JAWS and the 2019 Hall of Fame Ballot: Edgar Martinez
The following article is part of Jay Jaffe’s ongoing look at the candidates on the BBWAA 2019 Hall of Fame ballot. Originally written for the 2013 election at SI.com, it has been updated to reflect recent voting results as well as additional research, and was expanded for inclusion in The Cooperstown Casebook, published in 2017 by Thomas Dunne Books. For a detailed introduction to this year’s ballot, and other candidates in the series, use the tool above; an introduction to JAWS can be found here. For a tentative schedule and a chance to fill out a Hall of Fame ballot for our crowdsourcing project, see here. All WAR figures refer to the Baseball-Reference version unless otherwise indicated.
All Edgar Martinez did was hit — the statement is almost entirely true in both the literal and figurative sense. Even after adjusting for his high-scoring surroundings, Martinez could flat-out rake. A high-average, high-on-base percentage hitting machine with plenty of power, his numbers place him among the top 30 or 40 hitters of all time even after adjusting for the high-offense era. Martinez played a key role in putting the Mariners on the map as an AL West powerhouse, emerging as a folk hero to a fan base that watched Ken Griffey Jr., Randy Johnson, and Alex Rodriguez lead the franchise’s charge to relevancy, then skip town for more lucrative deals. But while Griffey and Rodriguez were two-way stars at key up-the-middle positions and Johnson a flamethrowing ace, Martinez spent the bulk of his career as a designated hitter. In that capacity, he merely put a claim on being the best one in baseball history.
More than 40 years after it was introduced — in the most significant rule change since the AL adopted the foul strike rule in 1903 — the DH continues to rankle purists who would rather watch pitchers risk injury as they ineptly flail away (Bartolo Colon excepted). In 2004, Paul Molitor became the first player elected to the Hall after spending the plurality of his career (44% of his plate appearances) as a DH, while a decade later, Frank Thomas became the first elected after spending the majority of his career (57% of his PA) there. By comparison, Martinez took 72% of his plate appearances as a DH, while David Ortiz — whose 2016 victory lap spurred plenty of Hall of Fame discussion — took 88%.
Since the debut of my system in 2004 (when Molitor was a first-year candidate but JAWS had yet to get its catchy acronym), I’ve classified players at the position where they created the most value, whether or not they spent the majority of their careers there. For Molitor that was a third base, where he played 788 games and generated real defensive value, strengthening a case that was virtually automatic by dint of his membership in the 3,000 hit club. I’ve applied that precedent to other candidates who spent good chunks of their careers at DH, such as Harold Baines, Chili Davis, and Thomas, mainly because JAWS enables easy comparisons with Hall of Famers not only at a given position but also with the at-large field of enshrined hitters. I’ve stuck to that precedent in examining the case of Martinez, who ranks fourth in games at DH (1,403) but also played 564 games at third base and another 28 at first.
I’ve compared Martinez to the Hall’s third basemen, corner infielders, and hitters in general, mainly because when properly used, JAWS is a tool used to build an argument, not answer a simple yes or no question. Within its positional adjustments, which account for the differing degrees of difficulty along the defensive spectrum, WAR levies a substantial penalty for not playing the field. But even with that penalty incorporated into his annual WAR, and even after his big league career started slowly (his first season playing at least 100 games didn’t come until age 27), Martinez measures up as valuable enough to merit a bronze plaque. A two-time batting champion and a seven-time All-Star, he posted eye-opening numbers even in an era full of them and created enough value even while riding the pine between trips to the plate to score better than many of the current ballot’s more celebrated position players.
After receiving a solid 36.2% in his 2010 ballot debut, Martinez struggled to expand his base of support as the ballot grew more crowded. His share plunged to 25.2% in 2014, and his candidacy appeared dead in its tracks once the Hall’s rule change truncated his eligibility from 15 years to 10. Since then, he’s caught some breaks thanks to a vigorous outreach campaign by the Mariners, his return to the team as its hitting coach, testimonials from recent honorees such as Johnson, Griffey, and Pedro Martinez, and the attention paid to the end of Ortiz’s career. The growing acceptance of advanced stats in Hall debates — with my own work on Edgar specifically cited by voters — hasn’t hurt, either. He’s gained at least 11.8 percentage points in each of the last three cycles, and at 70.4% entering his final year of eligibility, is on the cusp of election.
| Player | Career WAR | Peak WAR | JAWS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Edgar Martinez | 68.3 | 43.6 | 56.0 |
| Avg. HOF 3B | 67.5 | 42.8 | 55.2 |
| Avg. HOF CI | 67.2 | 42.7 | 55.4 |
| Avg. HOF Hitter | 67.2 | 42.4 | 54.8 |
| H | HR | AVG/OBP/SLG | OPS+ |
| 2,247 | 309 | .312/.418/.515 | 147 |
Though born in New York City on January 2, 1963, Martinez was raised by his maternal grandparents in the Maguayo neighborhood of Dorado, Puerto Rico, as his parents divorced shortly after he was born. He grew up three houses away from his cousin Carmelo Martinez, a major leaguer from 1983 to 1991. Martinez’s parents remarried when Edgar was 11, but he chose to remain with his grandparents. By then, he’d caught the baseball bug, drawn to the game by the heroics of Puerto Rican icon Roberto Clemente. He honed his swing with a broomstick, obliterating bottle caps, rocks and even droplets of water as they fell from the roof.
In 1982 — eight years before MLB made Puerto Rico subject to the amateur draft — a nearly 20-year-old Martinez was making $4 an hour on an assembly line at a pharmaceutical plant, taking classes at American University in San Juan, and playing semipro ball on the weekends when Mariners scout Marty Martinez (no relation) signed him for a $4,000 bonus. Old by prospect standards, he scuffled in his debut with Seattle’s Northwest League affiliate in 1983 (.173/.304/.202 in 126 PA) but quickly improved. He broke out in his age-24 season in 1987, hitting .329/.434/.473 at Triple-A Calgary.
Blocked at third base by Jim Presley, a one-tool player whose eight major league seasons and 135 homers amounted to 0.3 WAR, Martinez had to settle for cups of coffee from the Mariners in 1987 and -88. After opening the 1989 season as the starter in Seattle, he struggled so mightily (.240/.314/.304 in 196 PA) that he was briefly sent back down. Once he reworked his swing to incorporate a high leg kick, boosting his bat speed and allowing him to pull the ball with greater frequency, he stuck in the majors for good in 1990, hitting .302/.397/.433 for a 133 OPS+. With defense at the hot corner estimated to be 13 runs above average via Total Zone, his hefty 5.6 WAR ranked seventh in the league. A year later, Martinez hit .307/.405/.452 — the first of his 11 seasons with an OBP .400 or higher — and helped the Mariners crack .500 for the first time in franchise history. Again he was above average defensively (+6 runs) en route to 6.1 WAR, eighth in the league.
In 1992, Martinez won his first AL batting title, hitting .343/.404/.544 with a league-leading 46 doubles, and his 6.5 WAR tied for fifth in the league, though his season ended about three weeks early due to a bone spur in his right shoulder that required surgery. His injury troubles were just beginning, as hamstring and wrist injuries — as well as the 1994 players’ strike — limited him to 131 games over the next two seasons.
Though still a more than serviceable third baseman (seven runs above average in 1994, 19 above for his career to that point), Martinez’s string of injuries led the Mariners to relieve him of regular defensive responsibilities after that season; they needed his bat far more than his glove. Over the remaining decade of his career, he would play just 34 more games in the field, never making more than seven starts in a season, usually in interleague road games.
The decision paid off. In 1995, even while donning his mitt for just seven games, Martinez set a career-high with 7.0 WAR, good for second in the league. He hit .356/.479/.628, leading the league in batting average, on-base percentage, OPS+ (185) and doubles (52), and helping Seattle to its first playoff berth. He was a one-man wrecking crew in the Division Series against the Yankees, batting .571/.667/1.000 with four three-hit efforts and reaching base safely 18 times in five games. Martinez is still the co-holder of the record for most hits in a Division Series (12), and his 21 total bases rank fifth. His 11th inning double in the decisive Game 5 scored the tying and winning runs; The Double (as it’s remembered in the Pacific Northwest) is now on the short list of hits that have taken on lives of their own. The euphoria of that moment helped generate the groundswell of support that secured the Mariners a new taxpayer-funded stadium within a week of the series ending. In 2004, the city of Seattle renamed a street leading to Safeco Field “Edgar Martinez Drive.”
The 1995 season began a seven-year stretch in which Martinez hit a combined .329/.446/.574 and averaged 42 doubles, 28 homers, 107 walks and 5.8 WAR per year (40.7 total). He led the AL in on-base percentage again in 1998 (.429) and 1999 (.447) after finishing second with even higher figures in 1996 (.464, behind Mark McGwire’s .467) and 1997 (.4558 to Thomas’s .4561), and placed third in OPS+ three straight times (1996-1998) before falling to fifth or sixth in the next three seasons. During that span, he was the second-best hitter in baseball, at least based on the batting component of WAR; his 380 runs above average trailed only Barry Bonds’ 443.
As for his WAR, Martinez ranked fifth for that stretch behind Bonds (56.8), Rodriguez (46.7), Jeff Bagwell (45.0) and Griffey (41.1), and an eyelash ahead of Sammy Sosa (40.6). Here it’s worth remembering that defensive value is built into WAR in two ways: by estimating a player’s relative value (runs above or below average via Total Zone or, from 2003 onward, Defensive Runs Saved); and with positional adjustments that change over time to account for the skill required to play the position, based largely on the distribution of balls in play. In the Baseball-Reference version of WAR, a full season at third base has a value of +2 runs, which is to say that showing up for work and filling that spot without burning down the stadium is worth two extra runs beyond average. By comparison, a full season at DH has a value of -15 runs, so it takes an extra 17 runs per year of offense for a DH to match the value of an average-fielding third baseman.
In other words, the “But he was a DH, not a complete player!” sentiment is baked into the valuations, and even while being docked 13 or 14 runs per year due to his time at DH (he played just 33 games at third and first in that span), Martinez was as valuable as all but the aforementioned players in that span. The Griffey comparison is particularly startling: The centerfielder on those Mariners teams won an MVP award and four Gold Gloves during that stretch and led the AL in homers for three years in a row (twice with 56) — and he was more valuable than Martinez only by an annual margin of roughly two-thirds of a run.
Remarkably, Martinez maintained his keen batting eye and high level of production despite a serious vision abnormality. While in the minors, optometrist Dr. Douglas Nikaitani diagnosed him with strabismus, meaning that his right eye (his non-dominant one, and the one further from the pitcher) drifted out of alignment, costing him depth perception and an ability to pick up velocity changes. In 1999, his problems became particularly acute. He struggled to pick up the ball as it left the pitcher’s hand, and learned to duck his head and tuck in his shoulder to protect himself in case he lost complete sight of the pitch. With his career hanging in the balance, he returned to Dr. Nikaitani, who fired tennis balls at Martinez, forcing him to focus on aligning his eyes, and developed an exercise regimen for him to enhance his depth perception. “This is my theory: Edgar has lasted this long because he had the discipline to really work on his eyes so that they’re not a weak link,” said Nikaitani in 2001.
Seattle reached the playoffs again in 1997, 2000, and 2001, tying the MLB record in the latter season with 116 wins despite the departures of Johnson (traded to the Astros in mid-1998), Griffey (traded to the Reds in February 2000), and Rodriguez (signed with the Rangers as a free agent in January 2001). The 38-year-old Martinez was hardly window dressing on that team, hitting .306/.423/.543 with 40 doubles, 23 homers, a 160 OPS+ (fifth in the league) and 4.8 WAR. He played three more seasons, hitting well for two of them, before retiring. On Oct. 3, 2004, in a ceremony after Martinez played his final game, commissioner Bud Selig showed up to announce that the annual Outstanding Designated Hitter Award, which he had won five times, would be renamed in his honor.
…
Martinez isn’t the first Hall of Fame candidate to benefit from spending his twilight years as a DH. Molitor reached the 3,000-hits plateau and Cooperstown largely because of what he did there; likewise for Thomas and the 500-homer benchmark. George Brett’s 3,000th hit and the 500th home runs of Reggie Jackson, Eddie Murray, and Jim Thome all came while they were serving as DH; 101 of Jackson’s 573 dingers, 92 of Murray’s 504, and 205 of Thome’s 612 (including No. 600 as well) came in that capacity. Nevertheless, Martinez’s case is an interesting test for the voters. He played so few games in the field not only because he established himself at a relatively advanced age but also because the risk/reward payoff wasn’t merited once he emerged as an elite hitter, though it’s likely the Mariners could have stuck him at first base — a much easier position than third, requiring less mobility — had it been necessary.
It’s also worth considering that Martinez played in an era of increased specialization, particularly regarding bullpen roles. Teams concerned with the limitations of a pitcher’s stamina, health, or repertoire often convert starters to relievers, who rarely produce enough value within their smaller roles to merit consideration for the Hall. Mariano Rivera, the top newcomer on the 2019 ballot, is the best example of an exception; it’s quite possible he’d have never approached a Hall of Fame level had he remained a starter. Martinez was the Mariano Rivera of DHs: He was so good within his limited role that he produced enough value to transcend it.
(As an aside, Martinez owned Rivera: .579/.652/1.053 in 23 plate appearances. The great reliever told Charlie Rose in 2013: “The only guy that I didn’t want to face, when a tough situation comes, was Edgar Martínez… It didn’t matter how I threw the ball. I couldn’t get him out. Oh my God, he had more than my number. He had my breakfast, lunch and dinner.”)
Martinez’s case doesn’t rest entirely on his credentials as a DH, as he spent only 72% of his career there. The other 28%, during which he played the field, isn’t window dressing. It was as a third baseman that he won the first of his two batting titles, made three of his seven top-10 finishes in WAR, and one of his seven All-Star appearances. He wasn’t forced into DHing due to an iron glove or disinterest in defense. The scouting reports on him in the Hall of Fame’s Diamond Mines database, which date from the 1988-91 period, describe his defense as “solid” or “adequate.” As noted before, the metrics suggest he was a slightly above average third baseman – 18 runs above average for his career and five per 1,200 innings – bolstering his overall value.
In terms of the numbers he put up only as a DH, Martinez ranks third in hits (1,607) behind Ortiz (2,191) and Baines (1,690). He’s third in home runs (243) behind Ortiz (485) and Thomas (269), second in doubles (370 to Ortiz’s 557) and total bases (2,718 to Ortiz’s 4,239). His .959 OPS at the position (on .314/.428/.532 hitting) tops Ortiz’s .942 (.289/.383/.559) and every other player with at least 2,000 plate appearances in that role, and that’s without considering the impact of their ballparks. In terms of overall OPS+ at all positions — important, as it adjusts for the differing park and league scoring environments — Martinez has the edge on Ortiz, 147 to 141, not to mention a roughly 13-win edge in terms of WAR (68.4 to 55.3) in 1,417 fewer career plate appearances. Prorated, Martinez produced 5.6 WAR per 650 plate appearances compared to Ortiz’s 4.1 WAR, a 37% advantage for Edgar. Even with that substantial penalty built into WAR for the last decade of his career — roughly 1.5 wins per year! — Martinez ranked among the AL’s top 10 in WAR seven times; by comparison, Ortiz did so just three times.
Despite the penalty, Martinez created enough value as a hitter to meet or surpass the career, peak and JAWS standards among Hall of Fame third basemen, ranking 11th in the last of those categories. He’s 1.7 points behind Molitor, but with a seven-year peak that’s four wins higher. The margin between Martinez and the field is slightly larger when you expand the comparison to enshrined corner infielders (first and third base) or all hitters (with catchers given a boost to put them on the same scale as the other positions), as noted in the table up top.
All of that is without factoring in the late start to his major league career. From his age-27 season onward, Martinez created more value (67.6 WAR) than all but 21 position players, 19 of whom are in Cooperstown. In fact, of the top 35, 29 are in the Hall and three are awaiting their turns on the ballot; the other two are the two most notable and notorious players outside the Hall:
| Rk | Player | Hall of Fame | Years | WAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Barry Bonds | NO | 1992-2007 | 121.6 |
| 2 | Babe Ruth | YES | 1922-1935 | 118.1 |
| 3 | Willie Mays | YES | 1958-1973 | 115.6 |
| 4 | Honus Wagner | YES | 1901-1917 | 113.7 |
| 5 | Hank Aaron | YES | 1961-1976 | 96.4 |
| 6 | Stan Musial | YES | 1948-1963 | 90.9 |
| 7 | Ted Williams | YES | 1946-1960 | 88.9 |
| 8 | Ty Cobb | YES | 1914-1928 | 87.6 |
| 9 | Tris Speaker | YES | 1915-1928 | 85.4 |
| 10 | Nap Lajoie | YES | 1902-1916 | 81.4 |
| 11 | Mike Schmidt | YES | 1977-1989 | 79.5 |
| 12 | Joe Morgan | YES | 1971-1984 | 79.2 |
| 13 | Eddie Collins | YES | 1914-1930 | 78.1 |
| 14 | Cap Anson | YES | 1879-1897 | 77.0 |
| 15 | Roberto Clemente | YES | 1962-1972 | 73.7 |
| 16 | Wade Boggs | YES | 1985-1999 | 73.4 |
| 17 | Lou Gehrig | YES | 1930-1939 | 73.1 |
| 18 | Carl Yastrzemski | YES | 1967-1983 | 71.6 |
| 19 | Rogers Hornsby | YES | 1923-1937 | 70.1 |
| 20 | Adrian Beltre | Not Elig. Yet | 2006-2018 | 69.2 |
| 21 | Luke Appling | YES | 1934-1950 | 68.4 |
| 22 | Edgar Martinez | NO | 1990-2004 | 67.7 |
| 23 | Rickey Henderson | YES | 1986-2003 | 67.1 |
| 24 | Roger Connor | YES | 1885-1897 | 66.9 |
| 25 | Ozzie Smith | YES | 1982-1996 | 65.9 |
| 26 | Charlie Gehringer | YES | 1930-1942 | 65.6 |
| 27 | Chipper Jones | YES | 1999-2012 | 65.2 |
| 28 | Alex Rodriguez | Not Elig. Yet | 2003-2016 | 62.6 |
| 29 | Pete Rose | NO | 1968-1986 | 61.5 |
| 30 | Jackie Robinson | YES | 1947-1956 | 61.4 |
| 31 | Rod Carew | YES | 1973-1985 | 61.2 |
| 32 | Frank Robinson | YES | 1963-1976 | 61.2 |
| 33 | Brooks Robinson | YES | 1964-1977 | 60.4 |
| 34 | Dan Brouthers | YES | 1885-1904 | 60.0 |
| 35 | Ichiro Suzuki | Not Elig. Yet | 2001-2018 | 59.3 |
Throw in Martinez’s black and gray ink (two batting titles and a second-place finish; three OBP titles and three second places; one OPS+ lead and six top-five finishes), All-Star appearances, all-time rankings in OBP (14th among hitters with 7,000 plate appearances), OPS+ (tied for 30th with Hall of Famers Willie McCovey, Mike Schmidt, Willie Stargell, and Thome) and WAR batting runs (34th) as well as the impact of the 1995 postseason upon Seattle baseball history, and his case is strong enough to push him even further over the line.
Voters have been slow to come around to that conclusion. But with an increasing number of voters recognizing both the merits of his case and its urgency, he has jumped from 27.0% in 2015 to successive shares of 43.4%, 58.6%, and finally 70.4% in 2018.
Now Martinez can look to the example of Raines, whose eligibility was also curtailed, for hope. Raines received 55.0% in his eighth year of eligibility (2015), then 69.8% in his ninth and finally 86.0% on his final ballot, thanks in large part to a grassroots campaign that helped him build support. Unlike Raines, whose Expos are no longer an active concern, Martinez has received a considerable push from the Mariners via the team’s social media and website.
Can he find the remaining 4.6% — 20 votes, assuming the electorate remains at or around last year’s total of 422 — that he needs to get to 75%? As I noted in my introduction to the series, since 1966, 19 out of 20 candidates who received at least 70% of the vote and had eligibility remaining were elected the following year, with Jim Bunning the lone exception; he received 70.0% in 1987 (his 11th year), then 74.2% in 1988 before slipping to 63.3% in 1989. Ultimately, he was elected by the Veterans Committee, as were two candidates who missed by only a handful of votes in their final turns, namely Nellie Fox (74.7% in 1985) and Orlando Cepeda (73.5% in 1994). In the earliest of early indications that things may go Edgar’s way, three of the first six ballots to be submitted to the @NotMrTibbs tracker were voters who included Martinez for the first time.
If he makes it to 75%, Martinez will join Red Ruffing (1967), Ralph Kiner (1975), Jim Rice (2009) and Raines as candidates elected in their last turn. Whether by the first ballot or the 10th, the most potent designated hitter in history belongs in Cooperstown, for the advanced metrics show that he surpassed the value of many a 500-homer or 3,000 hit legend. Quite simply, his superiority with the bat transcended the limitations of his role. Let the countdown begin.
Brooklyn-based Jay Jaffe is a senior writer for FanGraphs, the author of The Cooperstown Casebook (Thomas Dunne Books, 2017) and the creator of the JAWS (Jaffe WAR Score) metric for Hall of Fame analysis. He founded the Futility Infielder website (2001), was a columnist for Baseball Prospectus (2005-2012) and a contributing writer for Sports Illustrated (2012-2018). He has been a recurring guest on MLB Network and a member of the BBWAA since 2011, and a Hall of Fame voter since 2021. Follow him on BlueSky @jayjaffe.bsky.social.
Edgar not getting in would be a great injustice to baseball and the man himself. He absolutely belongs in the Hall.
Very well written. Edgar absolutely deserves enshrinement.
I think the Frank Thomas vs. Edgar Martinez debate is worth a discussion. That it’s worth a discussion makes it pretty clear that Martinez belongs in the Hall.
One could argue that Thomas’s case would be stronger if he had been DH longer, since he put up some terrible defensive numbers–but some of Thomas’s offensive seasons were so comically good, I’m inclined to reward him for just pure pyrotechnics. He also has more overall value, although I’m not sure how it breaks down on a rate basis.
I’m curious about a comparison between them if they were in the same DH category. What do their peaks look like in comparison?
Thomas beats Martinez in fWAR 72 to 65.5, bWAR 73.9 to 68.4, bWAR7 45.4 to 43.7, and career wRC+ 154 to 147, but with fewer plate appearances Martinez does slightly edge out Thomas in WAR/PA. If we are considering Molitor a 3B, than I would consider Thomas the greatest DH, but Martinez is a close 2nd and certainly deserving of enshrinement.
That’s what I was wondering about–bWAR7 (or whatever the equivalent would be in fWAR). So it looks like the peaks are equivalent, and on a rate basis Martinez was similarly productive.
The one issue with that is that Thomas hit much worse as a DH, even if you adjust for more of those AB’s coming when he was older. Someone who can man the position and not lose anything with the bat has value, value that WAR may not fully cover.
This is a good point. Isn’t it pretty well proven that both pinch hitting and DHing have a negative effect on hitting? Is that still the case for a full-time DH like Martinez or Ortiz? If so, does WAR account for that? If not, maybe it’s positional adjustment penalty is too big?
WAR does not account for that, and the positional adjustment penalty likely is too big.
Thomas also beats Edgar out by quite a bit in WPA and WPA/LI
And the Nugenix ads seal the deal
You make a very strong case for him.
I was always suspicious of him with steroids (greatest seasons age 32+ and highest HR & RBI season in his age 37 season ) and a little light in the home runs, RBIs and runs scored, all traditional counting stats.
He’s a pretty clear steroid case in retrospect. I know this will draw a ton of thumbs downs on this site, but if you guys are being honest with yourselves you’d see it:
1. Power production came out of nowhere at age 32, when he also just happened to get huge
2. In the drug testing era, power hitters are becoming useless around that age
3. He maintained that peak until he was 40, which is unheard-of for power hitters in the drug testing era
4. He was injury-prone until he got huge, and old. Those are two things that don’t correlate, unless… you’re using PED’s.
On the flip side, Bagwell* was clearly a steroid case too, and now he’s in. He’s a far better candidate than Edgar, who’s borderline no matter how you look at it. So, if you’re using a sliding scale based on PED usage, there’s no way Edgar should be in. However, if you’re throwing up your hands and saying “well, everyone in that era was using PEDs so we might as well just treat them all equally regardless of whether the steroid use is obvious” then you might as well put Edgar in.
*And Piazza
Not sure you understand the definition of the word “clearly”.
It is not clear that Bagwell or Martinez used steroids.
Everyone did, does, and will continue to do PEDs. An unlucky few will get caught.
And I am OK with that.
If you look at aging curves since drug testing began, I think its very clear that PEDs are not common anymore. Some guys are still getting caught so clearly it is still going on. However, there are very, very few players who are effective into their late 30’s these days. Even the guys who don’t undergo a clear physical transformation can’t play that long anymore. That both tells me that PED testing is working…. and that PED usage was rampant in the 90’s-00’s.
If you’re being honest with yourself instead of merely being a fan. It is. Both guys were good hitters who suddenly became huge. Both maintained their peaks far longer than players can in the drug testing era. And, most importantly, neither guy was on anything like a hall of fame trajectory until they suddenly added 40 pounds of muscle and became power hitters. Its every bit as glaring as McGwire and Bonds’ sudden increase in bulk and sudden increase in power at the same time.
Eh, Edgar’s power surge happened before he got huge…and he was pretty much John Olerud before said power surge.
It’s entirely possible that the bulk-up came naturally, as a result of his no longer having to keep svelte for 3B.
Actually he was publicly out spoken against steroids, volunteered to be tested before mandatory testing existed, and was big on getting the league to enforce its rules.
I was too young to have seen him in his prime, becoming a big baseball guy around the age of 12. I remember playing MVP Baseball on my PS2 and always thinking “man, why is this guy leading the league in average instead of one of my players?” and it was always Edgar Martinez, some dude I’d never heard of and in his late 30s lol. That’s not a useful Hall of Fame story, but it was my first experience with him, and one that has always stuck with me during his HoF eligibility. He deserves his place there.
I love this series. Your Rivera piece was brilliant. This was equally compelling.
We’re at the time period where the players on the ballot coincided with the point in my life when I had the most time to watch baseball. I couldn’t have effectively argued statistically (at the time) that Martinez was going to be a HOF’er. But man did he ever pass the eye test. As an Angels fan, he single-handedly crushed more of my hopes and dreams than I care to remember. Soooo many freaking doubles into the gap.
I’m really surprised that he wasn’t a first ballot guy. One of the best pure hitters ever to don the uniform.
It is right that Edgar and Mo should go in together. The best DH ever and the best RP ever, each the best of their role by so much that they just overwhelm the role’s limitations.
The Mo quote on facing Edgar is pure gold! Great aside in the article 🙂
He probably will benefit from Ortiz’s case. Martinez was a significantly more valuable player but I think the public sentiment is that Ortiz is a Hall of Famer. Hard to enshrine Ortiz and then argue against Martinez because he was a DH.
Well, I think the standard argument which would come from old-school fans is that Ortiz has been “clutch” and performed well in the playoffs.
Note: I do not hold this position myself. Go ‘Gar!
Ask any Yankee fan alive in 1995 about Edgar Martinez’ clutchiness. (Or hell, anywhere through the early 2000’s…)
Strong arguments for Edgar. Guy definitely belong in the hall.
I wonder if there are any players who would have benefited immensely from not playing in the field. Maybe Adam Dunn. I am not saying he was as great a hitter as Edgar but the gap between his bat’s value and glove’s value was pretty significant. I wonder what his WAR total would look like without his defense weighing it down.
Although I am a rabid Edgar fan, in response to your post I have to point out that no one (to the best of my knowledge) has ever thought about fielding a roster of 25 Edgar Martinez-es.
https://www.fangraphs.com/not/dangerous-experiment-a-roster-of-25-adam-dunns/
Frank Thomas. Gary Sheffield. Hoo boy. Those two…it’s ugly.
Technically Manny Ramirez fits this too, although the Green Monster has confounded plenty of left fielders.
I’m a huge Edgar fan, so I naturally loved this article, and I think Jay did a great job illustrating two not-so-well-known points about Edgar:
1. He was a pretty good fielder before moving to DH;
2. His first real shot in MLB was delayed in part because of front office incompetence. One of the worst things that happened to Edgar was Jim Presley making the All-Star team in 1986 (100 RBI!). If Edgar is allowed to work through his growing pains in the big leagues in ’86 and ’87, he maybe could have had two or three more prime years to pad his counting stats.
Yup he spent 2 years absolutely murdering AAA pitching while the Mariners front office was apparently content with Jim Presley’s replacement level performance in Seattle. Give Edgar the job for those 2 years and he would’ve gone in on the first ballot.
I’ve heard this theory before but it doesn’t hold water. His AAA stats in 1987 were good and his AAA stats in 1988 were great. However, his MLB stats in 1989 when the M’s gave him his first real shot were an underwhelming 240/314/304. There’s no reason to believe that he would have done anything other than that in 1988. In 1990 he put up a nice 301/397/433 line but like we’ve said above it was several more years before he began putting up HOF-type numbers.
For those too lazy to look ’em up:
1987 (AAA): 129G, 531PA, 329/434/473 with 31 2B, 10 HR and a 1.71 BB/K ratio
(MLB): 13G, 46PA, 372/413/581 with 5 2B
1988 (AAA): 95G, 407PA, 363/467/517 with 19 2B, 8 HR and a 1.65 BB/K ratio
(MLB): 14G, 38PA, 281/351/406 with 4 2B
He had a very rough 1989. I think he loses at most 1 full season due to M’s front office incompetence (1988), maybe should have had a longer look in 1987.
The real shame to me is the injury plagued 93-94 seasons where he only played 131 games combined coming between his breakout 1992 (343/404/544, good for a 164 OPS+, with a league leading 46 2B and 18 HR) and before his legendary 1995 season (356/479/628, 185 OPS+, 52 2B, 29 HR). He and Belle should have been 1/2 for AL MVP in some order, but Mo freakin’ Vaughn won; Joe Table got a first place vote. Edgar was third. Jay Buhner finished fifth with a 262/343/566. That was…not a great display of voting that year.
Maybe his 89 would have been better with additional experience in the Majors in 87 and 88
“In other words, the “But he was a DH, not a complete player!” sentiment is baked into the valuations, and even while being docked 13 or 14 runs per year due to his time at DH (he played just 33 games at third and first in that span), Martinez was as valuable as all but the aforementioned players in that span.”
Well put, and persuasive. Though I think that if people are going to view such adjustments as a logical and consistent way to account for DHs not hitting, then it makes sense to consider the batting WAR obtained by NL pitchers for other candidacies.
True, very few people come out to see most pitchers hit, especially not a “good hitter for a pitcher” type like Tom Glavine (still worth 7.5 bWAR in hitting.) But neither do people come out to see most first basemen field, yet we still use the adjustment of WAR to rank great hitting mediocre fielders over great hitting terrible fielders for Hall comparisons. The “penalty” to, e.g., Mussina for not having the chance to hit compared to Glavine is the same as the penalty to Edgar for not having the chance to be an adequate or better 1B or 3B (which I agree he could have done).
Jay, regardless of how many times you have written this article (exactly 10x probably – paste them all together in a book and I’ll buy a copy), each one has been compelling and unique in its own way but all were great, just like an Edgar PA. Thank you for fighting the good fight. Edgar, the career and the man, deserves it.
I’m fine with Edgar going into the Hall of Fame, but am sort of baffled by how much more support there is from the sabermetric community than there is for Gary Sheffield though. When Edgar goes in next year, it will be because he was THAT good a hitter, yet Sheffield is in danger of falling off the ballot, despite having been an even better hitter.
Edgar’s career rate stats are slightly better than Sheffield’s, but that’s because Sheffield played his way into a lineup at such a young age, when he was good enough to start but not yet a star. Edgar’s wRC+ for the best 15-year stretch of his career was 149; for Sheffield it was 152, even though his stretch includes a sharper decline than Edgar, a decline likely due in some part to the wear and tear of playing defense.
If Edgar goes in (which again, I am totally on board with), I don’t see very compelling arguments for keeping even better hitters out.
Whether or not you think that guys should be penalized for this sort of thing, he was named in the Mitchell Report and that likely played a roll in his lack of support.
Yes, I should have added that I understand the PED stuff costs him the support of many. Even among those who don’t view such things as major factors in their decision-making (which is kind of what I meant by “sabermetric community,” though I realize that’s far too broad a generalization), Sheffield receives very, very little support.
Sheffield should absolutely also be in. He was somehow worth more negative defensive value by playing the field than Martinez was not playing it! If Sheffield had rightly been DHing for most of that time, his WAR would look even better. They were both about 40% better than league average for their career. They should both be in (as should Bonds, Clemens, etc.).
Sheffield was a jerk, Edgar was a class act.
Sheffield almost certainly used PEDs, nobody says that about Edgar.
Sheffield played for many teams, Edgar played for one team.
Sheffield has no “narrative” other than “great hitting jerk,” Edgar has a claim on “Greatest DH Ever.”
Gary Sheffield has hundreds more hits and homers than Edgar Martinez, and Sheffield won a World Series with the Marlins.
Now that I think about it, Sheffield’s swing was an intimidating thing to marvel at. I wouldn’t coach a kid to swing like that, but it really was fun to look at. I have no memory of what Edgar Martinez’s swing looked like. Not that I would put Craig Counsell in the Hall of Fame.
This. Sheffield and Dick Allen both look better than Edgar on paper, but Edgar was by all accounts a great guy and Sheffield and Allen were….. not.
Its a tradition that dates back to Rogers Hornsby.
Frank Thomas is the best DH in history.
Franks numbers fell allot as a DH. As a Dh Edgar was better. Frank T was the big hurt as a first basemen.
Frank and Edgar were essentially peers. I give Frank a very slight edge but like Jay I classify him as a 1B since that’s where he had his best years.
I’ve been reading arguments like this since Edgar retired, but this is probably the best one.
Edgar belongs in the Hall. There’s no credible argument that he does not without removing a whole bunch of other people.
Look, as a Red Sox fan, my first choice for the HoF as a DH is Edgar, not David. This is almost a silly conversation. It’s an obvious choice.
Want to make it even more obvious? 68.5 WAR over a career playing for a single team. I haven’t checked, but I’d want the voters to show me a single other candidate since 1945 who has done that and is not in the Hall.
There are not that many players who have only played for one team since 1945, and none that had 68.5 WAR and didn’t get into the Hall (relatively easily for most of them). Even since 1900, there are only 20 guys with that much WAR all with one team.
It did take Bagwell 7 tries and Appling 11 (!)
That said, Lou Whitaker has 68.1 WAR, all with the Tigers, and isn’t in. And that’s a travesty.
Did Bonds have different steroids than everyone else ?
It has never made any logical sense the Edgar was not elected. He was twice the dh Ortiz was and deserved this honor on the first ballot. Anyone that says anyways is punishing him for illogical reasons not related to baseball.
“the DH continues to rankle purists who would rather watch pitchers risk injury as they ineptly flail away ”
Gee….and here all this time I believed my dislike for the rule was because I like strategy, the cerebral nature of the game, and how the DH turns a chess-like game requiring planning, foresight and intelligence into Chutes and Ladders. Thanks, Jay, for showing me the error of my ways and that all I really care about is watching a fat and out of shape Masahiro Tanaka pull hammys.
Not understanding all of the downvotes. Unless people are offended by the Tanaka dig. Or perhaps the snarky delivery. But this is a valid argument. Even sabermetric darling Joe Maddon has stated his opinion that the NL requires more stratagy.
If we are so worried about pitcher injuries at the plate where is the worry about pitcher injuries while covering first base? I mean we pay these guys to pitch not field…
If you don’t like watching pitchers hit because they suck at it then that’s one thing. We can have differing opinions about it and argue if the extra offense is worth the tradeoff in strategy. But the injury excuse seems lazy.
I fail to see how something as simple as double switching and basically getting the pitcher’s spot out of the hitting lineup as soon as possible, because they know they all suck at hittin, is this mystifying and cerebral aspect of baseball.
The simple fact that pitchers get pinch hit for in pretty much every PA their spot comes up in past the 5th or 6th inning unless the game is totally out of hand tells you that pitchers having to hit isn’t somethin that managers want.
It’s not cerebral, strategic or something that requires any more brains. It’s just one of the last hills for dinosaur baseball purists to die on.
One aspect I am curious about for slow players whose careers were mostly pre-2002: is fWAR more charitable to them because it doesn’t include Ultimate Base Running runs above (or below) average? This cost Ortiz 73.5 runs in his career and Edgar 16 for the 3 years (2002-2004) when it is factored into his numbers.
I think there was an article about how Tim Raines would have benefited from UBR since he was an excellent baserunner; I would think the opposite is true for Edgar.
For the record, Edgar is one of my all-time favorites and I am very pro his HOF candidacy, but seems worthy of discussion as context for the WAR tables.
Don’t they have a way of estimating from before then just like they do with defense from before advanced defensive stats? Obviously some people get helped by this and others hurt, but I’m pretty sure that they don’t just ignore it entirely. I could be wrong though and would love for someone to clarify.
Among the 1009 players since 1871 to have been good or lucky enough to enjoy a career of at least 5000 PA , Edgar Martinez’s 147 wRC+ ranks 27th overall, tied with the likes of Mike Schmidt and Honus Wagner, and notably ahead of a bevy of other HOFers. Cooperstown-worthy? Definitely.
Every time I read about DH’s being penalized for not playing defense It sets off my anger gene. That would only make sense if the team wasn’t allowed to use a defensive replacement. How can a player who isn’t even on the field be a liability to his team in that regard, which is the only logical reason there could be for penalizing the player’s contribution to the team. Instead a very valuable defender is placed on the field in his place. If you ask anybody how many players are in the starting lineup of a baseball team the answer would be 9 but that is wrong, the answer is that in the AL it is 10. Accept that the DH is a specialist, similar in role to a closer. Closers are not discriminated against for only pitching 60-80 innings a season so why should DH’s be discriminated against for doing what they do very well?