pitching.

A corollary of all of this is what I’d consider the bigger takeaway, and it’s driving some behind-the-scenes research at FanGraphs as I write this. To make this kind of differentiable pitch model, you have to break from the style used by PitchingBot or Stuff+. I don’t claim to know the inner workings of every public pitch model, but they mostly work using advanced statistical techniques, particularly gradient boosting. That’s a method of applying flexible rules that is useful in hunting for interactions between pitch characteristics; maybe this much vertical break matters more from one arm slot than from another, or something along those lines.

That flexible handling of interactions makes these models hard to interpret, though. You can’t “bump” a stuff model by a mile an hour and get a coherent answer about how good the pitch would be. It just doesn’t work that way. There’s no “velocity slope” where every mile an hour improves the model’s estimation of a pitch; every pitch falls into the equivalent of a very complex Plinko board with many different rules for how the different characteristics will interact. That means that the concept of Greeks can’t exist in such a model, because you can’t really calculate a derivative.

Resnick created a three-factor model for his presentation, but you could create a different version yourself. The interesting part for me is that the style of pitching model we’ve most frequently seen isn’t the only way to do it. There are tradeoffs associated with complexity, and not all of them are immediately evident. I also really enjoy the idea of measuring rate of change, rather than just a steady state, and I imagine teams do as well. Knowing how good a pitcher is? That’s table stakes these days. Knowing how good they can become? More fruitful, and modeling some version of their pitch Greeks feels like a good way to make progress on that front.

4. Historical Reframing by Jun Hee Kim, Adrian Burgos Jr., Shen Yan, Ryan To, and Daniel J. Eck
At a past Saberseminar, Eck presented something called Full House Modeling, a method of adjusting statistical records based on the cohort of players currently in the major leagues. To simplify, the method relies on producing a hypothetical talent pool for each year and adjusting performances based on that talent distribution. In other words, players who succeeded against a smaller subset of competition – less global population and less non-American talent characterized the early years of baseball – receive proportionally less credit than players who produced similar results against wider competition.

That formulation of this model has been much discussed, and you can see some formal explanations here. This presentation, spearheaded by Kim with the assistance of some of the professors who wrote the initial full house modeling paper, focused on modifying and extending the method to put the statistical accomplishments of Negro League players in context.

To make this model work, the researchers added some demographic data to their population-level splits. If you’re trying to figure out how competitive the Negro Leagues were in a given year, or how competitive the AL and NL were for that matter, knowing the proportion of players of each race in the league, as well as their representation in the U.S. population, is necessary. With that data, Kim was able to take existing statistics and create adjusted WAR totals that put everyone on a level playing field.

That was only half of the presentation. The other half covered testing whether this method passes the smell test. Luckily, there’s a great sample of players to use here: players who first played in the Negro Leagues and later transitioned to AL or NL clubs. The model makes a true-talent prediction for every player in every year, with aging thrown in. By comparing the talent predictions and actual results of players who switched between leagues, they got good confirmation that the rough contours of the method worked; predictions for league-switching players did a good job of matching their actual results.

I don’t think this research is going to revolutionize my understanding of baseball. But I appreciated Eck’s first pass at the subject – I’ve long considered Barry Bonds to be the greatest player of all time relative to his era, and he tops Eck’s leaderboard comfortably – and I always have my eye out for ways of putting past eras into broader context. I also think that this style of modeling has applications for league translations, though I’ll leave the implementation to someone who’s a little handier with math. I thought this research was fascinating and something of a throwback compared to a lot of the nitty-gritty pitching mechanics presentations.

5. Pitcher/Batter Game Theory by Owen St. Onge
St. Onge, a master’s student at Syracuse, came up with an idea that made me jealous. I’ve looked into swing timing a bit recently, and St. Onge took the same data and asked a novel question: Can we measure how pitchers respond to late and early swings? He took Statcast bat tracking data and pitch data, turned the bat tracking data into timing information, then correlated it with future pitcher behavior.

The question at hand: Do pitchers and catchers respond to notably late or early swings? To define notably early or late swings, St. Onge took a data set of barreled contact and then predicted intercept points for optimal contact after controlling for all the usual suspects like pitch type, location, game state, handedness, and player identity. From that, he then tagged swings as early, on time, or late.

Strong relationships jumped out immediately. When hitters were early on fastballs, pitchers were far more likely to throw them something slower on the next pitch. When they were late on a fastball, the pitcher was more likely to double up. Likewise, when hitters were early on slower pitches, the pitcher was more likely to follow up with another slow pitch – but when they were late on slow pitches, pitchers were more likely to follow up with a fastball.

That alone would be a solid finding, but there was more. There was a notable difference between hitter behavior depending on whether they were very late or very early on the previous swing. Being early on one pitch is associated with being early on the next, and the same is true for being late. But the association on the late side is meaningfully less strong; it almost looks like it has a floor, in fact. One way of thinking about that is that hitters can catch up to anything, but they have a harder time with the inverse.

This project gave me a ton of ideas for extensions. Could we measure catcher game calling by looking for their ability to wrong-foot hitters? Could we produce individualized hitter reports that highlight specific talent or lack thereof when it comes to adjusting swing timing? Beyond timing, what about testing for poor swings, by one definition or another, based on pitch pairings? There’s a big world to investigate here.

That’s the best part about Saberseminar. It’s only two days long, and the presentations are packed in so tightly that there’s simply no way you’ll remember them all perfectly, even if you’re sitting there jotting down notes all day. But almost every presentation has depth to it. There are always avenues for more research. If you leave Saberseminar without wondering about some fundamental truth of baseball, you’re not doing it right. I got more research ideas in two days in that auditorium than in the previous month of pondering baseball data on my own. This list of five only scratches the surface. I can’t recommend Saberseminar enough – and I hope to see you there when I’m greedily taking notes on another batch of presentations next year.





Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.

32 Comments
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Anonymous Member #46Member since 2020
1 day ago

“Hitters can catch up to anything, but they have a harder time with the inverse.”

This may be part of why “throw fewer fastballs” is such a viable strategy despite velocity being better than ever.

crew87Member since 2016
1 day ago

Hitters can catch up to anything, but they have a harder time with the inverse.

Counterpoint: Jacob Misiorowski

(j/k)

watertexas8445
1 day ago

less global population and less non-American talent characterized the early years of baseball

Did this study also take into account the reverse effect of the more sports that are available, the percentage of elite athletes who choose baseball gets smaller? As in, the NFL, NBA, NHL, and many more leagues didn’t exist when MLB started, therefore MLB wasn’t losing athletes to those leagues. There has to be some amount of Kyler Murrays out there, top multi-sport athletes who could choose baseball but don’t.

watertexas8445
23 hours ago
Reply to  watertexas8445

I did some reading following the link Ben provided (and a few after that) to get what I was really after – how did they estimate the talent pool? Look for the supplemental material link on their main site: https://eckeraadjustment.web.illinois.edu/

TLDR: They do take into account several things, and try to estimate a “talent pool adjusted for interest”, (and they’ve made multiple versions that tweak it) but it doesn’t directly take into account the effect I’m talking about. I believe that their methodology overestimates the current talent pool. But it was interesting reading nonetheless.

scottsjunk1981Member since 2021
23 hours ago
Reply to  watertexas8445

I think that’s a real effect, but I think it’s pretty clearly swamped by the effect that free agency has had on sports labor supply. In the 1920s, the average salary in MLB was about 3 times the wages of an average worker. It was a good job, and probably came with additional status and intangible benefits. Plenty of kids probably did want to grow up to be ballplayers. But, for the vast majority of players, they’d make almost as much if they made foreman at a factory and considerably more if they were a lawyer. (And that’s just on a yearly basis, and doesn’t take into account professional longevity.)

In 2025, the average MLB played made about 70x the average worker in the US. The minimum MLB salary is more than 10x the average.

You might be losing, say, half the talent to other sports, but the pie is 10x or 20x bigger because almost every player who has a chance to make it is going to try to make it, in a way that just wasn’t true 100 years ago.

PC1970Member since 2024
21 hours ago
Reply to  scottsjunk1981

That is certainly true- Anyone that’s spent time reading about baseball from that era (1900’s-1930’s) has seen the story of a player who’s dad didn’t approve of him becoming a ballplayer or thought it was a waste of time, needed the player on the farm, etc.

That just would not happen nowadays & the youth sports industrial complex does a great job making sure parents are thinking their kids could be college/pro athletes

I also think the pool is just so much bigger- Not just African Americans, but, Caribbean, South America, Asia, etc. Those doors just were not open at that time & for those countries, baseball IS probably still the king.

Last edited 21 hours ago by PC1970
watertexas8445
21 hours ago
Reply to  scottsjunk1981

Maybe. One could also argue that there used to be hundreds more minor league teams so the interest in becoming a professional baseball player was higher then. I also would take the over on baseball losing more than 50% of the potential pool to other sports.

Regardless, the study makes no attempt to control for any of these effects (although it does mention some of them as possibilities that it then ignores), instead relying on an amalgamation of national polls of “favorite sport” and “general interest in said sport”.

Which is a much shallower attempt at adjustment than what we’re discussing. I had hoped the study (or any study that attempts to make era adjustments) would dive more deeply into these factors (and others such as youth sport affordability) . Alas, it did not.

bookbookMember since 2019
20 hours ago
Reply to  watertexas8445

You’re making very good points.

I honestly believe that the professionalification of training and the scientific advances for the most elite athletes (from early childhood!) is a tsunami that drowns talent pool considerations. My high school had a dingy spot under the staircase with a bench and set of weights. I went back 30 years later, and the gleaming rows of training machines for each muscle group and for specific athletic activities boggled my mind. (Sadly, the library didn’t see similar growth and development….)

Daniel EckMember since 2020
59 seconds ago
Reply to  watertexas8445

Thanks for the thoughtful discussion. I am one of the authors, and I want to clarify what we did.

Our primary talent-pool calculation does not separately estimate the probability that an elite multisport athlete chooses baseball. On that narrow point, watertexas8445 is correct. We instead account for competition from other sports through an interest adjustment that combines surveys of general baseball interest with surveys asking people to name their favorite sport. These observations are shifted forward ten years to reflect interest when future major leaguers were coming of age.

That being said, we directly examine the Kyler Murray effect in Section 5.2 of the published paper. We remove highly talented potential players from baseball (every 10th player through the 100th-best latent talent) after 1950 and, separately, after 1994. The top ten remains stable, although some modern players farther down the top 25 decline. The paper specifically mentions Kyler Murray and Patrick Mahomes when motivating this analysis. So the effect is not ignored; it is handled through both the interest adjustment and a sensitivity analysis rather than a separately estimated annual parameter.

It is also worth noting that our sensitivity analyses are deliberately conservative with respect to our main conclusions. Many arose through peer review and generally impose assumptions favorable to older players (e.g. greater historical interest, a sharp postwar talent-pool contraction, or missing elite athletes in modern baseball). We were not asked to run the mirror-image analysis in which elite potential players disappear from earlier pools because of tuberculosis or other premature mortality, disapproving parents, the low status of professional baseball, or its comparatively uncertain career prospects. Those mechanisms are at least historically plausible and would favor modern players. We nevertheless concentrated our sensitivity analysis on assumptions that work against our results.

In that same spirit, I recently considered the broader argument that surveys understate baseball’s former cultural reach here. The strongest case is probably 1920–47, when major league, minor league, semipro, town, Legion, sandlot, and informal baseball were widespread. But widespread recreational play does not automatically imply a correspondingly large pool of potential major leaguers, particularly when professional baseball was less lucrative and, in earlier periods, less respectable.

Integration provides an additional check. Using racial classifications assembled by Mark Armour and Dan Levitt, I examined US-born players in 1965 who later reached the Hall of Fame. Eleven were Black and 23 were white. Black Americans constituted about 11% of the relevant population but supplied 32% of those Hall of Famers.

Suppose, very generously, that 100% of the eligible Black population belonged to baseball’s talent pool. Preserving the observed 11-to-23 ratio would imply that about 26% of the white population belonged to the pool, producing a combined effective pool of approximately 34%. Our model assigns 1965 an interest weight of about 48%. Expanding the pool to 48% while preserving the observed composition would require an effective Black pool equal to approximately 141% of the actual Black population.
This does not prove that 48% is uniquely correct, and Hall of Famers are an imperfect proxy. But the demographic evidence does not support increasing our historical interest adjustment. Under the assumptions of this exercise, it points in the opposite direction and is consistent with scottsjunk1981’s broader point that countervailing forces may outweigh the loss of athletes to other sports.

The salary and minor league points are also real. Lower historical salaries may have discouraged talented players from pursuing baseball. Conversely, there were once far more professional teams. But minor league team counts are not a direct measure of major league talent depth. The postwar contraction also reflected MLB relocation, broadcasting, market correction, and consolidation into MLB-controlled farm systems. Most of the teams that disappeared were independent clubs.

We nevertheless consider an alternative talent pool with 90% baseball interest through the 1949 minor league peak, followed by a sharp decline through 1964. That assumption favors older players and returns Babe Ruth to the top. We explain why we do not find it best supported, but the model makes the consequences of adopting it transparent.

Finally, the calculation is not based only on polls. It incorporates Census populations, player birthplaces, regional expansion, international recruitment, integration, different AL and NL integration rates, and wartime depletion.

Our preferred talent pool is not uniquely correct. Better measurements of salaries, youth-sports access, scouting and development, and elite sport choice would improve it. But using an aggregate proxy is not the same as making no attempt to address the issue. We examine it through the interest adjustment, the missing-athlete sensitivity analysis, alternative talent pools in which interest is deliberately varied, and historical and demographic checks. The central rankings remain fairly stable unless one assumes an unusually large early pool followed by a sharp postwar contraction—an interpretation for which we found less historical support.

It is also worth clarifying what our era-adjusted statistics mean. Full House Modeling evaluates a player’s rank within a season and how his performance compares with the full distribution of his contemporaries’ performances. League-wide changes in training, nutrition, and player development are therefore reflected indirectly in that distribution, although the model does not attempt to isolate their individual effects.

Our results are not predictions of what Babe Ruth or Barry Bonds would literally do if transported into different historical circumstances. They are better understood as “+” statistics that account for the full seasonal performance distribution, the broader competitive environment, and talent-pool size. This differs from statistics such as WAR and wRC+, whose contextual adjustments are primarily anchored to seasonal baselines. The model estimates how population-level aptitude would be expressed in a common statistical context; it does not reconstruct a player under a different upbringing, training system, or set of life circumstances.

airforce21oneMember since 2026
22 hours ago
Reply to  watertexas8445

Not just Kyler Murrays, but kids that didn’t even start playing baseball due to playing other sports.

eccentricatlfan
23 hours ago

Just a bit of food for thought: Stemming off of the second presentation mentioned, I’d be very interested to know about the relationship between the amount the lead knee collapses and changeup whiff rate, especially if there’s any boomeranging in the latter.

At the very least, we know how that presentation can be very useful based on Michael Rosen’s article last year “Changeups are Weird”. While changeup velo might be a dead end, the velo difference between a pitcher’s fastball and changeup seems to track well with the changeup’s attack direction, namely that batters seem to have their bats caught out front more at the plate. By extension, better attack directions on changeups (in this case, the “catching out front”) correlate well with better whiff rates, so between these points it might seem like going headlong into the lead knee drop might be an interesting start.

That being said, it would be interesting to see if there’s a point where doing so causes more harm than good by serving as a tell for observant batters to know a changeup is coming. As was pointed out on Brendan’s chat yesterday, changes in a pitcher’s delivery based on pitch types might end up being a major factor in reduced deception and effectiveness, and depending on how much the knee drop is visible, that might be enough of an indicator to alert the batter. Of course, there’s plenty of other factors at play with how a changeup might be effective and/or how a pitcher might accidentally tip what pitches are coming, but it would be interesting what additional information comes out with looking at lead knee drops on pitch effectiveness, especially any drawbacks that might not be immediately obvious.

Last edited 23 hours ago by eccentricatlfan
scottsjunk1981Member since 2021
23 hours ago

That means that the concept of Greeks can’t exist in such a model, because you can’t really calculate a derivative.”

I get that the model structure means that there’s not an easy coefficient or whatever you can pull out that’s the local slope along whatever dimension, but can’t you empirically calculate a bunch of hypothetical pitches and build a grid to estimate these local slopes?

Maybe smoothness breaks down in spots, and that means that you’d need so much granularity that it would be uncomputable. But I’d expect relatively workable deltas (say, .1 mph, 1 deg of arm orientation, .5″ of extension, 10 rpm spin etc) to cover all the necessary interactions and not come close to exceeding normal computing limits.

Am I estimating that wrong? Or is there some other problem that I’m not seeing?

JimmyMember since 2019
21 hours ago
Reply to  scottsjunk1981

Generally these are gradient boosted trees, which yield piecewise-constant predictions and thus are inherently not smooth. There are often extremely sharp transitions. There are methods I’m not super familiar with for introducing some desirable smoothness properties (I’m looking at a paper called BooST: Boosting Smooth Transition Regression Trees for Partial Effect Estimation in Nonlinear Regressions right now that seems interesting here), but in general the best way forward would be replacing the XGBoost or whatever model with something with the desired smoothness properties. Realistically, that’s probably a neural network here in practice but we’d lose most interpretability, and in general XGBoost does extremely well at this sort of thing.

As an aside, nothing has ever made Ben’s finance background clearer than calling derivates/gradients/etc. “Greeks” 🙂

scottsjunk1981Member since 2021
20 hours ago
Reply to  Jimmy

I’ll check out that paper, but that all feels like a modeling issue and not a real world issue. By which I mean: does anyone actually doubt that the real world relationship between, say, extension and pitch quality is in fact smooth?

I’m very willing to be wrong there, but I don’t think I am. And if the underlying relationships and interactions are smooth, I’m going to interpret the model’s lack of smoothness as driven by the fact that the training set is too sparse to fully capture these relationships and not as a structural truth about pitching.

So maybe that’s the answer to why my suggestion doesn’t work – there just isn’t enough training data to populate a bunch of those buckets. You ask the stuff model to calculate the hypothetical and it can’t.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
19 hours ago
Reply to  scottsjunk1981

Do we have any data on the delta in extension caused by the stretch?

And the deltas between extension and pitch quality?

Could be an interesting one-way UNOVA to identify Vazquez/Strider/Nolasco types.

MikeSMember since 2020
23 hours ago

The stuff about more swing with the glove arm reducing injury risk may be due to a pitcher using his body more to generate velocity, rather than just with his throwing shoulder and arm. If the glove arm is swinging more, it probably means that his torso is rotating more and you are picking that up most easily in the glove arm because it is furthest from the center of mass. It makes intuitive sense (which does not mean it is correct!) that pitchers who are more rotational in their generation of power may put less stress on their throwing arms.

muenstertruckMember since 2024
23 hours ago

Regarding glove-arm momentum, I remember reading something way back about how a lot of the wear and tear on a pitcher’s arm is generated during the deceleration of the arm after the pitch is released. A very short, sharp decel means all that energy gets absorbed into the arm, and it has go somewhere.

A longer decel with more glove arm momentum to balance things seems like it would lead to less stress in the end.

And because there are trade offs, that means the pitcher is probably in a worse fielding position/less able to protect against a smoked line drive back up the middle. You can maybe protect against the long term injury at the risk of the short term. 🙁

airforce21oneMember since 2026
22 hours ago
Reply to  muenstertruck

So what I’m hearing is that pitchers should be rolling toward the plate after throwing?

jtricheyMember since 2021
22 hours ago
Reply to  airforce21one

Can’t wait for the first pitcher that goes into a tuck and roll after every pitch. Revolutionary!

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
19 hours ago
Reply to  airforce21one

We’re hearing that El Tiante was an Ironman for a goddamn reason!

KeithMember since 2024
9 hours ago

Further to this and because I’m an old guy, I’m convinced that somehow the old school wind up(see Scherzer) somehow limited injuries in certain hurlers. The glove arm motion(and generally more motion) overall during the windup maybe generates a more balanced energy or something? I don’t know, I not a bio mechanics guy, nor much of a sabre guy, but I’d love someone to look at pitchers over the last 20-30 years who use a full wind up compared to guys who always throw from the stretch and see if there is any in injury frequency differential. Or something like that.

theduke11
19 hours ago

https://youtu.be/vgSAiw9qaAM?si=Rd5bPIlXz1riqJb1

All one has to do is look at Bob Gibson to see an example of a pitcher who threw hard and never had an injury. What you will notice is exaggerated use of his non-pitching arm throughout his windup.

jdbolickMember since 2016
19 hours ago

I’ve long considered Barry Bonds to be the greatest player of all time relative to his era

I see this sentiment frequently and each time it leaves me flabbergasted. No one who covers cycling considers Lance Armstrong to be the greatest of all time because he was a cheater. No one who covers track and field considers Tyson Gay to be the second greatest sprinter of all time because he was a cheater.

In 1999, when Barry Bonds started using anabolic steroids, he had already achieved a Hall of Fame worthy career but he wasn’t even in the conversation for greatest player of all time. Why would anyone give him credit for the chemically enhanced performance that saw him go from a career 159 wRC+ at age 35 to a wRC+ of 232 in his age 36 through age 39 seasons?

Uncle SpikeMember since 2020
18 hours ago
Reply to  jdbolick

Agreed. If we disqualify Bonds and Clemens, does that mean that Willie Mays was the best player of all-time? I could get on board with that. I was actually thinking that Ted Williams had a shot and figured he would be much higher but didn’t realize how poor the pitching quality was back than.

katmanisaliveMember since 2024
15 hours ago
Reply to  Uncle Spike

I think the argument that Willie Mays is the greatest player ever has merit without disqualifying those guys. He almost certainly is the greatest all-around player of all time.

jdbolickMember since 2016
13 hours ago
Reply to  Uncle Spike

Babe Ruth is the best baseball player in the history of the sport. Willie Mays and Ted Williams are number two and number three in whatever order you prefer. Remember that Williams missed three of his prime seasons due to World War II.

3cardmontyMember since 2020
10 hours ago
Reply to  jdbolick

And almost 2 more for Korea…

katmanisaliveMember since 2024
15 hours ago
Reply to  jdbolick

My personal answer to that would be that if we say that he achieved greatest player ever performance purely due to his use of steroids (which is a completely reasonab acceptable assertetion), two things automatically become true:

1. If players were to attempt to achieve absolute max performance of the human body they would all be using steroids (I think this one is pretty much inarguable fact)

2. Barry Bonds was much better during his steroid years than any other steroid user.

For me it’s point 2 that makes those seasons and the performances in them the greatest of all time. Because none of the other known steroid users were even in the same planet as him.

Also, cycling is really not a good example. The sport has had absolutely rampant PED usage for at least 60 years now and almost every top historical cyclist is tainted in some way or another. If we believed that most baseball players were using steroids during that time then that would make the argument against them very silly, considering their peers would also be using.

Last edited 15 hours ago by katmanisalive
jdbolickMember since 2016
13 hours ago
Reply to  katmanisalive

2. Barry Bonds was much better during his steroid years than any other steroid user.

That’s because Barry Bonds used stronger substances. Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa used over the counter anabolic steroids like Winstrol and Stanozolol. Bonds started using those in 1999, which boosted his ISO from ~.300 before enhancement to .355 in 1999 and .381 in 2000.

During the winter of 2000, Greg Anderson introduced Bonds to Victor Conte. At BALCO, Conte developed designer anabolic steroids vastly more powerful than over the counter options. Bonds started taking Tetrahydrogestrinone, which boosted his ISO from the high .300s on normal anabolic steroids to .460 on The Clear.

Also, cycling is really not a good example. The sport has had absolutely rampant PED usage for at least 60 years now and almost every top historical cyclist is tainted in some way or another. 

This statement is completely wrong, as EPO wasn’t common in cycling until the 1990s. Eddy Merckx, Bernard Hinault, Jacques Anquetil, and many others are not tainted at all.

Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
39 minutes ago
Reply to  jdbolick

A major reason Bonds started using steroids is that “he wasn’t even in the conversation” after putting up 85 WAR over the previous 10 seasons.

He was 22 WAR better than Griffey and 7 RA9-WAR/18 FIP-WAR ahead of Maddux over the same span…all while playing clean in the peak steroid era.

99.2 WAR in under 1900 games.

Last edited 33 minutes ago by Cool Lester Smooth
Cool Lester SmoothMember since 2020
5 minutes ago

For reference:

Hank put up 90 WAR through 1964 games.

Willie put up 104 WAR through 1848 games.

Mickey put up 99.9 through 1883 games.

Trout’s at 90 through 1774.

Thats the sort of towering player Bonds was before the juice.

DylanMember since 2016
5 hours ago

Could we produce individualized hitter reports that highlight specific talent or lack thereof when it comes to adjusting swing timing?

Maybe this is a reach, but I generally assume that for any topic that comes up in a seminar like this, at least one team has also come up with this topic and figured out something similar. So I wonder if for at least some teams, the reason they’ve started calling pitches from the dugout is that they’re trying to do exactly this, and are starting to work off of game plans that are so specific to each hitter that it’s impossible for the catcher to keep track of all of the information.

Even if they’re not able to implement something like this yet, if the front office knows that things are eventually going in this direction, then it makes sense to get in front of things now and start implementing pitch calling from the dugout. That way, as they are able to create these hyper-specific plans, everyone will already be accustomed to that way of calling pitches.