Carlos Beltran signed with the Astros for a year and $16 million. There is probably plenty to say about this! There’s stuff to say about Beltran so far managing to defy the nature of aging. There’s stuff to say about the Astros being almost overloaded with position players. There’s stuff to say about Beltran returning to Houston after the two separated so many years back. There’s a lot for different people to tackle, but I’m only one guy and I’m also one guy in a hurry, so, here, numbers and plots. The Astros are good!

I mean, the Astros were already good. They were good before they signed Beltran. They were good before they got Brian McCann and Josh Reddick. Now they’re only better. Focusing strictly on offense, I’m going to show you two images. First, here’s one reviewing 2016. This shows total team offensive runs above or below average, that just being a combination of batting value and baserunning value. This is only for non-pitchers so as to try to balance out the leagues.

I highlighted the Astros, who were right around the middle. Specifically, they ranked 16th. Now for the projected future! I know this is to some degree a silly exercise. It’s all based on one projection system, and no team’s offseason is complete, and projections don’t do a great job of accounting for platoons. But this does give you a good idea of where things stand today. Here’s a 2017 projection of the same information as above, based on Steamer projections and our updated depth charts.

The 16th-place Astros now show up as the second-place Astros, and they’re first place in the American League. They’re 22 runs removed from the third-place Nationals, and they’re 27 runs removed from the Red Sox. Once again: the Red Sox will acquire at least one hitter. The Astros are probably finished, as their lineup goes. Anything else they do will probably be about pitching, and there are a lot of hitters left out there for other teams to pick up. But make no mistake — the Astros have built a lineup that’s going to be a daily challenge for any pitcher. There’s new flexibility and new depth, and the lineup might well lack an easy part. The winter meetings haven’t even begun and the Astros look like a terror.

As has been the case, it’s going to come down to how the rotation holds up. They’ll try to make an addition. It might not work, maybe not in the winter, but when a team isn’t sure how much it can trust its starters, the best you can do is to assemble lineup and bullpen depth. That’s what the Astros have done, and that’s why they look like possible, if not probable, AL favorites. It’s not a bad place for Beltran to seek that elusive World Series.

For two or three days, I’ve been sitting around, waiting for the Nationals to make a big trade. This isn’t the one I was expecting, but, the hell with it, as long as I’m here anyway, the Nationals have picked up Derek Norris from the Padres, at the cost of Pedro Avila. Avila is as 19 as any other 19-year-old, and last year he was fine as a low-level starting pitcher. You know the rest of this. Intriguing stuff, many years away. I will not be discussing Avila again in this post.

Norris is the more interesting of the two. The Nationals wanted a catcher to pair with Jose Lobaton, and Norris can slide right in for cheap. The Nationals will have him for two years if they want, and this year he’ll cost about $4 million. Not much. But, the thing I didn’t expect: Norris was baseball’s worst hitter last season.

That is, if you go by results, and if you set a minimum of 400 plate appearances. The minimum is arbitrary, so, you might say someone else was worse. But Norris did the least with the most playing time. I’m not sure how that escaped my attention as it was playing out, but actually, yes, I am sure how, because Norris played for the Padres, and why would I have been paying attention to them? Norris was dreadful, as you can see in this table.

He finished 203rd out of 203. It was an extremely brutal offensive season, and, related to that, Norris had a career-worst strikeout rate. Yet, it wasn’t all terrible. Fancy yourself an optimist? I like to subtract soft-hit rate from hard-hit rate. Here is a selection from that leaderboard, with the same 400-PA minimum.

No one’s impressed by being close to Marwin Gonzalez, but, Anthony Rizzo? Robinson Cano? Carlos Santana? Wilson Ramos was actually right after Cano. By this measure alone, Norris’ contact was just like Ramos’ contact. The point being, Norris didn’t fall completely apart. He can still sting the baseball, and his career wRC+ is almost league-average. The Nationals assume there’ll be a bounceback, just as Ramos’ three-year wRC+ marks went from 93 to 63 to 124. Like Norris, the bad, 2015 version of Ramos had a career-high strikeout rate. Last year he was one of the Nationals’ more valuable players.

And Baseball Prospectus also considers Norris something of a defensive plus. While he’s not much for throwing out runners, Norris has put together two strong years of receiving, and it stands to reason that should continue into Washington. Acknowledging that we have no idea if Norris actually calls a good game — he seems above-average defensively, and at the plate, he’s been above-average before. This is a pretty painless buy-low, even if it seemingly removes the Nationals from the justifiably perplexing Ramos free-agent sweepstakes. His tale is a sad one, but the Nationals had to move on.

From the Padres’ perspective, easy space has been cleared for Austin Hedges, who deserves this opportunity. And for Norris, while he still won’t be a full-time catcher, at least now his 2017 job share will come with a contender instead of with a rebuilder. That’s not bad news to take a man into a weekend.

Earlier this week, Baseball America named Dave Wallace their 2016 Minor League Manager of the Year. Wallace led the Akron Rubber Ducks, Cleveland’s Double-A affiliate, to the Eastern League title. It was his third year in Akron, and his sixth at the helm in the Indians system.

The 37-year-old former catcher is moving on. He’s not leaving the organization, but a change of scenery is in order.

“I won’t be managing next season,” Wallace told me earlier today. “That’s something I approached (team president) Chris Antonetti, (general manager) Mike Chernoff, and (director of player development) Carter Hawkins about. There are a few reasons, but the biggest is family. I have two kids, ages six and three, and I need to figure out the best way to go forward with my career, and at the same be the best dad, and husband, I can. My priorities start with them, and baseball comes after that.”

Wallace has been exploring his options with members of the Indians brain trust, who have been “overwhelmingly supportive” of his decision. He hopes to move into a role — quite possibly within the front office — that has a more flexible schedule, allowing him to be home for things like his kids’ birthdays.

He sees his impending job change as more than a family matter. It’s also a hiatus, and a stepping stone in his career. His long-term goal hasn’t changed.

“I want to get exposure to other aspects of the industry,” explained Wallace, who studied human and organizational development at Vanderbilt University. “That can only help me be a more well-rounded manager in the future. One thing that hasn’t changed is my desire to be a big-league manager one day.”

To be clear, there are two job postings here.

Position: Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Research & Development Intern

Location: Milwaukee
Read the rest of this entry »

Position: St. Louis Cardinals Baseball Operations Fellowship

Location: Jupiter, Fla.
Read the rest of this entry »

Well, here we go; the hot stove is starting to fire up.

Optimism growing in Mets camp they can get a deal done with Cespedes, sources say…

— Tim Brown (@TBrownYahoo) November 29, 2016

Sources: Cespedes back to #Mets.

— Ken Rosenthal (@Ken_Rosenthal) November 29, 2016

Sources: Cespedes deal expected to be four year, $110M.

— Ken Rosenthal (@Ken_Rosenthal) November 29, 2016

The Mets had been pretty interested in retaining Cespedes, and he seemed interested in sticking around, and it looks like both parties found a way to make it work even without waiting for the new terms of the CBA to be agreed upon.

At 4/$110M, Cespedes ends up effectively getting close to the deal everyone expected him to get last winter, when you factor in that he got $27.5 million for 2016 on his one-year deal. This is a little bit less than what our expected price was headed into the winter, as Cespedes settled on four years at a slightly higher AAV rather than pushing for a fifth year and getting the total guarantee up slightly. Here’s the blurb we included in our Top 50 free agent write-up, where Cespedes ranked #1 overall.

A year after getting rejected by the league, Cespedes is considered by most to be the best player on the market this winter. He followed up his 2015 offensive breakout with another strong year in Queens, and while his defensive performance took a dive while playing through a quad injury, his recent power spike shouldn’t be viewed with as much skepticism as it was last year. Of course, he’s still built like a linebacker and lower-half injuries are the kinds of things you don’t want to see from a guy who relies on athleticism for a good chunk of his value. So there’s still risk here, which is why we all seem to agree that a five-year deal is the best fit here, even for the top player available.

Criag Edwards went through Cespedes’ comparisons a few weeks back and found him to be worth something in the range of $100 million or so, so this seems like a perfectly reasonable investment for the Mets. He’s a good player, and this is what good players go for these days.

The question, of course, is what the Mets do now with an overcrowded outfield. With Curtis Granderson and Jay Bruce under contract for significant money as corner outfield options, Michael Conforto around as a young player who should fit into a corner spot as well, and now Cespedes, the team is overflowing with left and right fielders. One or even two of those guys are probably leaving Queens now, so with Cespedes back in the fold, the Mets can figure out how to make their roster work again.

Here are the prospects changing hands in last night’s deal between Seattle and Atlanta as evaluated by KATOH projection system. KATOH+ represents a player’s WAR projection over his first six years in the majors and includes said player’s Baseball America’s ranking as a variable.

*****

Alex Jackson, RF, Atlanta

Jackson has struggled to make contact ever since the Mariners popped him sixth overall back in 2014. He hit decently in his second crack at Low-A last year, but KATOH is alarmed by his 27% strikeout rate. The fact that he’s a right fielder who neither steals bases nor grades out well defensively also hurts his case. He’s hit for decent power, but the statistical negatives far outweigh the positives. Of course, Jackson was viewed as one of the best prospects in the country a mere two-and-a-half years ago, so it’s likely he still has some potential that isn’t showing up in his on-field performance. The traditional KATOH also projects him for 0.4 WAR.

KATOH+ Projection for first six years: 0.4 WAR

Read the rest of this entry »

The Angels presently project to have baseball’s worst bullpen. Now, they know it’s a potential weakness, and they’re going to make further moves to try to shore things up, but some time ago the front office did re-sign Andrew Bailey for a year and $1 million. It’s terribly unexciting, and this isn’t even new. Again: old transaction! But I thought about this when I read a new Mike Petriello article about Statcast stars. Here we are.

Seth Lugo got a mention in the article. From a Statcast perspective, Lugo is fascinating, because his curveball generated easily the league’s highest average spin rate. We don’t yet know quite what that means, but it’s not dull. Now, what about fastball spin rate? Justin Verlander had the highest average among starters. Carl Edwards Jr. thrived with his high-spin fastball out of the bullpen. And yet, while Edwards ranked second in average fastball spin, Andrew Bailey ranked first. His fastball averaged 2,674 RPM. The league-average four-seamer came in at 2,264 RPM.

Now, Bailey wound up with an ERA over 5. That’s a problem, and that feels like it ought to be more meaningful than some spin-rate metric. Bailey hasn’t had a positive WAR as a big-league reliever since 2011. He’ll turn 33 years old next May. When the Angels first re-signed Bailey for 2017, I came to this very screen, and I almost wrote an InstaGraphs post, but I stopped myself. I’m not picking Bailey as some ultra-sleeper. But there’s just enough for me to be intrigued. The same goes for the Angels, who plucked Bailey from the Phillies late in the summer. After making the move, Bailey’s cutter gained three miles per hour. His curveball gained a tick. And, with the Angels, in a small sample, Bailey threw 70% strikes. For the season overall, he threw two-thirds of his pitches for strikes. That’s what he did at his peak between 2009 – 2011.

Bailey’s top velocity is down a mile or two from earlier in his career, but now it seems like he could have the strikes back, and the fastball spin should make it hard to square up if hitters have to stay concerned about the other pitches. The increased velocity should help that, and even last season, Bailey generated one of the higher foul-ball rates, which is a sort of compromise between a ball in play and a swinging strike. Foul balls for pitchers are more good than bad. Bailey showed more than he had in a while, and his best version was a quality closer. This package might give the Angels a decent setup guy.

Mostly, I just want for more people to know about Bailey’s spin. Spin can go only so far — consult Bailey’s recent ERAs. But Bailey just got to blending spin and strikes, and his stuff played up in September. From a projection standpoint, Bailey isn’t very good. From a more scouty perspective, there could well be something left in the tank. The best starting point is always an interesting fastball, and Bailey’s is more interesting than most.

Shortly before Thanksgiving, I wrote an article about how Chris Sale had been hurt last season by lousy receivers. That was an interesting observation from the data, but it wasn’t the only interesting observation from the data. According to Baseball Prospectus, Sale lost the second-most runs from his pitch-framers. Brandon Finnegan, however, pitched to the worst strike zone, his framers costing him an estimated 7.8 runs. Meanwhile, from the same source, Madison Bumgarner pitched to the best strike zone, his framers helping him by an estimated 11.0 runs. That’s a 19-run difference from catchers alone.

Maybe you don’t believe the spread was really that big. It’s easy to believe there was some spread — Bumgarner pitched almost exclusively to Buster Posey, while Finnegan pitched to Tucker Barnhart and Ramon Cabrera. One should also be wary of putting everything on the catchers. Pitchers with better command are easier to receive than pitchers with worse command, and Bumgarner throws with greater accuracy than Finnegan does. So, in part, the zones were the pitchers’ fault. But one thing we know for sure is that, in the end, Bumgarner’s strike zone was more generous. Arguably the most generous. So here is how the Bumgarner and Finnegan called strike zones compare:

Pretty interesting! Here is an alternate view of the same information. Note this is also from the catcher’s perspective. This shows called-strike rates out of all called pitches:

Both pitchers are southpaws. Bumgarner got the far better zone high. He got the far better zone arm-side. He got the far better zone low. Glove-side, it’s about equal, if not in favor of Finnegan. That’s of some note — Finnegan wasn’t losing strikes everywhere. It seems like he frequently tried to target that glove-side edge, but he’d often miss, and his catchers were probably worse at receiving missed locations. So it goes. It’s another example of a point to be debated. Bumgarner got the way more generous strike zone than Finnegan did. Some of this is because Bumgarner hit his spots better than Finnegan did. That reflects well on Bumgarner’s talent! But with an automated strike zone, the gap in performance between the pitchers would’ve been narrowed. Bumgarner’s zone would’ve been worse, and Finnegan’s zone would’ve been better. You either like the way things are, or you don’t. They’ve been this way forever, even if we’ve only recently taken to measuring it.

An estimated gap of 18.8 runs. This compares the two extremes, but there was about the same difference in WAR last year between Max Scherzer and Carlos Martinez. Individual ball and strike calls seldom make a big difference in the moment, but, holy hell, can the differences ever add up.

Position: Boston Red Sox Baseball Operations Analyst (focus on Pitching Development)

Location: Boston
Read the rest of this entry »